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Abstract
The dissertation examines the choice between casual and regular labour contracts in Indian agriculture. 
In particular, it deals with two relevant decision problems : (i) how an employer chooses between 
casual and regular contracts and (ii) how a labourer chooses between casual and regular contracts.
Several models of contractual choice are developed. In the implicit contract model, regular labour 
contracts are a means through which risk-neutral employers offer some insurance against the wage and 
employment fluctuations to labourers, in return for lower wages. In the shirking model, regular 
contracts are used to perform non-monitorable tasks for which casual contracts are not incentive 
compatible: regular contracts with wages above the reservation wage act as a device to induce the 
workers not to shirk in non-monitorable tasks. In the collateral model, regular contracts with advance 
wage payments provide labourers with a means of using their labour services as a collateral substitute. 
The time constraint model shows that landless labourers have a comparative advantage in regular 
labour contracts, because the opportunity cost of precommitting labour time tends to be lower for 
them. In each of these models, it is shown that casual and regular contracts may coexist in equilibrium.
Empirical evidence bearing on these different theories is examined using data from three South Indian 
villages. The evidence is consistent with the implicit contract model, the collateral model and the time 
constraint model. However, we find no support for the shirking model. Other relevant aspects of labour 
contracts are also investigated, including labour force participation decisions, unemployment rates, the 
relative levels of casual-labour and regular-labour wages, the links between labour and credit contracts, 
and the determinants of labour demand.
The thesis concludes with a discussion of recent trends in the incidence of casual and regular contracts 
in rural India. The incidence of regular contracts has steadily declined in recent years. We argue that 
this decline primarily reflects a decline in supply (due, inter alia, to an improvement of credit facilities 
and an expansion of alternative employment opportunities) rather than a decline of demand.
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INTRODUCTION
l
Introduction
This dissertation seeks to examine the choice of contracts in the agricultural labour 
markets in India.
Agriculture is the single largest source of national income in India. In 1984, 44.8% 
of gross domestic product came from agriculture. According to the 1981 census, 66.56% of 
the labour force are engaged in agriculture. A study of the rural labour markets in India, 
therefore, assumes enormous importance not only to generate an appropriate employment 
policy, but also to alleviate the persistent problems of inequality and poverty of rural 
labourers.
Rural labour maikets in India are characterized by a variety of ties between 
employers and labourers. A particular distinction is made between casual and regular labour 
contracts. Casual labourers are hired for a short period (say, one to three days); payment may 
be paid on a daily or piece-rate basis. In addition, fanners may often hire some labourers for 
a longer term: a whole year or a particular crop season of the year. Such labourers are called 
permanent labourers, regular labourers or attached farm servants. Casual and regular contracts 
are different not only with respect to the duration of the contract, but also with respect to 
wage and non-wage benefits. In particular, regular farm servants are usually entitled to some 
additional facilities like credit, bonus, gifts, homestead land etc. which a casual labourer does 
not receive.
A number of studies (Bardhan & Rudra, 1981; Rudra, 1982a, 1982b; Bardhan, 1984a; 
Binswanger et al., 1984; Dr&ze & Mukheijee, 1987; Walker & Ryan, 1990) have pointed out 
that farmers hire both casual and regular contracts in different parts of India. A theoretical 
framework is developed here to analyse the contractual choices of employers as well as 
labourers. In particular, we consider when and under what circumstances choice of regular 
contract as opposed to casual contracts is the preferred option, and also why and how the 
choice of contract may evolve over time.
21. The Background
The analysis of choice of labour contracts may assume significance for the following
reasons.
1.1. Labour Utilization in Agriculture
Since the mid-60s, a great deal of attention has been paid to the issue of labour 
utilization in agriculture in less developed countries. Gradually, it has been recognised that 
the problem of gross under-utilization of the rural labour force cannot be solved merely by 
exporting labour to cities and towns by encouraging migration, as has been prescribed by the 
Lewis model (Lewis, 1954). ’It has been realized that a rapidly expanding rural-urban 
migration, without being matched by an increasing demand for labour in the organized sector, 
leads to an unplanned expansion of the already large informal sector in many cities with its 
resultant social and economic consequences’ (Dasgupta, 1977).
As an alternative, one needs to look for other ways of ensuring a fuller use of 
manpower resources in the rural sector. This has led to a growing interest in micro-level 
village studies. This is particularly important for a country like India, where 70% of the 
population lives in villages and where even two neighbouring villages are characterized by 
a myriad of heterogeneities. An urgent need to alleviate the problems of unemployment and 
poverty necessitates detailed studies of the functioning of labour markets in rural India.
1.2. Lack of Analysis
Most development models have been dominated by the long-standing debate on 
surplus labour in agriculture. These models tend to assume the smooth operation of different 
commodity and factor markets. The central idea of these models is that a rigid, institutionally 
given wage rate prevails for the homogeneous labour force. Hence, the surplus labour from 
the rural sector can be drawn into the urban sector, at a constant wage rate, to accelerate the 
process of development. This overshadows issues like the prevalence of a variety of personal 
ties between employers and labourers, informational problems, and various kinds of 
imperfection and market failure in the rural sector of low income countries.
In a complete, competitive market economy, representative farms/employers and 
employees buy and sell labour as a homogeneous commodity at well-defined prices 
determined by the market supply and demand. However, in rural labour markets, there are 
heterogeneous labour contracts and heterogeneous farms, informational problems and 
uncertainties, conflicting interests among the agents and problems of enforcement, crop
failure and seasonality of employment, credit requirements and problems of collateral; hence, 
markets often fail to clear.
The lack of adequate micro-theoretic development is nowhere so pronounced as in 
the case of rural labour contracts in agriculture. Contrary to the usual assumption of 
homogeneity of labour in agriculture, a number of village level studies conducted in different 
parts of India have repeatedly brought to light the essential heterogeneity of labour arising 
from a variety of personal ties1. Until very recently (Bardhan, 1984a, 1989), questions of 
contractual choice in the labour market, in general, and the dichotomy between casual and 
regular labour contracts, in particular, have been ignored in the standard microeconomic 
development theory. The present study is aimed at contributing to these recent efforts.
1.3. Rural Development Strategies
The empirical component of the study focuses on three villages in India, namely, 
Aurepalle in the Mahboob Nagar district of Andhra Pradesh, Shirapur in the Sholapur district, 
and Kanzara in the Akola district of Maharashtra, all situated in the semi-arid tropics (SAT) 
of India2. More than 250 million rural people reside in the SAT area of India and depend 
heavily on agriculture. Farmers and agricultural labourers constitute about two-thirds of a 
total of 180 million active workers living in these semi-arid tropical areas. An analysis of 
labour contracts pertaining to this area assumes a special prominence not only in formulating 
an employment policy, but also in devising an overall development strategy for the huge 
mass of poor people residing in this area. In doing so, the analysis is useful in (i) promoting 
an understanding of the functioning of a village economy as well as its changes over time; 
(ii) formulation of appropriate economic policies with a view to alleviate inequality and 
poverty; and (iii) assessment of the impact of any government policy on the cross-section of 
the landless poor residing in these villages.
‘This is clearly indicated by Rudra (1982a). He refers to a variety of labour contracts with respect to the 
duration of contract, mode of payment, medium of payment, degree of attachment etc as prevailing in rural West 
Bengal.
2The data have originally been collected by the International Crop Research Institute for the Semi-Arid 
Tropics (ICRISAT) situated in Hyderabad. Basic data have been supplemented by two successive surveys in 
Aurepalle which are described in chapter three.
42. The Problem
Basant (1984) and Walker and Ryan (1990) report that larger farms/households3 hire 
regular farm servants while smaller ones rely on casual labourers. However, given the 
seasonal fluctuations of agricultural production, there are implicit hoarding costs of 
employing regular labour as because there may not be enough demand for labour throughout 
the year. Agarwal (1981) and Reddy (1985) find that in a particular farm (small or large), 
there are differences in the nature of tasks performed; sometimes, casual and regular contracts 
can be identified by the nature of tasks.
A majority of these regular farm servants comes from landless families, usually 
belonging to the lowest caste in the village and without many alternative means of survival 
(Alexander, 1973; Basant, 1984). Though daily regular wages are lower than daily casual 
wages (Sanghvi, 1969; Ghose, 1980; Basant, 1984), regular labourers, in most parts of India, 
unlike casual labourers, receive some additional facilities (credit, bonus/gift) over and above 
their wage (Alexander, 1973; Bardhan, 1984a; Binswanger et al., 1984; Walker & Ryan, 
1990). The nature of these additional facilities is such that these are also difficult to obtain 
for the landless poor.
Two distinct schools of thought emerge from the existing literature. The bulk of the 
relevant theoretical literature is developed in the tradition of Segmented Labour Market 
(SLM) theory4 to explain the segmentation in the industrial labour market in developed 
countries. There are also occasional attempts in agrarian contracts theory5, especially in the 
80s, to explain rural contractual arrangements which incorporate various tools of imperfect 
information theory. We aim to extend the existing literature on choice of rural labour 
contracts; in doing so, the following arguments are advanced in the dissertation.
(1) If farmers are all risk-neutral and workers risk-averse, farmers may insure a group 
of labourers against the fluctuations of wage and employment and offer regular contracts. In 
the process, farmers may persuade that regular labourers to accept a lower wage compared 
to casual labourers; the wage differential constitutes the premium for the employment 
insurance in regular contracts.
^ h e  distinction between farms and households in the rural labour market is negligible. There is an 
interdependence between the operation of farms and households in these economies. Households have two 
functions. In their ability to organise production, they are called farms while they are called households in their 
ability to participate in labour market activities. We shall, therefore, use these terms interchangeably.
4We refer to Doeringer & Piore (1971), Bulow & Summers (1986), Jones (1987), Weitzman (1989).
5We refer to Hallagan (1978), Bardhan (1979,1983,1984a), Eswaran & Kotwal (1985a, 1985b) ,Guha (1989), 
Mukherjee (1991), Mukherjee & Ray (1992), Dasgupta (1993a).
However, given the seasonal idleness of regular labourers, maintaining a fixed pool 
of regular labourers throughout the year may involve some ’hoarding costs’. Hence, farms 
may not hire only regular labourers but also some casual labourers. The hoarding cost 
constraint may be less binding for larger farms because they have more demand for labour 
than smaller farms during any period in the production cycle; this may induce them to hire 
some regular labour.
HI. Regular wage per period is less than casual wage per period;
H2. Larger farms tend to employ more regular labourers than smaller farms.
(2) The second argument is a variant of the efficiency wage theory. There are some 
tasks difficult to supervise and, hence, the employment of casual labourers in these tasks may 
be inefficient. Thus, farms may offer regular contracts with some incentives to induce 
labourers not to shirk and perform these non-monitorable tasks. One effective incentive is to 
pay regular labourers more than reservation wage, inducing them to work hard so as to retain 
their jobs. Casual labourers may be employed to perform other tasks.
H3. Regular wage per period is greater than workers' reservation wage;
H4. Farms prefer to employ regular labourers to perform non-monitorable tasks.
(3) The third argument differs from the first two in that it focuses on the supply of 
labour. We consider a segmented credit market where the credit market is divided between 
the formal and informal sectors. Given this segmentation of the rural credit market, labourers, 
especially the landless ones, are usually excluded from the formal sector and, therefore, face 
a higher marginal cost of credit (i,e, discount rate) in the informal sector. In this respect, the 
provision of interest-free wage advance (i.e., credit) to regular labourers, which is not 
provided to casual labourers, may play a useful role. For given casual wages, there would 
exist a regular wage, paid in advance, which is mutually beneficial to the employer and 
labourers.
H5. I f  labourers have a higher discount rate than employers, a regular contract with advance 
wage payment can be beneficial to both employers and labourers.
(4) The fourth argument, too, is viewed from the perspective of labourers. Labourers’ 
family landholding vary in size. According to the size of their landholding, labourers can be 
divided into ’landed’ and ’landless’ categories. In the absence of any family obligation to
work on family land, landless labourers can market all their non-leisure time. On the other 
hand, landed labourers are usually obliged to devote some time to the family farm; hence, 
their opportunity costs of time for full-time regular employment is higher. The larger the size 
of the family landholding, the larger is the earning from the family farm, and the greater is 
the regular wage needed to be offered to induce a landed labourer into a regular job. Thus, 
according to the opportunity cost of time, landed and landless labourers choose between 
casual and regular contracts.
H6. Given a lower opportunity cost of precommitting time, landless labourers prefer to 
choose regular contracts more often than landed labourers do.
(5) It is also shown that all these models predict a significant role for alternative 
employment opportunities (in the family or outside) as well. If there are brighter prospects 
of alternative employment opportunities which offer better wage and/or non-wage benefits, 
one or both of the following hypotheses may hold good:
H7. An increasing availability of alternative employment opportunities may reduce the supply 
of regular labour.
H8. An increasing availability of alternative employment opportunities may necessitate an 
upward revision of the regular wage and non-wage benefits so as to encourage participation 
in the regular market.
3. The Chapters
Chapter one examines the empirical and theoretical background of studying the 
choice between casual and regular contracts in agriculture. Chapter two develops theoretical 
models to explain the contractual choice from the point of view of employers as well as of 
labourers.
Subsequent chapters analyse the empirical issues related to this choice. Chapter three 
describes the data-set used, analyses the distribution of land and non-land resources in the 
study villages, and classifies farms according to the existing distribution of resources. Chapter 
four analyses some aspects of labour and credit markets in the study villages set within the 
large Indian context with a view to examining the rationale of contractual choice; in this 
context, the validity of hypotheses HI, H3 and H5 is examined.
Chapters five, six and seven focus on the econometric issues where we examine the
7hypotheses relating to the nature and evolution of contractual choice in the study villages. 
Chapter five examines the farmers’ choice of labour contract with special reference to 
hypotheses H2 and H4 while chapter six considers the workers’ choice of contract and the 
nature of their market participation; in this context, the validity of hypothesis H6 is tested. 
Finally, chapter seven examines hypotheses relating to the changing pattern of labour 
contracts, i.e., H7 and H8. The dissertation ends with a summary of findings in the 
concluding chapter.
8CHAPTER 1. CASUAL AND REGULAR CONTRACTS : 
EXISTING EMPIRICAL AND THEORETICAL LITERATURE
Introduction
This chapter attempts to survey the existing literature on the choice between casual 
and regular labour contracts prevailing in rural India. The chapter is developed as follows. 
Section 1.1 examines the contribution of village-level studies in India. The findings of 
different village-level studies give rise to a number of stylised facts suggesting different 
circumstances when casual and regular contracts are chosen in different parts of India. 
Section 1.2 examines the extent to which existing theories, namely, segmented labour market 
(SLM) theory and agrarian contracts theory, explain these stylised facts. Finally, in section
1.3, an alternative framework of analysis is suggested in order to extend the existing 
literature.
1.1. Existing Village Level Studies
This section examines the findings of a number of village-level studies conducted in 
different parts of India. Given the availability of innumerable such studies, attention is paid 
only to those which specifically highlight the dichotomy between casual and regular 
contracts.
Section 1.1.1 summarises the primary findings of a number of selected village studies 
while section 1.1.2 analyses the basic features of casual and regular contracts; section 1.1.3 
enumerates the stylised facts. In the light of these stylised facts, the section is concluded with 
the identification of a number of characteristic features of the labour markets in particular 
villages studied in this thesis (hereafter ’the study villages’).
1.1.1. Village Level Studies in India
Since the 1950s, thousands of intensive village-level surveys have been conducted 
in different parts of India. Most are general surveys performed by anthropologists, 
geographers or economists. Only a few concentrate on agronomic, nutritional or other specific
socio-economic aspects.
Land-labour arrangements in agriculture may refer to both tenancy and hired labour 
contracts. There has been a series of studies to explain different types of tenancy 
arrangements prevailing in India (e.g., Bardhan and Rudra, 1980). We, however, abstain from 
studying these diverse tenancy contracts and focus, instead, on hired labour contracts only.
An interesting feature of the hired labour market in Indian agriculture is the wide 
diversity of labour contracts prevailing in different parts of the country1. The most basic 
classification is between casual and regular (attached) labour contracts. Casual labour 
contracts can be of different types. According to the system of wage payment, they can be 
daily-rated or piece-rated. Secondly, casual labour may involve individual or group contracts; 
in the latter case, usually a group of casual labourers headed by a leader enter a contract with 
the farmer to perform some tasks. Finally, there is a pronounced male-female division in the 
casual labour market where certain agricultural tasks are reserved for female labourers. 
However, women are excluded from regular contracts so that the regular labourers are 
predominantly male.
Most village studies in India focus primarily on wage and employment determination 
in the casual labour market with a view to hypothesizing the surplus labour argument in 
agriculture. Rudra (1982b) finds that the competitive condition of the same price for the same 
commodity in a particular market does not always apply. Casual male labourers with different 
productive qualities receive almost the same wages in a particular village for a particular 
operation.
Dr&ze and Mukheijee (1987), like Rudra, have analysed the determination of wages 
in the casual labour market. In particular, they have examined the explanatory power of the 
existing theories like the theory of implicit contract, efficiency wage theory and subsistence 
theory.
Others like Reddy (1985) and Binswanger et al. (1984) consider the principle of 
wage determination in the casual labour market. They find that casual wages vary across 
different castes, sex and season. Reddy has also discussed the significance of the nature of 
tasks in the determination of casual wages.
However, there have been a few attempts to consider the principle of wage 
determination in the regular labour market. For example, Ghose (1980) finds that the ’annual 
wage of regular farm servants is determined outside the demand-supply framework since
‘For example, see, Bardhan & Rudra (1981), Rudra (1982a, 1982b), Bardhan (1984a), Binswanger et al. 
(1984), Reddy (1985), Dreze & Mukherjee (1987), Walker & Ryan (1990).
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there are always more potential attached labourers than can be employed’. He discards the 
efficiency wage theory, and is in favour of accepting the subsistence theory to explain the 
determination of regular wage. Bardhan (1984a) also studies the principle of regular wage 
determination. He, however, finds that the monthly regular wage responds positively to the 
demand factors implicit in the ’village multiple cropping intensity’ and general agricultural 
development index of the district, though he sheds doubt as to the ability of the efficiency 
wage theory to explain the regular farm wage in Indian agriculture. Using the All India 
Agricultural Labour Enquiry data, Basant (1984) compares wages for casual and regular 
labourers where he discusses the significance of both the demand and supply factors in the 
market for attached farm servants.
1.12. Casual and Regular Contracts
There is a wide variety of labour contracts prevailing in Indian villages. Bardhan and 
Rudra (1981) report that there are fully attached labourers (regular), semi-attached labourers, 
’kirshans’ and casual or unattached labourers2. Rudra (1982b)3 reports a similar observation. 
Reddy (1985)4 emphasizes that the incidence of regular employment (saldari) is declining 
in the Amaravati district while the relative significance of casual contracts, namely, daily or 
piece-rate contracts, is increasing in farm operations. Binswanger et al. (1984)5 and Walker 
and Ryan (1990) have found that both regular and casual contracts prevail in their study 
villages; a further distinction is made between regular labourers who look after the livestock 
and those who take part in cultivation.
For the rest of this dissertation, we shall concern ourselves mainly with casual and
2Casual and attached labourers dominate the rural scene. However, there is a wide variety of contracts that 
fall in between. For example, Kirshans are very similar to the fully attached labourers, but are paid in terms of 
a share of the produce (while the fully attached labourers have fixed annual wages). Kirshans, however, differ 
from share-cropping tenants in that they work on the employer’s land with the employer’s means of production 
under his direction. Secondly, there are semi-attached labourers. They have continuous association with some 
employers on a priority basis along with the freedom to work for other employers at other times. This guarantee 
of labour service is often based on the allotment of a piece of land by the employer.
3Rudra conducted an extensive investigation in two areas in Bolpur and Illambazar blocks in the Birbhum 
district near Shantiniketan (West Bengal, eastern India).
4Reddy’s (1985) study is based on the information collected from the Amaravati district in Varhad region of 
Maharashtra state (western India).
^hey studied the information collected by the International Crop Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics 
(ICRISAT) at Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh. Since May 1975, ICRISAT is involved with the village studies at six 
locations in south India; these are : Aurepalle and Dokur in the Mahbubnagar district of A.P., Shirapur and 
Kalman in the Sholapur district of Maharashtra and Kanzara and Kinkheda in the Akola district of Maharashtra.
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regular contracts only. This classification is primarily based on the duration of the contract, 
although these two types of contracts also differ with respect to the basis of payment, 
medium of payment, frequency of payment etc. This classification is a useful simplification; 
it incorporates a variety of factors operating in the rural labour markets in India and allows 
us to study the essential implications of this dichotomy - its causes, consequences and 
evolution.
The following sub-sections summarise different facets of these two types of contracts.
1.12.1. Regular Contracts
Large farmers in different parts of India hire some regular labourers for the whole 
agricultural year (Basant, 1984; Walker & Ryan, 1990), and/or sometimes for a particular 
crop season, say, in the production of cotton or irrigated paddy. By the end of the stipulated 
period, the contract can again be renewed, provided both parties agree. Regular farm servants 
dominate in tasks like soil preparation, fertilization, irrigation (Agarwal, 1981; Reddy, 
1985)6. However, such labourers may have to do other work as well, for example, in the 
slack season they may do some non-farm work for the employer.
At the beginning of the contract period, the nature of work (farm work/livestock 
rearing etc.), and wage and non-wage payments are decided. Daily hours of woik are usually 
flexible and may increase with greater work pressure on the farm, especially when tasks like 
irrigation start Regular farm servants may be paid monthly or at regular intervals over the 
contract period. In many instances, a significant portion of the contract wage is taken as 
advance/loan7 (Walker & Ryan, 1990; Mukheijee, 1991). In some areas, regular labourers 
are given a homestead to live in (Bardhan, 1984a) or some bonus/gifts during the harvesting 
season (Alexander, 1973). Some employers also offer one or more meals per day, and a 
blanket and/or a pair of chappals (Indian sandals) to the regular labourers once a year 
(Binswanger et al., 1984)
Usually labourers from landless households or those from lower castes participate in 
the market for regular farm servants (Basant, 1984). Almost all studies indicate that regular 
farm servants in Indian villages are predominantly male.
Some studies (Bhalla, 1976; Gough, 1983; Binswanger et al., 1984) report that there 
is a division even among the regular labourers themselves. Bhalla observes that in Haryana
^hese are the tasks that are both difficult to supervise and need to be performed regularly.
7If the amount as an advance taken in the beginning of the year exceeds the annual wage to be received, the 
excess is termed a loan and interest is charged on the loan.
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agriculture, there are two tiers within the class of attached labourers where labourers from 
the landed households occupy the upper tier. Thus family landholding acts as the dividing 
line between labour arrangements. Gough observes that in Thanjavur villages, caste acts as 
the dividing line between two tiers of attached farm servants (locally known as paniyals) 
where the higher-caste labourers are found in supervisory jobs receiving higher wages. 
Binswanger et al. report that there are two groups of regular labourers in the ICRISAT 
villages; some look after the livestock while others participate in farm activities.
1.1.22. Casual Contracts
Casual contracts usually predominate in tasks like transplanting, weeding or 
harvesting8. An individual or a group of individuals may be contracted to perform a 
particular task for certain agreed hours in the day. Usually, the number of hours worked a 
day are less than those in regular contracts which are less flexible.
There are usually two alternative systems of payment, namely, daily-rate and piece- 
rate. A daily wage labourer is paid at the end of each day. The worker is paid even if s/he 
shirks. If there is close supervision (e.g., if a member of the employer’s household works 
alongside the hired labourer), s/he may be forced to put in the required amount of work. 
However, in this case, there is the cost of supervision. Sometimes, the employer may reduce 
this cost by adopting a piece-rate payment. In this case, a contract is given to accomplish 
certain operations (say, transplanting or harvesting a plot of land) within a stipulated time. 
If the work is not done in time, labourers themselves are penalised for the delay. Hence, it 
is in the best interests of the workers to perform the task in time. However, quality may 
suffer in this arrangement because of the rush to complete the task.
Another variant of the piece-rate contract has been observed in some villages 
(Breman, 1974; Walker & Ryan, 1990), where a group of labourers headed by a leader enters 
a contract with the employer to perform a particular task. Payment is made for the whole 
group for a stipulated period of time. This is then divided among the group members. 
Usually, the leader gets a premium for his/her supervisory task. The leader is induced not to 
shirk because his/her identity is intertwined with that of the group. If the leader shirks, the 
group as a whole suffers or gets penalised by earning a bad reputation.
In addition, there are differences between male and female casual wages. Low caste 
and tribal women primarily participate in casual farm employment and receive lower wages
8Sometimes, it is argued that these are the tasks that are easier to supervise and have to be completed within 
a short period of time (usually it varies from a few days to a week) (Reddy, 1985; Dreze & Mukherjee, 1987).
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than men and yet are unemployed for most of the year. ’Employers and male labourers 
rationalize lower female wages in terms of an alleged efficiency difference. But the fact is 
that their wages are lower even in operations like transplanting in which they are recognized 
to be more skilled and specialized’ (K. Bardhan, 1984).
Secondly, there are differences according to the nature of the tasks as well. This is 
usually related to the specific season of the year9. Daily casual wages vary distinctly over 
the slack and peak seasons of the year. However, the daily wage of a casual labourer of a 
given sex for a particular task in a given season is surprisingly uniform in a particular village 
across farms (Bardhan & Rudra, 1981; Rudra,1982b; Reddy, 1985; Dr£ze & Mukheijee, 
1987). On the other hand, there is no such standard wage paid to regular farm servants who 
are predominantly male. The regular wage, in this case, is found to vary from one farm to 
another even in a single village (Bardhan & Rudra, 1981).
I.I.2.3. A Comparison
The significance of seasonality of agricultural production in the choice of labour 
contracts in rural India cannot be ignored. It has explicitly been acknowledged by Bardhan 
(1984a): ’Weather dependence not only makes the timing of each individual operation 
somewhat unpredictable, it also means that when the time comes the job has to be done very 
quickly and there are various risks and costs of delay’. He argues that employers offer some 
regular labour contracts at the beginning of the agricultural year in order to ensure a timely 
and ready supply of labour which minimises both recruitment costs and wage fluctuations 
over the slack and peak periods. Eswaran and Kotwal (1985a), Guha (1989), Mukheijee 
(1991) and Dasgupta (1993a) have also argued from different perspectives that the 
coexistence of regular and casual contracts in Indian agriculture can to a large extent be 
attributed to the seasonality of agricultural production.
Regular workers work for longer hours and perform a wide range of tasks for the 
employer. Regular wages are fixed for a specific period and are not subject to variation 
according to the type of work or the demand for labour.
The daily wage paid to a regular labourer is usually less than that paid to a casual 
labourer. However, by the very nature of the contract for regular labourers, annual wage 
income from regular employment is usually higher than that from casual employment. 
Binswanger et al. (1984) find that the cash equivalent of the total monthly regular wage is
9Some tasks are extremely sex-specific. For example, transplanting and weeding are usually performed by 
females while ploughing is undertaken by male labourers. However, in tasks like harvesting, usually both male 
and female labourers are hired. The practice often varies from one village to another.
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greater than the Ryan-Ghodake monthly wage equivalent (monthly casual wage). Using All 
India Labour Enquiry II and Farm Management Survey data, Ghose (1980) observes that the 
daily regular wage is lower than the daily casual wage in every state of India except Bihar. 
Using the same data-set, Basant (1984), however, finds regular daily wages are higher than 
casual wages in Bihar, Mysore and Bombay, equal to casual wages in West Bengal and lower 
than casual wages in Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Punjab, 
Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh. In an earlier study, using the Intensive Survey of Agricultural 
Labour data (Vol. 1 - All India), Sanghvi (1969) finds that the average daily wage of a 
regular labourer is less than that of a casual labourer, and he argues that the wage differential 
reflects the security of employment and the indivisibility attached to the regular contract.
Unlike casual labourers, regular farm servants are entitled to some additional facilities 
(credit etc.). For example, regular farm servants in some south Indian villages have even been 
found to obtain some interest-free credit. This seems to act as the principal motivation for 
individuals entering regular contracts (Binswanger et al., 1984; Walker & Ryan, 1990). 
Alexander (1973) studies the case of regular farm servants (paniyals) in Kerala; paniyals are 
found to receive bonus and gifts at harvest time and loans during the lean period. Casual 
labourers do not usually obtain such fringe benefits10.
1.13. Stylised Facts
The above discussion gives rise to a number of stylised facts:
SF1. Seasonality of Production and Employment. Given the seasonal fluctuations of 
agricultural production over the peak and slack periods (Bardhan, 1984a; Mukheijee, 1991), 
labour demand is low in the slack season so that seasonal idleness of regular labour is an 
important consideration for farms (Guha, 1989).
SF2. Heterogeneity o f farms. Given a high degree of inequality in the distribution of 
land and non-land resources, only a few farms are large while a majority of the farms are 
small or medium. Usually, the larger farms hire regular farm servants while the smaller ones 
rely on casual labourers (Basant, 1984; Walker & Ryan, 1990).
SF3. Heterogeneity o f tasks. There are differences in the nature of tasks performed;
l0Rudra (1982a) and Bardhan (1984a) have mentioned that even besides the regular farm servants, there is 
a wide class of labourers in different villages in West Bengal who obtain loans from the employer during the 
agricultural lean period on the condition that they provide labour services to the employer in the peak period, 
usually at the wage prevailing in the slack period (forward contract). However, neither in my data set from the 
ICRISAT villages nor in any other studies in India have such additional benefits offered to the casual labourers 
been observed.
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sometimes, casual and regular contracts on a farm are identified with different types of tasks 
(Agarwal, 1981; Eswaran & Kotwal, 1985a)11.
SF4. Heterogeneity of workers. Regular farm servants are predominantly male and 
a majority of regular farm servants come from poor landless households in the villages and 
usually belong to the lower castes. Most are without many alternatives (Alexander, 1973; 
Basant, 1984).
SF5. Casual-regular wage differential. Usually daily earnings from regular contracts 
are lower than daily casual wages (Sanghvi, 1969; Ghose, 1980; Basant, 1984).
SF6. Additional non-wage facilities. Regular labourers usually receive some non-wage 
facilities like credit, bonuses, gifts, homestead land etc. in addition to their wages (Alexander, 
1973; Bardhan, 1984a; Binswanger et al., 1984; Bell and Srinivasan, 1988).
The significance of seasonality (SF1) has been discussed in the literature (Bardhan 
1984a, Guha, 1989; Mukheijee, 1991 etc.); though Guha (1989) has remarked on the element 
of seasonal idleness of maintaining a steady pool of regular labour in a nutrition-efficiency 
framework, its significance has not explicitly been considered in the existing empirical 
studies. Moreover, stylised facts like SF2, SF4, SF5 and SF6  have not received much 
attention while SF3 has been considered by Eswaran and Kotwal (1985a) only. Our analysis 
intends to account for these stylised facts.
1.1.4. Evidence from the Study Villages
The empirical analysis in the dissertation is based on the information collected by the 
ICRISAT from three villages, namely Aurepalle, Shirapur and Kanzara. The same data set 
has been used by Binswanger e t al (1984) as well as Walker and Ryan (1990). Their primary 
findings are consistent with mine; e.g., they have observed that daily regular wage is lower 
than daily casual wage and that regular labourers obtain interest-free credit facilities from the 
employer. However, my own research brings out some additional features of the labour 
contracts in the study villages.
(a) The larger farms not only possess more land, but also more non-land resources12.
11 Agarwal (1981) has observed that regular farm servants are employed primarily in the more responsible 
tasks like ploughing and irrigation. Reddy (1985) has observed that regular contracts are allocated certain tasks 
required to be performed regularly and more responsibly. Reddy, Dreze & Mukherjee (1987) have discussed the
advantages/disadvantages of daily and piece-rate casual contracts in certain agricultural operations like 
transplanting, weeding and harvesting with a view to minimise supervision costs as well as ensure quality.
l2See further discussion in chapter three.
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The distribution of resources in the study villages is quite unequal so that there are only a 
few large farms while the majority are smaller ones.
(b) The larger farms (belonging to the large and medium landholding class in the 
ICRISAT data set) are the major demanders of regular farm servants13 as opposed to the 
smaller ones.
(c) On an average, the regular labour content relative to casual labour content is 
found to be higher in the slack period tasks like soil preparation, irrigation and fertilization 
in the larger farms14. This is especially true in the production of paddy in Aurepalle and 
cotton in Kanzara.
(d) In general, individuals from landless/labour households (as defined in the 
ICRISAT data) participate in the regular farm servants’ market15,16.
(e) The extent of involuntary unemployment increases in the slack period of 
agricultural production17.
(I) With increasing government support, there is a general reluctance among the rural 
labourers to participate in regular farm jobs18.
1.2. Existing Theoretical Studies
There have been few attempts to analyse the coexistence of casual and regular labour 
contracts. The existing literature can be divided into two broad schools of thought, namely, 
the Segmented Labour Market (SLM) theory, and the agrarian contracts theory.
1.2.1. Segmented Labour Market Theory
As the very name suggests, this school of thought highlights the division between
13See further discussion in chapter five.
14See further discussion in chapter five.
15See further discussion in chapter six.
16Credit occupies a central role to smooth out production and consumption over slack and peak seasons. 
However, given the collateral requirement for formal credit, poor landless labourers are practically excluded from 
the formal (cheaper) credit market
17See further discussion in chapter six.
18See further discussion in chapter seven.
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different segments of labourers, say, between male and female or that between black and 
white labourers, primarily in the industrial labour market. At first, the theory was developed 
in the tradition of institutional labour economics. The central idea can be identified as the 
Segmented Labour Market theory or, more specifically, its variant the Dual Labour Maiket 
(DLM) theory. According to Doeringer and Piore’s (1971) pioneering exposition, an 
operationally meaningful definition of segmentation implies the following : (i) the segments 
of the market include distinctly different groups of individuals differentiated by such 
characteristics as caste, sex, age, wealth or education, and (ii) individuals can move from one 
segment to another only with substantial difficulty. In other words, the emphasis is clearly 
on the difference in exogenous workers’ characteristics (black and white, male and female, 
etc.) between primary and secondary sectors of employment.
1.2.1.L Early Notion
In the usual formulation of the dual labour market theory, the labour market consists 
of two sectors - a high-wage primary sector with good working conditions, stable 
employment and substantial returns to human capital variables, and a low-wage secondary 
sector with bad working conditions, unstable employment etc.
Secondly, primary sector jobs are rationed, i.e., all workers eligible for primary sector 
jobs cannot secure one. Workers form queues for these jobs in the primary sector and are 
selected on the basis of their trainability and future loyalty. Employers tend to choose 
(discriminate) in favour of those who are viewed as traditional career-minded workers and, 
also in favour of workers with ethnic or cultural backgrounds (whites in general, as opposed 
to blacks or hispanics) similar to those of the managerial class. The rejected applicants and 
the rest obtain jobs in the secondary sector.
Each of the two sectors influences the worker’s preferences, attitudes and habits in 
ways that reinforce and shape the long-run progress or lack, thereof, of the worker’s career. 
In the secondary sector, low wages, lack of upward mobility and instability of tenure have 
negative feedback effects on workers’ attitudes towards work and training. In other words, 
the primary sector is shown to be a better sector of employment not only with respect to 
wage income, but also with respect to other peripheral advantages like security of 
employment or the prospect of upward mobility.
However, the allocation of workers (white and black or male and female) between 
primary and secondary sectors is somewhat arbitrary. Discrimination may perpetuate job 
segmentation by restricting certain workers to secondary firms - not so much because they
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lack education or skill per se, but more because these workers are perceived as having 
outward characteristics resembling those of other workers in the secondary labour market’. 
So it seems that discrimination might be one reason for segmentation to persist; but it does 
not appear to be a very convincing explanation.
According to Weitzman (1989), the ’dual labour market approach is somewhat harder 
to characterize’; the theory identifies wages as being more attached to the job (primary and 
secondary sectors of employment) rather than to the worker (differences in the observable 
characteristics).
1.2.1.2. Recent Interpretation
Different tools of imperfect information theory have recently been incorporated into 
the dual labour market literature, giving rise to a newer interpretation. For example, Kenneth 
Arrow (1973) has supported efficiency wage considerations to sustain a dual labour market 
structure. He has focused on the employer’s uncertainty about the productivity of different 
groups of workers, black and white or male and female.
Bulow and Summers (1986) have argued that firms are unable to measure perfectly 
the amount of effort workers are putting forth, especially in primary jobs, which again 
emphasizes the role of task characteristics to explain the dichotomy. One way of eliciting 
effort is to pay higher wages, thus raising the costs of finding replacement work. Jones 
(1987) has also explained the wage differential between primary and secondary jobs along 
the same lines. These later attempts suggest that a convincing explanation of market 
segmentation needs to account for different cases of market failure due to the problems of 
information and uncertainty.
1.2.1.3. Wage Differential : Some Explanations in the SLM Literature
The SLM literature suggests a number of factors to explain the wage differential 
between primary and secondary sectors of employment. These are summarised below :
(i) Differences in production technology across sectors. While a typical job in the 
secondary sector is relatively simple and easily supervised, primary jobs are complicated, 
requiring a fair degree of responsibility. Recent work (Bulow and Summers, 1986; Jones, 
1987) emphasizes the fact that supervision is difficult in the primary sector and, hence, there 
are better wage and non-wage benefits.
(ii) Differences in individual characteristics (age, sex, race, education) also play an 
important role in potential workers choosing between primary and secondary sectors. For
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example, it may be imperative for the employer to hire more educated workers for primary 
jobs and, hence, pay higher wages. However, choice of white or male workers as against the 
black or female is regarded as racial or sexual discrimination which is pronounced in the job 
market. Becker (1957) considers market discrimination19 to be the result of personal tastes 
of participants.
Some authors (Arrow, 1973) have considered the problem of screening a group of 
workers from the set of potential ones; according to them, screening the better workers from 
the potential ones, in an imperfect information world, maintains the wage differential between 
the primary and secondary sectors.
(iii) A third plausible explanation is the compensating differential for non-wage job 
attributes which include factors like differences in average weekly hours spent on different 
tasks, or job tenure or the quit rate for certain jobs which directly affect the utility of the 
workers20.
1.2.2. Agrarian Contracts Theory
Distinct from the tradition of the dual labour market theories, development 
economists have occasionally advanced some economic models which explain the choice of 
contracts in agriculture. These models are primarily based on the theories of uncertainty and 
information, which can further be distinguished into four major strands.
(a) Bardhan (1979a) argues that the prevalence of regular farm contracts in Indian 
agriculture minimises the recruitment costs of employing labour. He argues that in order to 
ensure a quick and ready availability of labour in the peak period, employers enter explicit 
or implicit contracts with a group of labourers in the slack period. Even if the slack-period 
wage rate is greater than the marginal product of labour in the slack period, the employer 
saves on the recruitment costs in the peak period so that the peak- period wage is less than 
the marginal product in that season.
In a later paper, Bardhan (1983)21 further argues that employment of regular 
labourers helps reduce the wage fluctuations over the slack and peak periods. Risk-averse
19If employers prefer to hire workers from group A rather than group B and are willing to sacrifice profits 
to do so, they may be said to have discriminatory tastes.
2CThis last explanation is obviously inadequate in situation where the nonwage attributes of primary sector 
jobs accentuate the difference between the two sectors. For example, compared to secondary workers, primary 
workers often enjoy more effective coverage of health and safety regulations.
21Both these papers (Bardhan, 1979a and Bardhan, 1983) are later included in Bardhan (1984a).
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workers faced with an uncertain spot wage rate may decide to participate in long-term 
contracts with risk-neutral employers for a pre-negotiated wage which is lower than the 
expected spot rate; the difference reflects a risk premium.
(b) Eswaran and Kotwal (1985a) have developed a shirking model of efficiency 
wages to explain the fanners’ choice of regular contracts. They have focused on the problems 
of disciplining workers in certain tasks which are difficult to supervise. They have postulated 
that the employment of regular labourers facilitates the assignment of such tasks to hired 
labourers without wasting resources on supervision. Under these circumstances, regular labour 
may substitute family labour to some extent. The regular wage is maintained at a level 
inducing the labourers to supply an acceptable level of effort (the idea being that a high 
regular wage raises the cost of being fired and thereafter acts as a disincentive against 
shirking). Any change in the casual wage necessitates a corresponding increase in the regular 
wage to be paid.
(c) Guha (1989) has developed a model which suggests that the prevalence of regular 
farm contracts internalises the economies of high wages. Assuming that (i) there exists a 
long-term relation between consumption and labour efficiency, (ii) long-term contracts are 
possible, (iii) production is seasonal and (iv) there is a trade-off between the positive effects 
of regular labour on productivity and the costly seasonal idleness of regular labour, he 
concludes that regular and casual contracts may coexist. Dasgupta (1993a, 1993b) has 
followed the same line to explain the coexistence of casual and regular contracts in Indian 
agriculture where higher wages are paid to the regular labourers in order to reap the benefits 
of higher productivity22.
(d) Hallagan (1978) has analysed the choice between share-cropping, fixed-rent 
tenancy and wage contracts in agriculture. He highlights the problem of screening the best 
worker from the set of potential workers in an asymmetric information world. Adverse 
selection problems may prevent the markets from operating efficiently. Hallagan argues that 
if all the individuals are risk-neutral in a world where the costs of monitoring and enforcing 
contracts for the provision of entrepreneurial ability are high, a combination of wage, share 
and rent contracts may reveal the types of workers by the choice of their contracts and match 
landlords’ need with workers’ endowments of entrepreneurial ability. Eswaran and Kotwal 
(1985b) point out that Hallagan’s assumption that landlords are ignorant about tenants’ 
entrepreneurial abilities is not a realistic one in most rural economies; instead they focus on 
the non-marketed resources in agricultural production. They have developed an endogenous
“ Further see our discussion in chapter two.
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model of contractual choice where they argue that wage, rent and share-cropping contracts 
reflect different techniques of combining the non-marketed inputs of ability to supervise and 
managerial ability among the agents, and making them the residual claimants.
1.2.2.1. Main Features
Rural labour markets in India display diverse features and trends. Each of the existing 
developmental models chooses to focus on particular aspects of these markets, while making 
a number of simplifying assumptions about the remaining aspects.
(i) The starting point of these models is that farms are identical. Clearly in reality 
farms are not identical; in particular, some farms are larger and their owners wealthier than 
others. Differences in wealth will be reflected in the choice of input-output mix, optimum 
production technique etc. Moreover, it has been observed that larger farmers hire regular farm 
servants while smaller ones rely more on casual labourers. Hence, one needs to incorporate 
the possibility of farms being heterogeneous in size and income.
(ii) Apart from the nutrition-based efficiency wage models, all the others, referred 
to here, have emphasized the factors affecting each farm’s demand for labour in the market 
while disregarding the role of individual preference in the prevalence of these contractual 
arrangements. In doing so, it has been assumed that workers are identical. Hallagan’s model 
is slightly different in that it assumes that workers are different with respect to 
entrepreneurial ability. However, given his emphasis on screening problems, his argument, 
too, revolves round the forces of demand. Guha and Dasgupta have, however, emphasized 
the nutrition and productivity of available workers. In doing so, they have assumed a fixed 
demand for labour from farms and, thus emphasized the supply of labour and disregarded the 
demand factor. In other words, nobody has so far looked at both the demand and supply side 
of the choice of contract in agriculture.
(iii) Eswaran and Kotwal assume an effort-augmenting mechanism in regular 
contracts. Guha and Dasgupta argue that higher wages paid to long-term regular labourers 
prevent the problem of malnutrition; the benefit of higher nutrition and, therefore, of higher 
productivity accrue to the employer. Questions may arise, however, as to the validity of the 
efficiency wage argument in rural labour markets. It appears from our discussion in section 
1 of the chapter that the wage (if we focus on daily wage only) paid to a regular labourer is 
not necessarily higher than that paid to a casual labourer. Hence, the economies of higher 
wages (efficiency wages) as such may not be appropriate to explain the existing dichotomy 
in rural labour contracts. It can still be argued that regular labourers, in different parts of
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India, receive most of their wages in advance (credit) which casual labourers do not (for a 
further discussion, see chapters two and four).
(iv) Finally, questions may be raised as to the extent of the information problem. In 
a closed village society, a particular employer knows the labourers of the locality individually 
and has a continuing association with some of them. Even among those whom he may not 
employ regularly, there are some on whom he can depend on not to let him down when he 
requires labour urgently. This implies that an employer has some information, though 
imperfect, about the quality of workers whom s/he is employing (Rudra, 1982b), thus 
weakening the basis of theories based on the notion of asymmetric information such as 
Hallagan’s. The implication of the negation of this assumption is that workers’ heterogeneity 
alone (with identical farms) would not suffice to explain the dichotomy in the rural labour 
market.
Our analysis aims to redress these issues.
1.23. A Comparison
There are similarities and differences between the two strands of the literature 
discussed earlier, namely, SLM theory and agrarian contracts theory. The similarity is that 
both of them mark a deviation from the competitive, market-clearing mechanism and 
emphasize the incorporation of the theory of uncertainty and information.
The difference is primarily related to the various patterns of demand for labour. Dual 
labour market theory is usually applied to the dichotomy between male and female labourers 
or that between black and white labourers in the industrial sector. In this case, a primary 
sector employer hires primary workers, while in a secondary sector an employer hires only 
secondary workers.
On the contrary, in an agricultural labour market in developing countries (as referred 
to in agrarian contracts theory), a wealthy employer is observed to hire both regular and 
casual labourers over the slack and peak seasons. Eswaran and Kotwal have emphasized that 
casual and regular workers are hired to perform two types of tasks over the slack and peak 
periods23. They emphasize the problems of supervision and monitoring in certain 
agricultural tasks. To this extent, Eswaran and Kotwal’s argument shares the view of Bulow 
and Summers (which, too, stresses the difference in the nature of the tasks to explain the
^Eswaran and Kotwal assume that all farms are identical and, hence, ignore the effect of farm-size on the 
incidence of regular farm contracts.
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dichotomy between primary and secondary sectors), subject to the difference already 
mentioned.
Secondly, in the SLM literature, primary sector jobs are undoubtedly preferred by 
all the labourers. However, the trade off between regular and casual farm contracts in 
agriculture is not so obvious. The daily earnings in a casual job are usually higher than that 
in a regular job with employment security (the lower daily wage of regular farm servants 
may be regarded as a premium for employment security offered), though the annual wage 
of a regular labourer may be higher. Besides, regular farm servants usually obtain some 
additional benefits like bonus, credit or homestead; though they may have to work for longer 
hours without much independence.
In its original formulation, the choice of employment in segmented labour market 
theory was based on the exogenous characteristics of the workers, their race or sex. However, 
workers’ characteristics are endogenous to the choice of contract in the agricultural labour 
market. Even if it is assumed that they are identical in ability, they may have different family 
obligations, time constraints, and alternative opportunities. Other factors like work conditions, 
job status (Rudra, 1982a24), employer’s characteristics etc. may also play a role in the 
choice of contract Hence, the net benefit (utility) from a contract will vary between 
individuals with different characteristics. Some may prefer regular farm contracts, while 
others may not
Thus, the segmented labour market theory fails to account for the intricacies of 
contractual choice in an agricultural labour market Hence, for the rest of the dissertation, we 
shall primarily concern ourselves with the theory of agrarian contracts.
1.3. Proposed Analytical Framework
In light of the preceding discussion, it appears that agrarian contracts theory needs 
to be extended so as to address the following issues:
(a) Theories on agrarian contracts assume that farms are all identical and, hence, fail 
to incorporate the farm-size factor.
(b) Though Bardhan (1984a) has considered the minimisation of wage fluctuations
MIt has been found that workers do not like to be totally at the beck and call of the employer; they want 
freedom and like to be their own boss. This general feeling has also been observed in the ICRISAT villages 
(Walker & Ryan, 1990).
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over the slack and peak periods, most models do not usually take account of the wage 
difference between casual and regular contracts. However, the casual-regular wage differential 
per period may have an important bearing upon the coexistence of casual and regular 
contracts in Indian agriculture.
(c) The importance of seasonality of agricultural production has been acknowledged 
by Bardhan (1984a) and Eswaran and Kotwal (1985a). While Bardhan considered the 
fluctuations of wages, Eswaran and Kotwal focused on the nature of tasks performed during 
slack and peak periods. However, given the problem of seasonality, seasonal idleness of 
regular labourers is an important consideration for the farms, especially for the smaller ones. 
This has not been incorporated explicitly25.
(d) The role of family landholding/wealth of the potential workers on the choice of 
contract is another neglected aspect of the agrarian contract theory. In a general framework, 
Atkinson (1983) has discussed the significance of family characteristics in occupational 
choice; however, little has been done to distinguish the choice of contract between landed 
and landless labourers.
(e) Most available studies focus on the demand for labour and, in doing so, the role 
of worker’s preferences in the choice of contract has been overlooked. The following 
considerations are relevant in this regard:
(i) Usually the casual daily (farm) wage is higher than regular daily wage;
(ii) Besides casual farm jobs, casual non-farm jobs are also available where wages 
are even higher.
(iii) By the very nature of the contract, casual wages are paid even if someone is 
found to shirk, in cases where effort is non-monitorable.
(iv) Employers complain about the non-availability of good regular farm servants26. 
These findings suggest that workers’ preferences need to be incorporated into the analysis 
of contractual choice in Indian agriculture.
The aim of this thesis is partly to develop a theory which addresses these issues and 
provides a sound explanation for the coexistence of casual and regular contracts. It is useful 
to begin with a discussion of employees’ and employers’ considerations.
“ Guha (1989) has considered the issue only in the context of nutrition-based efficiency wages.
“This has been noted by Walker and Ryan (1990). This has also been observed during my resurvey of 
Aurepalle.
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1.3.1. Employers' Considerations
The following considerations are relevant to employers’ preferences between casual 
and regular contracts.
First, production in traditional agriculture is seasonal in nature with labour demand 
being lower in the slack period of production. Hence, maintaining a steady pool of regular 
labourers throughout the year may involve a cost of paying regular labourers when their 
productivity is low. We will refer to this as ’hoarding cost’. Larger farms not only have the 
advantage of greater size of landholding, but they also have better access to other 
complementary factors of production per acre, including irrigation27. Due to this, larger 
farms have a larger and more uniform demand for labour throughout the year as compared 
to the smaller ones. Consequently, hoarding costs are lower in larger farms. Moreover by 
virtue of the ownership of land and non-land resources, larger farms are wealthier and, hence, 
they are less risk-averse than the smaller ones. Consequently, larger farms may be willing 
to bear the hoarding costs of hiring some regular labourers, and to provide some insurance 
to regular labourers in the form of stable employment and wages. In return for this insurance, 
regular labourers may be willing to accept a lower wage.
Secondly, given that workers may vary with respect to non-observable characteristics 
(say, physical or mental ability), the selection of workers from the pool of prospective ones 
may be difficult. Employers may not be able to detect who is a better worker. In this kind 
of asymmetric information situation, employers may offer different types of contracts to 
screen the better workers such that the workers’ choice of contract itself reveals their true 
types. However, as Rudra (1982a) argues, the problem of screening may not be an acute one 
in a closed village society. Indeed, in a small village everybody knows each other. Employers 
and employees have sustained contractual relationships and, hence, employers have a fair but 
imperfect idea of the quality (even if non-observable) of the labourers.
Thirdly, once hired, a conflict of interests may arise between the employer and 
labourers. Increasing effort enhances production, but reduces the utility of the workers. 
Workers may prefer to put in less effort while employers want more. Disciplining workers 
may be particularly difficult in the larger farms28 and, especially, in certain tasks. Tasks like
^For example, larger farms own more complementary factors like irrigation, livestock, the farm/non-farm 
equipment, financial assets etc. per acre (see chapter three).
“ Larger farms employ a larger labour force, sometimes spread over different plots; this makes supervision 
particularly difficult
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soil preparation, irrigation and fertilization are difficult to supervise29 as opposed to tasks 
like transplanting, weeding, harvesting etc. While the former may be called ’non-monitorable’ 
tasks, the latter are ’monitorable’ tasks. Fruits of the non-monitorable tasks are realized only 
after the harvest and, therefore, quality control in these tasks is an important consideration. 
Hence, the need for differentiated contracts may arise in the performance of monitorable and 
non-monitorable tasks. In chapter two, we will develop a model where regular contracts, 
together with appropriate incentives, are used to ensure adequate performance of non- 
monitorable tasks.
Given the conflict of interest between the employer and employees, one way of 
disciplining labourers with minimum supervision costs is to offer some incentives. Provision 
of credit offered to regular labourers in different parts of India may work out to be more 
efficient than ordinary credit contracts. The former is supposedly more efficient because the 
farmer not only earns the interest, but also minimises the moral hazard problem (Ray and 
Sengupta, 1989). If the labourer is fired, he not only loses the wage, but also the additional 
facilities, which are otherwise difficult to obtain. Farms which face more acute supervision 
problems (e.g., larger farms who manage a larger labour force, often dispersed over different 
plots in different parts of the village) may be particularly inclined to offer incentive 
compatible regular contracts with additional facilities.
Finally, there are different kinds of uncertainty in the organisation of agricultural 
production at different stages of production which may also affect the employment of regular 
labour, (i) Given the time-bound nature of agricultural operations, costs of unfavourable 
weather conditions may be enormous; (ii) seeds may not germinate; (iii) an attack of pests 
may harm the final crop. In certain regions where the costs of these uncertainties are very 
high, farmers may be induced to use more casual labour instead of incurring hoarding costs 
of maintaining regular labour throughout the year. On the other hand, timely supply of labour 
is very important for agricultural production, especially for certain operations. When the time 
comes for these operations, labour has to be applied immediately. If there is an uncertainty 
of securing a steady supply of labour in certain localities, the costs of delay may be 
enormous. Under these circumstances, farmers may be induced to employ some regular 
labour irrespective of uncertainties of the kind of (i), (ii) and/or (iii)30.
^The nature and the importance of tasks are also dependent on the characteristics of the crop. For example, 
in the production of irrigated crops, the importance of soil preparation, irrigation and fertilization assume greater 
importance compared to the dry crops.
30However, we do not consider the question of timeliness of labour because there does not exist any excess 
demand for labour in most Indian villages.
27
1.3.2. Employees* Considerations
Given the demand for labour, workers with given personal and/or family 
characteristics, will attempt to choose the contract with the highest level of utility. Whether 
workers are identical or heterogeneous, effort reduces utility and, hence, they will try to put 
in a minimum amount of effort.
By the very nature of agricultural production, most employment prospects are 
seasonal in nature (apart from a few regular jobs available in the village). Alternative non­
farm job prospects are also quite limited in most villages in India. Hence, employment 
security may be an important consideration for the participants in the market, especially the 
landless workers who do not have many better alternative employment opportunities.
Secondly, in the unskilled market for agricultural labour, the importance of personal 
characteristics like age or sex may be negligible. However, in these household economies, 
the role of some family characteristics like the family ownership of land and non-land assets 
of these labourers cannot be ignored in the choice of contract. Usually, workers from families 
with larger landholding (who also own more non-land resources) are frequently required to 
work on their family farm. Hence, they are unable to precomit themselves for the whole 
production season to work for any employer. This time constraint excludes them from the 
possibility of choosing regular contracts. On the other hand, in the absence of any 
responsibility for family farming, landless labourers are able to precomit their entire non- 
leisure time in the market and, hence, are likely to participate in regular contracts.
Thirdly, the availability of credit is crucial in supporting the rural labourers in low- 
income countries, especially in view of the absence of unemployment insurance markets in 
these economies. The problem is particularly acute in semi-arid areas where crop failure is 
common and, hence, credit occupies a central role in smoothing out production and 
consumption over the slack and peak seasons31. Credit constraints are particularly severe for 
the poorer landless labourers. Land is usually regarded as the most acceptable form of 
collateral in these low-income countries and, therefore, individuals from landless households 
are unable to offer the necessary collateral. Hence, they are forced to go to the informal 
sector, and have to pay a much higher interest rate compared to that prevailing in the formal 
sector. Under these circumstances, regular contracts with some wage advance may be the 
preferred option for the poorer landless labourers; in effect, regular contracts enable them to 
use their labour as a collateral.
Finally, some informational asymmetry may prevail like the labourer may not know
3,This is discussed in some detail in chapter four.
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about certain characteristics of the prospective employer (whether wages are paid regularly, 
whether supervision is fair, etc.) before s/he actually works for the employer. This, however, 
is less of a problem in a closed village society where the characteristics of the employer may 
actually be common knowledge. But workers may have some personal values like the desire 
to be one’s own boss, dislike of being closely supervised etc.; these factors may also 
influence the choice of contract in a significant way.
1 3 3 . A Possible Outcome
In light of the preceding discussion of employers’ and employees’ considerations, 
regular labour contracts have the potential of being mutually advantageous. On the one hand, 
they provide workers with the opportunity to obtain regular employment with some 
loan/advance or some other form of additional non-wage facilities. The arrangement may be 
particularly attractive for the poorer landless labourers who can devote their entire non-leisure 
time to regular employment and who are unable to offer collateral to get credit from formal 
sources. In a regular labour contract the collateral requirement is substituted by the labour 
services promised to the employer/creditor.
On the other hand, employers gain not only by having a ready access to labour 
supply (particularly in some crops where continuous attention is required), but also at a lower 
cost. The employment of regular farm labourers also helps them (a) in minimising the costs 
of supervision and monitoring, especially in tasks difficult to supervise; (b) in ensuring the 
quality of performance; if the quality of performance of a particular task is not instantneously 
observable, but becomes observable over time then a regular labourer who does not perform 
adequately in such a task can be asked to improve his performance; (c) in minimising the 
wage fluctuations over the peak and slack period, (d) not only in earning an interest on credit 
offered to the labourer, but also in ensuring better control over the labourers. In case a 
labourer shirks, s/he will not only lose the job, but also the access to credit (which figures 
prominently in shaping his/her consumption over the slack and peak periods of employment). 
Thus, the informational problems in the credit market are found to spill over to the labour 
market in the form of regular contracts.
However, given the seasonality of agricultural production, the employment of regular 
farm servants only would be wasteful simply because there may not be enough demand for 
regular labour throughout the year. In other words, there are hoarding costs involved in 
maintaining a steady pool of regular labourers. Hence, employers may hire a few regular
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labourers to meet the regular demand for labour throughout the year, and to hire some casual 
labour on an ad hoc basis to meet the additional labour requirements at particular stages of 
the production cycles.
Regular contracts may be particularly relevant for certain types of tasks for which 
employment of casual labour is problematic. In the casual labour market, the piece-rate 
contract (individual or group-wise) has the advantage over the daily contracts that the costs 
of supervision can be minimised; but the quality of performance may suffer. Quality control 
may be an important consideration, especially, in certain tasks like soil preparation, 
fertilisation or irrigation (where the fruits of these tasks are realised only after the harvests). 
In these cases, regular farm contracts, combined with adequate incentives, may assume 
greater importance in ensuring the quality of performance as well as in minimising the costs 
of supervision and monitoring in view of the nature of tasks.
To summarise, the coexistence of regular and casual labour contracts in rural 
economies arises from different considerations of employers and employees, leading them 
to prefer each type of contract according to particular characteristics. The distinctions 
between smaller and larger fanns (leading to different costs of ’hoarding’ regular labour 
during the slack season), between poorer and wealthier labourers (leading to different time 
and credit constraints) and between monitorable and non-monitorable tasks, are particularly 
relevant.
CHAPTER 2. CASUAL AND REGULAR CONTRACTS : 
A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS
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In chapter one, we have proposed a general framework for the analysis of choice of 
labour contracts. Taking into account the different considerations of employers and 
employees, discussed in chapter one, four different models are presented here: (1) Implicit 
contract model; (2) Shirking model; (3) Collateral Model and (4) Time Constraint Model.
The assumption common to all these models is that the casual labour market is 
competitive and clears through the demand-supply interaction everyday1. However, each 
model invokes a different argument for the prevalence of regular contracts.
The chapter is developed as follows. Section 2.1 gives an outline of the basic 
arguments involved in the above-mentioned models, and describes the general framework for 
the analysis of contractual choice. The subsequent sections 2.2, 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5 modify the 
general model to incorporate the respective arguments of each model. The chapter concludes 
with an overview of the models presented vis-a-vis other existing models.
2.1. The General Framework
This section develops a general framework for the analysis of choice between casual 
and regular labour contracts in Indian agriculture from the points of view of employers and 
employees. The analysis is developed as follows : section 2.1.1. presents the arguments of 
the models to be developed in the subsequent sections while section 2 .1.2  builds up the 
general analytical framework for modelling labour demand.
2.1.1. An Outline of Primary Arguments
An outline of the models to be developed later is as follows:
(1) Implicit Contract Model If farmers are risk-neutral and workers risk-averse,
1This is strongly supported by the empirical evidence from different parts of India (see, Rudra, 1982a; Reddy, 1985; 
Dreze & Mukheijee, 1987).
31
farmers may insure a group of labourers against the fluctuations of wage and employment 
by offering them employment over a prolonged period at a predetermined wage. In the 
process, farmers will be able to pay a lower wage per day to the regular labourers as 
compared to the casual labourers, where the wage differential constitutes an insurance 
premium2.
Together with the advantage of hiring regular labour, however, the employer has to 
take account the fact that, if ’resale’ of labour is not possible (i.e., if employers cannot sell 
the labour of regular labourer to other farmers on days when their productivity on the 
employers’ farm is low), then there is a cost involved in maintaining a steady pool of regular 
labour throughout the year. We shall refer to this as the ’hoarding cost’ of regular labour (a 
formal definition will be given below). Given the existence of hoarding costs, farmers may 
not hire regular labourers only; they may hire some casual labourers as well. Hoarding costs 
may be particularly high for the smaller farms who have little need for hired labour during 
a large part of the year, thus inducing them to rely primarily on casual labourers.
(2) Shirking Model. The second model is a variant of the efficiency wage theory. 
Here we assume that some tasks are difficult to supervise, because effort is unobservable. 
Employment of casual labourers in these non-monitorable tasks may be inefficient since, by 
the very nature of the contract, casual labourers are paid even if they shirk. However, a 
regular labourer may be fired if the work is not done properly. Further, if the wage rate is 
higher for regular than for casual labourers, regular labourers will have an incentive to avoid 
being fired. Thus if a farm offers regular contracts with additional incentives, it may succeed 
in inducing the regular labourers not to shirk in the non-monitorable tasks, while employing 
casual labourers to perform other monitorable tasks.
In an implicit contract model, the regular-labour wage rate per period is less than the 
casual-labour wage rate per period while in a shirking model the regular-labour wage per 
period is greater than workers’ reservation wage. This does not necessarily imply that the 
predictions from these two models are incompatible. If regular-labour wage rate is greater 
than workers’ reservation wage, predictions from these models may still be compatible. 
However, note that if the shirking model is a full-employment model, then it implies that the 
regular labour wage rate is higher than the casual labour wage rate per period.
(3) Collateral Model Rural credit markets in India are segmented between formal
^ h a t  is meant here by ’wage per day’ for regular labourers is simply the annual wage payment divided by the number 
of days in the year (in the villages we will be studying, regular labour contracts take the form of a yearly commitment of 
labour supply by the labourers in exchange for an annual wage payment). We will also refer to this ’wage per day’ or the 
’imputed daily wage’ of regular labourer. This terminology should not obscure the ’indivisibility’ of regular contracts.
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and informal sectors. Credit is cheaper in the formal sector, though it requires some collateral 
to be offered. Land is the most acceptable form of collateral in these village economies. Due 
to their inability to offer the required collateral, it is difficult for landless labourers to secure 
credit. Hence, risk-averse landless labourers usually go to the informal credit market where 
the marginal cost of credit is comparatively higher.
Usually casual labourers are paid daily while a major portion of regular wages are 
paid in advance when the contract begins and no interest is charged on this advance. 
Consequently, regular contracts with advance (i.e., credit) payment may represent an 
attractive arrangement for landless labourers. If the marginal cost of credit is higher for asset- 
poor labourers than that for employers, and if there is no uncertainty about casual wages 
during the slack period, there exists a wage level for regular contract such that these contracts 
are beneficial to employers and labourers3.
(4) Time Constraint Model The opportunity cost of time is different for landed and 
landless labourers. Landless labourers do not have any obligation to spend labour-time on 
family land so that they can offer their entire non-leisure time in the labour market. On the 
other hand, landed labourers with obligations to work on family land cannot easily spare the 
time to participate in regular jobs. In other words, given that the opportunity cost of pre­
committing time is lower for landless labourers, they have a comparative advantage in the 
choice of regular contracts.
The collateral model suggests that, given a higher marginal cost of credit, risk-averse 
landless labourers who cannot offer collateral are particularly likely to participate in the 
regular market; the time constraint model also suggests that, given a lower opportunity cost 
of time, landless labourers have a comparative advantage in regular contracts. Combining 
these two arguments together, we may, therefore, infer the following:
Risk-averse landless labourers prefer to participate in the regular jobs with wage advance 
such that the marginal cost o f credit and opportunity cost o f time are minimised*.
It has also been shown that alternative employment opportunities (in the family or
3Another way of interpreting this situation, from the point of view of the employer, is that the rate of return obtained 
by lending to a labourer and persuading Him to accept a wage cut is greater than the rate of return on loans in the formal 
credit market (this is s im ilar to the point made by Ray and Sengupta (1989) that lenders often earn greater returns in 
interlinked contracts). In addition, interlinkage of credit and labour may have some productivity-enhancing effects, e.g., if 
the interlinked contract raise the cost of shirking and getting fired.
4The relevance of these two models strongly emerged from discussions with employers and employees during my field 
survey in Aurepalle (see further discussion in chapters three and six).
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outside) play a significant role in the choice of labour contract. If there are brighter prospects 
of alternative employment opportunities which offer better wage and/or non-wage benefits, 
there may arise growing individual reluctance to participate in regular farm jobs. Under the 
circumstances, a number of outcomes are possible: (i) On the one hand, given scarcity of 
labour supply, farmers may adopt alternative contractual arrangements so that the incidence 
of regular farm contracts may decline, (ii) On the other hand, given the farmers’ need for 
regular labour, regular wage and non-wage benefits may be revised upward so as to enhance 
labourers’ incentive to participate in regular farm jobs vis-a-vis other casual jobs. Of course, 
it is also possible for both effects to take place at the same time. As will be seen in chapter 
seven, there is some empirical evidence that this process has indeed taken place in rural India 
in recent decades.
2.1.2. Modelling Labour Demand
Farms are all assumed to be identical. They organise production using labour and 
other inputs. Suppose the production of a particular crop takes several slack periods to 
produce, t = 0, 1, 2,...., T-l where each slack period corresponds to a particular agricultural 
operation. After T slack periods, follows a peak period (T-th period) when the crop is finally 
harvested. Also suppose that there is no uncertainty in the slack periods while the amount 
harvested during the peak period is uncertain5.
This scenario can be modelled as a two-stage production function, where an 
intermediate output X realized by the end of period T-l (last slack period) is used in the final 
production function Q. Suppose at harvest time, labourers (whether they are casual or regular) 
receive a share of harvest as wages. We can then write output net o f harvest wages Q as 
follows:
Q = g(h < h  J r . j i e . J S )  (1)
^The assumption of no-uncertainty in the slack period is rather strong. It is made in order to simplify the presentation 
and focus on the other features of direct interest Even if there is uncertainty in the slack periods, the main arguments 
developed here would remain important. However, there would be some additional considerations, e.g., the fact that 
employing casual labour rather than regular labour gives the employer greater flexibility to deal with slack-period 
uncertainties.
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where price of the final output Q is normalised to unity6. Iq, ll5..., 1^ are the labour inputs 
(measured in, say, labour-hours) in the slack periods7, K is the size of landholding and 0 is 
a random variable (e.g., rainfall) denoting production uncertainty in the T-th period. 
Production function g(.) is assumed to be concave in the inputs, continuous and twice 
differentiable.
In this model, we consider labour hiring decision, including the decision of whether 
and how much regular labour to hire at the beginning of the season (for the whole season). 
The following cases may arise :
(a) The simplest possible case is one where there is no regular labour. Let a farm’s 
costs be as follows:
C = F  + wt%  (2)
( - o
where total labour demand lt in any period comprises of casual (\f) and regular Qf) labour. 
In this case, we assume that ltp = 0 which, in turn, means lt = ltc for each t  Let wtc be the 
casual daily wage and F the fixed cost of production (e.g., the imputed land rental). A farm 
then maximises its expected profit 7^  as follows:
T  -  1
* ,= £ [* ( /„ .......... lT_ , ;  K ,Q)] -  F -  Y ,  » , C I, (3)
t -  0
First order conditions of this profit maximisation with respect to lt are as follows :
E(g) = w,c f o r t  = 0 , 1  , 2  7W (4)
when gt is the derivative of g(.) with respect to lt. This, in turn, determines the labour 
demand functions as follows:
6In this model, last period output is taken as the numeraire. The issue of output-price uncertainty, if  important, would 
have to be modelled here as uncertainty in real wages. Some of the variants of the model, analysed further in this chapter, 
do include real-wage uncertainty.
7Note, laborer in different periods, say, 10, llf I^—Im corresponding to different agricultural operations are considered as
different inputs as in a standard static production function framework.
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= i , \ w c , K) v t  = o , i , 2  r-i (5)
where wc = {wtc} is the vector of casual wages.
(b) Next, we consider the case where total labour demand lt in period t consists of 
casual labour ltc as well as some regular labour P8. Suppose resale of regular labour is 
possible. This means that regular labour in excess of what the employer wishes to use on 
his/her own farm in any period can be hired out to another farm on a casual basis. Therefore, 
farm maximises expected profit
T - 1 T - 1
*2  = EgQ0  ; e , K) -  F -  £  w,c(l, -  P) -  Y , P
t -  o t -  o ( g )
= *1 ♦ E  <w-ct - o
where wp is the imputed daily wage9 of regular labour. In this case, an employer maximises 
the same profit 7^  as in case (a) plus an additional term related to the wage differential 
between casual and regular contracts10. It can immediately be seen that farm’s optimal 
decisions will be as follows:
(i) Optimum regular demand P = 0 if T wp > Et wtc.
(ii) Optimum regular demand P = °° if Twp < wtc
(iii) If T wp = Xt wtc, casual and regular labour are perfect substitutes.
(c) More generally, suppose no resale of labour is possible. There may be some slack 
periods when all regular labour is used so that P < lt* so that there is no hoarding cost 
attached to the maintenance of a steady pool of regular labour P even if resale is not
T he amount of the regular labour hired is determined at the beginning of the production period and is maintained at that 
level. Hence, we drop the time subscript from the regular labour component (1 )^ of total labour demand and write If = P.
’Regular wage is considered to be the cash equivalent of cash and kind payment made to the regular labourers. As 
explained earlier (pp. 31), the ’imputed daily wage’ of regular labourers is defined as the annual wage payment divided by 
the number of days in the year. This notion is used for the purpose of comparison with the daily wage of casual labourers.
10The model assumes no transaction costs in selling regular labour. The next model will assume that reselling is not 
possible at all. The case where reselling is possible but involves transaction costs can be considered as an intermediate case 
(this case will not be explicitly analysed here).
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possible. If, however, in some slack periods t, t = 0, 1, 2,....   T-l, there is an excess supply
of regular labour (P > lt*), there is a hoarding cost attached to it because these regular 
labourers are paid even when their productivity is low. In this case, the farm maximises the 
expected profit tc3:
Max . k3 = Eg(l0 , , .... , lT _ ; 0 , K)
/,, p
T -  1 T - l  (7)
- p -  E w < %  - p > -  E w P p
t -  o t  -  o
subject to the ’no-resale constraint’ that \  > P for all t  This is, therefore, a constrained 
expected profit maximisation problem. The Lagrangean of this maximisation problem can be 
written as follows:
L,(.) = Eg(l0 , / , ......; 0 , K) -  F -  £  w,c l,c -  j j w ' P  -  n, (P -  I)
t -  o / -  o t -  o ( g )
where is the Lagrange multiplier for the no-resale constraint in period t. Let us now define 
H(lt, P) = Zt Pt(P - lj) to be the hoarding cost function of the farm so that the Lagrangean can 
also be rewritten as follows :
T - l  T - l  (9)
£,(•) = Eg(l0 , /, ................ ; 0 , K) -  F -  £  w,c l,c -  £  w r P -  H(P, I)
t  -  0 t -  0
H(.) can be interpreted as the ’hoarding cost’ of regular labour, i.e., the cost of not being able
to resell labour in periods when the marginal product of regular labour is less than the
prevailing casual wage rate.
Given the inequality constraint, complementary slackness condition of the constrained 
expected profit maximisation problem implies the following :
Pt > 0 and lt > P with at least one equality, which, in turn, implies :
(i) If Pt > 0, lt = P, i.e., no-resale constraint is binding;
(ii) If lt > P, Pt = 0, i.e., no-resale constraint is not binding.
Maximisation of (8) with respect to lt requires :
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H , =  w , c  -  E ( g )  V  (  =  0  ,  1 ,  ,  T - l  ( 1 0 )
Suppose lt > P so that & = 0. In that case, equation (10) shows that lt is determined 
in such a way that the expected marginal product of labour in each period is equated to its 
marginal cost wtc. If, however, > 0, labour demand is determined in such a way that the 
marginal hoarding cost of regular labour is equal to the marginal cost of casual labour (wCt) 
net of expected marginal product. From these T marginal conditions, we determine lt = lt*, 
t = 0, 1, 2 T-l as follows:
i ;  = l*(K , w °) V t = 0 , 1 , 2 , ... , T- l
where we assume i L > 0 V r  = 0 , l , 2 , . . .  , T -l
dK
where, as before, wc = {wtc} is the vector of casual wages.
Secondly, maximisation of (8) with respect to P requires :
Hps E ■ E(",c - » o  = E V - r * '  <12>
r -  0 t -  0 t -  0
Let us call (12) to be the employers' indifference condition. This states that the 
difference between the wage cost of hiring a casual labour day after day and that of hiring 
a regular labourer over the season should be equal to the marginal hoarding cost of regular 
labour (which is non-negative). If this condition is satisfied, the employer is indifferent, at 
the margin, between hiring casual and regular labour.
For a given employer, we can now distinguish between ’surplus labour period’ (when 
the employer would, if possible, like to resell the labour of some of his/her regular labour) 
and ’labour hiring periods’ (when the employer hires casual labour in addition to regular 
labour).
[Insert figure 1 (pp. 63) here]
In surplus labour periods, lt = P and m = wtc - E(gt) > 0 (which directly follows from 
the complementary slackness condition). In labour hiring periods, however, lt > P such that
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Ht = 0 and wtc = E(gt). Since m = 0 during labour hiring periods, we can rewrite HP as 
follows :
Hr s  E  H (13)
I : P > l t
In figure 1, we measure regular labour on the horizontal axis and wage on the vertical axis. 
The line HP is the marginal hoarding cost HP (evaluated at lt = lt* for all t). We note that, for 
very small P (till the range OA), lt > P and 14 = 0 in each period (each period is ’labour 
hiring period’) so that marginal hoarding cost of regular labour is zero. In other words, if the 
amount of labour which the employer wishes to employ is greater than P in each period, 
there is not hoarding cost For very large P, however, ^  -> wtc (because E(gt) —» 0) and HP 
—» £  wtc. In other words, if P is very large, then an additional regular labourer creates a 
hoarding cost close to wct per day (because he will be redundant most of the year). Line 
C’DE (which is a ’mirror-image’ of the line HP, based on (12)) refers to the regular wage 
such that employers’ indifference condition (12) holds good.
Next we note that, for larger farms, the curve HP normally shifts to the right (i.e., 
the marginal hoarding cost of regular labour, at a given level of employment of regular 
labour, is typically lower for larger farms). Intuitively, larger farms have larger lt* for each 
t (as assumed earlier), and, therefore, for given P, they are more likely to hire casual labour 
in any period; since m = 0 in each hiring period, HP will be lower for the larger farms.
We can conclude with the following propositions:
Proposition 1. Suppose, T wp > I^w^, then no regular labour is hired. Farmers rely 
exclusively on casual labour.
Proposition 2. Suppose T wP < Xtwtc, and that at least some regular labour is hired. The 
employer’s indifference requires 14 > 0 for some t. Thus, for each employer, there exists at 
least one t such that lt = P (ltc = 0) and hoarding costs are positive (i.e., no-resale constraint 
is binding). This is intuitively plausible; when wage costs of regular labour are less than 
those of casual labour, it is never optimal for a farm to use a positive amount of casual 
labour in each period.
Proposition 3. The larger the farm-size, the larger is the amount of regular labour hired.
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2.2. Implicit Contract Model11
The primary idea of the implicit contract model is that farmers are risk-neutral while 
workers are risk-averse12. Hence, farmers may enter a regular contract with the workers to 
insure them against the fluctuations of wage and employment over the course of the 
production cycle.
2.2.1. Farms
As in section 1, farms are all assumed to be identical. Suppose they are all risk- 
neutral, too, irrespective of the difference in the farm-size. In order to be in an implicit 
contract framework, we now introduce uncertainty in casual wages during slack and peak 
periods. Production functions (1) are retained. If resale of labour in the slack period is not 
possible, farms maximise the following expected profit net of harvest wages :
* = m 0 . h  *r-i  ; e . K) -  F  -  £  E(w,c) l,c -  £  w p P (I4)
t -  0 f « 0
The earlier derivations go through with minor modifications. The employer’s indifference 
condition (12) is modified to :
(!5)
t -  0 t -  0
Let us define wp as follows :
(16)
which is the average expected value of casual wage. Since p* > 0 V t, the value of wp at 
which the employers’ indifference condition is satisfied is never greater than wp.
nFor convenience of exposition, the model presented in this section ignores discounting. However, discounting is easy 
to introduce, and does not affect the results, as long as employers and labourers have the same discount rate. The case where 
discount rates are different will be taken up in the ’collateral model’.
12 There is a good deal of general evidence that risk-aversion decreases with increasing wealth. This also seems to apply 
in rural India (see Binswanger, 1993). In one experiment (Binswanger, 1977), it was found unexpectedly, that poor workers 
are not significantly more risk-averse than richer farmers. However, the attitudes to risk observed in these experimental 
situations need not be the same as those applying to real-world decisions, so that this evidence remains highly tentative.
2.2.2. Workers
Workers are all assumed to be identical and they are all risk-averse so that their 
utility functions are concave (U’ > 0; U" < 0).
If a worker accepts a regular contract, his/her utility is:
U p = U(wp , w p , ......  , w 0  (1T>
If, however, s/he chooses a casual contract, his/her utility is13:
V c = E[U(w0c , wtc   , wTc_,)] (18)
where casual wages are assumed to be stochastic14.
’Workers’ indifference condition’ is satisfied when Up = U0 or:
U(wp , w r  w 0  = E[U(w„c  wTc. , )] (W)
Let wp, be the value of wp at which this condition is satisfied. By concavity of U, we 
immediately know that wp. < wp.
2.2.3. Equilibrium
In equilibrium, demand for regular labour is determined by the farms’ indifference 
condition (15) while supply by the workers’ indifference condition (19). The situation is 
depicted in figure 2  where we plot regular wage on the vertical axis and the amount of 
regular labour hired on the horizontal axis.
[Insert figure 2 (pp. 64) here]
13 Here, as in much of the chapter, we are assuming that there are no constraint in selling labour on the casual labour 
market (i.e., no involuntary unemployment). The implication of involuntary unemployment for the implicit contract model 
will be examined in section 2.2.4. In general, involuntary unemployment raises the attractiveness of regular labour for 
labourers (as shown in that section in the context of implicit contract model), since regular labour involves some security 
of employment
14For simplicity, it is assumed here that the probability of getting a casual employment is equal to unity. With this 
assumption, we eliminate the possibility of unemployment in the model. However, it should be borne in mind that the 
availability of casual employment is not certain in the rural labour markets; it is rather dependent on the agricultural season 
of the year and is not necessarily one. These possibilities are included in the later sections of the chapter.
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Farms’ demand for regular labour is derived as follows. At low values of P (P < P), 
Ht = 0 (.*. HP = 0), i.e, the no-resale constraints are not binding; thereafter, the constraint 
becomes binding as the value of P rises. Hence, the demand curve for regular labour AA’B 
is first horizontal at the wage wp and then slopes downwards (this curve is the same as C’DE 
in figure 1) where wp is as defined earlier. The supply curve, on the other hand, is infinitely 
elastic at wp* (< w1); this is depicted by the line CD in figure 2. There is a unique 
equilibrium, with regular wage wp* and employment level P* (see figure 2). We conclude :
Proposition 4. For given values of {wcJ ,  there exists a unique equilibrium regular wage wp* 
such that wp. < 5^  [E(wct)/T].
Thus, in this model casual and regular labour contracts coexist as a mutually 
advantageous arrangement between risk-neutral farms and risk-averse workers.
2.2.4. An extension : A Model with Unemployment
It is easy to extend the preceding model to take involuntary unemployment into 
account. Involuntary unemployment occurs because there may be a constraint on the workers’ 
participation so that an individual willing to participate in the market may not be able to find 
one. To illustrate, consider the simple case where for casual labourers, there is a known 
probability pt of employment in each period t such that 0 < pt < 1. Farm’s demand for labour 
remains the same so that employer’s indifference condition (15) is still ensured.
We now have to modify Uc as follows:
V c = £[t/(H-0c.p0 ..........w £ .p M)] (2°)
Consequently, we modify workers’ indifference condition in that finding a casual job is not 
certain. On the contrary, there is a probability pt attached to the availability of casual 
employment in any period t. It is still the case that there exists a wage wp at which labourers 
are indifferent between casual and regular contracts and that wp, is lower than the average 
expected value of the casual wage. In fact, it is intuitively obvious that the regular wage at 
which the labourers’ indifference condition is satisfied is lower in the presence of involuntary 
unemployment than when there is full employment (for a given profile of casual wages).
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Proposition 5. The wage at which a labourer is indifferent between casual and regular 
contracts is lower in the presence of unemployment; the difference accounts for the premium 
for employment insurance to be paid by the regular labourers.
2.2.5. Comments
In the implicit contract framework, risk-neutral farms are willing to offer wage and 
employment insurance to risk-averse workers. In the process, farmers pay a regular wage 
which is less than the casual wage per period. A labourer is willing to give up his risk- 
premium in order to enjoy a stable income and employment. The casual-regular wage 
differential can also be interpreted as the marginal hoarding cost of regular labour.
Given a highly unequal distribution of land resources in the Indian villages, there are 
usually a few large farmers in the village while a majority of farms are small farms. Given 
this distribution of small and large farms, it is expected that only a few regular farm contracts 
are offered while casual contracts dominate the rural labour market. Most available empirical 
evidence obtained from different parts of India supports the prediction.
2.3. Shirking Model
In this section, we develop a shirking model of efficiency wages. The idea is as 
follows: differences in the nature of tasks induce farmers to offer regular contracts to perform 
the tasks difficult to supervise and ensure no-shirking in these tasks.
2.3.1. Non-Substitutability
As before, the production of a particular crop is considered. The production of the 
crop is organised over an infinite sequence of periods, where each period can be thought of 
as one season, including the harvest.
The analysis in this section differs from that in section 2.2 in that it is assumed that 
casual labour cannot be hired to perform certain tasks, called ’non-monitorable’ tasks for 
which neither the effort level nor the productivity level can be observed on the day of hiring. 
Casual labourers are exclusively hired to perform ’monitorable’ tasks such as harvesting.
Suppose each period involve tasks like soil preparation, tilling, irrigation, application 
of fertilizer, transplanting, weeding and harvesting. Some of these tasks like soil preparation, 
tilling, irrigation, application of fertilizer are difficult to supervise. For example, it is difficult
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to supervise how deep the blade has gone while tilling or whether the water flow into the 
field has properly been controlled while irrigating. Moreover, these are tasks which need 
considerable care and judgement. Hence, quality control is also important in these tasks. The 
latter is particularly important because the fruits of these tasks are realized only after the 
harvests. These tasks are called ’non-monitorable’ tasks15.
Tasks like harvesting, however, are easy to supervise. Moreover, given the simpler 
nature of these tasks and easier supervision, quality control is relatively easy, too; these are 
termed as the ’monitorable’ tasks16.
Employers hire regular labour to perform non-monitorable tasks. In a non- 
monitorable task, it is assumed that the labourer may or may not shirk. If the labourer shirks, 
it is assumed that he is caught and will be dismissed at the end of the period. Casual 
labourers are hired to perform monitorable tasks. The resulting outcome may be the 
coexistence of casual and regular contracts in equilibrium.
Given the problem of supervision, an employer may not be able to observe the actual 
effort level of the workers in non-monitorable tasks. Consequently, a regular labourer hired 
to perform these tasks may be tempted to shirk in these tasks (i.e., s/he may not offer the 
required effort level). To overcome this problem, an employer may use certain effort- 
augmenting schemes (see, Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984) to discipline labourers so that 
labourers, in their own best interests, take the actions that the employer wants them to do. 
The effort-augmenting scheme, in the model presented below, consists of offering a 
sufficiently high wage to regular labourers so that it is in their interest to avoid being fired.
2.3.2. Farms
On the employers’ side casual and regular labour are regarded as non-substitutable 
inputs in the production function since they perform different tasks. We consider an infinite 
sequence17 of periods where each period can be thought of as one season. Since P and ltc
15These tasks correspond to ’Type I’ tasks in Eswaran & Kotwal (1985a).
1(The distinction between these two types of task is closely related to the nature of the crop produced. For example, it 
is important to know whether the crop is irrigated or not. Irrigation is one major task where supervision is difficult and which 
is required at regular intervals throughout the growing season of the particular crop in question. It has also been found that 
usually regular farm servants are hired by large farmers in the production of irrigated crops.
17With a finite horizon, regular labourers always have an incentive to shirk during the last period; so the employers 
should fire them at the end of last-but-one period; but then labourers will have an incentive to shirk during the last-but-one 
period and so on. By recursion, the incentive mechanism breaks down if  we have finite horizon. Hence, we concern ourselves 
with an infinite production sequence.
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are not substitutable, we modify the production function of section 2.1. In this case, output 
net of harvest wages is given as follows.
Q '  = h ( P  ,  l , °  ; 9' , K )  (21)
where as before P is the amount of regular labour hired and ltc is the input of casual labour 
in period t. As before h(.) is the level of output net of harvest wages where h(.) is assumed 
to be concave, continuous and twice differentiable in its inputs. 0l is the uncertainty 
parameter in period t.
Farms are all assumed to be identical. They maximise the following expected profit:
M a x  it, = Y ,  S' E W p  • 1<C : 9' ■ *)] - E 8' (I7 + W ‘ C  l , C  +  w r  P ]  (22)
P , l,c I - 0 t - 0
Here wp is the regular wage per period and wct is the casual wage in period t (not stochastic), 
and 8  is the employers’ rate of discount Price per unit of output is normalized to unity. 
Profit maximisation with respect to P requires the fulfilment of the following condition :
= MPr (23)
where MPP can be interpreted as the average expected marginal product of regular labour.
Secondly, profit maximisation with respect to lct in each period t requires the 
following:
w,c = E(h,c) V r = 0 , 1 , 2  c24)
Given the problem of supervision in the non-monitorable tasks, wp needs to be large 
enough to ensure that regular labourers do not shirk. This takes us to the next section where 
we consider workers’ behaviour.
2.3.3. Workers
Workers are all assumed to be identical; they all dislike putting in effort (e), but
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enjoy consuming goods. It is further assumed that each worker either offers a zero level of 
effort (e = 0 ) or some fixed positive level of effort e = e > 0  in agricultural production18. 
There are non-monitorable and monitorable tasks to be performed. Efficient performance of 
any task requires e > 0 .
If a labourer chooses a regular contract, s/he receives a series of incomes (wp, wp, )
per period in return for an effort level e. If, however, a casual contract is chosen, the stream 
of income is (wc0, w^,....). The point of difference between casual and regular contracts, 
aside from the wage level, is that a labourer may shirk in the regular contract (offered to 
perform the non-monitorable tasks), but it is not possible to shirk in the casual contract for 
monitorable tasks.
Suppose the single-period utility function for an individual worker (with casual or 
regular contract) is given by :
where wj refers to the wage income of the j-th type contract, j = P, C accordingly as the 
worker is hired on a regular (indexed by P) or on a casual (indexed by C) basis, respectively. 
Let us further assume that the utility is separable. Then with suitable normalization, following 
Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), we may write the multi-period utility functions in the following 
forms19 :
Suppose the value of indirect utility (maximum utility to be derived subject to the 
budget constraint) for regular and casual workers are YP and Vc respectively where Vc is 
simply as follows:
u j = u j(wj , e) (25)
u p = u p ( wp - e , w p - e y ....) 
u c = u c (w0c -  e , w f  -  e , ....)
(26)
Vc = u c(w0c -  e, w f  -  e, .... ) (27)
l8More generally, it can easily be extended to the case where the required amount of effort level in each task et performed 
in period t is dependent on the particular task performed in period t.
19We assume that v ?  and e are both measured in money terms. This will enable us to write down the no-shirking 
condition explicitly in terms of the wage differential between casual and regular contracts.
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Given the problem of supervision in non-monitorable tasks, a regular labourer may or may 
not shirk. Assuming 8  to be the rate of discount for the labourers as well, the indirect utility 
of a non-shirker in regular employment will be :
Vp = (w p -  e) + 8 (w p -  e) + 82(w p -  e) + 
= -j-ij ( wp - e ) ; 0 < 8 < l
(28)
Next, consider the case of a shirker in regular employment We suppose that if 
someone shirks in any of the slack periods, say, (K - l)-th period, s/he will be caught and 
fired at the end of that period. Hence, the discounted utility o f a shirker in regular 
employment who decides to shirk in period (K - 1) will be given by:
Vp ~ ]fwP ~ e) + 8  ( w P -  e) + 82 (w p -e) +....+ 5* - 2 ( wp -  e)]
* + [s* v op * s**1 v or *....] (29>
= (w F -  - y " + 8* ' ‘w f + 8K — Vop
l - o  1 - 5
where VOP is the indirect utility derived from outside the regular employment.
It is easy to show that, it is in the interest of a regular labourer to shirk (and loose 
his/her job) in period K - 1, then it is even better for him/her to shirk in the preceding 
period, K - 2. By recursion, if a labourer shirks at all, it will be in the first period. Further 
it will be in the labourer’s interest to shirk in the first period, rather than not to shirk at all, 
if and only if the following condition is satisfied:
e > $(wp -  Vop) (30)
This condition has a straightforward intuitive interpretation. The left-hand side can be 
interpreted as the cost of postponing shirking by one period. The right-hand side is the 
benefit, in terms of additional utility (wp - V 0p) in the following period. If the cost is higher 
than the benefit, then the labourer decides not to postpone shirking, i.e., the labourer shirks.
It follows that, if the employers want to ensure that labourers do not shirk, they have 
to offer a wage wp at least equal to wp*, where 
This is the no-shirking condition.
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w p = y  + l  (31)w* OP ■g-
To illustrate, consider the case where the casual labour market is competitive, so that 
wtc = e for all t and there is no involuntary unemployment Then it can be assumed that a
fired regular labourer simply joins the casual labour market when Vop is as follows:
Vor = w,c -  e = 0 <32>
Hence, the no-shirking condition is modified to:
Since 0 < 5 < 1, the last equation implies that regular labourers receive higher wages than 
casual labourers.
2.3.4, Equilibrium
The equilibrium of the model is characterised as follows. We assume that the casual 
labour market is competitive, so that there is no involuntary unemployment and the wage rate 
for casual labour in each period is determined by supply and demand. The wage rate for 
regular labour, on the other hand, is derived from the no-shirking condition, as described in 
the preceding section. Given this wage rate, employers employ regular labour up to the point 
where wage equals marginal product (see equation (23)).
In terms of comparative statics, we can say that anything which leads to an increase 
in Vop (e.g., a tightening of the casual labour market leading to an increase in casual wages) 
will lead to an increase in regular wages, since employers will have to pay a higher wage in 
order to satisfy the no-shirking condition.
2.3.5. Comments
In this shirking model, differences in the nature of tasks generate a differentiation of 
labour contracts. In particular, it is argued that farms prefer to hire regular labour to perform 
non-monitorable tasks. In order for this to be feasible, employers have to pay a regular wage
48
sufficiently high that the no-shirking condition is satisfied. With a competitive casual labour 
market, this condition requires regular wages per period to be higher than casual wages.
Agarwal (1981) has observed that in the highly advanced area of Punjab, the primary 
function of regular farm servants is to help with irrigation. Binswanger et al. (1984) find that 
most regular farm servants in a number of south-Indian villages are involved in ploughing, 
a non-monitorable task. However, other studies (e.g., see, Breman, 1974; Bhalla, 1976; 
Bardhan & Rudra, 1981; Rudra, 1982b) report that regular farm servants are supposed to 
perform most agricultural tasks (as well as some non-agricultural tasks such as looking after 
the livestock, driving bullock carts or carrying harvests to the market, especially in the slack 
seasons when there is a low demand for labour). Thus, the basis of task-based differentiation 
of labour contracts may be rather weak. In chapter five, we shall attempt to test the 
hypothesis of task-based segmentation in the villages studied in the dissertation.
2.4. Collateral Model
Rural credit markets are segmented between formal and informal sectors (Binswanger 
et al., 1985). Formal credit is cheaper, but it requires collateral to be offered. Usually, land 
is the most acceptable form of collateral and landless households are unable to offer this 
collateral. Hence, they primarily borrow from the informal credit market where the marginal 
cost of credit is much higher. In this context, regular contracts can play a useful role of 
collateral substitute.
Casual labourers are usually paid daily. However, a major portion of regular wages 
are paid in advance when the contract begins. The amount of this advance is free of interest. 
Only if the amount of the advance exceeds the amount of total wage, an interest is charged 
on the additional amount which constitutes the loaa Thus, regular labour contracts with 
interest-free advance (credit) payment may solve the problem of credit access for the landless 
labourers where the labour contract with the employer substitutes for the collateral 
requirement.
2.4.1. Farms
Let us now go back to the original model as presented in section 2.1.2 where there 
is no production uncertainty in the slack periods, though there is uncertainty in the peak
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period. We also assume that casual wages are given exogenously. Production is organised 
over several slack and peak periods, t = 0, 1,..., T. Output and, therefore, profit are realized 
at the end of period T so that (1) remains the relevant production function.
Let r be the interest rate (i.e., discount rate) of the employers, Wp the regular wage, 
fully paid in advance and wtc the casual wage in current value in period t. Farms maximise 
the following expected present discounted value o f profits realized in period T net of harvest 
wages :
*5 = S, m> -  F  -  £  s, w,c i,c - w  P
' - o (34)
T -  1
= s, E{g(l0 , Z, , .. , lT_ , ; 0 , X)] -  F  -  £  W  [/, -  P]~ W r P
t - o
subject to the no-resale constraint that \  > P for all t  In (34), st is the discount factor for 
period t, i.e., st = (1 + r)_t. Hence, the Lagrangean of this constrained expected profit 
maximisation is :
L5Q  = £{g(l0 0 . K)] - F
-  E  s,w <c v ,  -  p ]  - w p p  -  n, (p  - 1,) (35)
t  -  0 t -  0
where ^  is the Lagrange multiplier for the no-resale constraint in period t.
Differentiating the Lagrangean (35) with respect to lt, we obtain:
i, E(g) -  s, w,c * vl, = 0 V ( = 0 , 1 T -l  (36)
where as before gt is the partial derivative of g(.) with respect to 
For the labour hiring periods,
pf = 0 so that st . E(g) = st . w,c (37)
However, for the labour surplus periods,
[it = st . wtc -  st . E(g) > 0 ; lt = P (38)
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Equations (37) and (38) determine labour demand lt* in each period t as follows:
(39)
where wc = {wcJ  is the vector of casual wages.
Differentiating (35) with respect to P, we obtain the following :
T  - 1
(40)
where (40) is the modified indifference condition of employers.
Let w be the value of Wp at which the employers’ indifference condition is satisfied, 
i.e., the right-hand side of (40) is zero. We can immediately derive :
2.4,2. Workers
Workers are all assumed to be identical with a discount rate 6  (which is also the 
interest rate faced by them) where workers’ discount rate 8  is assumed to be higher than that 
(r) of employers (i.e., 8  > r). This is because labourers have access to a different segment of 
the rural credit market Labourers may choose a regular or a casual contract. Regular 
labourers receive Wp at the beginning of the contract period. However, casual labourers 
receive wtc per period so that the present discounted value of the stream of casual income 
earned over T periods is Wc = Xt ul . wtc where Ut = (1 + 8)'1. If we now approximate utility 
derived from any contract by the stream of income earned net of harvest wages from the 
respective contract (this ignores risk-aversion, but it is easy to extend the results to take risk- 
aversion into account), we have:
T  - 1
* s E s, w<c -  E  m, (41)
t  -  0 f . P >  I,
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U p = W p
T -  1
w, w c
r -  0
U c = W c = Y , ut t
r - 1 (42)
Suppose w* be the regular wage at which workers are indifferent between casual and regular 
labour contracts. From (42), we have:
T -1
= Y,u, wtc
t - 0
2.4.3. Equilibrium
The Equilibrium is depicted in figure 3, where employment of regular labour is 
measured on the horizontal axis and the regular wage (paid in advance) on the vertical axis. 
Suppose casual wages are given exogenously. Then there exists a regular wage rate Wp = w* 
such that workers’ indifference condition holds good. On the other hand, employer’s 
indifference condition requires that at Wp = w, (41) holds good.
[Insert figure 3 (pp. 65) here]
Further, it is clear that, for small values of P (implying p* = 0 V t), w is larger than 
w*, since St > for all t. However, as P increases beyond P, \\ > 0 and labour demand 
declines accordingly. WW’ is the labour supply curve (derived from workers’ indifference 
condition). Much as in section 2.2, we have shown that there is a unique equilibrium, with 
Wp = w* and P = P*, involving coexistence of casual and regular contracts.
2.4.4. An Extension : Partial Advance Model
So far we have assumed that the total regular wage is paid in advance. Let us now 
consider the case where regular labourers receive a partial advance ’A’ in the beginning of 
the production period and then a wage wp each period.
Proposition 7. If 8  > r, employers prefer to pay regular wages in advance.
Under a partial advance scheme, workers’ indifference condition (43) is modified to
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the following:
T - 1
e  « k *  -f - o
W, = 0 (44)
where wPA* is the regular wage per period in current value at which a worker is indifferent 
between casual and regular contracts and is the workers’ discount factor (Ut = (1 + 5)'*). 
Similarly, employers’ indifference condition (41) is modified to the following :
T - l  T - l
A + £  s, = £  st wtc -  £  p, <45>
t - 0 t - 0 t : P>1.
where wp = wPA is the wage rate at which employers’ indifference is ensured and s* is the 
employers’ discount factor = (1 + r)'*).
It can be seen from workers’ and employers’ indifference conditions that under the 
partial advance scheme there is an inverse relationship between advance component ’A’ and 
wage component wp so that as wp increases, the amount of ’A’ to be paid declines. Given 
that 5 > r, St > ^  this means that the absolute marginal decrease in wp due to an increase in 
’A’ is higher for farmers (i.e., absolute slope of employer’s indifference curve) than that for 
labourers (i.e., absolute slope of labourer’s indifference curve). Hence, employers would 
prefer to increase the amount of advance until the point is reached when the total regular 
wage is paid in advance.
[Insert figure 4 (pp. 6 6 ) here]
This is shown in figure 4 where we plot advance ’A’ on the horizontal axis and regular wage 
wp per period on the vertical axis. AB is the worker’s indifference curve (whose absolute 
slope is Ut = l/a+8)1) and A’B’ is the employer’s indifference curve (whose absolute slope 
is st = l/(l+r)*) where 8  > r. Since St > t ,^ A’B’ is flatter than AB. (Aq, w p0)  is the 
combination of advance and wage payment which is as good for employers as for labourers. 
However, it can be seen from the figure that there exists an advance A’>Aq and a wage wp’ 
< wp0 (in the dotted area) which is strictly preferred by the employers.
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2,4.5. Comments
If the entire regular wage is paid in advance, the labourer may have the incentive to 
shirk without being worried to lose the wage payment per period since the payment for the 
contract period has already been made. If, however, employers have the problems to monitor 
labourers, a partial advance model may have the advantage in disciplining regular labourers. 
Empirical evidence suggests that in most cases a substantial portion of regular wage is paid 
in advance, the rest in several instalments (see further discussion in chapter four).
2.5. Time Constraint Model
The ownership of family land and/or non-land resources may impose a time 
constraint on the individual’s ability to offer labour-time in the market. Our final argument 
is related to a comparison of landed and landless labourers with respect to the labour time 
available for sale in the market. For example, a landed labourer needs to work on the family 
farm; members of households with some caste-occupations like toddy-tapping, stone-cutting, 
weaving, carpentry etc. may be required to devote some labour time in these family activities. 
In other words, under certain circumstances, a labourer may not be able to offer his entire 
non-leisure time in the market20.
2.5.1. Farms
As in section 2.1, assume that the production is organised by identical farms over a 
finite number of slack and peak periods. Farmers employ labour over different slack and peak 
periods such that marginal products are equal to respective wages. The basic model of section
2.1 is retained so far as farms are concerned. The difference is that here we introduce a 
discount factor. Employers’ indifference condition (12) is, therefore, modified to the 
following:
^ a sa n t (1984) points out that ’the labourer’s choice between attached and casual contracts may also be restricted for 
reasons other than his preferences’. Atkinson (1983) also argues that the family background has a significant effect on the 
occupational choice in the labour market
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E  E«, (46)
t : P > lt I - 0
where = (1 + 5)_t is the employers’ discount factor, 8  being their discount rate. In order to 
consider the nature of workers’ time constraint, we move on to the next section.
2.5.2. Workers
Suppose the potential labourers in the market are differentiated with respect to family 
landholding. We also assume that there are only two types of labourers available in the 
market, those who belong to the ’landed’ households and those who belong to the ’landless’ 
households. The choice of a contract will be determined by the relative net gain to be derived 
from each contract subject to the time constraint
Suppose that one unit of labour time is available in any period t, and is allocated 
between casual labour (Ect21) and other activities (1 - E^) in period t, t = 0,1,2,...,T-122. 
Suppose a regular job requires one to offer the whole of one’s labour time in the market 
while a casual job requires E^ < 1. In return, a regular job offers a stream of income
{w1*,...^} while a casual job offers {wc0, w^, w ^ .J  with a probability pt of getting a
casual job in any period t
A landless labourer is in a position to offer his entire labour time in the regular 
market in return for a wage payment wp per period. However, a landed labourer may devote 
labour time to casual labour and reserve Eft to be devoted to the family farm in period t (E^ 
+ E / < 1). Suppose s/he receives a share of family farm output, (wft . Eft) if he devotes time 
E / on family farming and earns (wtc . Et°) with a probability pt from casual labour.
Let us now compare the net rate of return accruing to a landed labourer from regular 
and casual contracts. If a landed labourer chooses a regular contract, s/he receives YLP while 
he receives Y1'0 from a casual contract.
21It is assumed here that each individual enjoys a constant amount of leisure time in each period.
“ As explained in section 2.1, we focus only on the slack periods 0,1,...,T-1. This is because we assume that in the peak 
period both casual and regular labourers receive a share of the harvests.
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T  -  1
yv
t - 0
T  -  1
(47)
t - 0
where is the workers’ discount factor (Ut = (1 + 8)**) as in section 2.4.2, 8  being the 
workers’ discount rate in period t)23. Suppose there exists a wage wp = wPL per period such 
that a landed labourer is indifferent between casual and regular contracts, which in turn, 
requires the following:
E  Kjp, • ™,C ■ E,C * W  ■ Ef]
(48)
E«,
Next we consider the net rates of return, YNP and YNC, accruing to a landless 
labourer from regular and casual contracts respectively.
YNP = Y u t w p
r _1, "° (49)
YNC = Y ,  • Pi • W ‘ Ct - o
If wp = wPN per period t is the regular wage at which a landless labourer is indifferent 
between casual and regular contacts, the following holds good :
w™ -  (50)
r  - 1
Remembering that E f  + E / = 1, (48) and (50) immediately imply the following:
^Note that here we assume that workers’ discount rate is the same as that of the employers.
Proposition 8. wPN < wPL if and only if wft > pt . wct.
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More precisely,
w PL _ WPN =
£  a, (w/ - p, w,c)E?
E«, ¥ 1  = 0 , 1 , 2  T -l  (51)
w PL > w PN iff w / > p, w /
It follows that given the initial resource distribution, the opportunity cost of 
precommitting time in regular contract is higher for landed labourers, if and only if the 
opportunity income of landed labourers from family farming per period is higher than the 
expected earnings of a landless labourer from casual employment when both devote the same 
labour time Etf. Under the circumstances, landless labourers will have a comparative 
advantage in regular jobs.
We can extend the same logic to argue that if the labourer has some alternative non­
farm employment opportunities like stone-cutting, weaving, sheep-grazing etc., in the family 
or elsewhere, s/he will have a higher reservation wage for regular labour than the one without 
these opportunities. In other words, labourers with the alternative employment opportunities 
(in the family or outside) will have a higher opportunity cost of precommitting time for 
regular jobs than those without. Hence, labourers without many alternative opportunities are 
more likely to be employed in the regular farm jobs simply because they are able to offer 
regular labour for a lower wage.
2.5.3. An Extension : Collateral Model with Time Constraints
Both the ’time constraint model’ and the ’collateral model’ suggest that, it is more 
attractive for landless labourers to choose regular contracts. Time constraint model argues 
that the opportunity cost of precommitting time is lower for landless labourers while 
collateral model argues that the marginal cost of credit is higher for landless labourers. In this 
section, we shall combine these arguments to establish that the choice of regular contracts 
by the poorer landless labourers not only satisfies the credit constraint in a segmented credit 
market, but also the time constraint. In doing so, we shall not only distinguish between farms 
and labourers, but also between landless and landed labourers with respect to their marginal
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cost of credit and opportunity cost of time.
As in the collateral model of section 2.4.1, we assume that the whole of regular wage 
Wp is paid in advance in the beginning of the period while casual wage wtc is paid per period 
t. The analysis of farms will be similar to that done in section 2.4.1 so that farm’s 
indifference requires the following :
T - l
E m, = E s ,  ■ w -c  - w (52)
t : P >  I.
where, as before, st is the employers’ discount factor.
Next we consider labourers. We distinguish between landless and landed workers 
with respect to their discount rates and the allocation of available time among alternative 
activities.
Let 6n and 8L be the discount rates (i.e., interest rates) of landless and landed 
labourers respectively such that the following inequality holds good:
5„ > 5L > r (53)
In the light of relative land distribution in rural India, we can justify inequality (53). It is 
reasonable to assume that employers own more land than landed labourers. Following Patnaik 
(1976), employers and landed labourers may be classified according to family land-labour 
ratio. Compared to landed labourers, employers have more land and, therefore, a higher land- 
labour (family labour) ratio so that they need to hire-in labour from the market to meet total 
labour demand. This means that landed labourers have a lower land-labour ratio so that their 
family earnings are not sufficient for survival. Landed labourers, may therefore, hire-out 
some labour-time in the market. Nevertheless, by virtue of their landownership, landed 
labourers are able to obtain some credit, though may not be to the same extent as that of an 
employer with larger land assets. In other words, the credit constraint is not at all binding for 
employers (because they have enough collateral to offer in the market), though it is so, at 
least to some extent, for landed labourers. However, due to their inability to offer land as 
collateral, landless labourers are not at all able to borrow from the formal credit market so 
that their discount rates are even higher than landed labourers.
Secondly, as already explained in the time constraint model, landed labourer may
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devote his/her time in the market as well as in the family farm. However, a landless 
labourer’s only option is to earn from market participation.
Taking account of both the time and credit constraints, the indifference conditions 
of landed and landless labourers can be modified as follows:
T - 1
Landless : W™ = pt . u,N . wtc
* - o (54)
T -  1
Landed : W[B = £  w/[p, . wtc . Etc + w f  . E,f]
t - o
where u^ = (1 + SjJ'1 and u^ = (1 + Sn)'1 are the discount factors of landed and landless 
labourers respectively such that utL > UtN. In (54), WPBN and WPBL are the regular wages (fully 
paid in advance) at which respectively landless and landed labourers are indifferent between 
casual and regular contracts. Definition of other variables are as before: pt is the probability 
of finding an alternative casual employment in period t, E^, E / are the time available for 
casual employment and family farming such that E^ + E/ < 1.
A comparison between WPBN and WPBL gives rise to the following expression :
T - l
-  W ?  = X) • p, • «'.C- E-C -  U.L ■ • E!  -  «<" • P, • W.C1 (55)
= E  [p< • W ' C ■ e ' C( u ' L -  O  + e K <*>1  ■ w < - u ”  ■ p , • vt,<c)]t - o
assuming E f  + E / = 1.
If, however, 8N = 6 l = 8 , u^ = UtN = Ut, (55) is modified to the following:
Wf* -  W™ =
T - l
Y ,  w, (w / -  P, • w,C) E,f (56)
A  comparison between (55) and (56) shows how with the assumption that 8n = 8 l  (i.e., there 
is no constraint on credit), the first term on the right hand side of (55) vanishes and equation 
(56) becomes comparable to (51) which, too, does not have the term relating to the cost of 
credit.
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Let us now analyse equation (55) which is more general than (56). Given 8N > 8L > 
0 (where pt, Etc > 0), u^ > u^. The first term on the right hand side of (55) is, therefore, 
always positive. This term reflects the differential effect of credit constraint between landed 
and landless labourers. Given a higher marginal cost of credit (i.e., higher discount rate) of 
landless labourers, present discounted value of expected casual earnings is higher for landed 
labourers if both landed and landless labourers devote the same time in the casual market. 
Depending on the opportunity employment prospects open to landed and landless labourers, 
the second term on the right hand side of (55) can either be positive or negative. Here 
(u^.w^ is the present discounted value of income a landed labourer receives from family 
farming while (11^ .pt. wtc) is the present discounted value of income a landless labourer 
expects to earn from casual jobs, if both devote the same labour time, namely, E/. In other 
words, the second term of (55) captures the differential income effect of available alternative 
employment opportunities accruing to landed and landless labourers. Depending on the sign 
and magnitude of the second term of (55), the following cases may arise:
(a) The second term is positive, if wtf > pt (uN/uLt) wtc. In other words, if the present 
discounted value of income earned by a landed labourer from the family farming is higher 
than the present discounted value of expected income a landless labourer earns from casual 
employment (when both devote the same labour time) per period, left hand side of (55) is 
positive.
(b) If, however, wtf < pt . (uN/uLt) . wtc for all t (i.e., when the second term is 
negative), total effect of time and credit constraints (sum total of the two terms on the right 
hand side of (55)) may still be positive, if and only if the first term on the right hand side 
of (55) is sufficiently large, i.e., if and only if the present discounted value of casual wages 
is sufficiently greater for landed labourers.
(c) If, on the other hand, the negative effect of the second term (i.e., present 
discounted value of expected income of a landless labourer from casual employment is higher 
than that earned by a landed labourer from the family farming when both devote E/ labour 
time) is greater than the positive effect of the first, left hand side of (55) will be negative. 
It is, however, unlikely that the negative effect of the second term would be so large so as 
to outweigh the positive effect of the first term.
In both cases (a) and (b), the cost of precommitting labour time in regular jobs is 
higher for landed labourers. In other words, regular contracts with wage advance are likely 
to be particularly attractive to landless labourers, given their higher marginal cost of credit 
and lower opportunity cost of time.
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Conclusion
Rural labour markets in India are diverse and complex. Empirical evidence suggests 
different stylised facts. Different models focus on different aspects of these labour markets. 
However, a general equilibrium model of contractual choice explaining all the stylised facts, 
is yet to be developed.
The chapter introduces a general theoretical model to explain the choice of casual and 
regular contracts in Indian agriculture. The central theme here is to identify the seasonality 
of agricultural production and to introduce the concept of ’hoarding costs’ of maintaining a 
steady pool of regular labour. Subsequently, the general model is modified to incorporate the 
arguments of the implicit contract model, shirking model, collateral model and the time 
constraint model so as to explain different stylised facts (see chapter one).
As mentioned in the review of literature in chapter 1, there is a group of models 
labelled as ’nutrition-based efficiency wage models’ (e.g., see Guha, 1989; Dasgupta, 1993a, 
1993b). These models argue that higher wages raise productivity. However, employers are 
able to reap the benefits of higher efficiency only at a later date. This is because the effects 
of higher wages on strength and energy of the workers would be felt after weeks and not 
within a day or two. What it means is that employers would have the incentive to pay higher 
efficiency wages only to regular labourers working on a longer term basis.
A number of shortcomings of the nutrition-productivity argument may be cited for 
the exclusion of these models:
(i) Empirical studies find that earnings from regular labour are lower than earnings 
from casual labour, even after taking into account involuntary unemployment in the casual 
labour market (see our discussion in chapter four). This raises doubt as to the validity of the 
nutrition argument (which requires daily regular wages are higher) in explaining labour 
market phenomena in India.
(ii) Bardhan (1984a) finds that regular wages respond to the changes in the demand 
and productivity conditions which contradicts the nutrition-based efficiency wage argument.
Dasgupta (1993a) attempts to redress these and other criticisms. In chapter 16 of his 
book, he has developed a two-period model where production is organised over the slack and 
peak periods to establish the coexistence of casual and regular contracts in the village labour 
market. In his framework, peak period’s productivity is a function of consumption in these 
two periods and productivity in the peak period is positive if consumption is greater than the 
maintenance requirement in the peak period. Workers’ reservation wage depends not only on 
their family landholdings, but also on the earnings from the village common property
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resources. The level of nutrition from the commons is a positive function of the quality of 
the commons and a negative function of the number of people living on it. Marginal increase 
in the productivity of the commons or a decrease in the size of the population, therefore, 
leads to an increase in casual wages. He, therefore, argues that in any cross-section of 
villages those possessing a richer stock of common property resources per person during the 
slack seasons are the ones that would be expected to sustain higher casual wages during the 
busy season.
In addition to the shortcomings already mentioned, two major weaknesses of the two- 
period model are:
(a) He argues that mobility costs are so high in the village economy that migration 
of labour from the less prosperous village to the more prosperous ones are absent which, to 
some extent, contradicts Mukhopadhyay (1987). Mukhopadhyay has, in fact, argued that 
long-distance migration is more common in the Indian villages so that cost/distance seems 
to be a less deterrent (see discussion in chapter four). This contradicts his assumption that 
population density is geographically uniform.
(b) Even if we assume away migration, birth rate or morbidity rate of labourers living 
on the commons may have significant effect in equalising wages across villages in this two- 
period model. It may be argued that given higher nutrition in the villages with more earnings 
from the commons, death rates are lower as compared to those with less income from the 
commons. Thus, in the long run through the process of natural selection, wages may be 
equalised.
Bliss and Stern (1978) find ’the incidence (of permanent contracts) does seem very 
much less than would be predicted by the theory, for many parts of India and, certainly in 
the part of West U.P., where we were working’. If the wage-productivity relationship is 
strong enough, it should be universal. But only a minority of labour contracts in different 
parts of India are of regular variety24, the majority being of casual nature. In view of all 
these evidences, we abstain from incorporating this nutrition-productivity nexus into our 
analysis.
However, during my field surveys, I have noticed that there is a general consideration 
among farmers to discipline labourers so as to minimise shirking. This has been unanimously 
supported in our interviews. The idea is captured in the ’shirking model’ where we argue that 
employment of regular labour in certain tasks help employers to induce the required effort
“ Using 27th round NSS data, Bardhan (1984a) finds that only 18% of total labourers can be labelled as the regular or 
attached labourers.
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has been used. Empirical evidence may show that daily regular wages are lower than daily 
casual wages (see chapter four); but the additional facilities (credit, bonus/gift etc.) offered 
in the regular contract may play a significant role to discipline regular labourers, especially 
when these additional facilities are otherwise difficult to obtain. We shall consider the 
empirical validity of the argument in chapters four and five.
In modelling the rural contractual arrangements, usually the farms’ demand for labour 
has been emphasized which ignores the workers’ preference pattern. The implicit contract 
model with hoarding costs and the shirking model have been developed here in this tradition. 
Nevertheless, there is growing evidence of the strength of the labour supply in determining 
the nature of contractual arrangements in rural India (Basant, 1984; Walker and Ryan, 1990). 
The ’collateral model’ and the ’time constraint model’ may throw some light in this regard. 
The analysis shows how given risk-aversion, time constraint and credit constraint of workers, 
the comparative advantage of risk-averse landless labourers lies in the choice of regular 
contracts. These notions had originated from my field surveys in Aurepalle (one of the 
villages under ICRISAT’s study) during 1991 and 1992. During the interviews, a number of 
labourers frankly told that they participated in regular contracts because they are rationed in 
the credit market. Regular contract with the employer gives them ready access to credit 
(advance payment). More interestingly, I met some labourers who admitted that they will 
eventually go back to their family business once their credit need would be over.
Finally, it is to be noted that there are some other factors which are not considered 
here and which may also affect the choice of labour contract such as institutional 
interventions in the labour market (state, workers’ organisations), the impact of technical 
change (particularly mechanisation) and the importance of traditional norms in hiring 
decisions (having a regular labourer provides prestige/status to the employer. Some of these 
issues will be considered in chapter seven, in the light of empirical evidence from rural India.
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CHAPTER 3. CASUAL AND REGULAR CONTRACTS :
A CASE STUDY
DESCRIPTION OF THE STUDY VILLAGES, ENUMERATION OF THE DATA­
SET AND CLASSIFICATION OF FARMS
This chapter deals with the description of the study villages, enumeration of the data­
set and classification of sample farms/households. The chapter is divided into two sections
3.1 and 3.2. Section 3.1 deals with the enumeration of the data-set and the construction of 
variables used in the analysis while section 3.2 considers the classification of sample farms 
according to the distribution of land and non-land resources in the study villages.
3.1. Description of the Study Villages and Enumeration of the Data-Set
The section is developed as follows. Section 3.1.1 discusses the significance of the 
data-set while section 3.1.2 describes the socio-economic characteristics of the study villages. 
In section 3.1.3, the variables used for the analysis in this dissertation are described. The 
primary data-set consists of the data collected by the International Crop Research Institute 
for the Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT) situated in India. The original data-set is supplemented 
by two successive resurveys of one of the study villages (Aurepalle) which I have carried out 
in the winters of 1991 and 1992; these are discussed in section 3.1.4. The section concludes 
with a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of the data-set in our analysis.
3.1.1. Data-Set and Its Significance
Once the analytical framework had been defined, an appropriate data-set was required 
to test the proposed hypotheses. However, given the time and cost constraints, I was unable 
to conduct my own survey. Hence, I looked for an already existing cross-sectional data-set. 
There were not many systematically maintained cross-section village studies in India. In 
addition, there were problems of availability of the existing data-set. The selection of the 
data-set, therefore, involved a considerable amount of search costs. Once the pilot-search was 
over, I was left with three options : (i) data collected from the north Indian village of
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Palanpur by Bliss and Stem (1982), (ii) Rudra’s study of the villages in West Bengal (1982b) 
and (iii) the ICRISAT village study. My primary difficulty with the Palanpur data arose from 
the fact that there were no regular farm contracts available in Palanpur (Dr&ze & Mukheijee, 
1987). In Rudra’s data, the village was taken as the unit of account I, however, intended to 
study the choice of contract at the individual level. This naturally led to the choice of the 
ICRISAT data set which has been used in a number of studies (e.g., see Walker & Ryan, 
1990).
Since 1975, ICRISAT has been involved in village level studies (VLS) to analyse the 
socioeconomic, agro-biological and institutional constraints to agricultural development in the 
semi-arid tropical (SAT) areas of India. Information gathered from such village studies helps 
in recommending technology which is feasible and acceptable to the farmers. Since the main 
purpose of the VLS is to understand the traditional farming systems in different agroclimatic 
zones, five districts representing major agroclimatic zones within the SAT of India are 
purposively selected. The basic factors considered for the selection of the districts are soil 
types, pattern of rainfall and relative importance of crops like sorghum, pearl millet, pulses 
and groundnuts - crops in which ICRISAT is primarily interested.
The data-set covers wide-ranging aspects of traditional farming households, and is 
unique in many ways.
(i) This is one of the few systematically maintained agricultural data-sets in a 
developing country covering a cross-section of farming households across a number of 
villages and over a period of 10 years. Hence, it allows both a comparison of sample 
households across villages and also a comparison over time.
(ii) It gives information not only about the cultivation and participation behaviour of 
the sample households, but also about the income and consumption expenditure of these 
households.
(iii) Cultivation particulars include highly disaggregated plot-wise and task-wise 
input-output details (in quantity as well as in value terms) covering a wide range of 
traditional and modem inputs used among the sample households belonging to different 
landholding classes.
(iv) The data-set is rich in the information that it provides about the asset structure 
of the farming households. It looks at the ownership of various farm and non-farm assets as 
well as the financial assets of the sample households over a period of ten years, which is not 
available in many studies.
In addition, we make use of the resurvey data collected by ICRISAT from the study
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villages in 1989 which offers a more recent set of information; this has been useful in our 
study of the evolution of contracts in the study villages. Original information is further 
supplemented by my visits to Aurepalle (one of the ICRISAT villages) in January 1991 and 
then again in January 1992 (see our discussion later in this chapter) which sheds light on the 
family background of the regular farm servants.
3.1.2. Characteristic Features o f the Study Villages
Originally, ICRISAT had chosen six villages from different agroclimatic zones. These 
are Aurepalle and Dokur in the Mahboob Nagar district of Andhra Pradesh, Shirapur and 
Kalman in the Sholapur district and Kanzara and Kinkheda in the Akola district of 
Maharashtra. Later, Dokur was dropped from ICRISAT studies; moreover, the information 
from Kalman and Kinkheda was not regularly maintained after 1978-79. Hence, for the 
purpose of the study in this dissertation, we shall focus on the information collected from 
three of these ICRISAT villages, namely, Aurepalle, Shirapur and Kanzara. The basic 
features of these selected villages are summarised in table 1.2.
The choice of these villages is guided by the following factors : (i) Data for these 
villages has been consistently maintained for the entire period (1975-84). (ii) These villages 
are in three different agroclimatic regions of the semi-arid tropics (situated in different states 
of India) and, hence, they allow interesting inter-village comparisons of household behaviour 
over the years.
3.1.2.1. Agro-economic Characteristics
’ Aurepalle’ is situated in the Mahboob Nagar district of Andhra Pradesh. The average 
annual rainfall is around 700 mm. and the variance of this rainfall is quite high; in 1980 the 
rainfall was 457 mm. while in 1978 it was 1010 mm. Most rainfall is concentrated in the 
months of June to September. Although dry, the region has supported a considerable amount 
of rice cultivation with the help of tank and well irrigation for a long time. March through 
May are the months of field preparation in dry lands. Kharif planting1 begins in June and 
continues until the second week of July. Farmers are busy with interculturing (usually 
sorghum-pearl millet-pigeonpea) during July and September. Kharif crops are generally 
harvested during the months of October-November (early). Rabi cropping starts in
‘If a crop is planted early June to August, it should be treated as a kharif crop irrespective of the harvesting 
date. Similarly, if any crop is planted after September and harvested before March/April, it is a rabi crop. Any 
crop planted after the rabi in the months of March/April is treated as a summer crop.
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September-October and crops are harvested in January-February. Kharif paddy is planted in 
June-July and harvested in November-December while rabi paddy is planted in December- 
January and is harvested in March-April.
In Aurepalle most wages (daily as well as regular) are paid in kind - 5-6 kgs. of 
paddy to men and 3-4 kgs. of paddy to women per day. The male-female distinction is 
pronounced in the casual labour market. Labour income is predominantly derived within the 
village from the agricultural labour market. Besides landless households, small and medium 
farmers also participate in the village labour market.
’Shirapur' is situated in the Sholapur district of Maharashtra state. The region has 
remained an area of drought and scarcity for most of its history. Periodic famines and relief 
works are part of its recorded history. Under British rule, Sholapur city has gained gradual 
importance as being one of the centres of the cotton textile industry and contributed largely 
to the employment opportunities of the region. Sholapur district has a bimodal rainfall pattern 
with an annual average rainfall of less than 700 mm. The first peak appears in the month of 
June while the second phase starts in the month of September. It is difficult to work in the 
deep black soils after the heavy rain in June. If the rain is not sufficient in June, the soil will 
not be charged with moisture and crops may fail; if there are excess rains, waterlogging may 
spoil the harvest. Moreover, if there is excess rainfall for a prolonged time in September, it 
may harm the flowering of the kharif crops. Because of the erratic pattern of rainfall in the 
area, rabi cropping offers more assured crop prospects than kharif cropping. Consequently, 
rabi crops are the most important ones in the region. On an average, 64% of the gross 
cropped area is sown in the post-monsoon season. Summer crops are negligible. 
Intercropping is practised by all farmers. About 3 to 4 crops are mixed in a single plot. 
Pigeon-pea, pearl-millet, hybrid sorghum, paddy, ground-nut, maize etc. are grown during 
the kharif season whereas local and hybrid sorghum, chickpea, safflower, wheat are grown 
in the rabi season.
The third village included in our study is 'Kanzara'. It is situated in the Akola 
district of Maharashtra. The district had always been intensely cultivated and was famous for 
growing cotton. After 1867, the construction of railways encouraged the extension of the area 
under cotton by 50%. Murtizapur (which is 8 km. north of Kanzara), the taluka head quarter 
had seven cotton presses and ten ginning factories. Akola region has three distinct seasons 
: (i) hot season (February-June), (ii) rainy season (June-October) and (iii) cold season 
(October-January). The rainy season begins with the arrival of the monsoon in the second 
week of June and continues till the end of September. In comparison to the other two
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villages, Akola region is a more assured rainfall area. The average annual rainfall in Kanzara 
is 995 mm. The maximum rainfall is usually received in the month of July. With the onset 
of the monsoon, farmers begin kharif planting (around the third week of June). Major kharif 
crops are cotton, pigeon-pea, hybrid sorghum, groundnut, mung and urad. Rabi cropping 
starts soon after the kharif harvesting of mung, hybrid sorghum and paddy in October. 
Harvesting of wheat and chick-pea is finished by the third week of February. From March 
until the onset of the monsoon, farmers prepare their fields for the next kharif season. This 
is a relatively relaxing period for the farmers.
There are three distinct seasons in all these villages, namely, kharif (rainy season), 
rabi (winter) and summer. However, given the variation of climatic condition among the 
study villages, kharif is the main crop in Aurepalle (67.6% of the plots have been sowed) and 
Kanzara (85.3% of the plots have been sowed) while rabi is the main crop in Shirapur 
(59.8% of the sample plots have been sowed).
3.I.2.2. Socio-Economic Characteristics
As many as 22 castes exist in Aurepalle. Caste norms are strictly followed in the 
village even today. The higher caste people do not allow scheduled caste (Mala and Madiga) 
families to work in their houses, but hire them to work in their fields. The traditional 
occupation of the Malas is participation in agricultural wage employment while Madigas are 
leather-workers by tradition2. At present, regular farm servants (RFS) in the village primarily 
come from Madiga castes; sometimes Mala and/or Gowda (toddy-tappers by tradition) also 
participate in the regular market. Even in the daily labour market, labour is supplied mainly 
by these two castes - Mala and Madiga; the importance of caste in labour market 
participation is quite unique to this village.
There are different castes in Shirapur; but the caste norms are not as strict as in 
Aurepalle (Walker & Ryan, 1990). The most obvious caste distinction is that made between 
the Harijans (Mahar, Huler, Cobbler and Musician) and the upper castes. There are no 
physical barriers between the communities and many a Maratha and shepherd family has 
Harijan neighbours. A majority of the wage labour comes from the landless labour 
households who belong to Harijan families. However, no caste-based participation is observed 
in the regular farm labour market in the village.
There are 14 castes in Kanzara. Like Shirapur, the most obvious caste distinction is 
between Maratha (the highest caste) and the Mahar and Mang (the lowest castes). Caste
2For a further discussion, see section 3.2.4.
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barriers are much weaker nowadays than they used to be.
Fanning in Kanzara is carried on by both men and women. Ploughing, harrowing and 
hoeing are performed by males only while weeding and picking (cotton) are exclusively done 
by females. Harvesting and threshing are performed by both sexes. This sex-based 
segmentation of agricultural operations is prevalent in the other two study villages as well. 
For example, in Aurepalle, transplanting and weeding are the two operations exclusively done 
by women labourers while ploughing, harrowing and hoeing are usually reserved for male 
labourers. Harvesting and threshing are carried out by both men and women. In Shirapur, too, 
many agricultural daily-rated tasks are sex-specific in a very similar way - men plough and 
women transplant and weed. However, in all three villages, regular farm servants are 
predominantly male members3.
3.123 . Tenancy Versus. Regular Contracts
So far, we have only considered the types of wage labour prevailing in the study 
villages. This overshadows the issue of tenancy. This sub-section, therefore, analyses the 
incidence of tenancy in relation to regular labour contracts in the study villages4.
Tenancy and regular farm contracts are two variants of the long-term land-labour 
arrangement as against the short-term one (daily or piece-rate). Both of these contracts are 
agreed upon for a stipulated period of time. In the case of regular contracts, labourers work 
on the employer’s (who is also the landlord) land under his guidance and supervision at a 
fixed wage rate (agreed upon by both the parties). In the case of tenancy, however, tenants 
cultivate landlords’ land on their own and they are co-claimants of the residual profit. The 
advantage with tenancy is that the tenant has a share in the residual profit so that he has an 
incentive to put in the right amount of effort. In the case of wage labour, however, no­
shirking is to be ensured by monitoring or some other incentive mechanism which may be 
expensive.
In the semi-arid tropics of India, the incidence of tenancy varies from one region to 
another. However, it is most common in the drought-prone Sholapur villages5. In contrast, 
only about one field in twenty is cultivated by a tenant in Aurepalle. Although both share­
3 Given our direct interests, we abstain from analysing the male-female division in the labour market, apart 
from indicating some of the sex-specific features of the rural labour markets. Some discussion can be found in 
(K. Bardhan, 1977a, 1977b, 1977c).
^here is a vast literature on tenancy arrangement, but the link between tenancy and wage-labour contract 
is not much discussed (Hayami and Otsuka, 1988).
5This section is based on Jodha (1981), Shaban (1985, 1987) and Walker & Ryan (1990).
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cropping and fixed-renting exist in each village, share-cropping is more prevalent in Shirapur 
than in Aurepalle. On the other hand, fixed-renting is relatively commoner in Aurepalle 
because of the larger proportion of absentee landlords in the village. Because of the difficulty 
of supervising the sharecropped area, absentee landlords ensure a fixed income from land, 
by offering a fixed-rent tenancy (see table 1.2.3).
A common feature of tenancy in the study villages is the short duration of the lease. 
In most cases (share-cropping or fixed renting), the duration of leasing-out in any of these 
study villages is one crop season. This is due to influence of the tenancy legislation Act. 
Landowners are aware of the threat of losing their land to the tenants with leases of longer 
duration. Consequently, there is a virtual abolition of longer-term tenurial contracts such as 
’Rehan’6 tenancy in Aurepalle. No cases of ’Rehan’ were reported among the respondents 
from 1975 to 1985.
Even in the face of tenancy legislation, the incidence of tenancy (though of shorter 
duration) is found to be a common way of tying long-term labour to land in Shirapur, but 
not so much in Aurepalle or Kanzara (where long-term labour contracts are more common). 
The obvious question that arises is why tenancy is replacing regular contracts more in 
Shirapur and less in Aurepalle or Kanzara. The plausible reasons are as follows : (i) Shirapur 
is situated in the drought-prone area of Sholapur where the risk of crop failure is higher than 
in Aurepalle or Kanzara. This acts as a disincentive to the employer to invest in agriculture. 
They would prefer some arrangement where the risk is shared with others. Under the 
circumstances, share-cropping arrangements suit the needs of both the landlord and tenants 
to help carry out agricultural production, (ii) The incidence of tenancy has been, to some 
extent, brought about by the farmers’ effort of allotting bullocks to land (also, see Pant, 
1985). The 1971-73 drought in Shirapur has led to increased mortality among bullocks. 
However, following the drought, many households could not/did not buy bullocks to re­
initiate cultivation. Moreover, due to the increased price of fodder, many households are 
forced to sell their bullocks. In other words, risk-sharing and resource adjustment on land 
may be two major justifications for farmers in Shirapur to use tenancy more than wage- 
labour.
As already mentioned, shorter-duration tenancy contracts are usually preferred in 
order to avoid tenants’ ownership rights laid out in tenancy legislations. If, however, the 
landlord is an absentee one or if the landlord is old or there are some kinship ties, land may 
also be leased out for a longer duration. Usually, a share-cropping arrangement is made
6In this case the owner used to sign over the cultivation rights of the land to the tenant in exchange for a loan.
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between landlords and tenants in the case of short-period lease where the tenant’s share 
varies between 50% to 75% of the output depending on the arrangement of input allocation. 
On the other hand, a fixed-rent contract is executed if the lease is for a longer duration.
3.13. ICRISAT Data-Set
The ICRISAT sample consists of forty randomly selected households from each 
village, ten each from four different categories of households, namely, labour, small farmers, 
medium farmers and large farmers denoted by the numbers 0, 1, 2 and 3 respectively. Table 
1.37 shows the classification of three farming classes (denoted by the numbers 1, 2 and 3) 
in the study villages.
For labour households a random selection of ten households is made amongst those 
who operate less than 0 .2  ha.8 of land and who hire themselves out as labourers (as primary 
occupation). In the case of farm households, the purpose is to give a proper representation 
to small, medium and large farmers. In view of the different land-man ratios and the wide 
variation in average size of operational landholding and land-productivity differences among 
the selected villages, different criteria have been chosen for the classification of farm-size 
groups for each study village. For example, farmers classified as ’large’ in Shirapur and 
Kanzara hold more land than those in Aurepalle.
The analysis in the dissertation is primarily based on the situation prevailing in the 
study villages during the second half of ICRISAT’s study, namely, 1980 to 1984. Most of 
our empirical analysis refers to this period, unless otherwise stated. All the variables in value 
terms have been reduced to a base year of 1960-61 = 100 using the appropriate index number 
(described in the relevant sections).
The choice of the period is, to some extent, decided by the fact that most of the work 
on ICRISAT data is based on the first phase of ICRISAT village level studies (VLS), 
namely, 1975/76-79/80 or the whole ten-year period (1975-84). Moreover, since 1979 there 
are changes in some of the VLS schedules. Hence, I intend to focus primarily on the second 
phase of the VLS data at ICRISAT, i.e., the period 1980 to 1984.
As already mentioned, two additional data-sets will be used to supplement the 
original information. These are the resurvey data collected by the ICRISAT in 1989 from all 
three study villages, and the resurvey data collected by me from Aurepalle in 1991 and 1992
7Here the terms ’farms’ and ’households’ are used interchangeably. Each consists of a number of members, 
taking part in the production (in the family or elsewhere) as well as consumption activities.
T he conversion factor between hectares and acres is as follows: 1 ha. = 2.5 acres.
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(see section 3.1.4).
Information about various aspects of traditional fanning practices and household 
economies was collected through 12 specifically designed work sheets/schedules as follows:
(i) VLS-C : Household Member Schedule
(ii) VLS-E, F, G, N, P : General Endowment Schedules
(iii) VLS-K : Labour, Draft Animal and Major Machinery Utilization Schedule
(iv) VLS-Y : Plot and Cultivation Schedule
(v) YLS-L : Household Transaction Schedule
The variables used for the analysis have been constructed from these schedules. A 
brief account of the method of constructing these variables is given here.
3.I.3.I. VLS-C : Household Member Schedule
The VLS-C schedule is designed to collect demographic, educational and related
details of the individual members in the sample9. This schedule is recorded at regular
intervals to register the change in household composition in each year. It contains the
personal characteristics of each member of the household10. The schedule is adjusted to
consider each member once a year. If there is a change of status (e.g., if the member left the
household or re-entered) after the rabi (second) season, s/he is not included. With this
adjustment, the following variables are constructed for each village and for each agricultural
year during the period 1980-84 :
TYPE = 1 if LHCLASS = 2, 3 
= 0 if LHCLASS = 0, 1 .
AGE = Age of the i-th individual in years
9If a sample household migrates permanently, a substitute household is randomly selected from the same 
group of households in the village. But when a household migrates temporarily, no substitute household is 
selected. All the information from the temporarily migrated household continues to be collected with a note in 
remark columns, if in any round of the survey a household is not available in the village. There is no observation 
in the VLS-C but a line is coded with the household identification and date, keeping other columns blank.
For division of household (splitting of family), all members not belonging to the subgroup (split family) 
of the leading household member (father, eldest son etc.) are coded as leaving the sample household, with 
appropriate recording in the appropriate schedule. Landholdings and other capital assets that are divided are 
adjusted accordingly and information in other schedules are collected for the main family as the sample 
household.
In each village, thirty households from the cultivator group and ten households from the labour group were 
randomly selected; hence the sampling fractions are not the same for these two groups.
1(>rhere are also additional details about family members residing outside like their place of work, purpose, 
frequency of visits in the village, remittances.
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SQAGE = Square of age.
MALEORN = 1 if the i-th individual is a male 
= 0  if female
EDUCAORN = 1 if the i-th individual is going/has gone to school 
= 0  if illiterate
ABLEORN = 1 if the i-th individual has no physical disability 
= 0  otherwise.
Members of the household who are at or above the age of six years and sell labour
in farm and/or non-farm activities are called casual labourers. Hence, the VLS-C schedule
provides the personal details of the group of casual labourers in the study villages.
Information about regular farm servants are also included in this schedule. The
following variables are constructed for each village for a pool of regular labourers hired
between 1980 and 1984.
AGE = Age in years 
SQAGE = Square of age 
MALEORN = 1 if the i-th labour is male 
= 0  otherwise 
EDUCAORN = 1 if the i-th labour is literate 
= 0  otherwise
3.13 2 .  VLS-E, F, G, N, P Schedule
This is a broader group of five schedules which are normally collected once a year 
in the beginning of July. These schedules are coded separately under different names as given 
below. We shall, however, make use of VLS-E, VLS-F and VLS-P schedules only for our 
purpose; we do not need to use the information contained in VLS-G and VLS-N schedules.
Name of the Schedule Schedule Code
Animal Inventory Schedule E
Farm Implement Inventory Schedule F
Farm Building Inventory Schedule G
Stock Inventory Schedule N
Credit and Debt Schedule P
VLS-E : Animal Inventory Schedule
The VLS-E schedule contains information about the ownership and value of the
livestock ranging from cattle-bullock-buffalo to sheep-goat, cock-hen and pig as well as the
stocks and values of the animal products (after deflating by the state-wise consumer price
index constructed for miscellaneous items for the agricultural population at 1960-61 prices).
For the purpose of analysis, the following variables are constructed from this schedule.
OBULVA = Value of the cattle, bullock and buffalo owned by the farm at 1960-61 prices 
OTHBULVA = Value of the other animals owned by the farm at 1960-61 prices.
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VLS-F : Farm Implement Inventory Schedule
The VLS-F schedule contains information about all major implements and minor 
farm/non-farm machineries. For major implements and machineries, the number and values 
of the machine/implement concerned are recorded. For minor implements, where several 
types of tools are involved, it is sufficient to record their total value. The following variables 
are computed for each year in each of the study villages (after deflating by the state-wise 
consumer price index constructed for miscellaneous items for the agricultural population at 
1960-61 prices)
TNIREQ = Value of traditional non-irrigation equipments at 1960-61 prices.
MNIREQ = Value of modem non-irrigation equipments 
IREQ = Value of irrigation equipments (modem + traditional)
NFDCEQ = Value of non-food crop equipments (like sugar-cane crusher, oil extractors etc.) 
NFMEQ = Value of non-farm equipments (like those used in handicrafts)
SEQVAL = Total value of different farm and non-farm equipments owned by the sample 
households
PCTFEQVA = Proportion of farm equipments in the total value of different farm and non­
farm equipments.
VLS-P : Credit and Debt Schedule
The VLS-P schedule records different financial items (and their values) like credit
(or debt), deposit, savings, insurance policies held by the sample households for different
purposes during each year of the study period. First, the following variables in value terms
(after deflating by the statewise consumer price index for general items for the agricultural
population at 1960-61 prices) are constructed for each household.
CREDIT - Amount of credit outstanding (to different partners of the transaction including 
that lent to regular farm servants)
DEBT - Amount of debt
DEPOSIT - Amount of deposit
SAVINGS - Amount of savings
LIC - Amounts invested in insurance
FINAST - Amount of other financial assets, if any.
TFINASTVA = CREDIT + DEPOSIT + SAVINGS + LIC + FINAST
PCTCDT - Proportion of credit offered to different partners in the total value of different
financial assets.
Secondly, these financial items are aggregated according to the source. In this respect, 
we divide the source into two categories : (i) Amounts lent to or borrowed from the 
organised credit market, namely, the government (local or state), the co-operatives, 
commercial banks etc.; (ii) Amounts lent to or borrowed from the informal credit market, 
namely, village moneylender, friends, relatives etc. Accordingly, the following variables are
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constructed (1960-61=100) for each household for each year :
TCREDIT - Total amount of credit outstanding
TDEBT - Total amount of debt to be repaid
PCTDFML - Proportion of total debt from the formal source.
3.13.3. VLS-K : Labour, Draft Animal and Major Machinery Utilization Schedule
The purpose of the VLS-K schedule is to record the resource utilization of the
members of the sample households in the casual labour market at regular intervals. The
investigators interviewed sample households every two to three weeks to elicit information.
With reference to the day of the interview, we have information about the days worked on
own farm, others’ farms, other non-farm or governmental projects, days involuntarily
unemployed etc. From the available information, a series of aggregated participation
variables11 are computed for each year :
SOWNFWD - Total number of days worked on own farm 
SFDAY - Total number of days worked on others’ farms 
SNFDAY - Total number of days spent on non-farm work 
SGDAY - Total number of days spent on government work 
SUNEMP - Total number of days spent involuntarily unemployed.
Secondly, we compute a series of aggregated wage variables for each labourer for
each year as follows :
TFWAGE = Total wage from farm work at 1960-61 prices 
TNFWAGE = Total wage from non-faim work at 1960-61 prices 
TGWAGE = Total wage from government projects at 1960-61 prices 
TOTCWAGE = SFWAGE + SNFWAGE + SGWAGE
3.13.4. VLS-Y : Plot and Cultivation Schedule
The VLS-Y schedule is designed to record operation-wise input-output data for each 
plot for each household engaged in farming at regular intervals during the study period 
(1980-84). It also includes the important characteristics of each plot, including those of the 
sub-plots.
The schedule is divided into two parts. Part one of the schedule gives the plot-wise 
variables over different seasons of the year, namely, kharif, rabi and the summer. These 
variables include the area cultivated, area irrigated, sources of irrigation, soil type, value of 
the plot per acre, revenue rate (that do not change during a crop year) etc. However, we find 
that while kharif is the main crop-season (when most of the plots are put to cultivation) in 
Aurepalle and Kanzara, rabi is the main crop-season in Shirapur. We, therefore, construct the
"These participation variables have been weighted by the days worked on the respective types of jobs as a 
%  of total days worked in the year.
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following variables for the kharif season in Aurepalle and Kanzara and for the rabi season 
in Shirapur for each sample farm for each year of the five-year period.
CULT AREA - Area cultivated by plots in acres (1 ha. = 2.5 acres)
IRRAREA - Area irrigated by plots in acres
PLOTVAL - Value of plot per acre in Rs. 100 (deflated by the consumer price index for 
general items for the agricultural population with 1960-61 as the base year).
Next, the total area owned, cultivated and irrigated are aggregated by adding the area
under each plot Variables constmcted at this stage are as follows :
NPLOT = Number of plots cultivated by each household in a given season.
MPLOTVAL = Mean value of the plots per acre belonging to each household 
AGGAREA = Total area owned 
AGGCULT = Total area cultivated 
AGGIRR = Total area irrigated
Part two of the schedule reports the task-wise details of the labour and non-labour 
inputs used in the production of different crops cultivated on different plots by each sample 
household in a particular crop year. In other words, the schedule yields household demand 
for different types of labour including casual and regular labour. The following variables are 
constructed for each sample farm for each year :
TASK = a if labour is hired for tasks like soil preparation, manuring, applying fertilizer or 
doing irrigation.
= b if labour is hired for tasks like transplanting, weeding and interculturing 
= c if labour is hired for tasks like harvesting and post-harvesting work
For each type of task, the following variables are constructed :
FLHR = Total family labour-hours
FLHRHA = Family labour-hours per acre (1 ha. = 2.5 acres) of land cultivated
CLHR = Total casual labour-hours
CLHRHA = Casual labour-hours per acre of land cultivated
PLHR = Total regular labour-hours
PLHRHA = Regular labour-hours per acre of land cultivated
A similar exercise is repeated for a few major crops produced in each of the study 
villages to look at the input-output composition. For example, we have considered the 
production of paddy (local and hybrid types) in Aurepalle, cotton (local and hybrid types) 
in Kanzara, sorghum in Shirapur.
Finally, the following aggregated variables are constructed for all the crops produced 
in the major season of the year by each of the sample households.
SFLHR = Total number of family labour-hours used on different plots
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SCLHR = Total number of casual labour-hours used on different plots 
SPLHR = Total number of regular labour-hours used on different plots 
STLHR = SFLHR + SCLHR + SPLHR
OBULHR = Total number of own bullock labour-hours used on different plots
OBUL = 1, if OBULHR (own bullock hours) > 0 
= 0  otherwise.
3.I.3.5. VLS-L : Household Transaction Schedule
The VLS-L schedule gives information regarding the income accounts and 
consumption expenditure of each sample household as well as the inter-enterprise transactions 
among the sample households. We make use of the income account for our purpose; the 
schedule is used to break down the income into different components for the sample 
households for each year of the study period (1980-84) at 1960-61 prices.
CROPINC - Total income from crop production net of production costs;
LIVESTOC - Income from the sale of different productions and/or hiring out animals net of 
costs on labour, inputs, fuels etc.;
RENTINC - Income from land-leasing/share-cropping, land/building/machines acquired/sold, 
capital gains, animals, implements, etc. net of taxes, fees, fuels, labour and machine 
expenses;
LAB INC - Income from regular jobs including regular farm servants, from daily and 
exchange labour (unlike the VLS-K schedule, no distinction is made between farm and non­
farm labour)
TRANSINC - Income from savings, Life Insurance, interest on credit, gifts, remittances, 
pension etc.
MISCINC - Income received from handicrafts, trading, personal service trades, marketing etc. 
net of taxes, fees, fuels, materials and labour expenses.
TINC = CROPINC + LIVESTOC + RENTINC + LABINC + TRANSINC + MISCINC.
3.1.4. Resurvey Data-set
As already mentioned, I have conducted two resurveys to Aurepalle, once during the 
winter of 1991 and then again in 1992.
During the first resurvey in January 1991, we12 interviewed a group of farmers and 
labourers (both casual and regular) about the general economic conditions prevailing in the 
village labour market. In particular, the employers were asked about the usefulness of 
alternative contracts (e.g., regular, piece-rate or daily labour contracts) and their preference 
for one contract against the other. Labourers were asked about their preference for alternative
12I was accompanied by Mr. Nageswar Rao from the ICRISAT head quarters at Hyderabad; Mr. Rao helped 
me in interpreting the local language ’Telegu’.
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contracts (e.g., piece-rate, daily or regular) and whether they had any plan to change this 
current jobs and, if so, why.
Employers, in general, appear to prefer piece-rate contracts because it requires less 
supervision and the work is done in time. However, piece-rate contracts are more expensive 
compared to daily rate casual contracts or regular contracts and are used in those tasks like 
harvesting where the cost of delay may be substantial. Though cheaper than piece-rate 
contracts, daily casual contracts require close supervision which, too, involves some costs. 
Employing regular labour is cheap, but sometimes the rate of absenteeism is very high.
Access to interest-free wage advance (i.e., credit) was found to be the primary 
motivation for labourers to choose regular farm contracts who could not secure credit from 
the credit market in the village. Landless labourers who neither had any alternative source 
of credit, nor the opportunity to do family fanning, in particular, preferred to participate in 
full-time regular farm contracts. Secondly, some regular labourers reported that their family 
landholdings were too small to enable them to survive and, in most cases, the land was not 
even irrigated; they also could not afford to purchase expensive inputs like fertilizer, 
pesticides etc. to cultivate their own land. Hence, it is more convenient for them to choose 
regular farm contracts. Thirdly, some reported that they did not like searching for casual jobs 
once a particular job was over, and their prospects for non-farm jobs in the village were poor. 
In other words, in the absence of alternative opportunities, risk-averse landless labourers 
preferred to participate in regular farm jobs, thus securing some livelihood for the year13. 
A number of other factors also emerged from our discussion with the employer and 
labourers. Regular contracts involved less supervision. Sometimes regular labourers also 
supervised casual labourers who were working for the same employer, the latter gave them 
some power over the casual labourers. However, some young enterprising labourers reported 
that they would prefer to participate in piece-rate contracts which offered higher wages; 
though the pace of work was greater, they liked the opportunity to earn more. On the 
contrary, the older and sickly labourers, who were unable to keep pace with the hard work 
of piece-rate contracts, preferred to do some light work on a daily basis. Some old labourers 
preferred to do regular jobs for some considerate employer whom they had known over a 
long period; this set them free from having to search for casual jobs when a particular job 
was over.
The second resurvey was primarily aimed at collecting information on the personal
,3In some cases, regular labourers had a continuing association with the employer; they preferred to work for 
a known entity.
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details of a group of casual and regular farm labourers in the village. Information was 
collected from a group of twenty-six regular farm servants hired by the sample households 
in the on-going agricultural year 1991-92 which related to the following aspects.
FLHOLD = The amount of family landholding in acres 
IRRORN = 1 if family land is irrigated 
= 0  otherwise
MALAGA = 1 if the i-th labourer belongs to Mala or Madiga household 
= 0  otherwise
CASTE4 = 1 if the i-th labourer belongs to caste ranking four 
= 0  otherwise
FATHRFS = 1 if the father is/was a regular farm servant 
= 0  otherwise
MEMOCCP = 1 if any family member of the i-th labourer is a casual labourer 
= 0  otherwise
TOTWAGE = Amount of the wage to be received for the annual contract at 1960-61 prices. 
ADVANCE = Amount of the advance taken by the i-th labourer from the employer 
LOAN = The difference between advance and the annual wage if the former is larger.
All regular farm servants were found to be male. Hence, the personal details were
collected from a group of eighty-five (85) male casual labourers hired by the sample
households in Aurepalle in January 1992. Thus the very choice of the sample takes account
of the sex-bias present in the labour market. For this sub-group, similar details, as ffom the
regular farm servants, were collected; however, the family background of the casual labourers
was left out (which was available in the ICRISAT data set).
3.1.5. Advantages and Disadvantages of the Data-set
The ICRISAT data-set is a detailed data-set covering wide-ranging aspects of 
traditional farming households over a period of time in a number of villages situated in the 
semi-arid tropics (SAT) of India. It has detailed information about the cultivation particulars 
of the sample households; it includes information about the casual market participation of the 
members of the sample households.
However, the analysis of the dichotomy in the labour market between the regular and 
casual contracts necessitates further information on the personal details of both groups of 
labourers. In this respect, the ICRISAT data is found to be less satisfactory. It contains the 
details of the casual labourers in the village (VLS-C and VLS-K schedules); however, when 
it comes to the personal details of the regular farm servants, the VLS-C schedule gives details 
of age, sex and the educational qualifications of the attached farm servants, but omits their 
family background. For example, size of the family landholding (dry or irrigated), number
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of dependents, occupation of the other members of the family to which the regular farm 
servants belong are not known. The resurvey of Aurepalle was directed towards this end.
Secondly, in the analysis of the labour market, one serious problem seems to be the 
following. VLS-Y schedule gives the plot and cultivation details (e.g., utilization of different 
kinds of labour, namely, family, regular and casual labour-hours). The VLS-C schedule gives 
the personal details of household members (some of whom participate in the casual market) 
as well as that of regular farm servants hired by the household (who are treated to be 
attached to the employers’ households in the ICRISAT data). However, we do not have any 
way to match the two. For example, we cannot identify which one of the regular farm 
servants or the family members (given by the VLS-C schedule) contribute to the farm output 
and how much (given by the VLS-Y schedule) since the latter is given in aggregate hours 
(e.g., total number of family, regular or casual labour-hours used) for each type of task 
performed during the crop year.
3.2. Distribution of Resources and Classification of Farms in the Study Villages
The theoretical analysis in chapter two suggests that the division of the market 
between casual and regular labour contracts is closely related to an unequal distribution of 
land in the village economy where the larger farms tend to offer the regular farm contracts 
and the risk-averse landless labourers tend to choose the regular contracts. Given that 
landownership is one of the major explanatory variables in our analysis, it may be useful to 
examine the relationship between the distribution of land and non-land resources and then 
decide if the land-based classification of farms is a valid one.
Using the data-set described in section 3.1 of this chapter, the ownership and 
distribution of land and non-land assets is examined in this section. The section is developed 
as follows. Section 3.2.1 considers the distribution of land while section 3.2.2 examines the 
distribution of non-land resources among the small and large farms. Income is sometimes 
used as a measure of the ownership of land and non-land resources. Section 3.2.3, therefore, 
examines the distribution of income with respect to landholding status. Finally, section 3.2.4 
examines the relationship between landholding status and the caste ranking of the sample 
households. The section is concluded with a brief summary of the findings.
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3.2.1. Ownership and Distribution of Land
Irrespective of the availability of a wide range of village-level studies in India, there 
is no universally accepted method of classifying farms. Most official sources, however, 
classify farms according to the size of landholding14, a norm followed by the ICRISAT too. 
A classification based on size alone, however, may be misleading because there may be wide 
variation in the physical quality of land, say, with respect to the location of the plot, soil- 
quality, availability of irrigation etc. even among plots of the same size15. Further 
differences may arise with respect to the households’s efforts to adopt advanced techniques 
of production as opposed to traditional ones. These socio-economic factors may serve to 
differentiate households, even when they hold the same amount of land. That is why, in this 
section, the physical and technical quality of the plots owned by small and large 
farms/households in the study villages are examined.
3.2.1.1. Landholding Status
As has already been shown in table 1.3 of the chapter, the sample households are 
divided into four categories, namely, labour households, small farmers, medium farmers and 
large farmers.
The ownership of cultivable land is usually distributed over a few plots. The VLS-Y1 
schedule gives plot-wise information of the size of landholding (AGGCULT, AGGIRR) as 
well as the number and value (NPLOT, MPLOTVAL) of the plots owned by the farms; the 
mean and standard deviation of these variables are shown in table 2 .1.1.
The average cultivated area is the smallest in Aurepalle and the largest in Shirapur, 
though the average irrigated area is the smallest in Shirapur during the study period 1980-84. 
However, the plot value per acre is the lowest in Kanzara and the highest in Shirapur. In all 
these cases, a high standard deviation is noted which implies that land is unequally 
distributed among the sample households, both in quantity and in quality, whether cultivated 
area, irrigated area or plot value per acre is considered.
3.2.1.2. Distribution of Land
Land is distributed unequally in the study villages. The average operational
14 It is to be noted here that the concept of land ownership is not ambiguous in these Indian villages. 
Everyone knows who owns what; in other words, it is a strong notion of ownership.
15It is noteworthy here that there is no measure of farm size in the ICRISAT data-set based on standardised 
hectares, i.e., controlling for land quality.
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landholding is 3.53 ha (2.4 acres = 1 ha) in Aurepalle. However, the average size of 
landholding of the largest farm size category is 7 times bigger than the average size of 
landholding, in general. In Kanzara, more than one-third of the households operate less than 
8% of the total area while 6 % of the households operate 33% of the total area. The same 
picture holds in Shirapur where 50% of the cultivating households operate 17% of the total 
area16.
In order to examine the nature of the distribution among sample households, the 
labour households and small farms (as defined in the ICRISAT data-set) are aggregated as 
the ’smaller farms’ while medium and large farms are aggregated as ’larger farms’.
Corresponding to this classification, a variable called TYPE is created as follows.
TYPE = 1 if the i-th farm is a larger farm 
= 0  if the i-th farm is a smaller one.
There are 81 larger farms (TYPE = 1) in Aurepalle, 71 in Shirapur and 92 in 
Kanzara over this five year period. First, the difference in the mean and standard deviation 
of the area cultivated, area irrigated, soil quality and plot value between the small and large 
farms are considered. These are shown in tables 2.1.2,2.1.2’, 2.1.2" and 2.1.2’” respectively.
On an average, the larger (TYPE = 1) farms are found to have a greater number of 
plots as compared to the smaller (TYPE = 0) ones. When the area under different plots are 
added up (AGGCULT), larger farms continues to possess significantly larger amount of land 
as compared to the smaller ones (table 2 .1 .2 ).
Secondly, the differences in the physical qualities of landholding between small and 
large farms are considered. A comparison of the irrigated area between small and large farms 
shows (table 2 .1.2 ’) that the smaller farms have virtually been excluded from access to 
irrigation facilities. In addition, soil quality also varies between smaller and larger farms 
(table 2.1.2"). A greater proportion of large farms have access to better (more productive) soil 
quality17 like the deep black and the medium to shallow black. This is also reflected in the 
difference in the mean plot value per acre (MPLOTVAL) between small and large farms 
(table 2.1.2’” ). The difference is statistically significant in each case. Thus, the average plot 
value is higher among the larger farms indicating their access to plots with better location,
16A similar trend is found in an all-India perspective; 26th round National Sample Survey data reports that 
in 1971-72, 82% of rural households owned only upto 5 acres of land.
17Given the crop-pattem and climatic conditions, black soil plots are usually considered to be more productive 
in Shirapur and Kanzara while the red soil area is more productive in Aurepalle. However, there are some plots 
which are situated in the areas containing problem soil.
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better soil quality and irrigation facilities. Thus the farms owning larger amounts of land also 
have the better quality land. In other words, a comparison of the physical attributes of 
landholding in the study villages reinforces the size-based classification of farms.
In order to determine the extent of inequality in the distribution of land resources, 
Theil’s T and L18 indices are calculated (for definition and choice of these indices, see 
Appendix 1). The distribution of cultivated and irrigated area are positively skewed in each 
village as shown by the Theil’s T and L indices (see table 2.1.2""). The degree of inequality 
is found to be larger in the distribution of cultivated area (AGGCULT) as compared to the 
distribution of irrigated area (AGGIRR). According to Theirs T indices, the degree of 
inequality in the distribution of cultivated and irrigated area is the highest in Kanzara and the 
lowest in Aurepalle.
3.2.2. Ownership and Distribution o f Non-Land Assets
Farms organise production with the help of labour (human and animal) and non­
labour inputs. Some of these inputs are owned by the farms while others are bought or rented 
in the relevant markets. Besides land and family labour (human), a farm may own animal 
labour (bullocks, buffaloes etc.), farm and non-farm machineries as well as financial assets 
like savings, deposits, life insurance etc. The ownership of any of these inputs adds to a 
farm’s wealth. This section considers the distribution of the non-land resources between the 
small and large farms in an attempt to examine the association between the ownership of land 
and non-land resources in the study villages.
3.2.2.I. Bullock Labour
Farming households use animal labour to carry on certain agricultural operations like 
soil preparation, ploughing, irrigation etc. Some of these animals are owned by the farms 
while others are hired. Information about the ownership of bullock labour (cows and 
buffaloes) is included in VLS-E schedule. The total value of bullocks (OBULVA) as well 
as the value of bullocks per acre of land cultivated by the sample farms is calculated at 1960- 
61 prices. The mean and standard deviation (in the parentheses) of OBULVA for smaller and 
larger farms are given in table 2 .2 .1.
There is a significant difference in the ownership of bullocks between the smaller and 
larger farms in Aurepalle and Kanzara, though the difference is not found to be significant
18Theil’s L index cannot be calculated if the variable concerned takes a value zero for some farms.
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in Shirapur. However, the difference in the value of bullocks per acre of the land cultivated 
between the small and large farms is much smaller than that of total value of bullocks, 
though still the larger farms own more.
Moreover, the use of own bullock labour in family farming as obtained from the 
VLS-Y2 schedule is considered. In this respect, the variable OBUL is constructed as follows:
OBUL = 1 if the i-th household uses its own bullock in farming.
= 0  otherwise.
The proportion of cases (frequency) where OBUL = 1 is given in table 2.2.1’. In all 
the study villages, a greater proportion of larger farms is found to use their own bullocks in 
family farming as compared to the smaller farms.
3 .2 .2 .2 . Farm and Non-Farm Equipments
Information about the ownership of farm/non-farm equipments is found in the VLS-F 
schedule. After deflating by the appropriate consumer price index at 1960-61 prices, the 
variable SEQVAL is constructed. The mean and the standard deviation of the total value of 
farm/non-farm equipments (SEQVAL) and that per acre of the land cultivated are shown in 
table 2 .2 .2 .
The total value of farm and non-farm equipments as well as the value per acre is 
higher in the larger farms in all the study villages, with a large standard deviation in each 
case, suggesting that there is an inequality in the distribution of such equipments.
3.22 3 .  Financial Assets
Details of the ownership of different kinds of financial assets held by the sample 
farms are given in the VLS-P schedule. Using this schedule, the value of all financial assets 
TF1NASTVA is calculated at 1960-61 prices for each of the households for each year of the 
study period (1980-84).
The mean and standard deviation (S.D. in the parentheses) of TFINASTVA are given 
in table 2.2.3. In this case, too, larger farms have a larger share of total financial assets in 
all the study villages. In each case, this is associated with high standard deviation as well, 
and this is tme whether the total value or value per acre is considered, the only exception 
being Kanzara.
An Overview
The analysis, in this section, strengthens the rationale for a size-based classification 
of sample farms. Larger farms, in the study villages, not only have more land, but also have 
better quality land as well as more non-land resources per acre19. This also means that land 
based classification alone underestimates the true extent of inequality. Ramachandran (1990) 
has also found that major landlords and upper class peasants in Tamilnadu own more land 
and non-land assets than agricultural labourers.
3.23. Household Income and Its Distribution
Household income is the sum total of the returns from the ownership of land and of 
different non-land resources. Given that the larger farms own more land and non-land 
resources, it is expected that the larger farming households will earn more income compared 
to the smaller ones. The hypothesis will be examined in this sub-section.
Information is gathered from VLS-L (Household Transaction Schedule). Different 
components of income are added to calculate the total income (TINC) of the sample 
households for each year of the study period (1980-84) at 1960-61 prices.
First, the average total income between small and large households is compared; the 
mean and standard deviation of income per household are shown in table 2.3 for the period 
1980-84. The table indicates that, on an average, larger farms have a larger share of income 
and the computation of simple t statistics shows that the difference is significant in each case. 
Moreover, the variation of income among the sample households is large, thus indicating 
substantial inequality in the distribution of income between the smaller and larger farms.
Secondly, the degree of inequality in the distribution of income is calculated using 
Theil’s T and L indices which are presented in table 2.3’. While Theil’s T indices show that 
Aurepalle has the highest degree of inequality, Theil’s L indices show Shirapur has the 
highest degree of inequality in income; in either case, Kanzara has the lowest degree of
19The results cause us to refer to the farm size and productivity literature which generally argues that there 
is an inverse relationship between farm size and productivity. It is argued that the inverse relationship holds good 
because the smaller farms use more inputs per acre. Hence, our distributional results on the ownership of land 
and non-land resources, obtained in this section, may be used as evidence against the established inverse 
relationship between farm size and productivity. This however, needs clarification. First, some argue that small 
farmers may be more productive primarily because they face a lower cost of labour than the larger one. Our 
results do not contradict this argument. Secondly, as Bhalla and Roy (1988) argue, if we ignore the labour market 
imperfections, land and capital market imperfections actually work in favour of the larger farms to make the 
relationship positive. The evidence obtained here may further strengthen their argument Nonetheless, it should 
be bome in mind that the ownership of more land and non-land resources by the larger farms does not necessarily 
imply that they also use more of these factors in cultivation.
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inequality in the distribution of income. A comparison between tables 2.1.2"" and 2.3’ 
suggests that income is more unequally distributed than land. It fits with the observed fact 
that large farms have more non-land resources per acre than small ones.
Finally, in order to test the relationship between total income per household and 
landholding status, the chi-square tests of independence between total income and the 
landholding status variable TYPE are computed. Likelihood ratio statistics are 293.89440 
(d.f.=208), 281.41284 (d.f.=202) and 277.25887 (d.f.=200) in Aurepalle, Shirapur and 
Kanzara, respectively, while Pearson’s chi-square statistics are 212.0000, 203.0000 and 
200.000, respectively, for Aurepalle, Shirapur and Kanzara. Both sets of chi-square statistics 
are highly significant. These statistics, therefore, indicate that there prevails a significant 
correlation between household income and landholding status in the study villages which 
further strengthens the land-based classification of sample farms.
3.2.4. Caste and Landholding Status in the Study Villages
Although caste does not play a crucial role in the analysis of this thesis, the 
relationship between caste and land ownership deserves brief examination. Caste is still an 
important factor in explaining the present day effects of earlier inequalities in the ownership 
and control of land and non-land resources which, in turn, is reflected in the economic and 
political power held by these households.
According to Doherty (1982), caste refers to socially inherited political and economic 
inequality and specialization, based on and operating through endogamous groups which 
taken together comprise a single complex society. In the anthropological discussions, caste 
system is sometimes referred to as the ’jati-vama’ system which has two major facets. These 
are the endogamous group into which one is bom (one’s ’jati’) and the broad group of 
occupations (meaning of the Sanskrit word ’vama’ is colour which by extension refers to 
class) with which a jati is associated. Both these concepts can be ranked according to their 
social standing which is based on economic and political power.
Because of the history of each region and the differences between villages in a given 
region, local political and economic positions are not exactly equivalent even for the castes 
that may be considered to be of the same origin. In many instances, these local differences 
are distinctly marked. However, on the basis of questionnaires administered through panels 
of respondents, statistical methods have been developed for the determination of caste rank 
within a village (Mahar, 1959). In this section, we shall describe this caste-ranking of sample
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households in the study villages and examine the correlation between caste ranking and 
landholding status.
3.2.4.1. Caste-Ranking
Let us first consider the major caste groups existing in these villages which is shown 
in tables 2.4.1. The traditional occupations corresponding to each caste (given in the 
parentheses) are described.
In the ICRISAT village studies, caste codes along with three different caste ranks are
given:
VSDCAST - V. S. Doherty caste rank for the i-th household 
JHBCAST - Behrman caste rank for the i-th household 
JGRCAST - J.G Ryan caste rank for the i-th household
While VSDCAST is based on overall social, religious and economic standing of 
sample households of different castes in the village (a slightly greater weight was given to 
religious rank), JHBCAST is based on the rank ordering of the relative frequency with which 
households of different castes appear in the sample. JGRCAST is, however, based on 
inspection of descriptive data on occupation and socioeconomic condition of individual castes 
reported by field investigator. Because of the comprehensive nature of the ranking, we shall 
follow the latter according to which the sample households are divided into four caste groups, 
namely, caste 1, caste 2, caste 3 and caste 4. The ranking of different castes, according to 
JGRCAST, is shown in table 2.4.1’.
Let us examine how these caste categories 1, 2, 3, 4 are distributed between small 
(TYPE = 0) and large (TYPE = 1) farms as shown in table 2.4.1". It shows that in all the
study villages, a greater proportion of larger farms come from higher caste groups, namely
caste 1 and caste 2. In other words, there appears to be a close association between caste- 
rank and landholding status in the study villages today.
3.2.4.2. Caste-Ranking (JGRCAST) and Land-holding Status : Some Tests of 
Association
In order to examine the association between JGRCAST and landholding status 
(TYPE), chi-square test-statistics20 between TYPE and JGRCAST are computed. Values of 
these statistics are shown in table 2.4.2.
Critical value of chi-square with degrees of freedom equal to three is 11.345 at 1%
^ o r  a description of the tests of independence, see appendix two.
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level of significance and 7.815 at 5% level of significance. Hence, all the computed chi- 
square statistics are significant at 1% and 5% levels of significance. These, therefore, suggest 
that there is a close and statistically significant correlation between landholding status 
(TYPE) and caste-ranking (JGRCAST) in all the study villages. In other words, larger 
farmers, in the study villages, belong to the higher castes as well.
Conclusion
This chapter has described the significance of the data-set to be used in the empirical 
analysis of the following chapters and the characteristics of the study village. We have also 
discussed the distribution of land and non-land resources in the study villages. On this 
question, the primary findings of the chapter are as follows.
(i) There is a positive correlation between land ownership and land quality/value; this 
does not invalidate the use of land area as an index of land endowment, although it does 
mean that land area alone underestimates the extent of inequality in land ownership.
(ii) Large farmers not only own more non-land resources, but they also own more 
non-land resources per acre; again this means that land assets can be used as a proxy for total 
productive resources, if necessary. It also means that land assets underestimate the true extent 
of inequality in the ownership of productive resources.
(iii) There is a strong correlation between land ownership and income per household.
(iv) There is a strong correlation between caste and landownership as well.
The analysis of this chapter, therefore, justifies the use of land ownership or 
landholding status as a classification criterion. In particular, the larger farms in the study 
villages are found to be the wealthier farms while the smaller farms are the poorer ones.
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CHAPTER 3: TABLES
TABLE 1.2. Agro-Economic Characteristics of the Study Villages
Variable Aurepalle Shirapur Kanzara
Population Density [1] 167 110 156
Literacy [2] 25.3% 41.4% 42.70 %
Family Size [3] 6 7 6
Total Area 16.29 ha. 14.72 sq km. 5.96
Cultivable Land(ha.) 11.8 1327.46 539.61 ha.
Irrigated Land [4] 20% 10.49% 3.75%
Irrigation Source Tank, Wells Wells Wells
Rainfall (mm.) [5] 653 597 995.24 MM.
Soil Types Red soil Black soil Black Soil
Major Crops Sorghum, Castor, Sorghum, Cotton, Sorghum,
- Pearl Millet, Paddy Pigeon Pea, Mung, Ground Nut
- Pigeon Pea Wheat, Pulses -
Major Season [6] Kharif (82%) Rabi (64%) Kharif (51%)
Crop Income [7] 48% 34-46% 53.40%
Labour Income 20% 43% 25.30%
N ote : [ I ]  Persons p e r  sq. km. [2] Literacy measures the % o f  people who has gone to school. 
[3 ] Average fam ily size in these villages. [4 ]  % o f  total cropped area irrigated.
[5 ] A verage annual rainfall in the village. [6 ] Principal agricultural seasons observed are the kharif 
(June to September), the rabi (October to January) and the summer. H owever, the number o f  p lo ts  
cultivated in the summer is negligible in all the villages. [7 ] Crop income is calculated as a 
percentage o f  net household income.
TABLE 1.2.3. Incidence of Tenancy in the Study Villages
Village Owner Operated Share-Cropped Fixed Rent
Aurepalle 96.4% 0.5% 3.1%
Shirapur 64.5% 35.5% 0.0%
Kanzara 83.9% 12.3% 3.8%
Source: Walker and Ryan, 1990
N ote : Figures refer to eight cropping years, 1975-76 to 1982-83.
TABLE 1.3. Classification of Sample Farms in the Study Villages
Landholding Class Aurepalle Shirapur Kanzara
Small Farmer (1) 0.2 - 1.2 0.2-2.0 0.2-1.8
Medium Farmer (2) 1.2-3.2 2.0-5.3 1.8-5.3
Large Farmer (3) > 3.2 >5.3 > 5.3
Note : These figures refer to the operational size (in acres) defined as the area o f  owned land minus 
the area cash-rented or share-cropped out plus the area cash-rented or share-cropped in 1974/75.
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TABLE 2.1.1. Ownership of Land in the Study Villages, 1980-84
Village AGGCULT AGGIRR MPLOTVAL NPLOT NO. OF 
OBS.
Aurepalle 9.16 (7.92) 1.57 (2.83) 5.89 (2.95) 5.31 148
Shirapur 15.18 (13.06) 1.32 (2.10) 9.00 (3.60) 7.33 131
Kanzara 14.06 (17.73) 1.70 (3.63) 4.52 (2.29) 5.46 147
variable.The definition o f  these variables is described in section 1 o f  the chapter. To repeat, 
AGGCULT, AGGIRR are respectively the total area (in acres) cultivated and irrigated by a sample 
household
TABLE 2.1.2. Mean and Standard Deviation of the Area Cultivated, 1980-84
Village Small Farms Large Farms
Aurepalle 4.24 (3.33) 13.23 (8.32)
Shirapur 11.65 (11.95) 17.98 (13.31)
Kanzara 5.37 (6.51) 19.10 (20.11)
Note: Values in each cell refer to the mean and standard deviation (in parentheses) o f  the relevant 
variable.
Small Farms : Labour households +  Small Farmers 
Large Farms : M edium + Large Farmers.
TABLE 2.1.2’. Mean and Standard Deviation of Area Irrigated, 1980-84
Village Small Farms Large Farms
Aurepalle 0.20 (0.51) 2.71 (3.40)
Shirapur 1.10 (1.86) 1.50 (2.26)
Kanzara 0.04 (0.27) 2.67 (4.28)
N ote : Values in each cell refer to the mean and standard deviation (in parentheses) o f  the relevant 
variable.
TABLE 2.1.2". Plot-wise Differences in Soil Quality among Sample Farms, 1980-84.
Soil Type
Aurepalle Shirapur Kanzara
I n I n I II
Deep Black * * 31.4% 15.4% 2.5% 8.9%
Medium Black * 14.4% 38.6% 34.2% 93.3% 84.1%
Medium to Shallow Black 8 .1% 31.5% 15.4% 39.0% * 7.0%
Shallow Red 87.6% 51.5% * * 4.2% *
Gravelly * 1.9% 13.0% 10.5% * *
Problem Soil 4.3% 0.7% 1.4% 0.5% * *
Others * * 0.3% 0.3% * *
N ote
proportion o f  p lo ts  in each soil category held by the farm s in the respective landholding classes.
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TABLE 2.1.2” *. Mean and Standard Deviation of the Plot Value Per Acre in Rs. 100 at 1960-61 
Prices, 1980-84
Village Small Farm Large Farm
Aurepalle 4.03 (1.42) 7.43 (3.01)
Shirapur 8.34 (2.94) 9.67 (3.97)
Kanzara 3.29 (1.50) 5.25 (2.36)
Note : Values in each cell refer to the mean and standard deviation (in parentheses) o f  the relevant 
variable.
TABLE 2.1.2"”. Theil’s Inequality Indices in the Distribution of Land in the Study Villages
Theil’s Aurepalle Shirapur Kanzara
Index
AGGCULT AGGIRR AGGCULT AGGIRR AGGCULT AGGIRR
T 0.34 0.24 0.36 0.27 0.59 0.28
L 0.66 * 0.51 * 0.63 *
Note : Definition o f  Theil’s indices are given in Appendix 1. 
TABLE 2.2.1. Value of Own Bullocks at 1960-61 Prices, 1980-84
Villages
Small Farms Large Farms
Total Value Value per Acre Total Value Value per Acre
Aurepalle
Shirapur
Kanzara
212.93 (217.16) 
611.05 (773.88) 
86.41 (138.67)
10.45 (4.49) 
25.68 (7.62) 
12.50 (0.73)
865.81 (986.83) 
551.21 (528.66) 
601.26 (642.76)
11.76 (0.65) 
76.47 (29.17) 
17.57 (0.79)
Note: Values in each cell refer to the mean and standard deviation (in parentheses) o f  the relevant 
variable.
TABLE 2.2.1’. Use of Own-Bullocks in Family Farming, 1980-84
OBUL = 1
Aurepalle Shirapur Kanzara
I n I n I n
Frequency 41.8% 65.4% 38.6% 67.6% 27.8% 82.6%
N ote : OBUL is as defined in section one o f  the chapter. I => Small farm s; II => Large farm s
TABLE 2.2.2. Value of Farm and Non-Farm Equipments in Rs. at 1960-61 Prices, 1980-84
Village
Small Farms Large Farms
Total Value Value per Acre Total Value Value per Acre
Aurepalle
Shirapur
Kanzara
109.47 (152.40) 
248.22 (374.79) 
71.99 (85.63)
31.41 (4.68) 
77.54 (57.11) 
23.21 (5.01)
1758.79 (5641.97) 
398.35 (569.69) 
932.34 (1206.41)
180.11 (50.17) 
144.59 (46.80) 
58.17 (8.32)
N ote : Values in each cell refer to the mean and standard deviation (in parentheses) o f  the relevant 
variable.
TABLE 2.23. Value of Financial Assets in Rs. at 1960-61 Prices, 1980-84
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Village
Small Farms Large Farms
Total Value Value per Acre Total Value Value per Acre
Aurepalle
Shirapur
Kanzara
13.30 (26.91) 
209.00 (357.54) 
69.86 (321.94)
6.12 (2.69) 
54.82 (17.73) 
16.25 (10.78)
226.63 (540.19) 
390.40 (733.76) 
357.98 (882.94)
16.99 (3.41) 
93.98 (24.17) 
12.86 (3.47)
N ote : Values in each cell refer to the mean and standard deviation (in parentheses) o f  the relevant 
variable.
TABLE 2.3. Household Income in Rs. at 1960-61 Prices, 1980-84
Variables Aurepalle Shirapur Kanzara
I
n
All Farms
1741.98 (1370.73) 
6086.17 (7728.78) 
3877.50 (5933.88)
2201.66 (3035.26) 
3324.89 (3442.47) 
2746.98 (3282.41)
1373.18 (834.47) 
4144.71 (4373.47) 
2745.35 (3430.96)
Vote : I => Small farm s; II => Large farm s. Values in each cell ref er to the mean and standarc' 
deviation (in parentheses) o f the relevant variable.
TABLE 2.3’. Theil’s Inequality in the Distribution of Income Per Household, 1980-84
Theil’s Index Aurepalle Shirapur Kanzara
T 0.66 0.53 0.51
L 0.63 0.67 0.45
N ote : For definition, see Appendix 1.
TABLE 2.4.1. Description of Castes in the Study Villages
Aurepalle Shirapur Kanzara
Brahmin (Priests) Maratha (Farmers) Maratha (Farmers)
Reddy (Farmers) Kosthi (Weavers) Kunbi (Farmers)
Velama (Farmers) Wani (Merchants) Gosavi (Priests)
Padmasale (Weavers) Mali (Farmers) Mali (Farmers)
Bogama (Dancers) Dhangar (Shepherds) Muslim (Farmers)/3/
Katika (Butchers) Muslim (Farmers) Sonar (Gold-Smiths)
GOWDA (Toddy Tappers) Mahar (Labourers) Kumbhar (Potters)
Wadla (Carpenters)/// Huler (Labourers,Sweepers) Navhi (Barbers)
Chakli (Washers) * Parit (Washers)
Kurma (Shepherds) * Kaikadi (Basket-Makers)
Mala (Farm Labourers) * Mahar (Farm Labourers)
Madiga (Farm Labourers)/2/ * Mang (Farm Labourers)/^/
Note : [1] Sometimes, Wadlas work as blacksmiths as well.
[2] Traditionally, Madigas are the leather workers; they remove dead cattle from the village. 
Most work as agricultural labourers. A few are village watchmen.
[3 ] Muslims are also found to work as government servants.
[4 ] M angs are also the traditional musicians in the village.
TABLE 2.4.1’. J.G.Ryan Caste-Ranking (JGRCAST)
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Aurepalle Shirapur Kanzara
Caste JGRCAST Caste JGRCAST Caste JGRCAST
Brahmin 1 Maratha 1 Maratha 1
Reddy 1 Kosthi 1 Kunbi 1
Velama 1 Wani 2 Gosavi 2
Padmasale 2 Mali 2 Mali 2
Bogama 2 Dhangar 3 Muslim 2
Katika 2 Muslim 4 Sonar 3
Gowda 3 Mahar 4 Kumbhar 3
Wadla 3 Huler 4 Navhi 3
Chakli 3 * * Parit 4
Kurma 4 * * Kaikadi 4
Mala 4 * * Mahar 4
Madiga 4 * * Mang 4
inspection o f  the descriptive data on occupation and socio-economic condition o f  individual castes 
reported by f ie ld  investigators. Accordingly, sample households are divided into fou r caste groups, 
namely, caste 1, caste 2, caste 3 and caste 4.
TABLE 2.4.1". Distribution of Castes among Small and Large Farms
JGRCAST [1]
Aurepalle Shirapur Kanzara
I n All I II All I n All
CASTE 1 * 43.513 22.7 39.1 82.6 60.9 * 40.0 18.24
CASTE 2 * .0 6.8 4.3 4.3 4.3 45.8 40.01 3.213.
CASTE 3 38.161 30.413 34.1 34.821 13.0 23.9 16.6 0.010. 6
CASTE 4 .9 .0 36.4 .7 * 10.9 37.5 0 25.0
N ote : The figures are given in p er  cent; 1 => Small Farms ; II => Large h arms.
[1] This caste ranking corresponds to J.G.Ryan caste ranking.
TABLE 2.4.2. Caste Ranking and Farm Size : Chi-Square Test Statistics
Test-Statistics Aurepalle Shirapur Kanzara
Pearson (%2) 19.27 (3) [1] 10.84 (3) 12.86 (3)
Likelihood Ratio (%2) 24.74 (3) 12.94 (3) 16.29 (3)
Note : For the description of the tests, see Appendix 2. 
[1] Degrees of freedom is given in the parentheses.
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Location of the Study Villages
B a n g a lo r e
a Bhopa l  x
Akola
B o m b a y
H yderab ad
A  Vw v  V w  0
S h o l a p u r ^
Llahbu bna
Sem i-ar id  tropical  b ou n d ar y  
ea Capital
A N e i g h b o r i n g  s ta te  cap i ta l s  
e  District  h e a d q u a rte r s
M a h b u b n a g a r  and n e ig h b o r in g  
5 districts  ( m e d i u m - d e e p  Alfls-  
ols ;  annua l  a v e r a g e  rainfall of  
713  m m)
S h o l a p u r  a nd  n e ig h b o r in g  3 
d i s t r i c t s  ( m e d i u m - d e e p  and  
d e e p  Vertisol s ,  annual  a v e r a g e  
rainfall of 691 mm)
Akola  and  n e i g h b o r in g  3 d i s ­
tricts ( m e d i u m - d e e p  Vertisols ,  
annual  a v e r a g e  rainfall of 017  
mm)
Sca le :  1:27 0 0 0 0 0 0
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CHAPTER 4. CASUAL AND REGULAR CONTRACTS : SOME 
ASPECTS OF LABOUR AND CREDIT MARKETS IN RURAL
INDIA
Introduction
Our theoretical analysis suggests that the choice between casual and regular contracts 
in rural India is closely related to the conditions prevailing in the labour and credit markets. 
This chapter sets out to examine rural labour and credit markets in the study villages, set 
within the larger Indian context. Section 4.1 studies the structure and composition of the 
labour markets in India while section 4.2 focuses on labour markets in the study villages. 
Section 4.3 takes a brief look at the demand side, before we move on to examine the supply 
side of the labour market in section 4.4, which, among other things, provides estimates of 
participation and unemployment rates to be used later in the chapter. Section 4.5 examines 
the wage and employment considerations involved in casual and regular labour contracts, 
while section 4.6 examines the availability and cost of rural credit to landed and landless 
labourers in the study villages. The chapter ends with a brief summary of our findings.
4.1. Rural Labour Markets in India
The discussion in this section is divided into two sections. Section 4.1.1 discusses 
the structure and composition of rural labour markets in India, while section 4.1.2 discusses 
their characteristic features.
4.1.1. Structure and Composition
Agriculture and related activities (forestry, fishery, hunting etc.) form the main source 
of rural employment; in 1977-78, 80% of the male work force and 8 6 % of the female work 
force were engaged in agriculture. Apart from agriculture, it is manufacturing, mining, retail 
and wholesale trade and personal and community services which contribute to mral 
employment Both agricultural andnon-agricultural activities involve self-employment as well 
as wage employment.
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The National Sample Survey (NSS) reports the composition of rural workers in India 
as shown in table 1.1. The majority of main and marginal workers in rural India are self- 
employed. Next in importance comes wage employment, where the importance of casual farm 
and non-farm employment is overwhelming as compared to regular farm employment. Male 
labourers dominate in the regular market while female participation is relatively higher in the 
casual labour market.
Secondly, the distribution of agricultural labour between family and hired labour is 
considered (table 1.1’). Family labour predominates in traditional agriculture; it contributes 
to 69.3% of total labour. 25.3% of total labour is contributed by casual labour. Only 5.4% 
of total labour is supplied by regular labourers who are predominantly male.
However, the pattern of labour use varies across regions according to the nature of 
the crop produced. Reddy (1985) observes that in the Amaravati district of Maharashtra 64%- 
8 6 % of the total labour force are hired labour while Rudra (1973) observes that the figure 
varies between 40% and 8 6 % in West Bengal.
4.12. Characteristic Features of Rural Labour Markets in India
Casual labour is the most dominant type of hired labour contract. The search for 
casual labourers is usually carried out by the employers or the wives of the employers, most 
commonly in the evening before the work has to begin. In general, three forms of wage 
payments, namely, daily wages, piece-rate wages and harvest shares1 prevail in these 
villages.
Rudra (1982a) has studied the types of casual labour contracts prevailing in a few 
eastern states of India which is based on the Survey of Agrarian Relations, 1975. Table 1.2 
taken from Rudra (1982a) suggests that a large proportion of casual labourers are hired on 
a daily basis. However, many casual labourers may enter some informal arrangements with 
the employers to work for a number of days in succession. However, given the costs of 
supervision, piece-rate contracts are gaining popularity, especially in certain regions.
A common feature of the casual labour markets in India is the pronounced 
seasonality of production and employment (Reddy 1985; Dr&ze & Mukheijee, 1987). 
Seasonality of employment is found to be closely related to the seasonality of different 
agricultural tasks performed during the production cycle. Usually, periods of harvesting and
‘In the case of contracts based on harvest shares, workers receive a fraction of the harvest products; this 
fraction varies from one region to another.
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post-harvesting constitute the peak period when labour demand goes up in the villages. Using 
NSS data, seasonal fluctuations of rural employment among male and female labourers in 
India are shown in table 1.2’. NSS data reports wage and employment conditions for male 
and female labourers in rural India during the four quarters of the year. Male farm 
employment is found to be the highest from October to December while female farm 
employment is the highest from July to September. Daily casual farm wages also vary across 
quarters, being the highest during the quarter of July-September.
Involuntary unemployment in the casual labour market is common, especially in the 
slack season (see footnote 12 and also the discussion in section 2.2.4 of chapter two). Rudra 
(1982a) observes that less productive workers are more vulnerable to becoming unemployed. 
However, there is a given daily (casual) wage which is downward rigid for a given sex which 
displays very little seasonality. This has been widely observed in different parts of India 
(Rodgers, 1975; Bardhan & Rudra, 1981; Rudra, 1982a; Rao, 1984; Dr6ze & Mukheijee, 
1987). In fact, Rudra (1982a) has presented strong evidence that even in the face of 
unemployment, undercutting wages is rare in the villages in West Bengal; this has generally 
been caused by a strong feeling of solidarity among the labourers. However, piece-rate wages 
vary across tasks and across individuals (Dr&ze & Mukheijee, 1987).
Male-female discrimination is pronounced among the casual labourers which is 
primarily related to the nature of tasks performed. Vaidyanathan (1986) offers some evidence 
in support of this observation as shown in table 1.2". While male labour content is relatively 
higher in ploughing and sowing, female labour content is higher in transplanting, weeding 
and harvesting. A similar trend is noted in some micro-studies as well. For example, Rudra 
(1982a), Reddy (1985) and Drfcze and Mukheijee (1987) have all observed that compared to 
men, casual women labourers dominate in tasks like transplanting, weeding and harvesting. 
In addition, table 1.2’ shows that the daily female farm wage is less than that of the male 
wage in every quarter. A part of this is attributable to the differences in the nature of tasks 
men and women perform; sometimes, women receive a lower wage than men, even for the 
same operation.
Long-term attached (regular) labour contracts, sometimes known as labour-tying, are 
prevalent in different parts of India. The number of regular farm jobs available in a village 
is limited; they fulfil large farmers’ need for hired labour. Given the seasonality of labour 
demand, large farmers hire a few regular farm servants while meeting the rest of their labour 
demand by hiring casual labourers. Employment of regular labourers only is wasteful since 
the demand for labour may be lower in some slack periods. Predominantly, male members
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and individuals from poor and lower castes in the village participate in the regular job 
market.
Contracts are usually agreed on for the whole production year or for a particular crop 
seasoa Contracts can be renewed after a year if both parties agree. Wages are usually agreed 
on for the whole period of the contract. One can refer to Rudra’s (1982a) findings from 
different districts in West Bengal in 1974 as shown in table 1.2” ’. It follows that the annual 
contract is the most common type of regular contract in rural West Bengal.
Regular farm servants are usually paid in a few instalments over the period of the 
contract. They are paid in kind or cash or in both cash and kind; however, there are no 
standard regular wages in a village. Regular wages vary from one farm to another and also 
from one individual to another, even among those employed by the same farm.
Rural labour markets in India, both casual and regular, are largely closed (Rudra, 
1982a; Bardhan & Rudra, 1986). Inter-village labour mobility in the neighbourhood is rare. 
The main form of labour hiring across villages is in terms of labour migration (Breman, 
1985; Mukhopadhyay, 1987). Labour migration takes the form of moving from less 
prosperous areas to the more prosperous ones.
One of the most extensive micro-level studies on intra-rural labour circulation is done 
by Breman (1985) in some villages in south Gujrat. He has found a significant increase in 
the number of migrant agricultural labourers, especially moving from the tribal hinterland of 
Surat district into the prosperous plains of southern Gujrat. He has argued that this recent 
upsurge in the use of migrant labour has been caused by the deliberate policy of landowners 
not to employ local landless labourers, raising unemployment and underemployment in the 
locality. Landlords find that migrant labourers are not only more hard-working, but also more 
docile than the local labourers. Oberoi and Singh (1980) have, however, found that 
landowners in Punjab compete with each other for the available migrant labourers in order 
to meet the local labour scarcity in the peak seasons.
Using 1981 Census data, Mukhopadhyay (1987) focuses on the rural-to-rural 
migration of labourers; she finds that inter-state migration for employment is more common 
(table 1.2 ""); ’distance seems to be a lesser deterrent of this mobility than is normally 
presumed’.
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4.2, Labour Markets in the Study Villages
Agriculture is the primary source of income in all three study villages. Crop revenue 
is the most important source of income (49% of total average household income in Aurepalle 
is earned ffom crop production; the corresponding figures are 34% in Shirapur and 53% in 
Kanzara). Next to crop revenue, labour income occupies the second place in terms of share 
in total income in all the study villages (20% in Aurepalle, 42% in Shirapur and 25% in 
Kanzara)2. In the light of our discussion in section 4.1, this section highlights the 
composition and characteristics of the labour markets in the study villages.
4.2.1. Structure and Composition
The hired labour market in each of the study villages is divided between agricultural 
and non-agricultural jobs. While agricultural labour demand is related to the production of 
different crops in the village, non-agricultural job opportunities come ffom a number of 
different sources, the most common sources being construction work in the village, local 
factories (for example, location of the Sholapur textile factories in the vicinity of Shirapur 
generates demand for unskilled labour ffom Shirapur), and government projects on public 
utility services (for example, initiation of a canal woik near Kanzara). Jobs in either field can 
be identified as regular or casual3.
Casual farm jobs can be daily-rated or piece-rated in different types of farm 
operations like transplanting, weeding, harvesting or post-harvesting. In some cases, contracts 
are agreed on for shorter periods, varying between a single day to at most a week. Payment 
is made per day for an agreed number of hours of work. The other type of casual labourers 
are paid on a piece-rate basis for a specified job, say, transplanting a plot of land. ’Daily 
earnings are generally higher ffom contract work (piece rate) compared to daily rated jobs, 
but the latter often involves longer hours and/or more strenuous work’ (Walker & Ryan, 
1990). However, the farmer’s incentive is that the cost of supervision is minimised by the 
very nature of the piece-rate contracts, thus they are willing to pay a higher wage to piece- 
rate workers (Dr&ze & Mukherjee, 1987). The availability of jobs in the daily labour market 
is usually impersonal in nature; but the access to contract work (piece-rate work) usually 
operates through personal contacts with the contractors.
2Source : Asokan, Rao and Rao (1991), Bhende (1983) and Kshirsagar (1983).
3Members of the sample households who are aged 6 years or above, and who offer labour for farm and/or 
non-farm activities are designated as casual labourers (see section 3.1 in chapter three).
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There are also a few regular farm jobs available in these villages. Besides a few 
domestic servants (usually women and boys) in the wealthy households, men are exclusively 
employed as regular farm servants in all the study villages. The employers of regular farm 
labourers and domestic servants are usually wealthier and larger farm households. Regular 
farm servants fulfil the large farmer’s need for regular hired help. They mainly look after the 
livestock4 and plough and cultivate the fields.
Non-farm casual jobs are usually organized on a piece-rate basis by the government 
agencies or via contractors. These are especially significant in Shirapur and Kanzara. 
However, non-farm regular job opportunities are really limited in the village. They include 
a minority of salaried individuals in the village like a teacher in the village-school, a post­
man in the Post-Office or a night-watchman in the village.
According to their primary occupation5, individual members of the sample 
households (whose age is between six and sixty years) can be classified into the following 
four categories.
(i) Self-Employment. It includes employment in own farm cultivation, rural crafts, 
traditional caste occupations, trading etc.
(ii) Casual Employment. It includes employment in agricultural labour and other 
casual employment in farm or non-farm activities.
(iii) Regular Employment. It includes employment in regular farm work, livestock 
rearing and other regular profession or service jobs.
(iv) Others. It includes other categories of involvement like going to school or 
college, domestic work etc.
Over the ten-year period (1975-84), self-employment continues to be the most 
important source of employment in the study villages. It constitutes about 40% of total 
employment in Aurepalle, 39% in Shirapur and 51% in Kanzara. Next in importance comes 
wage employment which includes both casual and regular employment in farm and non-farm 
activities. Compared to regular employment, the importance of casual employment is higher 
in all the study villages which is similar to the trends observed in other parts of India. 
However, an inter-village comparison shows that the relative importance of regular 
employment is higher in Aurepalle than that in Shirapur or Kanzara.
4Usually younger regular farm servants in the study villages look after the livestock who may not participate 
in cultivation. We, however, consider those who take part in farm cultivation.
sThe primary occupation includes cultivation, agricultural labour, casual labour, livestock rearing, trading, 
rural crafts, traditional caste occupations, attached labour, profession or service, domestic work and others like 
going to school or colleges etc.
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Secondly, there is a marked distinction between male and female labourers in these 
villages which is closely related to the nature of the tasks performed. Only harvesting and 
threshing are performed by both men and women labour. With respect to other tasks, there 
is significant segmentation. While transplanting and weeding are predominantly performed 
by women labourers, tasks involving bullock power (e.g., ploughing, irrigation etc.) are 
performed by men. On an average, the daily female wage is lower than the daily male wage 
in the casual labour market Relative dominance of female labourers is higher in the casual 
labour market. Male are primarily engaged in self-employment (which includes own farm 
cultivation among other things) or in regular farm jobs in the study villages.
Walker and Ryan (1990) reports that there has been a positive and significant time 
trend in Aurepalle and Shirapur (the trend is not significant in Kanzara) for both male and 
female casual wages over 75-76 and 83-84. The trend is obvious in Shirapur where there was 
significant increase in off-farm labour demand during this period. In Aurepalle, however, we 
do not find any such obvious evidence of enhanced labour demand. It seems that this upsurge 
in real wage is more a reflection of supply shift where people significantly switched to 
different kinds of self-employment including various caste occupations so that labour supply 
decreased, thus causing real wage rate to rise. Interestingly, male-female wage differential 
has narrowed down in both Aurepalle and Shirapur, women in Shirapur have positively 
gained from the equal pay provision of the Maharashtra Employment Guarantee Schemes.
4.22. Characteristic Features
As in other parts of India, regular jobs in the study villages are limited in number; 
only a few wealthy households in these villages employ regular farm servants. Regular wages 
vary among farms and among individuals employed by the same farm. A particular feature 
of the wide variation of the annual regular wage among different farmers in the same village 
is very interesting; during the resurvey of Aurepalle in 1991/92, it came out ffom our 
informal discussion with farmers as well as labourers that larger farmers who do not 
supervise their regular farm servants closely, usually pay a lower cash wage. The difference 
in farm size, thus, generates a dispersion in regular wages prevailing in the village. However, 
medium farmers usually hiring one/two regular farm servants (as compared to large farmers 
hiring upto five to six regular farm servants at times) supervise them closely, but usually pay 
a higher annual wage. Labourers, however, generally prefer to work for the generous/rich 
employers in the village because the additional harvests they manage to get from these
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employers more than compensate for the lower wage.
The regular labour market is free from the hereditary patron-client relationship 
between labourers and employers. This has clearly been brought out in our interviews with 
the regular farm servants in Aurepalle. Labourers who were satisfied with the present 
employer were considering renewing their contract at the end of the current year. However, 
there were those who chose regular farm contracts because they wanted to have access to a 
source of credit; they planned to change jobs as soon as they were free of debt. There were 
others who left previous employers because they had problems with the employer or some 
other colleague.
A majority of labourers (landed/landless) are engaged in casual farm/non-farm jobs 
during the year. Casual labour contracts can be of different types : (a) daily contract, (b) 
piece-rate contract, (c) group contract, (c) is a variant of (b) where a group of labourers is 
contracted at the piece rate; different types of contract are usually related to different 
agricultural operations for different crops. In the slack season when job prospects are bleak, 
some individuals move into self-employment and take up different caste occupations. For 
example, Gowdas in Aurepalle get into toddy-tapping.
The following features of the labour market in the study villages can, thus, be 
summarised :
(1) The labour market is divided between casual and regular contracts; casual 
contracts may be of two types, namely, daily and piece-rate contracts.
(2) Males dominate in the regular labour market while female wage labour is 
concentrated in the casual labour market.
(3) Regular wages vary across individuals and faims in a village. Usually, the closer 
the supervision by the employer, the higher is the wage offered. Moreover, regular wages 
may even vary among the labourers hired by the same employer. A part of this variation may 
be attributed to the experience of the workers where more experienced workers receive higher 
wages.
(4) Usually, a major portion of regular wages are paid in advance while the rest is 
paid at regular intervals throughout the contract period.
(5) Casual wages are usually paid daily or in piece-rates. Daily earning ffom the 
piece-rate contract tend to be higher than daily earnings ffom daily-wage contracts, though 
the intensity of work in the former is also greater.
(6) There is a definite discrimination against female casual labourers in the study 
villages such that female wages in all tasks are usually lower than that of male wages.
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(7) Casual unemployment goes up in the slack period of agricultural production; 
however, the extent of unemployment varies among the study villages according to the 
availability of alternative employment opportunities.
(8) Labour markets are largely closed in the study villages, in the sense that inter­
village hiring is uncommon. However, some in-migration from the surrounding less- 
prosperous areas takes place in Kanzara.
4.3. Aspects of Labour Demand
Farm households in all the study villages rely significantly on hired labour. ’In 
Mahboobnagar and Akola villages, hired labour provides the lions’ share (60 to 80 per cent) 
of total labour use in crop production’ (Walker & Ryan, 1990).
This section examines different aspects of labour demand in the study villages. In 
particular, the variation in the pattern of labour hiring between small and large farms, 
especially with respect to the relative content of family and regular labour (section 4.3.1), the 
seasonal fluctuations of labour demand (section 4.3.2), and crop failure in the semi-arid 
tropics (section 4.3.3) are highlighted.
4.3.1. Family Versus Hired Labour
As noted earlier, both males and females are hired as casual labourers while only 
males are employed as regular farm servants. A few wealthier farmers hire regular farm 
servants for long periods of time, while casual labourers are employed by all types of 
farming households. This closely follows the trend observed in different parts of India. The 
rest of the labour is supplied by the family labour.
Information about labour hiring6 is obtained from VLS-Y2. In order to examine the 
nature of labour hiring, the ratios of regular labour-hours to total labour-hours (PL/TL) and 
that of family labour-hours to total labour-hours (FL/TL) are calculated for all crops.
Table 3.1 presents the average values of PL/TL and FL/TL in the sample farms
6Most sample farms/households may be involved in both hiring-in and hiring-out of labour. However, usually 
this holds good for casual labourers only; farms may hire-in some casual labour in the busy seasons while some 
family members may hire themselves out if there is not much work to be done on the family farms. So far as 
hiring-in and hiring-out of regular labourers are concerned, there is a segregation: usually larger farmers hire-in 
regular labourers and landless households hire themselves out as regular labourers.
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hiring regular farm servants over the study period 1980-84. For each column, the numbers 
in parentheses indicate the corresponding figure when all farms are considered. In general, 
the probability of hiring regular labour in the study villages is higher in larger7 farms than 
that in smaller farms; in Aurepalle and Shirapur, a few smaller farmers also hire regular farm 
servants, though the proportion is much less than that on the larger farms. This is true 
whether we consider all farms or only the farms hiring regular labourers, though the 
difference is larger for the sub-sample of farms hiring regular labour. A comparison of labour 
use between all farms and farms hiring regular labour suggests that the average use of regular 
labour-hours is lower among the larger farms if all farms are taken into account.
Secondly, the use of family labour-hours among the sample farms is considered. 
Pooling all sample farms together, the average use of family labour-hours is higher in smaller 
farms as opposed to the larger ones (the difference is significant, too). In general, it appears 
that there prevails a substitutability between the use of regular and family labour in these 
farms, i.e., the average use of family labour-hours is higher in the smaller farms, who hire 
less of regular labour-hours. Next we consider the use of family labour-hours among the 
farms hiring regular labourers. There are no small farms in Kanzara hiring regular labour- 
hours while smaller farms in Aurepalle use more family labour-hours (and less regular 
labour-hours). However, the average use of family labour-hours is lower among the larger 
farms (using regular labour) in Aurepalle and Kanzara so that we may argue that regular and 
family labour are substitutes in these villages. But in Shirapur, the average use of regular and 
family labour-hours are almost equal in larger farms (hiring some regular farm servants). It 
should, however, be noted that the average use of regular labour-hours is very low in 
Shirapur. In other words, there is no obvious relationship between the use of regular and 
family labour in Shirapur.
4.3.2. Seasonality of Labour Demand
As mentioned earlier, agriculture is the primary source of living in these villages. But 
agricultural production is found to be highly seasonal in this part of the semi-arid tropics of 
India. Labour demand not only fluctuates over the peak and the slack periods of production, 
but also among the study villages, due partly to the existence of different seasonal patterns 
in different villages.
The peak period is the period of buoyant agricultural activities. This is related to the
7This classification corresponds to the variable TYPE. See the description of the variables in chapter three.
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timing of labour-intensive tasks like transplanting and weeding on the one hand, and 
harvesting and post-harvesting, on the other. However, the timing of these tasks depends on 
the nature of the crops produced which varies ffom one village to another. For example, due 
to the erratic rainfall pattern in the summer, rabi (winter) is the main crop in Shirapur. 
Hence, the labour demand, in Shirapur, is higher in the month of November when 
transplanting/weeding starts, and also in the months of February-March, when harvesting 
starts. However, kharif is the main crop in Aurepalle and Kanzara. Accordingly, the relative 
labour demand increases in these villages during July-August (transplanting and weeding) and 
then again in October-November-December (harvesting and post-harvesting).
One may argue that the seasonality of labour demand is reflected in the task-wise 
variation of daily wages. Rudra (1982a) argues that the task-wise variation of wages 
sometimes account for the demand for non-substitutable labour.
Finally, there is an inter-village variation in the demand for labour. Drought-prone 
Shirapur is the village worst affected by the variability of labour demand over the slack and 
peak periods while the situation is relatively stable in Kanzara. Given the seasonality of 
labour demand in agriculture, the availability of casual contracts in agriculture is specific to 
particular months in the year. Hence, in the slack season, there is a scarcity of casual farm 
jobs in these villages. At this time of the year, a casual labourer may opt for some non-farm 
job, provided s/he can secure one. However, the availability of non-farm casual jobs is 
limited and rather village-specific (see discussion in chapter seven).
4.33. Crop Failure
Besides seasonal fluctuations, crop failure is another hazard prevalent in the semi-arid 
tropics of India which is sometimes responsible for the diminution of labour demand. The 
problem may be more acute if there is a general crop failure rather than failure in some 
specific crops of the locality. In order to avoid complete crop failure, farmers in the semi-arid 
study villages often adopt to intercropping which significantly reduces the possibility of 
complete crop failure in the drought-prone area. In this case, farmers cultivate a combination 
of different crops (usually two-three crops at a time) on the same plot of land in different 
rows so that even if production of one crop fails, there are still others to survive. Among the 
three study villages, crop failure is particularly frequent in the Sholapur villages. On an 
average, 11% of the cropped area suffers ffom complete crop failure which is more 
predominant in the sole cropping area as opposed to that in the intercropping area.
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The problem with frequent crop failure is that it not only contributes to the 
fluctuations in crop income, but also to that in farm labour income. Hence, labourers/farmers 
need to hedge against the possible drop in their incomes by some other means.
Intercropping is a common way of hedging against volatility of crop production in all 
the study villages. For example, sorghum/pearl millet/pigeon pea or castor/pigeon pea 
intercropping in Aurepalle and cotton/pigeon pea/sorghum or pigeon pea/sorghum/green 
gram/ground nut intercropping in Kanzara are commonly practised. Kanzara is, however, in 
an advantageous position. Besides the relatively higher and more dependable rainfall pattern, 
cotton is a stable performer and there is a lower incidence of crop failure in Kanzara. The 
extent of intercropping is much higher in the smaller farms in their attempts to safeguard 
against the risk of crop failure as opposed to that in the larger farms. In other words, the 
extent of sole cropping is positively associated with the size of the operational landholding.
4.4. Aspects of Labour Market Participation
Participation in the labour market depends on a number of factors. It not only 
depends on the personal and family characteristics of the workers (determining his/her 
preference pattern), but also on the availability of work. In this section, the probability of 
participation, the probability of unemployment and the seasonality of employment are 
considered.
The analysis in this section primarily relates to casual labourers. This is because, by 
the very nature of the contract, regular labourers are supposed to work everyday except when 
they are sick. Hence, they are excluded from the analysis of participation and market 
unemployment.
4.4.1. Probability of Participation
Casual labourers have the freedom of participating in farm and/or non-faim work; 
the latter may include participation in some on-going government projects as well. One way 
to examine the nature of farm participation is to consider the probability of participation. 
Two measures are used here, namely, the probability of farm labour force participation (POL) 
and the probability of casual farm labour participation (POM) as follows :
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P0L = OWNFWD + FDAY
OWNFWD + FDAY + NFDAY + GDAY + INUNEMP
pom  = _______________________________________________   (1)
OWNFWD + FDAY + NFDAY + GDAY + INUNEMP
the difference between POL and POM is that the number of days worked on the labourer’s 
own farm which is not included in POM.
where OWNFWD = no. of days worked on own farm;
FDAY = no. of days worked on others’ farm;
NFDAY = no. of days worked on other non-farm work;
GDAY = no. of days worked on governmental project;
INUNEMP = no. of days involuntarily unemployed.
The average values of POL and POM for male and female casual labourers in the 
study villages during 1980-84 are shown in table 4.1. By definition, POL and POM are 
identical for landless labourers (both male and female) since they do not have the opportunity 
to work on their family farms. The difference between POL and POM is positive for landed 
labourers since they are required to work on their own plots. Secondly, POM is significantly 
higher for landless male and female labourers in all the study villages which, to some extent, 
lends support to our argument of time constraint that the opportunity cost of time is less for 
landless labourers. Thirdly, the probability of casual farm labour participation POM is the 
lowest in Shirapur and the highest in Aurepalle. This, perhaps, suggests that there are more 
non-farm work opportunities in Shirapur compared to Aurepalle where farming is the most 
important economic activity. Finally, we note that, on an average, casual female participation 
probabilities, POL and POM, are higher than those of male labourers, POM being even 
higher for landless female labourers. This points to the relative dominance of female 
labourers in the casual market
4.4.2. Probability of Unemployment
Unemployment is pervasive among casual labourers, especially in the slack seasons. 
It not only varies among the male and female labourers, but also among the study villages. 
In order to examine the nature of unemployment, the probability of involuntary 
unemployment (PU) is calculated for each year during 1980-84 and also for landed and 
landless labourers. It is defined as the number of days an individual is unable to get 
employment out of the total number of days s/he has tried (where unemployment does not 
include the number of days worked on the individual’s own farm). Estimated values of the 
PU are shown in table 4.2.
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In general, the average probability of unemployment (PU) is higher for females in 
all the study villages with Shirapur being the exception8. Walker and Ryan (1990) have 
estimated the probability of unemployment for all six ICRISAT villages for the year 1975-76; 
they found that PU is 0.19 for men and 0.23 for women. Considering the five-year period 
(1980-84), our estimated PU figures are very close to their figures for male labourers in 
Aurepalle and Kanzara and for female labourers in Aurepalle and Shirapur, other figures, too, 
are close enough to be compared. It follows that the extent of unemployment among male 
and female casual labourers has remained almost unchanged over a period of ten years (1975- 
84).
Secondly, we compare the probability of unemployment between landed and landless 
labourers. The probability of unemployment is higher among landless labourers in all the 
study villages and is even higher for landless female labourers (though the difference is not 
significant). This may be related to the fact that female labourers are excluded from regular 
farm and/or most non-farm jobs in these villages.
Finally, considering the five-year period (1980-84), unemployment among both male 
and female labourers is found to be the lowest in Kanzara and the highest in drought-prone 
Shirapur. Thus, like participation, unemployment, too, is dependent on the characteristics of 
the village labour market.
4.4.3. Seasonality of Participation
Given the seasonal nature of agricultural production, participation/unemployment in 
the rural labour market, too, follows a seasonal pattern too. To analyse this seasonal pattern, 
we calculate the average monthly duration of unemployment (in days) in 1980 (one of the 
years under study; the choice of the year is arbitrary) for male and female casual labourers 
during different months of 1980 as shown in table 4.3.
The monthly duration of unemployment appears to be closely related to the pattern 
of seasonality of agricultural production, as indicated by the crop calendar of the respective 
villages. For example, female labourers primarily participate in tasks like transplanting, 
weeding and harvesting and the monthly duration of unemployment for female labourers is 
lower in the months of August and September (when the transplanting and weeding of the 
kharif crops are in operation) and then in November-December (when harvesting starts).
8 The persistence of significant differences in both wage and unemployment probability between men and 
women reflects a strong gender division of labour. As mentioned earlier (see pp. 72 of chapter three), the gender 
division of labour is not a major focus of the study; this is in fact a much under-researched issue, which calls for 
further attention.
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However, male labourers dominate in sowing, ploughing, irrigation (irrigation continues 
throughout the production process for the irrigated plant) as well as in harvesting; the 
duration of unemployment among male labourers is lower in the month of August, and then 
again in October and January. The pattern of monthly duration is similar in Kanzara because 
kharif is the main crop there.
The pattern of unemployment is, however, different in Shirapur. Given the erratic 
rainfall pattern in the village, rabi (winter) is the main crop. Accordingly, the duration of 
unemployment is lower in November (when transplanting-weeding goes on) and then again 
in January-February (when harvesting starts). Secondly, compared to Aurepalle and Kanzara, 
the general level of unemployment is higher in Shirapur. It is even higher among the female 
labourers throughout the year.
4.5. Wages and Employment in Casual and Regular Contracts
This section examines the wages and employment levels of casual and regular 
labourers and the underlying relationship between casual and regular contracts.
4.5.1. Casual and Regular Employment
By the very nature of the contract, a casual labourer has the freedom to combine 
different alternative activities. S/he can work on his/her own farm if s/he is a landed labourer 
or on another farm; s/he can also find employment in some non-farm or government projects. 
However, a full-time regular farm servant is attached to a particular employer for the contract 
period and does not have the freedom to work for others at all during this period. Hence, the 
total benefit from the regular contract comes solely from farmwork on the employer’s land.
Basic information about wage and employment particulars of regular labourers is 
obtained from the VLS-C schedule while that relating to the casual labourers is obtained from 
the VLS-K schedule (see chapter three). Since regular labourers in the study villages were 
all found to be male, we compare the wage and employment conditions of regular labourers 
with male casual labourers only.
On an average, casual male workers in all the study villages have more days of work 
in farm employment (FDAY) than in other non-farm jobs (NFDAY) and/or governmental
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works (NFEMP), all of which add up to total employment (TOTEMP)9. In Shirapur and 
Kanzara, however, more days of casual work are found in non-farm and governmental 
employment as compared to Aurepalle (table 5.1). Shirapur has gained from substantial non­
farm employment opportunities because of being in the vicinity of the Sholapur textile 
industry as well as receiving government support because the village comes under the 
Drought-Prone Area Program (DPAP). Kanzara has benefitted from a number of on-going 
projects primarily initiated by the Maharashtra Employment Guarantee Scheme of the state 
government (see further discussion in chapter seven).
A regular farm servant is attached to his/her employer for a stipulated period. The 
average period of contract is about a year in Aurepalle or Shirapur; however it varies 
between three to five months in Kanzara where regular farm servants are hired primarily for 
long-duration cotton cultivation. During the contract period, regular farm servants are 
supposed to work every day except the days when they are sick. Binswanger et al. (1984) 
have assumed that, on an average, a regular farm servant works for 25 days a month (which 
is 300 days a year). The difference in the days of employment also includes the difference 
in the number of hours worked a day. A casual worker works for 7-8 hours a day in all the 
villages while a regular farm servant usually works for a longer number of hours a day; the 
working day of a regular labourer varies between 10-12 hours, sometimes they work even 
longer, especially when irrigation work starts.
4.5.2. Casual and Regular Wages
Next, wage incomes between casual and regular contracts are compared. We calculate 
average village level male casual and regular wages at 1960-61 prices as shown in table 5.2. 
In Aurepalle, regular wages are mainly paid in kind10 while in Kanzara they are 
predominantly paid in cash11. On the other hand, in Shirapur, a combination of wages paid 
in cash and kind is observed12. Regular wages usually vary among the farms in the study
9The number of days worked on the individual’s own farm is excluded here.
10In Aurepalle, the permanent wage is usually paid in kind. 44.5 kg. of paddy per month plus one pair of 
sandals every year plus pinch of tobacco everyday. Some farmers also give a blanket every 2-3 years. Cash 
payments are nil.
“In Kanzara kind payment is negligible and most of the payment is made in cash. The range of cash payment 
varies from one farm to another.
12In Shirapur, we find a combination of cash and kind payments. Range of cash payments varies from one 
farm to another while the kind payment is fixed at 27.5 Kg. of sorghum per month.
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villages; even in the same farm, different regular labourers may receive different wages. 
Bardhan and Rudra (1981) and Rudra (1982a) report that regular farm servants obtain a fixed 
wage which is personalised and varies from one farm to another in the same village. 
However, Breman (1974) and Sundari (1981) have observed village-specific rates for regular 
farm servants. Freeman (1977) finds that regular farm servants in Orissa are paid a share of 
the final product while Sundari (1981) and Rudra (1982a) find that usually regular wages 
include meals, clothes and other components.
It is instructive to compare daily wage earnings between regular labour (DPLWAGE) 
and casual labour (DCLWAGE). For convenience, we shall refer to these notions as the 
’regular daily wage’ and ’casual daily wage’, respectively. All wages are calculated in rupees 
(Rs.) at 1960-61 prices (see chapter three). As shown in Table 5.2, the regular daily wage 
is substantially lower than the casual daily wage in all the study villages, the difference being 
minimum in Kanzara and maximum in Aurepalle. However, given the uncertainty of getting 
a casual job, the casual daily wage needs to be adjusted by the probability of employment. 
In doing so, casual daily wages are multiplied by (1 - u), where u is the probability of 
unemployment (see section 4.4 of the chapter). Even after this adjustment, the regular daily 
wage is lower than the casual (adjusted) daily wage in Aurepalle and Shirapur. In Kanzara, 
however, the unemployment-adjusted casual daily wage is very close to the regular daily 
wage. This means that, in Kanzara, the labourers’ ’indifference condition’ is satisfied, 
assuming no risk aversion and no credit constraints (see discussion in chapter two).
The comparison between casual and regular daily wages is somewhat misleading if 
we do not distinguish between landed and landless casual labourers. Landed casual labourers 
usually get some non-wage income as well as wage income. It may, therefore, be useful to 
compare regular daily wages with the daily wages earned by landless casual (male) labourers. 
We find that regular daily wages are lower than unemployment-adjusted casual daily wages 
of landless labourers (DCLWAGE’) in all the study villages. This suggests that hypothesis 
HI holds good for the landless labourers in the study villages. However, we do not have the 
information on the reservation wage of the workers; hence, we cannot examine the validity 
of hypothesis H3, i.e., whether regular daily wages are higher than workers’ reservation 
wages.
Given that regular daily wages are lower than casual daily wages, we expect a risk- 
neutral landless male labourer to prefer casual employment Hence, in order to explain the 
choice of regular contract by the landless labourers, we need to take into account: (i) risk 
aversion, (ii) credit constraint and (iii) the possibility of non-farm wage income. While (i)
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and (ii) may encourage the choice of regular contracts, (iii) may have an adverse effect and 
may, therefore, induce the choice of casual contracts.
Total income from a regular job (TOTWAGE) comes from the farm work for the 
employer13 while the total income from a casual job may come from farm as well as non­
farm employment (which may include income from on-going government projects as well). 
The significance of non-farm wage income not only varies between landless and landed 
labourers, but also among the study villages (see table 5.2’). Compared to landed labourers, 
landless casual labourers have a higher proportion of total income earned from non-farm 
activities in all the study villages because they can offer more non-leisure time in the market 
and they are also more mobile14; the relative significance of non-farm income is the least 
in Aurepalle and the highest in Shirapur. As shown in table 5.2, regular labourers in all the 
study villages earn more than the casual annual wages earned from farm work. However, as 
shown in tables 5.2 and 5.2’, the situation is reversed when the non-farm incomes are added 
to farm income to yield the total casual income (TOTCWAGE) earned in a year.
A comparison of Aurepalle with Shirapur and Kanzara shows that regular labourers 
in Aurepalle are the poorest15, having the lowest daily income. To some extent, this may 
be explained by the lack of alternative employment opportunities in Aurepalle, giving rise 
to a lower reservation wage of the workers. Aurepalle does not have any alternative source 
of non-farm demand for labour like the government-operated land improvement or irrigation 
projects near Kanzara, Shirapur or the location of Sholapur textile industry in the 
neighbourhood of Shirapur16. In the absence of other alternative employment opportunities, 
the bargaining position of regular labourers in Aurepalle is weaker compared to other study 
villages, giving rise to a lower market wage in Aurepalle.
4.53. Comparison with Existing Studies
A comparison of casual and regular wages in the study villages shows that casual
13It should be remembered here that the period of contract varies among the study villages. Hence, the total 
income from the regular contract is the daily regular wage multiplied by the average period of contract in each 
village; the average periods of contract are approximately 300 days, 250 days and 100 days in Aurepalle, Shirapur 
and Kanzara respectively.
MOften the non-farm job prospects come from the neighbourhood of the village; hence, labourers may have 
to travel a few miles to go to the work place.
15This observation is also supported by Walker & Ryan (1990), pp. 133.
16Further see our discussion in chapter seven.
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daily earnings are higher for casual than that for regular labour, though regular annual 
earnings may be higher than casual annual earnings from farm work only. A number of 
studies, drawn from different parts of India, also report similar results.
For example, using data from the Second Agricultural Labour Enquiry (1960), the 
Rural Labour Enquiry (1963), Final Report and the National Sample Survey (25th round), 
Ghose (1980) has compared the daily and annual casual (male) and regular wages (1960- 
61=100) in different states of India. His estimates are given in table 5.3. The table shows that 
annual regular wages are higher in most states of India like Assam, Bihar, Karnataka, 
Rajasthan, U.P. (Uttar Pradesh) and West Bengal. However, daily casual wages are found to 
be higher than daily regular wages in all the states, except Bihar. Using the same data-set, 
Basant (1984) finds slightly different results from those obtained by Ghose (1980). He finds 
that daily regular wages are higher than daily casual wages in Bihar and Mysore, equal in 
West Bengal, while lower in Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, 
Punjab, Rajasthan, Tamilnadu, Uttar Pradesh and Bombay.
Next we refer to Rudra (1982a). Using the findings of the Farm Management Survey, 
Rudra compares casual and regular daily wages. His findings are summarised in table 5.3’. 
Rudra, too, finds that in all cases, casual daily wages are higher than regular daily wages. In 
an earlier study, using Intensive Survey of Agricultural Labour (Vol. I - All India), Sanghvi 
(1969) also finds that the regular daily wage is less than casual daily wage in most states in 
India. Table 5.3" is taken from Sanghvi (Table 4.7, pp.100).
In general, most studies indicate that casual daily wages are higher than regular daily 
wages which lends support to hypothesis HI. However, annual wages are not readily 
comparable in the study villages because of the variation in the duration of the contract. In 
other studies, no such conclusive trends are found; sometimes annual wages from casual 
labour are higher than annual wages from regular labour, sometimes it is the other way 
round. Secondly, the composition of total income between farm and non-farm income is not 
clear in some of the available studies. We, however, distinguish between farm and non-farm 
income earned by a casual labourer. This is important in the comparison between casual and 
regular contracts because regular labourers do not have the opportunity to participate in non­
farm employment. Finally, as already mentioned, landed casual labourers earn some income 
from own farms. Hence, a distinction needs to be made between landed and landless casual 
labourers, though none of the studies referred to here do so. To the extent that own farm 
income is significant in total casual income, it may offer a kind of employment insurance to 
these landed labourers. Regular daily earnings are lower than casual daily earnings; this is
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true even if we take unemployment into account. In this context, the role of employment 
insurance cannot be undermined. Therefore, the consideration of employment insurance may 
affect the choice between casual and regular contracts.
In an implicit contract framework, where risk-neutral farms enter a contract with risk- 
averse labourers, regular daily wages are less than casual daily wages. As shown in the 
extension of the implicit contract model in chapter two, the difference between the two 
constitutes the premium for employment insurance. Rudra (1982a) has also argued that in the 
rural labour market with fluctuations of employment over slack and peak periods, the 
difference in casual and regular daily wages accounts for the premium for employment 
insurance in regular farm contracts.
4.6. Aspects of Rural Credit
Offering additional non-wage facilities to regular farm servants is common in rural 
India, the most common form being the credit-labour interlinkage in the regular contracts. 
B reman (1974) finds that the availability of consumption credit is common in the backward 
parts of Gujrat and Maharashtra; Bardhan and Rudra (1981) find that regular farm labourers 
in eastern India obtain small consumption loans from the employer. Bell and Srinivasan 
(1988) report that regular farm servants in the villages of Bihar, Punjab and Andhra Pradesh 
are entitled to obtain interest-free wage advances from the regular employer.
Besides credit, attached labourers may also get some land from the employer. 
Bardhan and Rudra (1981) report that in the Gangetic plains, the incidence of land allotment 
is as high as 89% in Uttar Pradesh whereas it is almost negligible in West Bengal. Sundari 
(1981) finds that the practice of land allotment to tied labourers is common in Chingleput 
district of Tamil Nadu whereas Gough (1983) finds the practice obsolete in Thanjavur 
district. Breman (1974), Reddy (1985), and Walker and Ryan (1990), too, do not find the 
practice of land allotment in Gujrat, Maharashtra and the ICRISAT villages, respectively. The 
reasons why regular labourers are allotted land in some regions, but not in others call for 
further investigation, but this issue will not be pursued here. One possible reason may be as 
follows. If regular labourers are employed mostly on large farms where average value of land 
is the highest, the opportunity cost of ceding this land to workers will be high. Therefore, 
land is not ceded.
Regular farm servants in all the study villages are found to obtain some interest-free
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wage advance (i.e., credit) from the regular employer which a casual labourer does not get. 
This section examines how the offer of credit in the regular contract may modify the 
labourers’ (especially the landless labourers’) preference between casual and regular contracts.
4.6,1, Nature of the Credit Market
Given the seasonality of production and frequent crop failure in the semi-arid tropics 
of India, access to credit is crucial to smooth out production and consumption at the 
household level.
Credit markets in the study villages are segmented between formal and informal 
sectors. Given the difference between these two sectors in the prevailing rates of interest as 
well as the collateral requirement, rural households are divided between them according to 
their landholding status because land is the most acceptable form of collateral. Usually, 
formal credit requires a substantial amount of collateral while the collateral requirement is 
negligible in the informal credit market; however, the rates of interest charged by the 
informal credit sources are much higher. The formal credit market consists of the cooperative 
credit societies17, the commercial banks (interest charged is between 9% and 14% per year), 
land development banks and other government agencies. The other component is the 
unorganized or informal market which includes the credit offered by the moneylender (annual 
interest charged ranges from 18% to 36% in Aurepalle, a maximum of 16% in Shirapur or 
Kanzara18), relatives, friends and the employees of the regular farm servants (annual interest 
charged varies between 18% and 24%). In what follows, it is clear that formal credit is 
cheaper than informal credit in the study villages.
Table 6.1 which is borrowed from Bhende (1986) describes the sources and volume 
of credit available to the sample households. The incidence of formal credit (from co­
operative credit societies, land development banks, commercial banks etc.) is relatively low 
in Aurepalle where informal sources (e.g., private moneylenders) supply the bulk of the 
credit. In Shirapur and Kanzara, however, the bulk of credit comes from the formal sources.
Table 6.1’ compares the share of formal credit among farms of different sizes. The 
smaller landholding classes in Shirapur and Kanzara have greater access to the formal sector 
compared to those in Aurepalle. However, neither in Kanzara nor Aurepalle, do the labouring 
households have any access to formal credit; the situation is different in Shirapur, where 75% 
of the labour households have access to the cheaper formal credit. This has been made
l7In Akola villages, the major share of 46%-48% of total credit is advanced by the cooperative credit sector.
l8This has been made possible by the passing of the Moneylenders’ Act of 1960 by the Maharashtra 
Government which specifies registration and the maximum interest rate of 16% per annum.
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possible by the Drought Prone Area Program (DPAP) which is operating in Shirapur and not 
in the other two study villages. On the whole, it appears that the spread of formal credit is 
much less among the different landholding classes in Aurepalle; in contrast, the access to 
formal credit is higher in Shirapur and Kanzara. In other words, the credit constraint on the 
labour households, especially the poorer landless ones, is more binding in Aurepalle 
compared to the other two study villages.
Though the rate of interest charged by the informal source of credit is usually higher, 
villagers, especially the landless households, often prefer to go to the latter because no 
collateral is required while normally land is regarded as the most acceptable form of 
collateral in the formal credit market. Moreover, loans can be obtained relatively quickly; in 
contrast, obtaining credit from the financial institutions (banks or cooperatives) requires a lot 
more formalities to be completed and may even require bribes to be paid to the concerned 
official.
This information lends support to the primary assumption of the Collateral model that 
the marginal cost of credit (discount factor p j is higher for employees than (p’j) for 
employers (see chapter two). In other words, market interest rates facing poorer, landless 
labourers are higher than for wealthier employers in the study villages.
4.62. Incidence of Wage Advance
Landless labourers are unable to offer collateral as required in a formal credit market; 
hence, they are forced to go to the informal credit market Even in the informal credit 
market, the availability of credit depends on the wealth and reputation of the borrower. In 
Kanzara, landless labourers can borrow Rs. 100 from the moneylender without collateral and 
a maximum of Rs. 500 by offering collateral in the form of livestock, durable goods etc. As 
already mentioned, Shirapur comes under the Drought Prone Area Program (DPAP) where 
credit is made available to landless labourers and small farmers to buy sheep, goats and cattle 
from the Cooperative Society. However, landless labourers find it difficult to secure credit 
for consumption purposes.
It is customary for regular farm servants in the study villages to receive an advance 
payment from the employers. The contract with the employer acts as the substitute for a 
collateral, which is otherwise difficult to provide. This appears to be the principal motivation 
to enter a regular contract, as revealed again and again in our interviews conducted in 
Aurepalle in 1991 and 1992 (also, see Binswanger et al., 1984; Walker, 1990).
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Consequently, individuals from households with no/marginal landholdings may prefer 
to participate in regular farm jobs. Regular wages are usually paid in a few instalments, a 
major portion of which is paid at the beginning of the contract period (Walker & Ryan, 
1990). This is called an advance, on which no interest is charged. But if the amount of the 
advance exceeds the total sum to be received from the contract, an interest is charged. In 
Aurepalle, the interest charged is usually 18%. In Kanzara, interest may take the form of a 
reduction in the salary given while in Shirapur apparently no interest is charged. In many 
cases, the understanding about the interest charged is implicit rather than explicit; hence, the 
information is difficult to obtain.
Let us explain how the credit-labour linkage in the regular farm contracts works in 
Aurepalle. The analysis is based on my resurvey data collected from Aurepalle in January, 
1992 (see chapter three) as shown in table 6.2.
The following inferences can be made from the available information. A significant 
proportion of regular wages are taken as an advance (interest-free) in the beginning of the 
contract period; all the regular farm servants in our sample have taken advances from the 
employer. An advance is treated as a loan when the amount of the advance is greater than 
the amount of the wage contract for the period. This is found to occur in 50% of the cases 
and interest at the rate of 18% is charged on the loan component. In 50% of the cases in 
which a loan is incurred, it is found to be taken for productive purposes like purchasing 
land/bullocks or for cultivation of the family land. Sometimes, it is taken for consumption 
purposes, like construction of residential houses, a marriage in the family, medical treatment 
of a family member or repayment of old debts.
The results obtained from sections 4.6.1 and 4.6.2 lend support to hypothesis H5. The 
credit market is segmented between the formal and informal sectors and the labourers have 
access to a different segment (informal credit) as opposed to the employers such that 
employers face a lower interest rate (i.e., discount rate). Consequently, the lower discount 
rates of employers vis-a-vis labourers provides the principal motivation for the payment of 
advances to regular labourers.
4.63. Implicit Vs. Market Rates of Interest
Given the segmentation of the rural credit markets between formal and informal 
sectors, the computation of interest rates implicit in regular farm contracts is an exercise of 
great interest. We determine implicit rates of interest as follows.
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To simplify the exercise, we consider landless labourers only. Suppose both casual 
and regular labourers are available for works for L days a year. If r = r* is the rate of interest 
at which a labourer is indifferent between accepting a regular contract at the beginning of the 
year, or remaining in the casual labour market, the following expression holds good :
(1 + r*) wd L = wd (1 -  u) L
r n =  (i - » )  _  2
(2)
where wpd, wcd are regular and casual daily wages respectively and u is the probability of 
unemployment19.
Given daily regular and casual (adjusted) wages in table 5.2 of the chapter, values 
of implicit interest rates can be calculated from equation (2). Estimated values of the implicit 
interest rate are shown in table 6.3. Implicit interest rates vary among the study villages; 
Kanzara has the lowest annual rate of interest while Aurepalle the highest
Next values of the implicit interest rates are compared with the observed market 
rates of interest prevailing in the study villages (see table 6.3’). While (a), (b) and (c) 
comprise the sources of formal credit, (d) alone is the main source of informal credit in the 
study villages. As already mentioned (tables 6.1 and 6.1’), the formal and informal credit 
agencies in the study villages charge different rates of interest which vary with the size and 
the period for which the loan is incurred.
While comparing implicit interest rates with observed market interest rates, attention 
is paid to the reference period. If the regular contract lasts for one year as in Aurepalle, the 
reference period is one year. Casual wages are distributed over this reference period while 
regular wages are paid at the end of the reference period. Assuming that all casual wages are 
paid in the middle of the reference period, r* is compared with an observed interest rate 
applying to a six-month loan20.
If the implicit interest rate (r*) is higher than the prevailing market rate of interest, 
a landless labourer who is not rationed on the credit market (formal or informal), ought to
19Equation (2) assumes that both casual and regular labourers work equal number of days in a year. Also, as 
already mentioned in chapter two (foot note 8) that due to the indivisibility of annual regular contracts it is an 
artificial normalization to use daily wages.
^Theoretically, if wages are paid on a daily basis, one can compare l/(l+r*) with Zjl/Cl+r"1)1 where r ^  is 
the market interest rate observed per day so that t ranges between 1 and 365 days.
122
prefer casual contracts to regular contracts. When we compare the implicit interest rate with 
the observed interest rate, the situation varies among the study villages.
Minimum, maximum and modal values of the relevant interest rates are shown for 
each village. In order to get an idea of the credit constraint, let us compare the implicit 
interest rates with the observed modal interest rates. Among the study villages, the implicit 
interest rate is the lowest in Kanzara. The modal interest rates charged by different formal 
and informal sources are higher than the implicit interest rate. Hence, a landless labourer in 
Kanzara may optimally choose a regular contract. The implicit interest rate is 130% in 
Shirapur which is higher than the observed modal interest rates from formal and informal 
sources in the village. Hence, a landless labourer in Shirapur ought to prefer a casual contract 
if s/he has access to formal/informal credit. The implicit interest rate is the highest (258%) 
in Aurepalle which is higher than the modal interest rates charged by the government, 
commercial banks, co-operatives as well as private moneylenders. This implies that a landless 
labourer in Aurepalle is better off choosing a casual contract unless he is rationed on the 
formal and/or informal credit maikets. Thus, in Aurepalle and Shirapur, quantity rationing 
on the credit market seems to be necessary to explain why some landless labourers choose 
regular contracts.
However, as already discussed in section 4.6.1, cheaper credit is available sometimes 
even to the landless households in Shirapur under various government programmes (also see 
chapter seven). This may explain why the credit incentive of regular contracts may be 
relatively less in Shirapur relative to that in Aurepalle and Kanzara. Consequently, the 
incidence of regular contracts is less in Shirapur (see table 3.1).
Conclusion
This chapter offers some preliminary empirical evidence on the factors which 
determine the choice between casual and regular contracts in rural India. With this aim in 
view, it analyses some aspects of labour and credit markets in the study villages with 
reference to these in an all-India context.
Sections 4.1 and 4.2 offer useful background information as to the structure and 
functioning of rural labour markets in the study villages, with reference to the rest of India. 
Labour markets in the study villages are divided between casual and regular jobs and 
between farm and non-farm jobs. Primarily males dominate in the regular labour market
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while the casual labour market is divided between male and female labourers. Unemployment 
is pervasive in the casual labour market, especially during the slack periods in agriculture and 
among female labourers. While section 4.3 considers the pattern of labour demand section 
4.4 studies that of labour supply. The analysis clearly shows the seasonal character of rural 
labour maikets in India, reflected not only in the variation of wages over the production 
cycle, but also in the fluctuations of participation and unemployment rates.
Section 4.5 looks at the issue of comparative wages and, among other things, shows 
that risk-neutral landless labourers ought to prefer casual to regular contracts because casual 
daily wages are higher even if we take unemployment into account. Section 4.6, however, 
shows that this argument gets strongly modified once we take into account the fact that 
regular labourers receive a large part of their wages in advance and that the comparative 
attractiveness of casual and regular contracts depends quite crucially on whether and at what 
rates labourers have access to credit.
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CHAPTER 4 : TABLES
TABLE 1.1. Composition (%) of Main and Marginal Workers in Rural India
Employment Status
1977-78
Male Female
Self-Employment 62.8% 62.1%
Regular Wage/Salaried Employment 10.6% 2.8%
Casual Wage Employment 26.7% 35.1%
Source : A. Vaidyanathan (JV86).
TABLE 1.1’. Pattern of Labour Use (109 Days/Year) in Indian Agriculture, 1977-78
Type of Labour Family Regular Casual Total
Male 25.2 2.4 7.8 35.4
Female 9.3 0.3 4.8 14.4
Total 34.5 (69.3)% 2.7 (5.4)% 12.6 (25.3%) 49.8 (100.00%)
Source : A. Vaidyanathan (19&6).
TABLE 1.2. Types of Casual Contracts (% of Respondents)
Type West
Bengal
Bihar Orissa U.P
Daily Contracts 75 95 100 92
Contracts for Longer Periods 24 3.7 0.0 8.1
Piece-Rate Contracts 16 21 0.0 0.0
Source : A. Rudra, 1982.
N ote: The same village may have more than one type o f  contract; hence, the entries (which are % o f  
villages) need not add up to 100.
TABLE 1.2’. Seasonal Fluctuations in Casual Employment in India
Quarter Male Employment
(Days/Week)
Female Employment 
(Days/Week)
Casual Farm Wage 
(Rs./Day)
Farm All Farm All Male Female
Oct.-Dec. 5.28 6.08 3.93 4.49 2.76 2.29
Jan.-Mar. 4.12 5.15 2.21 3.23 2.46 2.09
Apr.-June 4.44 5.15 1.91 3.05 2.56 1.76
July-Sep. 4.90 5.67 4.24 4.86 3.11 2.64
Overall 4.69 5.52 3.15 3.97 2.75 2.33
Source : NSS, 27th round.
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TABLE 1.2". Distribution (%) of Employment in Agriculture by Operations and Sex,
1977-78
Operations Male Female Total
Ploughing 14.0 1.5 10.3
Sowing 2.0 1.6 1.9
Transplanting 2.7 5.8 3.6
Weeding 7.2 14.7 9.7
Harvesting 12.7 19.5 14.7
Manual Work 55.9 53.8 55.0
Non-Manual Work 5.5 3.1 4.8
Source : Vaidyanathan (1986).
TABLE 1.2” ’. Duration of Farm Servants’ Contracts
Duration of the Contract Number of Cases
1 Season 4
1 Year 57
2 Years 3
3 Years and Above 5
Total Number of Cases Observed 69
Source : Rudra (1982).
TABLE 1.2"". Rural-To-Rural Migration in India, 1981
Last Residence Rural
Short-Duration Migration as % of Total Migration
Male Female
Within the District 8.32 13.08
In Other District of the State 13.29 25.98
Other States 16.32 27.90
Source : S. M ukhopadhyay (1987).
TABLE 2.1. Distribution of Male and Female Casual Employment in the Study Villages, 1980-84
Employment
Aurepalle Shirapur Kanzara
Male Female Male Female Male Female
Self 0.35 0.47 0.51 0.26 0.67 0.35
Casual 0.07 0.40 0.32 0.24 0.19 0.21
Regular 0.41 0.05 0.007 0.20 0.01 0.28
Others 0.17 0.08 0.165 0.29 0.12 0.16
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TABLE 3.1. Proportion of Family-Labour and Regular-Labour Hours Used in Sample Farms 
in the Study Villages
Village
PL/TL in Farms Hiring Regular Labour FL/TL in Farms Hiring Regular Labour
Small Large All Small Large All
A 0.22 (0.03) 0.25 (0.13) 0.25 (0.08) 0.55 (0.67) 0.24 (0.44) 0.29 (0.55)
C 0.27 (0.01) 0.35 (0.02) 0.32 (0.01) 0.21 (0.60) 0.36 (0.55) 0.27 (0.58)
E na (na) 0.16 (0.04) 0.16 (0.03) na (0.58) 0.18 (0.39) 0.18 (0.46)
A  => Aurepalle; C  => Shirapur ; E  
Labour-Hours, TL => Total Labour-Hours. Numbers in the parentheses denote the average use o f  
respective types o f  labour i f  all farm s are considered, 'na' implies not available.
TABLE 4.1. Probability of Participation in Farm Labour and Casual Farm Labour in the Study 
Villages, 1980-84
Participation
Probability
Aurepalle Shirapur Kanzara
Landless Landed Landless Landed Landless Landed
Male POL 0.62 0.78 0.43 0.56 0.69 0.76
POM 0.62 0.57 0.43 0.24 0.69 0.43
Female POL 0.74 0.81 0.58 0.58 0.69 0.84
POM 0.74 0.70 0.58 0.44 0.69 0.60
the days worked on own farm .
TABLE 4.2. Probability of Involuntary Unemployment (PU) in the Study Villages, 1980-84
Year
Aurepalle Shirapur Kanzara
Male Female Male Female Male Female
1980 0.22 0.24 0.38 0.39 0.29 0.26
1981 0.13 0.17 0.47 0.37 0.14 0.16
1982 0.11 0.22 0.43 0.36 0.08 0.07
1983 0.12 0.19 0.10 0.11 0.05 0.07
1984 0.10 0.15 0.02 0.03 0.10 0.09
1980-84 0.14 0.20 0.31 0.26 0.13 0.13
Landed 0.13 0.19 0.34 0.25 0.13 0.13
Landless 0.20 0.25 0.21 0.28 0.14 0.14
N ote : Probability o f unemployment is defined in the text.
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TABLE 4.3. Monthly Duration (Days) of Unemployment in the Study Villages, 1980
Months
Aurepalle Shirapur Kanzara
Male Female Male Female Male Female
January 2.71 5.50 0.80 6.67 6.33 7.13
February 5.14 5.71 1.22 3.67 5.00 5.46
March 5.43 11.69 7.75 13.83 7.53 12.24
April 4.38 10.29 7.43 10.00 5.06 7.87
May 4.14 4.72 3.71 16.00 5.80 10.23
June 6.00 5.85 8.27 17.50 3.36 4.52
July 6.67 4.48 0.78 1.33 5.77 6.14
August 2.83 2.33 12.67 18.70 11.29 11.85
September 3.45 2.62 15.20 8.50 5.24 4.13
October 2.50 3.09 9.50 9.43 0.93 4.21
November 4.64 4.41 5.75 3.92 4.63 2.50
December 3.30 3.76 5.33 7.67 4.44 5.22
TABLE 5.1. Employment Particulars of Casual Labourers in the Study Villages, 1980-84
Village
Male Casual Labourers
FDAY (Days) NFDAY
(Days)
GDAY
(Days)
TOTEMP
(Days)
Aurepalle 59.25 17.84 0.62 77.70
Shirapur 50.98 24.55 21.26 96.80
Kanzara 71.00 9.47 21.23 101.70
TABLE 5.2. A Comparison of Casual and Regular Wages (Rs.) At 1960-61 Prices in the Study 
Villages, 1980-84
Villages
Regular Labourers
Male Casual Labourers
TFWAGE DCLWAGE
DCLWAGE’
TOTWAGE DPLWAGE Landed Landless All
A 112.74 0.38 71.40 1.46 1.17 1.36 1.21
C 157.77 0.63 97.96 2.14 1.14 1.45 1.36
E 131.61 1.32 104.78 1.47 1.17 1.33 1.29
N ote : A => Aurepalle; C  => Shirapur; E => Kanzara.
TOTWAGE and TOTFWAGE are the annual wage incomes earned by regular and casual 
labourers from farm employment earned by regular and casual labourers respectively; 
DPLWAGE and DCWAGE are the average regular and casual daily wages while DCWAGE’ 
is the average casual daily wage adjusted by the probability of employment.
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TABLE 5.2’. Significance of Non-Farm Casual Income in the Study Villages, 1980-84
Village TNFWAGE/TOTWAGE
TOTCWAGE
Landless Landed All
Aurepalle 0.22 0.15 0.17 157.86
Shirapur 0.44 0.40 0.41 181.06
Kanzara 0.28 0.19 0.22 182.88
N ote : TOTNFWAGE is the average annual non-farm income while TOTCWAGE is the total casual
wage income in Rs. at 1960-61 prices earned from casual employment.
TABLE 5.3. Casual and Regular (Daily and Annual) Wages (Rs.) in Different States of India, 
1956-57
State
Annual Wage Income (Rs.) Daily Wage Income (Rs.)
Casual Regular All Casual Regular
A.P. 398 387 395 0.81 0.46
Assam 578 625 614 1.25 1.11
Bihar 377 461 414 0.89 1.02
Gujrat * * * * *
Maharashtra * * * ♦ *
Kerala 388 469 399 1.17 0.75
Karnataka 531 518 529 0.91 0.81
M.P. 321 387 341 0.78 0.55
Orissa 342 377 347 0.87 0.61
Punjab 606 764 683 1.85 1.29
Haryana * * * * *
Rajasthan 349 290 336 0.98 0.45
Tamilnadu 347 293 338 0.76 0.46
U.P. 407 487 420 1.08 0.70
West Bengal 482 626 514 1.12 0.99
Source : Ghose (1980).
TABLE 5.3*. Casual and Regular Daily Wages (Rs.) in Different States of India in the Sixties
State Year Casual Daily Wages Regular Daily Wages
Assam (Nowgong) 1968-71 3.81 3.17
Punjab (Ferozpur) 1967-70 5.04 4.57
A.P. (Cuddapah) 1967-70 2.02 1.11
Orissa (Cuttack) 1967-70 2.58 0.96
Kerala (Alleppy and Quilon) 1962-65 2.43 1.77
U.P. (Mujaffarnagar) 1966-69 2.83 2.71
Source : Rudra (1982).
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TABLE 5.3” . Casual and Regular Wages (in Annas) in Different States of India
State
Regular Labourer Male Casual Labourers
Daily Wage Annual Wage Daily Wage Annual Wage
Uttar Pradesh 15 5175 19 5264
Bombay 11 3638 18 2957
West Bengal 24 7426 27 6426
Punjab 19 4800 29 3175
South India 13 2362 16 2802
Orissa 08 6762 12 2725
Madhya Pradesh 12 4407 13 2379
India 12 4047 18 3500
Source : Sanghvi (1969).
N ote : In common usage sixteen anna is equal to one Indian Rupee.
TABLE 6.1. Sources and Volumes (% Share in Total) of Credit in the Study Villages, 1975-84
Sources
% Share in Total
Aurepalle Shirapur Kanzara
Co-operative Society 1 47 46
Land Development Banks 38 9 34
Commercial Banks 2 8 11
Government Agencies 3 2 2
Friends and Relatives 1 19 3
Private MoneyLenders 52 15 4
Source : Bhende (1986).
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TABLE 6.1’. Access to Formal and Informal Credit by Different Landholding Classes in the 
Study Villages, 1975-84.
Landholding Class Households Having 
Access to Informal 
Credit (%)
Households Having 
Access to Formal 
Credit (%)
Share of Formal 
Credit in Total Credit
(%)
Aurepalle:
Labour 100 0 0
Small Farms 93 7 52
Medium Farms 100 11 15
Large Farms 91 36 59
Total 95 15 47
Shirapur
Labour 100 75 75
Small Farms 87 50 38
Medium Farms 92 69 68
Large Farms 100 82 73
Total 95 70 66
Kanzara
Labour 12 0 0
Small Farms 80 73 95
Medium Farms 100 100 82
Large Farms 87 87 97
Total 72 67 94
Source : Bhende, 1986.
TABLE 6.2. Incidence of Advance/Loan in Regular Contracts in Aurepalle, 1992.
Variable
TOTWAGE Loan
<300 300-500 > 500 <300 300-500 >500
Frequency 38.46% 57.69% 4.46% 30.7% 15.4% 38.5%
Source : Resurvey D ata, 1992.
N ote : Annual regular wage TOTWAGE is calculated at 1960-61 prices.
TABLE 6.3. Implicit Interest Rates in Regular Contracts in the Study Villages, 1980-84
Villages Implicit Annual Interest Rate
(%)
Aurepalle 258
Shirapur 130
Kanzara 0.8
N ote : Implicit interest rate is the interest rate at which a landless labourer is indifferent between a 
casual and a regular contract.
TABLE 6.3’. Observed Annual Interest Rates in the Study Villages, 1980-84
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Sources Aurepalle Shirapur Kanzara
(a) Government 
(b) Commercial Banks 
(c) Co-operatives 
(d) Private Moneylenders 
Others [1]
12% (12%)
12%-72% (72%)[2] 
12%-168% (12%) 
12%-600% (216%)
12%-156% (36%) 
6%-92% (12%) 
12% (12%) 
12%-132% (12%) 
12%-120% (36%)
10%-376% (10%) 
6%-12% (12%) 
6%-12% (6%) 
6%-12% (12%) 
10%-144% (48%)
N ote : [ l ]  ’Others' refer to priva te shops, friends, relatives, landlords etc.
[2 ] Numbers in the parentheses refer to the modal interest rates charged by the respective credit 
agencies.
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CHAPTER 5. CASUAL AND REGULAR CONTRACTS : 
DETERMINANTS OF THE FARMS’ CHOICE OF LABOUR
CONTRACTS
Introduction
It has been argued in chapter two that, given the hoarding costs associated with 
hiring regular labour, it is larger farms (with relatively high and steady labour requirements) 
that are more likely to hire regular farm servants. We have also argued that regular labour 
is hired to perform certain non-monitorable tasks, which are difficult to supervise. This leads 
us to investigate empirically the relevance of two possible determinants of the demand for 
regular labour: farm size and nature of task. Using the ICRISAT data available from the 
study villages, this chapter examines the validity of the following hypotheses (see also the 
introductory chapter):
H2. Larger farms tend to employ more regular farm servants than smaller farms.
H4. Farms tend to employ regular farm servants in the non-monitorable tasks.
The chapter is developed as follows. In section 5.1, a description of the regression 
variables used in the analysis is given. The hypotheses are then examined in sections 5.2, 5.3 
and 5.4 of the chapter. The chapter ends with a brief summary of the findings.
5.1. Description of Regression Variables
The empirical exercise to test the hypotheses focuses on three villages from the semi- 
arid tropics of India, namely, Aurepalle, Shirapur and Kanzara (see chapter three). The 
analysis is based on observations for a period of five years (1980 to 1984). The following 
variables have been constructed for each village and for each agricultural year of the study 
period 1980-84.
Information about the landholding class (LHCLASS) is given in all the schedules.
Using LHCLASS, the type of the farm is constructed as follows :
TYPE = 1, if the i-th farm is a larger one 
= 0 otherwise.
Next, the contract variable is constructed as follows. First, from the VLS-Y schedule,
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we construct the variable SPLHR giving the total number of regular labour-hours used on 
different plots owned by the household. Using SPLHR, we construct the contract variable PL 
as follows:
PL = 1 if the i-th farm hires some regular labour (SPLHR > 0);
= 0 otherwise.
Task dummy used in the analysis is defined as follows :
TASK = 1 if the i-th labour is hired to perform non-monitorable tasks 
= 0 otherwise
Other variables used in the analysis are as follows1 :
FEQVALD = Total value of farm-equipments held.
LNFEQVAL = Natural logarithm of FEQVALD
MPLOTVAL = Mean value of the plots per acre belonging to each household at 1960-61 
prices
LNPLOTVA = Natural logarithm of LNPLOTVA 
AGGCULT = Aggregate area cultivated 
LNCULT = Natural logarithm of AGGCULT 
AGGIRR = Aggregate area irrigated 
LNIRR = Natural logarithm of AGGIRR
SFLHR = Total number of family labour-hours used in cultivation 
LNSFLHR = Natural logarithm of SFLHR
OBUL - A dummy variable which takes a value 1 if the farm in question uses its own 
livestock in cultivation, and zero otherwise.
The following village and year dummies are also constructed.
AUREPALLE - It takes a value one if the observed farm comes from Aurepalle; it is zero 
otherwise;
KANZARA - It takes a value 1 if the observed farm comes from Kanzara; it is zero 
otherwise;
YEAR80 - It is equal to one, if the observation is from year 1980, and zero otherwise
YEAR81 - It is equal to one, if the observation is from year 1981, and zero otherwise
YEAR82 - It is equal to one, if the observation is from year 1982, and zero otherwise
YEAR83 - It is equal to one, if the observation is from year 1983, and zero otherwise.
5.2. Determinants of Choice of Contract and Demand for Regular Labour-Hours
This section examines hypothesis H2 which emphasizes the role of farm size in 
determining the farm’s demand for regular labour. It was argued in section 2.2 of chapter two 
that the larger the farm size, the larger is the demand for regular labour because the hoarding
'For details of the construction of these variables, see chapter three.
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costs of maintaining a steady pool of regular labour are lower.
To begin with, the conditional probability that a farm of given size hires regular 
labour-hours is calculated as follows. Suppose A; denotes the event that a farm is of size i, 
i=s,l where ’s’ refers to the small farms and ’1’ to the larger farms2. Let B denote the event 
that the farm of a given size hires some regular farm servants. Since the probability of the 
event B given can be approximated by the relative frequency, the conditional probability 
of B given A; is given by the following expression.
n(A B) ...
Pr(B/A) = 1 (1)
‘ n(A)
where n(A4B) is the number of joint occurrences of and B and n(A )^ is the number of 
occurrences of A; in the total number of occurrences of these two events. Values of these 
conditional probabilities for each type of farm are given in table 2  for each of the study 
villages.
In both Aurepalle and Kanzara, the probability of employing regular labour is higher 
on the larger farms as compared to the smaller ones. In fact, in Kanzara the probability is 
zero for the smaller farms. In Shirapur the probability of hiring a regular labour is, however, 
very low in either type of farm, though still higher for the larger farms. When all the study 
villages are pooled together, the conditional probability of employing a regular labourer is 
found to be much higher on the larger farms.
Using chi-square tests of independence, a simple statistic between type of farm 
(TYPE) and that of contract (PL) can be constructed (see Appendix 1). Computed values of 
chi-square test statistics (Pearson as well as likelihood ratio LR) are given in table 2’. Chi- 
square statistics are significant and suggest that there is a statistically significant relationship 
between farm size and type of contract in Aurepalle and Kanzara; however, the chi-square 
test statistics are not significant in Shirapur. When all the study villages are taken together, 
the significant relationship between the variables is still maintained.
Next, we draw a few diagrams to explore the relationship between SPLHR, SCLHR, 
on the one hand, and landholding status (TYPE) or farm size (AGGCULT), on the other. 
Figures 1-3 are a series of scatter diagrams for the study villages where we plot total casual
2Using the variable TYPE, sample farms are classified into two groups, namely, ’small’ (TYPE=0) and ’large’ 
(TYPE=1).
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labour-hours (SCLHR) on the horizontal axis and total regular labour-hours (SPLHR) on the 
vertical axis according to whether the farm in question is a small (TYPE = 0) or large (TYPE 
= 1) farm. The empty squares show the use of labour-hours by the larger farms while 
asterisks show the same for the smaller farms. It can clearly be seen from figures 1 and 3 
that a significant number of large farms in Aurepalle and Kanzara rely on regular labour (a 
large number of empty squares lie in the positive quadrant) while a large number of asterisk 
signs lie on the horizontal axis, thereby implying that these small farms do not hire regular 
labour at all. Interestingly enough, none of the small farms in Kanzara hire regular labourers 
while there are only a few small farms in Aurepalle who hire some regular labour. The 
situation is very different in Shirapur where only a few farms (both small and large) hire 
regular labourers. On the whole, it appears that, regular labourers tend to be hired by the 
large farms in the study villages.
The pattern of labour hiring becomes clearer when we consider the continuous farm 
size variable AGGCULT. Figures 4-6 depict total regular-labour (SPLHR denoted by the 
solid line) and casual-labour (SCLHR denoted by the dotted line) hours plotted against farm 
size (AGGCULT) in each of the study villages. The demand for casual labour fluctuates 
among the farms of different size. However, it is clearly seen that the larger the farm size, 
the greater is the demand for regular labour-hours in all the study villages.
The discussion so far suggests that there is a strong correlation between the size of 
farm and the type of contract offered. In the light of this relationship, a regression framework 
is built up to determine the factors (including farm size) that significantly explain the demand 
for regular labour in the study villages. This can be looked at in two ways: (i) how farms 
choose between casual and regular contracts (PL) and (ii) how farms determine the demand 
for regular labour-hours (SPLHR). The distinction between (i) and (ii) is that the dummy 
dependent variable PL in (i) is replaced by a continuous variable SPLHR in (ii). In this 
section, these two decision variables, namely, the type of the contract and the demand for 
regular labour-hours, are determined independently in a univariate framework3.
The analysis is primarily based on the estimates of univariate probit and tobit models. 
A univariate probit model is one where the dependent variable of the regression is a dummy 
variable (it takes a value 0 or 1). In a tobit model, however, the dependent variable is 
continuous, but censored; tobit random term follows a normal distribution as in a probit 
model.
3The case of joint determination of the type of the contract and the demand for regular labour-hours is taken 
up in section 5.3.
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The section is developed as follows. Section 5.2.1 describes the method of estimation 
(probit and tobit models) while section 5.2.2 presents the probit and tobit estimates of the 
determinants of the type of contract. Finally, in section 5.2.3 the significance of hoarding 
costs are examined by considering only those farms which hire regular labour, making use 
of a truncated regression model.
5.2.1. Probit and Tobit Models
Firstly, we estimate a univariate probit model of the determinants of the type of the 
contract PL; a number of explanatory variables are included of which one is farm size. 
Secondly, a tobit model is used where the dependent variable of regression is LNSPLHR 
(natural logarithm of SPLHR) with the set of explanatory variables remaining the same. In 
each case, the marginal effects of the explanatory variables have been calculated.
5.2.1.1. Probit Model
Suppose that the dependent variable of interest is a dummy variable denoting the type 
of the contract (PL) which takes a value 1 if the farm offers a regular contract and is zero 
otherwise. The aim is to find out the factors that determine PL. Assuming that a set of 
explanatory variables x determines the choice of the optimum contract, the following relation 
holds good.
Prob[PL = 1] = F(x , p)
Prob[PL = 0] = 1 -  F(x , p)
where F is the cumulative distribution function. The parameter vector p reflects the impact 
of changes in X on the probability. In this regard, one can use any continuous distribution; 
in practice, however, the use of a probit model which uses a normal distribution is common 
(Maddala, 1983; Greene, 1992).
Prob[PL = 1] = U(t)dt = < S ( P '4  ( 3 )
where O is the cumulative normal distribution function. The probability model, in general, 
involves a regression framework such that the following holds good :
E(y) = 0 * [1 -  F(p'jc)] + 1 * F(p'jc) = F(fix)
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(4)
where y is the dependent variable of regression - this is PL in our context.
In each case, the parameter vector p can be estimated by maximising the log- 
likelihood function L.
L = Y,[yi ln° (P X )  + ( i  -  y) M l  -  M P X ))] (5)
If, however, heteroscedasticity is present, the original probit estimates are to be 
corrected. Suppose the variance of the random term d Li follows a multiplicative 
heteroscedastic model (see Petersen and Waldman, 1981):
a- = exp { i  Z.) (6)
where Z4 is the vector of explanatory variables causing heteroscedasticity (a subset of x).
The final task is to incorporate a? into the log-likelihood function to estimate (p, y) 
as follows:
lnt' = E y. + (1  -  y .) ln(l -  a> Vx‘ \'  e x p ^  '  \  e x p  (Y z)J
(7)
Marginal Effects (ME)
In the probability models, estimated parameters do not necessarily reflect the 
marginal effects. Hence, one needs to derive the appropriate marginal effects as follows :
= [ . | « ]  * p =AP'x) » p (8 )
ox d(P'x)
where f(.) is the density function corresponding to the cumulative distribution function F(.). 
In particular, the general expression, given above, will be modified if one makes use of the 
probit specification.
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ae {p l) = O(p'jc) * p (9)
where d>(.) is the cumulative normal distribution function for the probit model.
5.2.I.2. Tobit Model
The probit model uses a dummy dependent variable. Alternatively, one can consider 
the determination of a continuous variable, namely, the total regular labour-hours (SPLHR) 
used by a farm.
Suppose the dependent variable (y4) of interest is SPLHR4 which is zero for the 
farms not hiring regular labour. The distribution of SPLHR can be considered to be a 
censored one, with the cut-off point being zero. Hence, a tobit specification is used to find 
out the determinants of the demand for regular labour-hours. The tobit model can be 
specified as follows.
where p is the vector of unknown parameters and x is the vector of explanatory variables; 
u ’s are the random terms distributed normally with mean zero and common variance a 2.
Suppose nj is the number of observations for which y* = 0 and % the number of 
observations for which > 0. Given these specifications, following Maddala (1983), the tobit 
likelihood function can be written as follows.
where Oj is the cumulative normal distribution function. We maximise the likelihood function 
to obtain the parameters p, a 2.
If, however, heteroscedasticity is present, the maximum likelihood estimates of the 
parameters will be inconsistent. Hence, one needs to correct for heteroscedasticity. As in the 
probit case, a multiplicative heteroscedasticity is assumed as follows :
yi = p 'x + ui if RHS > 0 (10)
= 0  otherwise
4Since log is a monotonic transformation, if we use LNSPLHR (natural logarithm of SPLHR) as the 
dependent variable, the basic properties of a tobit model remains; moreover, since SPLHR * 1 for any individual 
in the sample, the distribution of LNSPLHR does not censor any positive observation.
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of = exp (a!z) (12)
where z{ is a subset of x causing heteroscedasticity. Replacing a  with a ; in the log-likelihood 
function and including a 2 in the summation adjusts for the presence of heteroscedasticity. 
The final task is to find out the maximum likelihood estimates of (3 and a 5.
Tobit Marginal Effects
The marginal effects of a tobit model can be calculated as follows.
5.2.1.3. Model Specification
We use the same set of explanatory variables in the probit and tobit regressions. The 
difference arises with respect to the dependent variable. It is a dummy variable (PL) in the 
probit model while it is a continuous variable (LNSPLHR) in the tobit model.
The primary arguments of the ’implicit contract model’ developed in chapter two are 
related to sharing risks between farms and workers and minimising hoarding costs of regular 
labour. Risk-sharing takes place because farms are wealthier and hence, less risk-averse than 
the workers. A particular distinction is made between small and large farms; large farms not 
only own a larger quantity and better quality of land (as reflected in plot value per acre), but 
also own more non-land resources per acre so that they have higher income too (see chapter 
three). By virtue of their income and wealth (due to the ownership of more land and non-land 
resources), larger farms are expected to be less risk-averse compared to the smaller ones. 
Hence, the variables which add to a farm’s income and/or wealth are expected to reduce the 
degree of risk-aversion of the farm.
Secondly, farm size is also the determinant of hoarding costs. Given other things, 
larger farms have greater demand for labour. This, in turn, means that the larger the labour 
demand, the smaller are the hoarding costs of maintaining a steady pool of regular labourers. 
Hence, larger farms with lower hoarding costs are capable of hiring more regular labour.
5 However, note that these estimates are to be interpreted keeping in mind the instability of tobit maximum 
likelihood estimates.
dE(PL/x) (13)
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The following explanatory variables are used to determine the farm’s choice of 
regular contracts.
X  = (ONE , LNIRR , LNSFLHR , LNPLOTVA , LNFEQVAL , OBUL , 7YP£,(14)
, AUREPALLE , KANZARA , YEAR80 , YEAR81 , T£A/?S2 , YEAR83)
Alternatively, one can replace the dummy variable TYPE by a continuous variable 
LNCULT as follows:
X ' = (ONE , LNIRR , LNSFLHR , LNPLOTVA , LNFEQVAL , OBUL , LNCULT 
, AUREPALLE , KANZARA , TEA/W0 , YEAR81 , YEAAS2 , YEAR83) (15)
The original probit and tobit models are also corrected for the presence of heteroscedasticity. 
Assuming that the continuous variables cause heteroscedasticity, two sets of specifications, 
namely, Z and Z,’ may be used as corresponding to X and X’, respectively.
Z = (LNIRR , LNSFLHR , LNPLOTVA , LNFEQVAL) (16)
Z ' = (LNCULT , LNIRR , LNSFLHR , LNPLOTVA , LNFEQVAL)
As mentioned before, the explanatory variables are chosen in such a way that they 
primarily reflect risk-sharing and hoarding costs minimisation as implied by the implicit 
contract model (see chapter two); sometimes they may also account for the costs of 
supervision which may be an additional consideration for farms.
Irrigation plays a significant role in many ways. Firstly, irrigation adds to a farm’s 
wealth by enhancing the plot value per acre. Usually larger farms are the ones who possess 
irrigated land. Secondly, irrigation introduces the possibility of multiple cropping that 
generates a year-round demand for labour. Hence, irrigated farms need more labour
i
throughout the year and thus hoarding costs are lower in these farms. This may be ensured 
by hiring regular farm labourers and offering them additional facilities (which may also 
induce regular labourers not to quit the job). Finally, irrigated land has to be irrigated 
regularly by using labour and the task of irrigation is difficult to supervise (Agarwal, 1981; 
Eswaran & Kotwal, 1985a). Hence, farms may employ regular labourers to ensure no­
shirking in irrigation (see chapter two).
The ownership of farm equipments is significant in different ways. On the one hand,
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it implies that the farm, in question, is a wealthy one and, hence, less risk-averse; they can 
offer some regular contracts to insure labourers against the fluctuations of wages and 
employment Secondly, it may require a greater skill to perform the tasks using various farm 
machineries. Very often, these are also the tasks difficult to supervise. Hence, these tasks are 
not expected to be done by the labour hired on a casual basis, enhancing the likelihood of 
employment of regular labour. Thirdly, use of farm equipments may also have an adverse 
effect on the demand for regular labour (see Agarwal, 1981); e.g., use of farm equipments 
such as a thresher may reduce the demand for labour. In other words, the ownership of farm 
equipments may have a positive and/or negative effect on the demand for regular labour so 
that the net effect may be insignificant, if the positive and negative effects outweigh each 
other.
The variable OBUL denotes whether the farm, in question, uses its own bullocks 
and/or buffaloes in cultivation. Livestock is also an important form of wealth and, hence, it 
may enhance a farm’s ability to share risk with the regular labourers. Secondly, tending and 
feeding livestock are year-round activities which generates a steady demand for labour 
throughout the year. Therefore, labourers hired to perform these tasks will entail lower 
hoarding costs, thus justifying the employment of regular labour. Thirdly, tending, feeding 
and grazing livestock are usually done on the fields away from the farm. Hence, the farmer 
cannot always keep an eye on these labourers. Moreover, tasks involving the use of livestock 
like ploughing or irrigation are difficult to supervise. Consequently, a farm may have the 
incentive to offer regular farm contracts with additional incentives so as to induce labourers 
not to quit and not to shirk. However, in the study villages, farmers often make a distinction 
between the regular farm servants who look after the cattle and those who participate in 
cultivation. The latter are called ploughmen (also see Binswanger et al. 1984) who are 
primarily entrusted with the responsibility of cultivation and not looking after the farmer’s 
livestock. Instead of using ploughmen, farmers sometimes use family labour to perform the 
jobs using their own bullocks while young regular labourers look after the cattle without 
participating in farming. This means that use of own bullocks in cultivation may not 
necessarily be regular-labour-augmenting.
Besides animal labour, labour-hours supplied by the family members (LNSFLHR) 
is also used as an explanatory variable. It can be argued that family labour acts as a substitute 
for regular labour (also see discussion in chapter four). On the other hand, there may be a 
complementarity between family and regular labour so that irrespective of a fixed supply of 
family labour farms may maintain a steady pool of regular labour to meet the steady demand
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for labour throughout the year. This may arise because regular labourers may be more skilled, 
especially in certain tasks like ploughing, irrigation or fertilisation. In other words, net effect 
of the use of family labour in production may be positive or negative on output; it may even 
be non-significant, if positive and negative effects outweigh each other6.
Finally, the dummy variable denoting landholding status of the farm (TYPE) is 
included as a regressor. In an alternative specification X’, the dummy variable reflecting 
landholding status is replaced by a continuous farm size variable LNCULT. In addition, two 
sets of dummy variables, namely, village and year dummies are included in the regression. 
Among the village dummies, AUREPALLE and KANZARA are used; the third village 
dummy SHIRAPUR is excluded to get rid of the dummy variable trap7. The sample includes 
observations over five years. Hence, four year dummies, namely, YEAR80, YEAR81, 
YEAR82, YEAR83 are included while the fifth one YEAR84 is excluded in order to avoid 
the dummy variable trap. These village and year dummies are expected to account for the 
variation in the demand for regular farm servants across villages and over time.
The mean and standard deviation (SD) of the explanatory variables over the five-year 
period are shown in table 2.1.3.
5.2.2. Probit and Tobit Estimates
This section maximises probit and tobit likelihood functions to estimate the 
parameters of the respective model and examines these parameter estimates with respect to 
hypothesis H2. As mentioned in section 5.2.1.3, two specifications of the explanatory 
variables, namely, X and X’ are used; the difference between these two specifications is that 
in X’ landholding status variable TYPE is replaced by the farm size variable LNCULT which 
is a continuous variable. However, in view of the fact that specification X’ is more 
informative (see section 5.2.2.1), specification X is dropped in the case of the tobit 
estimation.
5.22.1. Probit Estimates
Probit estimates of the parameters with respect to specifications X and X’ are
®There may also be some complementarities beteen regular and casual labour, e.g., because regular labourers 
are used to supervise casual labourers, as well as substitution effects. The regression equation used to analyse the 
determinants of regular labour use is best interpreted as a ’reduced form’ equation of a simultaneous-equation 
model involving the simultaneous determination of regular and casual labour use.
7These village dummies are naturally dropped when we consider regressions for individual villages.
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presented in tables 2 .2 .1  and 2 .2 .1’ respectively; marginal effects are shown in the third 
column of each table and t-ratios are given in the parentheses. Heteroscedasticity-corrected 
estimates are shown in table 2 .2 .1” ’.
First the goodness of fit measures (see Appendix 3) are considered. Values of LR 
statistics are 156.52 and 203.26 respectively for specification X and X’, respectively; these 
chi-square statistics with degrees of freedom equal to 12 are significant in each case, thus 
justifying the joint significance of the parameters of the model. The number of correct 
predictions is 370 in specification X, while it is 386 in specification X’, out of a total of 422.
Secondly, the normality assumption of the probit model is examined. In this respect, 
too, a likelihood ratio (LR) statistic (see Appendix 3) is constructed. Values of these LR 
statistics are 2.86 and 0.60 for specifications X and X’, respectively. Neither of the LR 
statistics are significant8; we, therefore, accept the null hypothesis that the random terms are 
normally distributed.
A serious problem which often arises in cross-section analysis is that of 
heteroscedasticity when the disturbance variance is not constant across observations. Testing 
for heteroscedasticity in a limited dependent model (probit /tobit /logit model) is not very 
common. However, certain tests are available in the recent literature (e.g., Davidson & 
Mackinon, 1984; Pagan and Vella, 1990). Following Greene (1990), we have used a 
likelihood ratio test for heteroscedasticity which follows a chi-square distribution with 
degrees of freedom equal to the number of the variables causing heteroscedasticity9.
We run two sets regressions using the probit model with the second one corrected 
for heteroscedasticity. Probit estimates are corrected for the presence of heteroscedasticity in 
the continuous variables (see Greene, 1992). The set of variables causing heteroscedasticity 
are Z and Z’ corresponding to our specifications X and X’ respectively (see section 5.2.1.3). 
Corrected set of estimates in each case are presented in table 2.2.1". Now for each 
specification, we not only estimate p’s, but also y’s (which correspond to the set of variables 
causing heteroscedasticity).
We compare the original probit model with the corrected one. To this end, likelihood 
ratio (LR) statistics are computed for specifications X and X’ where the degree of freedom 
is equal to the number of restrictions (i.e., the number of variables causing heteroscedasticity)
8Critical values of chi-square with one degree of freedom are 3.84 and 6.63 at 5 %  and 1% levels of 
significance, respectively.
9The chi-square distribution of the LR statistics depend on the normality assumption of the random variables. 
Since the hypothesis of normality is not rejected in each probit specification, there is a good justification for using 
this test
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as follows :
LR(X) = 2 (-l14.4186+125.2055) = 21.5738 => xV°- 
LR(X’) = 2(-91.4430+101.8334) = 20.7808 => x25
Both the chi-squares are significant11 and therefore the hypothesis of homoscedasticity
cannot be accepted. Both the likelihood ratios statistics (chi-square) are significant here. We,
therefore, accept the estimates corrected for heteroscedasticity (table 2 .2 .1") which are as
follows :
Yj = p r o , + ycz),
= -  286.17 + 82.49 LNIRR + 8.03 LNSFLHR + 1.44 LNPLOTVA* -  21.31 LNPLOTVA 
+ 7.61 LNFEQVAL* + 2.35 OBUL + 4.99 TYPE + 191.26 AUREPALLE + 130.91 KANZARA 
+ 57.35 YEAR80 -  0.03 YEAR81 -  8.90 YEAR82 + 0.04 YEAR83 (17)
Y. = + y(Z/)I
= -262.95 + 33.97 LNIRR -  5.83 LNSFLHR* -  42.03 LNPLOTVA + 13.86 LNFEQVAL 
+ 17.16 LNCULT* + 4.64 OBC/L + 235.79 AUREPALLE + 189.05 KANZARA 
+ 50.94 -  34.47 -  33.09 YEAR82 + 18.84 YEAR83 (18)
where denotes that the variable concerned is significant and 0, Y are the estimates of (3 
and y, respectively.
Dummy variable TYPE is not significant in specification X; but the continuous farm 
size variable LNCULT is positive and significant in specification X’. It, therefore, implies 
that the larger the farm size, the greater is the likelihood of employing regular labour. 
However, plot value per acre is significant in specification X. Given that there is a strong 
correlation between the quantity and quality of land in the study villages (see chapter three), 
it suggests that farms with a higher plot-value are the larger farms who have a greater 
likelihood of employing regular labour.
The variable LNSFLHR is negative and significant in the corrected model with 
specification X’ (but is not significant in specification X), which suggests that there is a
1<yThe subscript denotes the degrees of freedom.
"Critical values of chi-square with a degree of freedom equal to 4 are 9.4877 and 13.2767 at 5%  and 1% 
levels of significance, respectively while those with a degree of freedom equal to 5 are 11.0705 and 15.0863 at 
5 %  and 1% levels of significance, respectively.
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substitutability between family labour and regular labour, at least to some extent; if the 
supply of family labour goes up, there is a likelihood that some regular labour demand will 
be curtailed.
However, the ownership of farm equipments is both positive and significant in 
specification X which is not so in specification X’. In the latter case, though still positive, 
it is not significant. This suggests that, in specification X, farm equipment has a favourable 
effect on the employment of regular labour. However, in specification X’ it may happen the 
positive and negative effects of farm equipments on the demand for regular labour outweigh 
each other so that the net effect becomes insignificant.
Other variables like OBUL or LNIRR are positive, though not significant; similarly, 
the village and year dummies are found to be insignificant. This is true for both probit 
specifications X and X’, indicating that village specific demand factors are not significant to 
determine the demand for regular labour.
Next we determine the demand for regular labour-hours for two of the study villages, 
namely, Aurepalle and Kanzara, individually12. Using specification X’ (but excluding the 
village dummies), we estimate farms’ choice of contract for Aurepalle and Kanzara (see table 
2.2.l ’.a). In addition to farm size (LNCULT), two variables are statistically significant for 
these villages. These are LNSFLHR and LNFEQVAL; while LNFEQVAL has a favourable 
effect on the probability of hiring regular labour, LNSFLHR has a negative effect. These 
results, too, support those obtained from the pooled sample explained above. Moreover, a 
likelihood ratio statistic of heteroscedasticity suggests that the assumption of homoscedasticity 
cannot be rejected in the subsample of Aurepalle and Kanzara.
5.2.2.2. Tobit Estimates
Secondly, a tobit model is estimated to determine the demand for regular labour- 
hours. As already mentioned, we confine ourselves to specification X’ only which uses a 
continuous farm size variable (LNCULT). Both original and corrected tobit models are 
estimated as shown in tables 2.2.2 and 2.2.2’. The advantage with the tobit specification is 
that it uses a continuous dependent variable, namely, LNSPLHR as opposed to a dummy 
dependent variable (PL) used in the probit model which loses some available information.
Tobit marginal effects (ME) along with the respective t-ratios (given in parentheses)
,2In this case, we exclude Shirapur since the chi-square statistic between landholding status and type of 
contract is not significant for the village.
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are shown in the third column of table 2.2.213. The Wald statistic (which follows a chi- 
square distribution) is significant, indicating the joint significance of the parameters of the 
model.
Secondly, we test for the normality of the tobit random variable. Using the likelihood 
ratio (LR) test (see Appendix 3), we compute an LR statistic equal to 3.06 which follows a 
chi-square distribution. However the critical values of chi-square with degree of freedom 
equal to 2 exceed the computed value of the statistic both at 5% and 1% levels of 
significance. Hence, in the light of our sample, we accept the null hypothesis that the random 
variable is normally distributed.
Finally, we correct for heteroscedasticity in the continuous regressors. Corresponding 
to specification X’, we use the set of continuous explanatory variables Z’ causing 
heteroscedasticity. Heteroscedasticity corrected estimates are presented in table 2.2.2’. Besides 
o2, two sets of parameters, namely, p ’s and a ’s are obtained corresponding to two sets of 
variables X’ and Z’ (see section 5.2.1.2).
The original and corrected tobit models are compared to test for the assumption of 
homoscedasticity. To this end, a likelihood ratio test (see Appendix) is computed where the 
degree of freedom is equal to the number of restrictions (i.e., the number of variables causing 
heteroscedasticity). The LR statistic is as follows :
LR(X’) = 2(-294.0393+300.1706) = 12.2626 => %25 
The computed value of the chi-square statistic exceeds the critical value at the 5% level of 
significance14 and, hence, the hypothesis of homoscedasticity cannot be accepted. In other 
words, we accept the corrected tobit regression as follows.
Yi = P' (X% + at' (Z%
1 = -14.23 + 2.17 LNIRR* -  0.78 LNSFLHR -  0.15 LNSFLHR* -  1.07 LNPLOTVA 
+ 1.13 LNFEQVAL* -  0.03 LNFEQVAL+ 4.17 LNCULT* -  3.96 OBUL* + 8.65 AUREPALLE 
(19)- 4.27 KANZARA* + 0.82 YEAR80 -1.47 YEAR81 -  1.89 YEAR82 -  0.51 YEAR83
where ’*’ denotes that the variable concerned is significant and P, dc are the estimates of p 
and a, respectively.
13Given the more satisfactory result with respect to specification X ’ (see section 5.2.2.1), we continue to run 
the regression only with respect to X’ and exclude specification X.
l4The critical values of chi-square with a degree of freedom equal to 5 are 11.0705 and 15.0863 at 5% and 
1% levels of significance, respectively.
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As in the probit model (w.r.t. specification X’), the farm size (LNCULT) is not only 
positive, but also significant. This means, the larger the farm size, the greater is the demand 
for regular labour-hours. Moreover, the quality of land, as reflected in the access to irrigation 
facilities (LNIRR) is positively significant; therefore, access to irrigation is likely to enhance 
the demand for regular labour. This is because both farm size and irrigation facilities lower 
hoarding costs.
As in the probit model, family labour-hours (LNSFLHR) is negatively significant in 
the corrected tobit model suggesting a substitutability between family labour and regular 
labour. In addition, the ownership of animal labour (OBUL) is significant, though negative. 
This perhaps indicates the fact that sample farms with own bullocks use more family labour 
in the operations involving the use of bullocks15. The negative significance of both 
LNSFLHR and OBUL together may imply that family labour is used to perform the 
operations with own bullocks, thus reducing the demand for regular labour-hours.
In addition, the coefficient of LNFEQVAL is positive and also significant in the 
corrected tobit model, thereby implying that the ownership of farm equipments has a 
significantly favourable impact on the demand for regular labour. Finally, we consider the 
coefficients of the village dummies. Both the dummies are not only positive, but also 
significant, suggesting that village-specific demand factors are significant in explaining the 
demand for regular labour.
Finally, using specification X’ (excluding the village dummies) we estimate the tobit 
model to determine the demand for regular labour-hours in Aurepalle and Kanzara separately 
(see table 2.2.2.a). The variables which are statistically significant are LNCULT, 
LNFEQVAL and LNSFLHR. More interestingly, a likelihood ratio test of heteroscedasticity 
suggests that the assumption of homoscedasticity cannot be rejected for the sample. Hence, 
we consider the original (uncorrected) tobit estimates only for the individual villages.
A comparison of the probit estimates with the tobit ones (with respect to specification 
X’ only) shows that the tobit estimates are more efficient. The value of the tobit likelihood 
function is higher. Secondly, values of the tobit t-ratios are greater, thereby implying that 
tobit estimates have lower standard errors. The difference may be attributed to the fact that 
the dependent variable of the tobit model is a continuous variable (LNSPLHR) as opposed 
to a dummy variable (PL) in a probit model, thereby, supplementing information. Signs of 
the estimated coefficients are very similar in these two models; however, a number of
15One possible reason for the negative coefficient of OBUL could have been the tractor use. Because where 
tractors are used, oxen are not needed (tractors are driven by regular labour). However, use of tractors is 
extremely limited in the study villages.
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variables which are not significant in the probit model become significant in the tobit model.
5.23. Significance of Hoarding Costs
So far all the sample farms are considered in our estimation, some of which hire 
regular labour while others do not. In this section, however, we intend to consider the farms 
hiring regular labour only. The idea is as follows; if LNSPLHR is still found to be positively 
related to the farm size variable LNCULT (despite the fact that an hour of regular labour has 
zero marginal cost), there would be some confirmation for the notion of a ’hoarding cost’ of 
regular labour on the smaller farms. Indeed, if there is no hoarding, we should find that a 
farm’s regular labourer is fully employed irrespective of the size of the farm16.
5.2.3.I. A Truncated Model
To this end, we first choose a subset of the sample farms which hire regular labour 
(SPLHR > 0). Using a truncated regression equation, we regress LNSPLHR on the same set 
of explanatory variables X’. There are 79 farms in three of the study villages and SPLHR 
> 0  for each farm in this sub-sample.
As in the tobit model, the dependent variable of regression is the natural logarithm 
of SPLHR (LNSPLHR). The distinction in the truncated model arises from the fact that we 
truncate the distribution at zero. In a tobit model, however, the distribution is censored at 
zero. Under the conditions, the simplest possible regression framework is as follows :
LNSPLHR. = P'X/ + m, (20)
where ui ~ N(0 , a 2)
where X’ is the set of explanatory variables and p is the vector of parameters to be estimated 
as defined in section 5.2.1.3. Estimates are shown in table 2.3.2.
Next we repeat the same exercise for the farms hiring only one regular labour in the 
study villages. This is because of the fact that if there is no hoarding, ’ single’ regular labour 
will be fully employed irrespective of farm size. There are 38 farms which hire only one
l6This argument may not apply when some farms employ more than one regular labourer. In that case, we 
would expect LNSPLHR to be positively related to farm size, even if there are no hoarding costs (i.e., even if 
regular labourers employed throughout the year), because farms employing more than one regular labourer will 
tend to be the larger ones. For this reason, we run the regressions both (i) on the sample of all farms employing 
one regular labourer or more, and (2) on the sample of farms employing one regular labourer only.
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regular labour in the study villages. Using the same set of explanatory variables, we 
determine the demand for regular labourers for these farms. These estimates are shown in 
table 2.3.2’.
5.232. Parameter Estimates
Table 2.3.2 shows the ordinary least squares estimates as well as truncated regression 
estimates obtained from the sub-sample of farms hiring regular labourers. T-ratios are given 
in parentheses. The results are as follows. Farm size (LNCULT) is positive and significant 
among the farms hiring regular labourers. Given that the marginal costs of regular labour are 
zero, significance of the farm size variable among the sample of farms hiring regular 
labourers, to some extent, confirms that these farms face hoarding costs while employing 
regular labour. Accordingly, larger farms (with lower hoarding costs) are able to hire regular 
labourers. The variable indicating land quality like irrigation is also significant in this sub­
sample. The significance of farm size and irrigation facilities, both of which enhance the 
demand for labour among the farms hiring regular labour, strengthens the hoarding costs 
argument
The coefficient of family labour is negative and statistically significant, thereby 
implying a substitutability between family and regular labour-hours among the farms hiring 
regular labour. However, unlike the tobit model, the coefficient of OBUL is now positive 
(though not significant) among the farms hiring regular labourers. This suggests that/arms 
hiring regular labour use them to perform operations with the help of farm bullocks.
Secondly, we compare truncated estimates of the sub-sample with the tobit estimates 
for the overall sample (see section 5.2.2.2). It suggests that the inferences drawn from the 
tobit model remain unchanged for farm size (LNCULT), irrigation (LNIRR) and family 
labour-hours (LNSFLHR) in the sub-sample as well. However, in contrast to the tobit model, 
the coefficient of OBUL becomes positive in the sub-sample suggesting that the ownership 
of livestock definitely enhances the demand for regular labour among the farms hiring 
regular labour. Ownership of farm equipments (LNFEQVAL) is no longer significant in the 
truncated model. We also find that the standard errors of estimated LNCULT and LNSFLHR 
are less in the truncated model, suggesting a better precision of these estimates.
Finally, we consider the farms hiring only one regular labour (see table 2.3.2’). Farm 
size variable LNCULT continues to be highly statistically significant even when we consider 
the demand for regular labour-hours by these farms; this suggests that there are significant 
hoarding costs among the smaller farms. As before, the coefficient of family labour-hours is
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negative and it is significant. However, in this sub-sample of farms hiring only one regular 
labour, other factors of production like area irrigated, use of own bullocks, value of plots per 
acre and farm equipments are not found to be significant.
5.3. Simultaneous Determination of the Choice of Regular Contract 
and Demand for Regular Labour-Hours
So far the choice of labour contract is determined by the probit model independently
of the demand for regular labour-hours in a tobit framework. However, the decision as to
how much regular labour to hire is conditional on the first decision whether to hire any
regular labour or not. In this section, we shall jointly determine these two decisions as
follows. First the farm decides whether to hire a regular labour or not; if yes, the farm
decides how many regular labour-hours to hire. Using a ’double-hurdle’ model (Cragg, 1971;
Atkinson, Gomulka and Stem, 1984), these two decisions are determined where the first
hurdle is determined by a probit-criterion equation choosing the type of the contract to be
offered and then selecting the cases where regular labourers are hired, a truncated model is
used to determine the demand for regular labour-hours.
5.3.1. A Double-Hurdle Model
Suppose the demand for regular labour-hours is denoted by qj > 0. Zeros may arise 
either because the farm in question does not intend to hire regular labour or because the 
farm’s intention to hire regular labour is constrained by its ability to do so. The latter may 
occur because the farm is small (and hence, have significant ’hoarding costs’ of regular 
labour) or because the farm does not have access to irrigation (so that it does not have a 
steady demand for labour throughout the year), etc. Let qj be related to an unobserved 
variable q^ as follows: :
<?. = max(q* , 0 ) 
where q * = 8 V. + v. (2 1 )
vi -  N(0 , a*)
Let us now define the contract variable p; such that it takes a value 1 if the i-th farm
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hires regular labour, and zero otherwise. ps is related to an unobserved variable p* /7 as 
follows:
P i  = 1 if P *  >  0
= 0  i fpT < 0  (22)
where p* = p'x + ui 
s.t. u. ~ N(0 , c])
The set of independent variables Xj explaining p* and the set of variables wt 
explaining q / by the i-th farm, i = 1, 2 ,..., n, may have some variables in common; however, 
there needs to be some identifying variables between these two decision variables. Secondly, 
Uj and Vj are assumed to be independently and identically distributed; they are also assumed 
to be uncorrelated. In this framework, Pj and are assumed to be related as follows :
qi > 0  iff p^ > 0 , qj* > 0
qj = 0  iff either p* < 0  or q* < 0  or both
Given this set-up, the following probabilities can be calculated :
Prob[pi = 1] = Problp’ > 0] =
Problq > 0] = Prob{q' > 0] =* °v
where <!>(.) is the cumulative normal distribution function and ov is the standard deviation of
Vj-
If p* > 0, i.e, if p  = 1, a truncated regression in (5’Wi) applies (when qj > 0) so that 
the log-likelihood function of the double-hurdle model can be written as follows :
lnLDH = E  111-o + Eqi > 0 In <j)
q* -  6 V (24)
where (j) is the normal density function.
Using a likelihood ratio (LR) statistic, a double-hurdle model can be compared with
17It is to be noted here that the determinants of p; are unobservable, but not pi.
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a tobit model as follows :
LR = 2(lnLDH -  lnLuJ  -  £  (25)
where LDH and Ltobit are the log-likelihood functions of double-hurdle and tobit models, 
respectively. The likelihood ratio (LR) statistic follows a chi-square distribution where the 
degrees of freedom are determined by the number of regressors p in the probit criterion 
equation. Finally, we maximise the log-likelihood function of the double-hurdle model to find 
the estimates of p, 8 and
5.3.2. Model Specification
There are two hurdles to be determined in a double-hurdle model. The first hurdle 
relates to the decision whether the farm, in question, wishes to hire regular labour or not 
which is not observable. However, the dependent variable in the second hurdle equation is 
the actual number of regular labour-hours hired by each farm in the sample which is 
observable.
Given that larger faims own more land and non-land resources, explanatory variables 
of the probit criterion equation are assumed to be as follows : intercept term (ONE), amount 
of land cultivated (LNCULT), amount of land irrigated (LNIRR), number of family labour- 
hours used in cultivation (LNSFLHR) and value of farm equipments owned by the farm 
(LNFEQVAL).
At the second step, given the choice of contract, there are farms who actually hire 
regular labour. The second hurdle determines how many regular labour-hours (LNSPLHR) 
are to be used; in this case, the explanatory variables are the same as before, i.e., the set of 
variables included in X’ (see section 5.2.1.3). Hence, the identifying variables are 
LNPLOTVA, OBUL, AUREPALLE, KANZARA, YEAR80, YEAR81, YEAR82 and 
YEAR83, variables that are not included in the probit criterion equation.
LIMDEP, the computer programme, at our disposal, gives a routine for a particular 
variant of the double-hurdle model where the dependent variable in the probit-criterion 
equation is observable. This is, however, not the case here. Hence, we write a special
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programme to obtain the maximum likelihood estimates of the double-hurdle model18.
5.33. Parameter Estimates
Estimates of the double-hurdle model as specified in section 5.3.2. are shown in table
3.3.
First we consider the estimates of the probit criterion equation. Our estimates indicate 
that larger farms with greater irrigation facilities, and farm equipments are more likely to 
offer regular contracts. However, the greater the supply of family labour, the lower is the 
likelihood of offering regular contracts which supports the earlier result that family labour 
acts as a substitute for regular labour.
Next we consider the estimates of the second hurdle as indicated by the estimates of 
the truncated model. Farm size (LNCULT) is highly significant in determining the demand 
for regular labour. Given that the marginal cost of regular labour is zero, the significance of 
farm size in the truncated model (which considers only the farms actually hiring regular 
labour) implies that hoarding cost considerations are significant for farms such that smaller 
farms do not hire regular labour, this, in turn, strengthens the result obtained from the 
truncated regression model in section 5.2.3.
In addition, plot value per acre and farm equipment value favourably and 
significantly affect the farm’s decision as to how much regular labour to hire. Use of family 
bullocks in cultivation also exerts a significantly positive impact on the amount of regular 
labour hired by the farm.
The effect of family labour-hours on the demand for regular labour is, however, 
negative. This suggests that there exists a substitutability between family labour and regular 
labour which is compatible with the ’hoarding cost’ argument.
5.3.4. A Comparison with Tobit Estimates
We construct a LR statistic to compare the double-hurdle model with the tobit model:
18I am indebted to Joanna Gomulka at the STICERD, London School of Economics who has written the 
programme required for the estimation of the double-hurdle model.
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LR = 2(£D„ - LoJ
= 2 ( -159.148465+227.574453) 
= 136.8519
The LR statistic is significant at the 1% level of significance which, in turn, implies that 
estimates of the double-hurdle model is a significant improvement over those of the tobit 
model.
Secondly, estimates of the double-hurdle model justify the hoarding cost argument; 
farm size variable is highly statistically significant not only in the probit criterion equation, 
but also in the truncated regression determining the demand for regular labour-hours.
Thirdly, the coefficient of OBUL is negative in the tobit model (while it is positive, 
though not significant in the truncated model). In the double-hurdle model it is not only 
positive but also statistically significant.
5.3.5. An Overview
The econometric analysis carried out so far has been done in two steps. First, in a 
univariate framework, probit and tobit models were used to determine the choice of contract 
and demand for regular labour-hours respectively. In general, tobit estimates are found to be 
more informative because of the continuous nature of the dependent variable. In addition, we 
have estimated a truncated regression model to examine the significance of hoarding costs 
among the farms hiring regular labour. Secondly, in a bivariate framework, a double-hurdle 
model was estimated. The model jointly determines the choice of contract and demand for 
regular labour-hours. A comparison among probit, tobit and double-hurdle models shows that 
tobit estimates are better than the probit ones and double-hurdle estimates are better than the 
tobit estimates. The main findings, primarily with respect to hypothesis H2, are summarised 
below.
In addition to farm size, LNIRR, LNSFLHR, LNFEQVAL and OBUL are significant 
in the farm’s decision to hire regular farm servants.
As expected, the size of the farm turns out to be the most important determinant in 
our analysis. It has been shown that larger farms not only have a greater likelihood of hiring 
regular labour, but they also demand more regular labour-hours. As already explained in the 
implicit contract model, there are two factors that determine the demand for regular labour- 
hours. The first argument is related to sharing risks between farms and workers. The larger
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the farm size (in quantity as well as in quality), the larger is the value of other non-land 
resources (e.g., livestock, irrigation facilities, farm equipments etc.) as well (see chapter 
three). These larger farms are wealthier and, hence, for all practical purposes, they can be 
considered to be risk-neutral compared to the smaller ones because these large farms can 
diversify their portfolio to hedge against risks. Hence, these farms are willing to insure a 
group of regular labourers against wage and employment fluctuations. Secondly, given the 
size factor, the demand for labour-hours is higher in large farms throughout the year a part 
of which may be attributed to greater irrigation facilities, generating a year-round demand 
for labour. Hence, the ’hoarding costs’ of maintaining a steady pool of regular labourers are 
less in large farms, inducing them to demand more regular labour-hours. The fact that the 
hoarding cost constraint is more binding for small farms is not only confirmed by the 
positive significance of the farm size variable in the truncated regression on a sub-sample of 
farms hiring only one regular labourer (section 5.2.3), but also by the positively significant 
regression coefficient of farm size variable in the second hurdle of the double-hurdle model 
(section 5.3.3).
The significance of area irrigated (LNIRR) in all the models further strengthens the 
hoarding costs argument underlying the employment of regular labourers. The larger the area 
irrigated (which is also reflected in the plot value per acre), the greater is the demand for 
labour throughout the year and the lower are the hoarding costs of maintaining a fixed pool 
of regular farm servants. The variable LNIRR may also reflect the employment of regular 
labourers with a view to ensure no-shirking. Irrigation is an activity particularly difficult to 
supervise (Eswaran and Kotwal, 1985a). Hence, the greater the amount of irrigated land, the 
greater is the problem of supervision and the greater the likelihood of employing regular farm 
servants on irrigated land.
The coefficient of family labour-hours is negative, but not significant, in the probit 
model. In tobit and double-hurdle models, however, it is significant and negatively related 
to the farms’ demand for regular labour-hours. This suggests that family labour-hours act as 
substitutes for regular labour-hours. Hence, the greater the supply of family labour, the lower 
is the demand for regular labour-hours so that the hoarding costs of labour are minimised.
The variable OBUL is negatively significant in the tobit model. However, it becomes 
positive among the sub-sample of farms hiring regular labour (though not significant) as well 
as in the double-hurdle model (where it is highly significant) so that the positive effect of 
the use of own bullocks outweighs the negative effect (see section 5.2.1.3). The result, 
therefore, suggests that the use of own bullocks raises the demand for regular labour-hours
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among the farms hiring regular labour (though it may be negative when all farms are taken 
together).
The value of farm equipments (LNFEQVAL) is positive and significant in tobit and 
double-hurdle models. On the one hand, tasks using farm equipments need better skill and 
may be more difficult to supervise, necessitating use of skilled regular labour. On the other 
hand, use of some farm equipments (e.g., threshers, sprayers) may reduce the demand for 
regular labour. However, the total effect of farm equipments on the demand for regular 
labour-hours is found to be significantly positive, suggesting that the positive effect 
outweighs the negative one.
Thus, the variables denoting the quantity (LNCULT) as well as the quality 
(LNIRR/LNPLOTVA) of landholding is a significant determinant of the demand for regular 
labour-hours. In addition, other factors of production like LNFEQVAL, OBUL and 
LNSFLHR are also found to be significant; while the first two have favourable impacts, the 
last one has usually a negative impact on the use of regular labour-hours.
The implications of our results are as follows :
(i) The argument of risk-sharing between farmers and workers is consistent with the 
evidence arising from these Indian villages where larger and, hence, wealthier farmers (who 
own better-quality land as well) hire more regular labour-hours.
(ii) More interestingly, the significance of farm size (quantity as well as quality) on 
regular labour-hours strengthens the ’hoarding costs’ argument. Given that the marginal costs 
of regular labour are zero, the positive significance of the farm size variable confirms the 
significant hoarding-cost consideration among small farms19.
Our evidences are, therefore, consistent with the implicit contract model developed 
in chapter two.
5.4. Types of Tasks and Choice of Contracts
So far our analysis has focused primarily on farm size and the significance of 
hoarding costs in the determination of farms’ demand for regular labour. In this section, we 
consider the relevance of task characteristics and examine the validity of hypothesis H4 that 
labour contracts are allocated according to task characteristics in order to minimise
l9We have not used the argument that farms using regular labour benefit from the greater timeliness with 
which tasks are completed. This is because by assumption there does not exist any excess demand for labour.
157
supervision costs.
The analysis is developed as follows. Section 5.4.1 examines whether there exist 
particular tasks which have a higher content of regular labour-hours relative to other tasks. 
In section 5.4.2, we distinguish between monitorable and non-monitorable tasks by examining 
the distribution of casual and regular labour-hours between these tasks. In doing so, we 
control for farm size and cropping pattern. Some chi-square test statistics are also computed 
to examine the degree of association between the type of tasks and that of contracts. Finally, 
in view of the fact that the demand for regular labour depends not only on the nature of the 
tasks, but also on farm size, irrigation facilities, supply of family labour-hours and the nature 
of the crop produced (as argued in sections 5.2 and 5.3), a multiple regression analysis is 
done in section 5.4.3 which makes use of tobit and truncated regressions.
5.4.1. Classification of Tasks and Distribution of Regular Labours
This section examines if there is a particular type of task which has a higher content 
of regular labour-hours. The analysis in this section is based on the information collected 
from the study villages, namely, Aurepalle, Shirapur and Kanzara over a period of five years 
(1980 to 1984).
The classification of tasks as based on the distinction between three types of tasks 
made in the ICRISAT studies are as follows:
Type-a : Field preparation, manuring, fertilization and irrigation
Type-b : Sowing, re-sowing, transplanting, weeding, interculturing (which is followed by a 
crop maturation period)
Type-c : Harvesting (main product and by-product), harvest processing 
For each type of tasks, the total number of casual-labour (SCLHR) and regular-labour hours 
(SPLHR) used on different plots owned by a household are calculated from the VLS-Y2 
schedule. Using this information, we compute the conditional probability of hiring regular 
labour as follows.
Suppose Aj denotes the event that there is a demand for labour to perform task type 
j, j = a, b, c while denotes the event that the i-th combination of labour is hired, i = 1, 2, 
3, accordingly as the farm hires only regular, only casual, or both regular and casual labour 
to perform task type j. Thus, three probabilities, namely, P r^ /A j), P i^ B^Aj) and Pr(B3/Aj) 
are calculated for the j-th type of task, j = a, b, c as defined above. Estimated values of these
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probabilities are shown in table 4.120.
The following inferences can be made from the above tables.
First we consider the employment of casual and regular labour in task type ’a’.
(i) Proportion of farms employing only regular labour is positive (0.16) in Aurepalle. 
However, it is close to zero in Shirapur (0.02) and zero in Kanzara. (ii) Proportion of farms 
employing only casual labour is high in Shirapur (0.66) and Kanzara (0.77) and moderately 
high in Aurepalle (0.33). (iii) The proportion of farms hiring both casual and regular labour 
is negligible in Shirapur (0.02), but moderate in Aurepalle (0.15) and Kanzara (0.15)21.
Secondly, the employment of casual and regular labour in task type ’ b’ is considered, 
(iv) The proportion of farms employing only regular labour is positive but negligible 
in Aurepalle (0.05), close to zero in Shirapur (0.02) and zero in Kanzara (0). (v) The 
proportion of farms using only casual labour is very high in Shirapur (0.89) and Kanzara 
(0.84) and moderately high in Aurepalle (0.41). (vi) The proportion of farms using both 
casual and regular labour is moderate in Aurepalle (0.26), low in Kanzara (0.14), and almost 
negligible in Shirapur (0.02).
Finally the employment of casual and regular labour in task type ’c’ is considered, 
(vii) The proportion of farms using only regular labour is zero in all the villages, 
(viii) The proportion of farms using only casual labour is moderately high in Aurepalle 
(0.51), and substantially high in Shirapur (0.95) and Kanzara (0.76). (ix) The proportion of 
farms using both casual and regular labour is moderate in Aurepalle (0.31), low in Kanzara 
(0.16), and almost negligible in Shirapur (0.03).
It follows that casual contracts dominate in all types of tasks, especially in task types 
’b’ and ’c ’ in the study villages. Even in task type ’a’, the proportion of farms hiring only 
casual labourers is higher than that hiring only regular labourers. However, the relative use 
of regular labour-hours is higher in task type ’a’ than that in task types ’b’ and ’c’. On the 
other hand, relative use of casual labourers is higher in type ’b’ and type ’c’ tasks, especially 
in type ’c’ tasks where no farm uses only regular labour.
On an average, use of regular labour is the lowest in Shirapur compared to that in 
Aurepalle and Kanzara. To some extent, this can be attributed to the drought-prone nature
^ o t e  that conditional probabilities are nothing but the relative frequencies which allow us to describe the 
farming practices in these villages as to how labour contracts are allotted according to tasks though the robustness 
of these probabilities may be questioned. However, our chi-square tests of independence as well as regression 
analysis (see section 5.4.3) offer statistically significant measures of the relationship between types of tasks and 
types of contracts in the study villages.
21Note that Pr(B1/Aj)+Pr(B2/Aj)+Pr(B3/Aj) < 1 and the difference constitutes the use of family labour.
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of the village (see chapters four and seven). Given a high risk of crop failure, very often even 
larger farmers in Shirapur are not willing to offer regular farm contracts. Secondly, from the 
workers’ point of view, too, credit incentive to enter regular farm contracts is less in 
comparison to that in Aurepalle and Kanzara. As already discussed in chapter four, due to 
the government’s active Drought-Prone Area Programme (DPAP), the credit constraint on 
the landless labourers is low in Shirapur than in the other two study villages. In other words, 
both demand and supply forces in Shirapur lead to a situation where the regular labour 
content of total hired labour is less than that in the other two study villages.
5.4.2. Monitorable and Non-monitorable Tasks
The definition of tasks, in this section, closely follows that in section 2.3 of chapter 
two. According to the need for supervision and the ease with which it can be undertaken, 
tasks are classified into monitorable and non-monitorable types to examine hypothesis H4 
related to the task-based segmentation of the labour market between casual and regular 
contracts.
To this end, task types a, b and c are further classified as follows :
TASK = 1 if the labour concerned performs task type ’a’
= 0 if the labour concerned performs task type ’b’ and/or ’c’.
If TASK is unity, tasks are called non-monitorable tasks; otherwise tasks are monitorable
tasks22. This classification directly corresponds to that of Eswaran and Kotwal (1985a). In
their notation, non-monitorable tasks are type I tasks while monitorable tasks are type II
tasks. As argued in the ’shirking model’ (see chapter two), tasks like field preparation,
manuring, spreading fertilizer, irrigation are difficult to supervise and, hence, regular
contracts are offered to perform these tasks with a view to discipline labour such that the
regular wage per period is above the worker’s reservation wage.
It has already been shown in sections 5.2 and 5.3 that the larger the farm size, the
greater is the demand for regular labour-hours. The analysis in this section, therefore,
considers only the labour hiring by the larger farms23 which, to some extent, eliminates the
effect of farm size on the choice of contract and focuses on the relationship between the type
of tasks and the type of contracts prevailing in the study villages.
“The distinction between monitorable and non-monitorable tasks is, of course, a simplification. In particular, 
there is likely to be a continuum of tasks based on their degree of monitorability.
“By larger farms, we refer to the farms belonging to the medium and large households in the ICRISAT 
specification; in other words, these are the farms for whom the landholding status variable TYPE = 1.
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5.4.2.I. Distribution of Casual-Labour and Regular-Labour Hours in the Production of 
All Crops
In order to analyse the distribution of regular labour-hours between monitorable and 
non-monitorable tasks, we calculate here the conditional probability of hiring casual and 
regular labour. Let Ch denote the event that a large farm hires regular labour to perform a 
particular type of task h = 1, 0 accordingly as there is a demand for non-monitorable or 
monitorable tasks. As in section 5.4.1, we compute the conditional probability of employing 
regular and casual labour in monitorable and non-monitorable tasks in the study villages, 
namely, PrCBj/QJ, PrCB^C^ and PrOVC,,) according to whether (i) farms employ only 
regular labour (Pr(B1/Ch)), (ii) farms employ only casual labour (PrCB^Qj)) and (iii) farms 
employ both casual and regular labour (PrCB^Q,)) respectively where h = 1, 0 accordingly 
as labour is hired for non-monitorable and monitorable tasks respectively. The estimated 
probabilities are presented in table 4.2.1.
In Aurepalle, the probability that large farms employ only regular labourers in non- 
monitorable tasks is higher than that employing only casual labourers or that employing both 
casual and regular labour. However, the same does not hold good in Shirapur or Kanzara. 
In Kanzara, PrtBj/Cj) is zero while it is close to zero in Shirapur (0.01). In contrast, the 
probability of hiring only casual labour is higher even in the non-monitorable tasks24 in 
Shirapur and Kanzara. However, a moderate number of farms, 23% in Aurepalle and 24% 
in Kanzara, use both casual and regular labour to perform non-monitorable tasks; in Shirapur, 
the probability of using both casual and regular labour is negligible (0.01).
Next the conditional probabilities of hiring casual-labour and regular-labour hours 
or both for monitorable tasks are considered. None of the large farms in the study villages 
use only regular labour to perform these tasks so that PrOVQ,) is equal to zero in each case. 
However, the proportion of farms using only casual labour (P^B^Cq)) is higher than that 
using both casual and regular labour (Pr(B3/C0)) in Shirapur and Kanzara, but it is the other 
way round in Aurepalle.
A comparison of the probability of hiring only casual labourers between non- 
monitorable and monitorable tasks shows that in each of the study villages, PrtB^Co) is 
higher for the monitorable tasks. This implies that more regular or family labour is used to 
perform the non-monitorable tasks. Also, the proportion of farms using both casual and 
regular labour Pr(B3/C0) is higher for the monitorable tasks. This indicates that there is
^In these tasks, piece-rate contracts are gaining popularity in recent years which, by the very nature of the 
contract, minimises the need for the employer’s supervision.
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generally a higher demand for labour in the monitorable tasks so that in addition to regular 
labourers hired in the beginning of the production cycle, some casual labourers are hired. In 
other words, while it is more likely that only casual labourers are employed to perform 
monitorable tasks in the larger farms in all the study villages, it is not necessarily true that 
only regular labourers are hired to perform the non-monitorable tasks. Among the study 
villages it is only in Aurepalle that PrCBj/Q) is greater than PrtB^Q) and PrCB^Q).
Secondly, the average use of regular-labour and casual-labour hours as a proportion 
of total labour-hours is calculated in these three cases (farms hiring regular labour only, 
farms hiring casual labour only, and the farms hiring both casual and regular labour) for 
monitorable and non-monitorable tasks as shown in table 4.2.1’. We focus on farms using 
both casual and regular labour-hours which is more interesting. The average use of regular 
labour-hours is relatively higher than that of casual labour-hours in the non-monitorable tasks. 
The scenario gets reversed when we consider the monitorable tasks. There is an inter-village 
variation, too. Though the average use of regular labour-hours is relatively less in Shirapur, 
use of regular labour-hours in non-monitorable tasks is higher in Shirapur compared to that 
in Aurepalle and Kanzara.
Thirdly, we consider the use of casual-labour and regular-labour hours as a 
proportion of total labour-hours undertaking the non-monitorable and monitorable tasks 
among the farms hiring regular labour as shown in table 4.2.1"25. The conclusion of table 
4.2.1’ still remains valid so far as the farms hiring both casual-labour and regular-labour 
hours are concerned. It further reveals whether the allocation of casual-labour and regular- 
labour hours is different between tasks in these farms compared to our previous classification 
(table 4.2.1 ’). It follows that these farms (who hire regular labour) in Aurepalle and Shirapur 
use a greater proportion of regular labour-hours in the non-monitorable tasks compared to 
the monitorable ones. In Kanzara, however, the same does not hold good where the relative 
use of casual labour-hours is higher in both monitorable and non-monitorable tasks. However, 
in all three study villages, relative use of casual labour-hours is significantly higher in the 
monitorable tasks than that in non-monitorable tasks.
Finally, we compare the use of casual-labour and regular-labour hours among all 
farms (shown in table 4.1) and that among large farms only (shown in table 4.2.1) which,
^ h e  distinction between the third column of table 4.2.1’ and table 4.2.1" is that the entries in table 4.2.1" 
includes the farms that use only regular labour-hours and both casual-labour and regular-labour hours in the 
respective tasks. Also note that use of casual-labour and regular-labour hours are the same in the monitorable 
tasks in tables 4.2.1’ and 4.2.1" since farms in none of the villages use only regular labour in the monitorable 
tasks when all farms are considered (table 4.2.1’).
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to some extent, accounts for the effect of farm size on the use of regular labour-hours in 
respective task types. In the non-monitorable tasks, the propensity to use only regular labour- 
hours increases and that of using only casual labour-hours decreases as we switch from all 
farms to larger farms only. Consequently, the proportion of farms hiring both casual-labour 
and regular-labour hours in the non-monitorable tasks goes up when the sub-sample of larger 
farms is considered as compared to the pooled sample.
5.4.22. Distribution of Casual-Labour and Regular-Labour Hours 
in the Production of Paddy and Cotton
As already discussed in section 5.2 of the chapter, irrigation is found to play a crucial 
role in the demand for regular labourers. It is argued that irrigated crops absorb more regular 
labour-hours in the study villages because irrigation generates labour demand throughout the 
process of production and thereby minimises the hoarding costs of employing regular labour. 
It has been observed that compared to other crops, cultivation of paddy (traditional as well 
as the HYV) in Aurepalle and that of cotton in Kanzara absorb relatively more regular labour 
(Walker and Ryan, 1990). Hence, this subsection considers the allocation of casual-labour 
and regular-labour hours in these crops. The analysis is based on the conditional probability 
estimates (i.e., propensity) of hiring casual and regular labour for the monitorable and non- 
monitorable tasks as shown in table 4.2.2.
First, we consider the production of paddy in Aurepalle. In our sample, regular labour 
is hired by large farms only. The proportion of farms using only regular labour is 16% in the 
non-monitorable tasks where there is no farm which uses only regular labour-hours in the 
monitorable tasks. However, the proportion of large farms hiring only casual labour is equal 
(20%) in both monitorable and non-monitorable tasks. Finally, the proportion of farms using 
both casual-labour and regular-labour hours is higher in the monitorable tasks (80%) 
compared to the non-monitorable ones (60%).
In the production of cotton in Kanzara too both small and large farms participate in 
production though regular labourers are hired by the large farms only. Hence, the farms 
hiring only casual labour may be small or large in size while the farms hiring regular labour 
are all large farms. We also note that there are no farms in our sample which use only 
regular labour-hours in monitorable or non-monitorable tasks. With this qualification in mind, 
we consider the use of casual-labour and regular-labour hours in the production of cotton in 
Kanzara. The proportion of farms using only casual labour-hours is higher in the monitorable 
tasks (73%) than that (69%) in the non-monitorable ones. Finally, the proportion of farms 
using both casual-labour and regular-labour hours is equal (24%) between these two types
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of tasks, though much lower than the proportion of farms using only casual labour-hours in 
any task type.
Secondly, the average use of casual-labour and regular-labour hours relative to total 
labour-hours in the production of paddy and cotton is calculated as shown in table 4.2.2’. 
Here we focus only on farms hiring both casual and regular labourers (who are all large 
farms in the production of paddy and cotton). It can be seen from the table that the average 
use of regular labour-hours is much higher in the non-monitorable tasks compared to that 
used in the monitorable tasks while the average use of casual labour-hours is higher in the 
monitorable tasks in the production of both paddy and cotton.
Thus, the cropwise distribution of casual-labour and regular-labour hours suggests 
that the probability of employing regular labour is higher in the non-monitorable tasks in the 
production of paddy, but not necessarily so in the production of cotton though the average 
use of regular labour is higher in non-monitorable tasks than that in monitorable ones.
5.43. Types o f Tasks and Types o f Contracts
In this section, we formally examine the relationship between types of contracts and 
types of tasks. First, in section 5.4.3.1. we use some chi-square tests of independence to 
examine this relationship. However, in view of the inadequacy of these chi-square statistics, 
we perform a multiple regression analysis in section 5.4.3.2.
5.43.1. Some Chi-Square Test Statistics
First, Pearson’s chi-square and likelihood ratio (LR) chi-square statistics are 
computed to test the statistical significance of the association between type of tasks (TASK) 
and that of contracts (PL) in the study villages. We compute these chi-square statistics (i) for 
all crops and all farms, (ii) for all farms in the production of paddy in Aurepalle and cotton 
in Kanzara. These statistics are shown in tables 4.3.1 and 4.3.1’.
The degree of freedom of these chi-square statistics is 1. Critical value of chi-square 
with one degree of freedom is 6.63 at the 1% level of significance while it is 3.84 at the 5% 
level of significance. When all crops are considered together, none of the chi-square statistics 
are found to be significant; hence, we cannot infer that there is a significant relationship 
between the type of task and that of the contract. However, when we consider specific crops 
(paddy or cotton), the relationship between the two becomes significant.
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In the production of paddy and cotton, however, chi-square statistics are significant, 
though not so in the production of all crops pooled together. This means, task characteristics 
alone are not important to determine the nature of contracts. We need to consider both farm 
size and crop character to test the task-based segmentation of labour contracts.
Chi-square statistics infers whether there is a significant relationship or not; it does 
not, however, infer the direction of this relationship, i.e., whether this relationship is negative 
or positive. Secondly, chi-square statistics are based on bivariate relationship and, therefore, 
cannot take account of the effect of farm size or other variables on the choice of contract. 
Thirdly, while considering the type of contract, chi-square statistics use the contract dummy 
PL and not the actual use of regular labour-hours. Consequently, some available information 
is not used in this analysis which may alter the final outcome. Similarly, while controlling 
for farm size, we distinguish between small and large farms only instead of considering the 
continuous farm size variable accessible to us which, too, may be somewhat misleading.
5.4.3.2. Tobit and Truncated Models
In order to redress the above shortcomings of chi-square tests performed here, we 
incorporate a multiple regression framework where the number of regular labour-hours hired 
is assumed to be determined by the nature of tasks (TASK), farm size (LNCULT), size of 
irrigated area (LNIRR) and the amount of family labour-hours used in family farming 
(LNSFLHR).
Two sets of regressions are done here. First, we include all the farms in the sample. 
Using a tobit model, (i) we regress LNSPLHR on TASK, LNCULT, LNIRR and LNSFLHR 
for all farms and for all crops. We run tobit regression for all villages together with two 
village dummies AUREPALLE AND KANZARA; we also run the regression for Aurepalle 
and Kanzara individually, (ii) We regress LNSPLHR on TASK, LNCULT, LNIRR and 
LNSFLHR in the production of paddy in Aurepalle and cotton in Kanzara. Secondly, we 
select the farms hiring regular labourers and using a truncated regression model (see section 
5.2.3.1) repeat the same exercise as in (i) and (ii). Tobit estimates are shown in tables 4.3.2,
4.3.2.a, 4.3.2.b (heteroscedasticity corrected tobit estimates) while truncated estimates in 
tables 4.3.2’ and 4.3.2’.a.
5.433. Tobit and Truncated Estimates
First we consider the tobit estimates of the demand for regular labour-hours in the
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production of all crops where all sample farms are included. Dependent variable of the 
regression is LNSPLHR. Significant variables are LNCULT and LNIRR both of which 
enhance the demand for regular labour-hours. Coefficients of the task dummy TASK (which 
takes a value one if labour is hired for non-monitorable tasks (see section 5.1)) and family 
labour-hours (LNSFLHR) are negative, but they are not significant. This means, task does 
not exert a significant impact on the demand for regular labour-hours. When we consider all 
villages together, village dummies are highly significant. We also correct these tobit estimates 
for the presence of heteroscedasticity in the continuous variables (table 4.3.2.b). The 
likelihood ratio statistic is not significant for Kanzara, though it is significant for Aurepalle 
and for all the study villages taken together. In the latter two cases, we, therefore, accept the 
corrected estimates. This, however, does not alter our main inferences. Task characteristics 
remain insignificant as before.
Secondly, we consider the truncated regression estimates for the farms hiring regular 
labourers (table 4.3.2’). In this case, too, the task dummy is negative, but insignificant. This 
means that Eswaran and Kotwal’s argument that regular contracts are allocated to non- 
monitorable tasks does not hold good in the study villages, even if we consider the farms 
hiring regular labourers. On the contrary, the result indirectly lends support to the ’hoarding 
cost’ argument of chapter two. Regular labourers are not hired to perform non-monitorable 
tasks only. They are used in monitorable tasks as well such that farms’ ’hoarding costs’ are 
kept to the minimum.
Finally, we consider these tobit and truncated regression coefficients in the 
production of paddy in Aurepalle and cotton in Kanzara. As before, farm size and irrigation 
facilities are statistically significant, but task dummy is not.
Contrary to what is suggested by the chi-square tests, we find that the task dummy 
is insignificant in this multiple regression framework; this is true irrespective of whether we 
consider the specific crop variety like paddy or cotton. In other words, the task dummy is 
neither significant in the production of all crops nor in the production of paddy or cotton in 
the multiple regression framework. This holds good irrespective of the sample selection (i.e., 
whether we consider pooled sample or only the farms hiring regular labourers). However, the 
size of farm and that of the area irrigated are positive and statistically significant in the 
determination of the demand for regular labour among the sample farms. In other words, in 
the light of the information available from the study villages, hypothesis H4 suggesting task- 
based segmentation of rural labour contracts cannot be accepted.
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5.43.4. An Overview
It follows from our analysis that considerations of supervision and monitoring in the 
non-monitorable tasks are not significant in the allocation of labour contracts in the study 
villages, even among the farms hiring regular labourers. Once regular labourers are hired, 
they are used indiscriminately in non-monitorable and monitorable tasks such that hoarding 
costs are kept to the minimum. However, on an average, there is a greater use of regular 
labour-hours in the non-monitorable tasks than that in monitorable tasks. Secondly, relative 
use of regular labour-hours is higher in Aurepalle compared to Shirapur and Kanzara. This 
is because Aurepalle suffers from a more stringent credit and employment constraints than 
those prevailing in Shirapur and Kanzara (also see discussions in chapters four and seven).
The size of farm and the nature of the crop produced have significant effects on the 
employment of regular farm servants in these villages. The latter is closely related to the 
irrigation requirements of the crop. Crops that absorb more regular labour-hours are the crops 
with higher irrigation requirements. This suggests that farms with irrigation facilities (who 
are usually the larger farms in the study villages) cultivate the irrigated crops. These large 
farms, therefore, have steady demand for labour-hours throughout the year and they are the 
major demanders of regular labourers.
To summarise, our results do not lend support to hypothesis H4 derived from the 
shirking models; instead, it strengthens the validity of implicit contract argument put forward 
in chapter two. This can further be supported by the following empirical evidence obtained 
from the study villages : (a) daily wages of regular farm servants are usually lower than those 
of casual labourers (see chapter four) and (b) labourers join regular farm contracts only when 
they have pressing credit needs which is otherwise difficult (due to the scarcity of collateral) 
to obtain in a segmented rural credit market (see chapter four).
Conclusion
Bardhan (1984a) has argued that farms maintain a pool of regular labourers in order 
to minimise the ’wage fluctuations’ (over the slack and peak periods of agricultural 
production) and ’recruitment costs’ of hiring labour. Eswaran and Kotwal (1985a) have 
argued that regular farm servants are hired to perform the tasks difficult to supervise with a 
view to minimise the costs of supervision.
We argue that there is a ’hoarding cost’ of paying regular labour in the slack period
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when their productivity is low. We find that primarily larger farms hire regular farm servants 
in the study villages because their hoarding costs are lower. In addition to farm size, access 
to irrigation facilities, the ownership of farm equipments and livestock among larger farms 
significantly enhance the use of regular labour. Our evidence lends support to the implicit 
contract argument of chapter two that risk-neutral farms hire risk-averse regular labourers, 
taking into account the ’hoarding costs’ of regular labour in seasonal agriculture. It does not 
contradict Bardhan (1984a); it rather extends his arguments.
However, the available evidence from the study villages does not significantly 
support the task-based segmentation of rural labour contracts first advocated by Eswaran and 
Kotwal (1985a). Casual contracts dominate not only in the monitorable tasks, but also in the 
non-monitorable tasks. However, the average use of regular labour is relatively higher in the 
non-monitorable tasks in Aurepalle and Kanzara, though negligible in Shirapur. These 
findings weaken the plausibility of the shirking model in the traditional village labour 
markets in India and further strengthens the validity of the proposed implicit contract 
argument Once hired, regular labourers are used indiscriminately in all types of agricultural 
tasks.
Nonetheless, we cannot ignore the fact that there is a general consideration for farms 
to ensure no-shirking in any types of tasks where regular labour is used. Wage advance (i.e., 
credit) facilities offered to regular labourers can ensure a certain level of discipline for 
workers with minimum supervision. This is because any regular labourer caught shiiking is 
fired and, therefore, loses the access to credit offered by the employer which is otherwise 
difficult to obtain.
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CHAPTER 5 : TABLES
TABLE 2. Conditional Probability of Employing A Regular Labour
Village Large Farms Small Farms
Aurepalle 0.47 0.13
Shirapur 0.07 0.06
Kanzara 0.27 0.00
All Villages 0.26 0.07
TABLE 2’. Farm Size and Types of Contracts : Some Chi-Square Test Statistics
Test Statistic Aurepalle Shirapur Kanzara All Villages
Pearson’s chi-square 24.77 (1) [1] 0.50 (1) 17.71 (1) 31.82 (1)
LR (chi-square) 26.66 (1) 0.50 (1) 26.05 (1) 35.62 (1)
Pearson’s R 0.41 (5.42) [2] -0.06 (0.71) 0.35 (4.46) 0.27 (5.85)
N o te :  [ 1 ]  T he n u m bers in p a re n th e se s  d en o tes  the d eg re e  o f  f re e d o m .
[ 2 ]  T he n u m b ers in p a re n th e se s  d en o tes  t-ra tio .
TABLE 2 .1 3 .  Determinants of the Choice of Contract:
Mean and Standard Deviation of the Explanatory Variables, All Villages, 1980-84
All Villages Aurepalle Kanzara
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D
LNIRR 0.22 0.65 0.28 0.63 0.30 0.69
LNSFLHR 5.98 1.18 5.60 1.17 6.27 1.15
LNPLOTVA 1.69 0.55 1.65 0.44 1.38 0.46
LNFEQVAL 4.49 1.82 4.65 2.00 4.65 1.70
OBUL 0.57 0.49 0.54 0.50 0.62 0.49
TYPE 0.58 0.49 * 4c 3k 4c
LNCULT 1.80 1.10 1.66 0.94 1.98 1.09
AUREPALLE 0.35 0.48 3k 3k 3k *
KANZARA 0.35 0.48 * ik ♦ 3k
YEAR80 0.21 0.41 0.20 0.40 0.21 0.41
YEAR81 0.20 0.40 0.22 0.41 0.19 0.39
YEAR82 0.20 0.40 0.20 0.40 0.20 0.40
YEAR83 0.19 0.39 0.19 0.39 0.20 0.40
No. of 
Observations
422 422 148 148 146 146
Model Specification :
X  =  (LN IRR, LN SF LH R , L N P L O T V A , L N F E Q V A L, O B U L , T Y P E , A U R E P A L L E , K A N ZA R A , YE A R 80, YE AR 81, 
YEA R 82, YE A R 83)
T _  =  (LN IR R , LN SF LH R , L N PL O TV A , L N F E Q V A L , O B U L , L N C U L T , A U R E P A L LE , K A N ZA R A , YE AR 80, 
Y E A R 8I, YE A R 82, YE A R 83)
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TABLE 2.2.1. Probit Estimates I of the Choice of Regular Contract, All Villages
D ep en d en t V a r ia b le  : P L  =  1 i f  th e  i-th  fa rm  o ffers re g u la r  c o n tra c ts
Variables
Coefficients (T-Ratio) 
Using Specification X
Marginal Effects (T-Ratio) 
Using Specification X
ONE -4.31 (5.286)** -0.77 (5.249)**
LNIRR 0.52 (3.479)** 0.09 (3.186)**
LNSFLHR 0.06 (0.683) 0.01 (0.681)
LNPLOTVA 0.38 (1.330) 0.07 (1.321)
LNFEQVAL 0.22 (3.177)** 0.04 (3.113)**
OBUL -0.02 (0.097) -0.004 (0.097)
TYPE 0.23 (0.995) 0.04 (0.996)
AUREPALLE 1.43 (5.062)** 0.25 (5.030)**
KANZARA 0.76 (2.265)* 0.13 (2.274)*
YEAR80 0.53 (1.735) 0.09 (1.742)
YEAR81 -0.10 (0.318) -0.02 (0.318)
YEAR82 -0.06 (0.189) -0.01 (0.189)
YEAR83 -0.06 (0.212) -0.01 (0.212)
£, -125.2055 *
LR (%212) 156.5176 *
Correct Prediction 325+45=370 *
No. of Observations 422 422
N o te  d e n o te s  th a t th e  v a r ia b le  co n cern ed  is  s ign ifican t a t 5 %  w h ile  ’* * ’ d e n o te s  th a t it is  s ign ifican t a t 1 % .
TABLE 2.2.1*. Probit Estimates II of the Choice of Regular Contract, All Villages
D ep en d en t V a ria b le : P L  = 1 i f  th e i-th  fa rm  o ffers re g u la r  co n tra c ts
Variable
Coefficient (T-Ratio) 
Using Specification X’
Marginal Effects (T-Ratio) 
Using Specification X’
ONE -3.84 (4.331)** -0.46 (3.698)**
LNIRR 0.31 (1.829) 0.04 (1.678)
LNSFLHR -0.21 (2.016)* -0.03 (2.001)*
LNPLOTVA 0.23 (0.711) 0.03 (0.699)
LNFEQVAL 0.17 (2.273)* 0.02 (2.132)*
OBUL -0.87 (2.693)* -0.10 (2.433)*
LNCULT 1.09 (6.125)* 0.13 (5.232)**
AUREPALLE 1.91 (5.683)** 0.23 (4.853)*
KANZARA 0.82 (2.206)* 0.09 (2.116)*
YEAR80 0.14 (0.389) 0.02 (0.388)
YEAR81 -0.27 (0.753) -0.03 (0.753)
YEAR82 -0.25 (0.733) -0.02 (0.733)
YEAR83 -0.08 (-0.259) -0.01 (0.259)
t -101.8334 *
LR (Xu) 203.2619 *
Correct Prediction 331+55=386 ★
No. of Observations 422 422
N o te  : d e n o te s  th a t th e  va r ia b le  co n cern ed  is sign ifican t a t 5 %  w h ile  ’**’ d e n o te s  th a t it is  s ign ifican t a t 1% .
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TABLE 2.2.1’.a. Probit Estimates II of the Choice of Regular Contract, Aurepalle and Kanzara
D ep en d en t V a ria b le : P L  = 1 i f  th e  i- th  fa r m  o ffers re g u la r  co n tra c ts
Variable
A u re p a lle  
Probit Coefficients (T-Ratio) 
Using Specification X’
K a n za ra  
Probit Coefficients (T-Ratio) 
Using Specification X’
ONE -9.99 (0.226) -7.74 (0.150)
LNIRR 0.11 (0.265) -0.39 (0.587)
LNSFLHR -0.53 (1.967)* -1.09 (2.061)*
LNPLOTVA 0.69 (0.732) 0.04 (0.038)
LNFEQVAL 0.39 (1.936)* 0.76 (2.249)*
OBUL 4.63 (0.105) 7.52 (0.146)
LNCULT 1.86 (4.159)** 1.55 (2.560)*
YEAR80 8.43 (0.191) -9.88 (0.130)
YEAR81 0.23 (0.287) -1.11 (1.142)
YEAR82 0.24 (0.310) -0.84 (0.925)
YEAR83 0.19 (0.288) -0.63 (0.833)
t -26.82188 -14.28185
LR (x*„) 134.2989 105.1243
Correct Prediction 93 + 41 = 134 119 + 21 = 140
No. of Observations 148 146
A  lik e lih o o d  ra tio  te s t o f  h e te ro sced a s tic ity  (c a u se d  by  th e  con tin u ous re g re sso rs )  su g g es ts  th a t th e  a ssu m ption  
o f  h o m o sce d a stic ity  cannot b e  re je c te d  f o r  b o th  A u rep a lle  a n d  K a n za ra . H en ce, w e  p re se n t the o r ig in a l (i.e ., 
u n corrected ) e s tim a tes  on ly.
TABLE 2.2.1". Probit Estimates of the Choice of Contract, 
Corrected for Heteroscedasticity, All Villages
D ep en d en t V a r ia b le  : P L  =  1 i f  the i-lh  fa r m  o ffers re g u la r  co n tra c ts
Variables Coefficients (T-Ratio) 
Using Specification X
Coefficients (T-Ratio) 
Using Specification X’
ONE -286.17 (0.676) -262.95 (0.395)
LNIRR 82.575 (0.646) 34.56 (0.423)
LNSFLHR 8.12 (0.597) -5.26 (0.406)
LNPLOTVA -21.31 (0.398) -42.81 (0.414)
LNFEQVAL 7.35 (0.627) 13.56 (0.412)
OBUL 2.35 (0.116) 4.64 (0.347)
TYPE 4.99 (0.217) *
LNCULT * 15.06 (0.429)
AUREPALLE 191.26 (0.640) 235.79 (0.393)
KANZARA 130.91 (0.598) 189.05 (0.379)
YEAR80 57.35 (0.666) 50.94 (0.420)
YEAR81 -0.03 (0.001) -34.47 (0.394)
YEAR82 -8.90 (0.215) -33.09 (0.379)
YEAR83 0.04 (0.001) 18.84 (0.357)
L N C U L T * 2.10 (2.643)*
L N IR R -0.09 (0.277) -0.59 (1.090)
L N S F L H R 0.09 (0.675) -0.57 (1.826)
L N P L O T V A 1.44 (3.625)** 0.78 (1.298)
L N F E Q V A L 0.26 (2.124)* 0.30 (1.348)
t -114.4186 -91.4430
LR (x1,.) 178.0913 224.0426
Correct Prediction 325+58= 383 326+53= 379
No. of Observations 422 422
V o te  : '* '  d e n o te s  th a t  th e  v a r ia b le  c o n c e r n e d  is  s ig n if ic a n t a t  5 %  w h ile  '* * '  d e n o te s  th a t it is  s ig n if ic a n t a t  1 % .
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Variables causing heteroscedasticity :
Z = (LN IR R , LN SF LH R , L N PL O TV A , LN F E Q V A L )
Z ’ = (L N C U L T , LN IRR , LN SF LH R , L N P L O T V A , LN F E Q V A L )
TABLE 2.2.2. Tobit Estimates of the Demand for Regular Labour-Hours, All Villages
D ep en d en t v a r ia b le  : L N SPLH R  =  N a tu ra l logarith m  o f  th e n u m ber o f  re g u la r  la bou r-h ou rs u sed  on  a  fa rm
Variables Coefficients (T-Ratio) Using 
Specification X’
Marginal Effects (T-Ratio)
ONE -16.26 (4.416)** -1.31 (3.699)**
LNIRR 1.28 (2.076)* 0.10 (1.837)
LNSFLHR -1.06 (2.694)* -0.09 (2.497)*
LNPLOTVA 0.67 (0.534) 0.05 (0.525)
LNFEQVAL 0.77 (2.783)* 0.06 (2.507)*
OBUL -3.64 (2.901)* -0.29 (2.494)*
LNCULT 5.33 (7.461)** 0.43 (5.091)**
AUREPALLE 8.39 (6.069)** 0.68 (4.654)**
KANZARA 3.75 (2.449)* 0.30 (2.278)*
YEAR80 0.27 (0.194) 0.02 (0.194)
YEAR81 -1.21 (0.901) -0.09 (0.899)
YEAR82 -1.28 (0.986) -0.10 (0.981)
YEAR83 -0.45 (0.364) -0.04 (0.363)
o 1 4.63 (10.853)** *
1 -300.1706 ♦
Wald Statistic * 42.8783
No of Observations 422 422
N o te  : d e n o te s  th a t th e va r ia b le  co n cern ed  is  s ign ifican t a t 5 %  w h ile  ’**’ d e n o te s  th a t it is  s ign ifican t a t  1% .
TABLE 2.2.2.a. Tobit Estimates of the Demand for Regular Labours, Aurepalle and Kanzara 
D ep en d en t V a r ia b le :  LN SP L H R  = N a tu ra l logarith m  o f  th e  n u m ber o f  re g u la r  la b o u r-h o u rs u sed  on  a  fa r m
Variable
A u re p a lle  
Tobit Coefficients (T-Ratio) 
Using Specification X’
K a n za ra  
Tobit Coefficients (T-Ratio) 
Using Specification X’
ONE -12.296 (2.597)* -18.96 (0.253)
LNIRR 0.94 (1.312) -0.55 (0.789)
LNSFLHR -1.40 (3.744)** -1.93 (3.342)**
LNPLOTVA 0.72 (0.442) -0.54 (0.317)
LNFEQVAL 0.77 (3.220)** 1.75 (3.284)**
OBUL 4.83 (1.729) 15.58 (0.208)
LNCULT 4.19 (6.227)** 3.74 (5.275)**
YEAR80 11.87 (3.834)** -23.66 (0.234)
YEAR81 0.80 (0.568) -2.88 (1.854)
YEAR82 0.35 (0.253) -2.79 (1.885)
YEAR83 0.83 (0.694) -1.06 (0.900)
o 2 2.77 (8.953)** 2.53 (6.481)**
£ -142.6644 .70.44494
No. of Observations 148 146
A likelihood ratio test of heteroscedasticity (caused by the continuous regressors) suggest that the assumption of 
homoscedasticity cannot be rejected for both Aurepalle and Kanzara. Hence, we present the original estimates 
only.
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TABLE 2.2.2’. Tobit Estimates of Demand for Regular Labours, 
Corrected for Heteroscedasticity, All Villages
D ep en d en t v a r ia b le  : LN SP L H R  = N a tu ra l loga rith m  o f  the n u m ber o f  re g u la r  labou r-h o u rs u sed  on  a  fa rm
Variable Coefficient (T-Ratio) 
Using Specification X’
ONE -14.23 (2.584)*
LNIRR 2.51 (3.185)**
LNSFLHR -0.78 (1.586)
LNPLOTVA -1.10 (0.749)
LNFEQVAL 1.13 (2.196)*
OBUL -3.96 (1.988)*
LNCULT 3.83 (4.108)**
AUREPALLE 8.65 (4.095)**
KANZARA 4.27 (2.208)*
YEAR80 0.82 (0.524)
YEAR81 -1.47 (1.027)
YEAR82 -1.89 (1.307)
YEAR83 -0.51 (0.405)
L N C U L T 0.34 (2.242)*
L N IR R -0.34 (2.249)*
L N S F L H R -0.15 (1.942)*
L N P L O T V A 0.03 (0.129)
L N F E Q V A L -0.03 (0.548)
a 2 6.72 (1.365)
t -294.0393
No. of Observations 422
N o te  : d en o te s th a t th e  va r ia b le  co n cern ed  is s ign ifican t a t  3 %  w h ile  '* * ’ d e n o te s  th a t it is  s ign ifican t a t  1% .
TABLE 2.3.2. Hoarding Costs : Truncated Estimates of the Demand for Regular Labour-Hours by the 
Farms Hiring Regular Labour, All Villages
D ep en d en t v a r ia b le  : L N SP L H R  = N a tu ra l lo garith m  o f  to ta l re g u la r  labou r-h o u rs u sed  on  a  fa rm
Variable OLS Estimate Truncated Regression Estimates
ONE 2.88 (1.753) 2.88 (1.918)*
LNIRR 0.27 (1.787) 0.27 (1.955)*
LNSFLHR -0.45 (3.761)** -0.45 (4.114)**
LNPLOTVA -0.15 (0.362) -0.15 (0.0398)
LNFEQVAL 0.09 (1.198) 0.09 (1.310)
OBUL 0.12 (0.122) 0.12 (0.134)
LNCULT 1.81 (9.335)** 1.81 (10.198)**
AUREPALLE 0.73 (1.453) 0.73 (1.590)
KANZARA -0.09 (0.146) -0.09 (0.161)
YEAR80 0.76 (0.720) 0.76 (0.787)
YEAR81 -0.11 (0.273) -0.11 (0.299)
YEAR82 -0.47 (1.317) -0.47 (1.441)
YEAR83 0.20 (0.604) 0.20 (0.660)
a 2 * 0.82 (12.561)**
L -96.1849 -96.18234
No. of Observations 79 79
N o te  : d en o tes th a t th e  v a r ia b le  co n cern ed  is  s ign ifican t a t 5 %  w h ile  ’**’ d e n o te s  th a t it is  sign ifican t a t  1% .
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TABLE 2.3.2’. Hoarding Costs : Truncated Estimates of the Demand for Regular Labour-Hours by the 
Farms Hiring O n ly  O n e  Regular Labour, All Villages
D ep en d en t v a r ia b le  : LN SP L H R  =  N a tu ra l lo g a r  ithm  o f  to ta l re g u la r  la b o u r-h o u rs u sed  on  a  fa rm
Variable OLS Estimate Truncated Regression 
Estimates
ONE 1.18 (0.394) 1.16 (0.479)
LNIRR 0.12 (0.364) 0.12 (0.444)
LNSFLHR -0.39 (1.328) -0.39 (1.642)
LNPLOTVA 0.10 (0.136) 0.09 (0.160)
LNFEQVAL 0.13 (1.009) 0.13 (1.243)
OBUL 0.50 (0.406) 0.50 (0.503)
LNCULT 2.00 (5.954)** 2.01 (7.298)**
AUREPALLE -0.73 (0.372) -0.73 (0.459)
KANZARA -0.30 (0.278) -0.31 (0.348)
YEAR80 2.68 (1.824) 2.69 (2.243)*
YEAR81 -0.48 (0.620) -0.48 (0.764)
YEAR82 -1.37 (1.786) -1.36 (2.199)*
YEAR83 -0.09 (0.372) -0.09 (0.163)
a 2 * 0.89 (8.680)*
t 4c -49.5315
No. of Observations 38 38
N o te  : d e n o te s  th a t th e  v a r ia b le  c o n c e r n e d  is  s ig n if ic a n t a t  5 %  w h i le  ’* * ’ d e n o te s  th a t it  is  s ig n if ic a n t a t  1 % .
TABLE 3.3. Joint Determination of the Choice of Contract and Demand for Regular Labour-Hours : 
Estimates of Double-Hurdle Model, All Villages
Variables Double-Hurdle Model Tobit Model
Coefficient (T-Ratio) Coefficient (T-Ratio)
F ir s t  H u rd le  : T Y P E * *
ONE -1.316 (1.851)* 4c
LNCULT 0.51 (3.446)** 4c
LNIRR 0.55 (3.307)** 4c
LNSFLHR -0.32 (2.951)* 4c
LNFEQVAL 0.22 (3.357)** 4c
No. of Observations 422
S e c o n d  H u rd le  : L N S P L H R 4c 4c
ONE -1.30 (0.7286) -16.26 (4.416)**
LNIRR 0.27 (1.588) 1.28 (2.076)*
LNSFLHR -0.46 (3.340)** -1.06 (2.694)*
LNPLOTVA -0.15 (0.3125) 0.67 (0.534)
LNFEQVAL 0.18 (2.157)* 0.77 (2.783)*
OBUL 3.28 (3.118)** -3.64 (2.901)*
LNCULT 2.28 (10.73)** 5.33 (7.461)**
AUREPALLE 0.94 (1.686) 8.39 (6.069)*
KANZARA -0.20 (0.2918) 3.75 (2.449)*
YEAR80 4.12 (3.654)** 0.27 (0.194)
YEAR81 -0.28 (0.6407) -1.21 (0.901)
YEAR82 -0.66 (1.665) -1.28 (0.986)
YEAR83 0.18 (0.4863) -0.45 (0.364)
o 2 0.873 (11.68)** 4.63 (10.853)**
No. of Observations 244 422
t -159.148465 [1] -227.574453 [1]
N o te  : [ 1 ]  C a lcu la tio n  o f  th e  like lih o o d  fu n c tio n  d o e s  n o t include th e  p a r t  o f  th e  fu n c tio n  w h ich  is  con stan t. 
N e e d le s s  to  m en tion , th is  d o e s  n o t e ffec t th e m a x im isa tion  ex ercise . ’*’ d e n o te s  th a t th e  v a r ia b le  co n cern ed  is  
sign ifica n t a t 5 %  w h ile  ’**' d en o tes  th a t it i s  s ign ifican t a t 1% .
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TABLE 4.1. Conditional Probabilities of Hiring Labour for Different Types of Tasks, All Farms
Type of 
Tasks Village
Conditional Probability of Hiring
R eg u la r la bou r  
o n ly
C a su a l la b o u r on ly B o th  ca su a l a n d  re g u la r  labou r
’a’ Aurepalle 0.16 0.33 0.15
Shirapur 0.02 0.66 0.02
Kanzara 0 0.77 0.15
’b' Aurepalle 0.05 0.41 0.26
Shirapur 0.02 0.89 0.02
Kanzara 0 0.84 0.14
V Aurepalle 0 0.51 0.31
Shirapur 0 0.95 0.03
Kanzara 0 0.76 0.16
TABLE 4.2.1. Conditional Probabilities of Hiring Labour for M o n ito ra b le  and N o n -M o n ito ra b le  Tasks, 
Large Farms
Nature of Tasks
Village Conditional Probability of Hiring
R eg u la r  
la b o u r on ly
C a su a l labou r on ly B o th  ca su a l an d  re g u la r  
la b o u r
N o n -M o n ito ra b le Aurepalle 0.27 0.20 0.23
Shirapur 0.01 0.58 0.01
Kanzara 0 0.68 0.24
M o n ito ra b le Aurepalle 0 0.46 0.49
Shirapur 0 0.97 0.03
Kanzara 0 0.74 0.25
N o te  : T hese  p ro b a b ilit ie s  a re  ca lcu la ted  on  the b a s is  o f  labou r u se try la rg e  fa r m s  on ly.
TABLE 4.2.1’. Average Use of Casual-Labour and Regular-Labour Hours in M o n ito r a b le  and N o n -  
M o n ito ra b le  Tasks, Large Farms
Nature of Tasks Village
Average Use
I f  fa rm  h ires  
re g u la r  labou r-  
hou rs on ly
I f  fa rm  uses  
ca su a l labou r-  
h o u rs on ly
I f  fa rm  h ires b o th  re g u la r-la b o u r  
& ca su a l- la b o u r h ou rs
Regular Casual
N o n -M o n ito ra b le Aurepalle 0.66 0.37 0.45 0.34
Shirapur 0.68 0.39 0.59 0.10
Kanzara 0.00 0.55 0.30 0.46
M o n ito ra b le Aurepalle 0.00 0.46 0.19 0.58
Shirapur 0.00 0.53 0.15 0.38
Kanzara 0.00 0.49 0.14 0.72
Vote : T hese p r o b a b ilit ie s  a re  ca lcu la ted  on  th e  b a s is  o f  labou r use b y  la rg e  fa r m s  on ly.
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TABLE 4.2.1". Average Use of Casual-Labour and Regular-Labour Hours a m o n g  F a r m s  H ir in g  R e g u la r  
L a b o u r
Nature of Task Village
Average Use of
R eg u la r L a b o u r-H o u rs C a su a l L a b o u r-H o u r
Aurepalle 0.56 0.16
N o n -M o n ito ra b le Shirapur 0.64 0.02
Kanzara 0.30 0.46
Aurepalle 0.19 0.58
M o n ito ra b le Shirapur 0.15 0.38
Kanzara 0.14 0.72
TABLE : 4.2.2. Conditional Probabilities of Labour Hiring : P a d d y  and C o tto n  Production
Crop
Nature of Tasks Conditional Probability of Hiring
R e g u la r la bou r  
on ly
C a su a l labou r  
on ly
B o th
re g u la r  & ca su a l la bou r
Paddy N on -M o n ito ra b le 0.16 0.20 0.60
M o n ito ra b le 0.00 0.20 0.80
Cotton N on -M o n ito ra b le 0.00 0.67 0.24
M o n ito ra b le 0.00 0.73 0.24
TABLE 4.2.2’. Average Use of Casual-Labour and Regular-Labour Hours : P a d d y  and C o tto n  Production
Crop Nature of Tasks
Average Use
I f  fa r m  h ires  
re g u la r  labou r-  
h o u rs on ly
I f  fa r m  h ires  
c a su a l labou r-  
h o u rs on ly
I f  fa rm  h ires bo th  re g u la r  an d  
c a su a l labou r-h ou rs
Regular Casual
Paddy N o n -M o n ito ra b le 0.86 0.16 0.57 0.25
M o n ito ra b le 0.00 0.70 0.16 0.72
Cotton N o n -M o n ito ra b le 0.00 0.44 0.28 0.49
M o n ito ra b le 0.00 0.49 0.14 0.73
TABLE 4.3.1. Types of Tasks and Types of Contracts : Some Chi-Square Test Statistics, All Crops
Test Aurepalle Shirapur Kanzara All
Statistics
Pearson(%2x)/77 0.029 (0.00)/27 0.001 (0.00) 0.026 (0.029) 0.057 (0.023)
Likelihood Ratio (x \)  [ 1 ] 0.029 (0.00) 0.001(0.00) 0.026 (0.29) 0.057 (0.023)
N o te  : [ I  J T he su b scr ip t d en o te s  th e d e g re e  o f  f re e d o m  o f  th e  ch i-sq u a re  tes t s ta tis tic .
[ 2 ]  N u m b ers in p a re n th e se s  d en o te  th e  re leva n t ch i-sq u a re  w h en  o n ly  la rg e  fa rm s  a r e  co n sid ered .
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TABLE 4.3.1’. Types of Tasks and Types of Contracts : Chi-Square Statistics in Paddy and Cotton 
Production
Test Statistics Paddy Cotton
Pearson (%2X) [ 1 ]  
Likelihood Ratio (% \) [ 1 ]
9.10 (5.56) [ 2 ]  
12.19 (7.49)
4.74 (1.91) 
5.30 (2.04)
Note : [ 1 ]  T he su b scrip t d en o te s  the d e g re e  o f  f re e d o m  o f  th e  ch i-sq u a re  test s ta tis tic .
[ 2 ]  T he n u m bers in p a re n th eses  d en o te  th e re leva n t ch i-squ are  w h e n  o n ly  la rg e  fa rm s  a re  co n sid e red .
TABLE 4.3.2. Task Characteristics and the Demand for Regular Labour-Hours : T o b it  E s tim a te s , 
Aurepalle, Kanzara and All Villages
D ep en d en t V aria b le  : L N SPLH R  = N a tu ra l lo g a rith m  o f  to ta l re g u la r  la b o u r-h o u rs u sed  o n  a  fa rm
Variables Aurepalle Kanzara All Villages
ONE -7.57 (4.226)** -27.79 (4.771)** -20.82 (10.088)**
LNCULT 3.41 (6.547)** 3.52 (3.510)** 4.44 (9.342)**
LNIRR 2.09 (4.009)** 3.29 (3.334)** 1.98 (4.447)**
LNSFLHR -0.18 (0.649) 1.59 (2.000)* -0.11 (0.492)
TASK -1.32 (0.782) 2.88 (1.422) -0.79 (0.709)
AUREPALLE 4e * 9.98 (9.828)**
KANZARA 4e 4c 4.70 (4.380)**
a 2 4.00 (11.846)** 4.35 (8.456)** 4.67 (14.852)**
Log-Likelihood -340.2242 -158.8655 -575.6110
No. of Observations 294 292 842
N o te  : d en o te s th a t th e  va r ia b le  co n cern ed  is sign ifican t a t  5 %  w h ile  '* * ’ d en o tes  th a t it is  s ign ifican t a t  1% .
TABLE 4.3.2.a. Task Characteristics and the Demand for Regular Labour-Hours : T o b it  E s tim a te s , 
Paddy and Cotton Production
D ep en d en t V ariab le  : L N SPLH R =  N a tu ra l lo g a rith m  o f  to ta l re g u la r  la b o u r-h o u rs u sed  o n  a  fa r m
Variables Paddy Cotton
ONE -9.05 (3.524)** -21.467 (3.180)**
LNCULT 3.47 (6.041)** 3.67 (2.309)*
LNIRR 2.78 (5.251)** 5.47 (3.811)**
LNSFLHR -0.08 (0.352) 0.38 (0.767)
TASK -0.16 (0.232) 0.16 (0.103)
o 2 2.21 (8.142)** 4.09 (6.031)**
Log-Likelihood -100.2168 -73.69089
No. of Observations 66 156
N o te  : d en o te s th a t th e  v a r ia b le  co n cern ed  is sign ifican t a t 5% w h ile  ’**' d en o tes  th a t it is  s ign ifican t a t 1% .
A  like lih o o d  ra tio  tes t o f  h e te ro sced a s tic ity  (c a u se d  b y  th e  con tin u ous re g re sso rs ) su g g es ts  th a t th e  assu m ption  
o f  h o m o sce d a stic ity  cannot b e  re jec ted .
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TABLE 4.3.2.b. Task Characteristics and the Demand for Regular Labour-Hours : T o b it E s tim a te s  
Aurepalle, Kanzara and All Villages, Corrected for Heteroscedasticity
D ep en d en t V a ria b le  : LN SPLH R  =  N a tu ra l lo g a rith m  o f  to ta l r e g u la r  la b o u r-h o u rs u sed  on  a  fa r m
Variables Aurepalle Kanzara All Villages
ONE -11.23 (5.158)** -26.85 (2.504)* -22.79 (6.308)**
LNCULT 3.97 (7.336)** 3.13 (1.831) 4.08 (4.990)**
LNIRR 2.46 (6.530)** 3.21 (1.976)* 3.15 (5.241)**
LNSFLHR -0.009 (0.047) 1.68 (1.602) -0.002 (0.008)
TASK 0.008 (0.006) 2.94 (1.227) -0.22 (0.242)
AUREPALLE * * 10.41 (6.166)**
KANZARA * * 5.75 (4.430)**
L N C U L T -0.30 (2.076)* 0.13 (0.383) 0.06 (0.913)
L N IR R -0.63 (4.723)** -0.04 (0.167) -0.41 (4.414)**
L N S F L H R 0.02 (0.955) -0.02 (0.153) 0.005 (0.205)
o 2 9.45 (2.695)* 3.27 (0.810) 5.33 (5.342)**
Log-Likelihood -306.9012 -158.6372 -560.2511
No. of Observations 294 292 842
N o te  : d en o tes  th a t th e  va r ia b le  co n cern ed  is sign ifican t a t 5 %  w h ile  '**' d en o tes  th a t it is  s ign ifican t a t 1% .
TABLE 4.3.2’. Task Characteristics and the Demand for Regular Labour-Hours : T ru n c a te d  R e g ress io n  
Estimates, Aurepalle, Kanzara and All Villages
D ep en d en t V aria b le  : L N SPLH R  =  N a tu ra l lo g a rith m  o f  to ta l re g u la r  labou r-h o u rs u sed  o n  a  fa r m
Variables Aurepalle Kanzara All Villages
ONE 2.45 (4.660)** -1.57 (0.806) 1.38 (2.544)*
LNCULT 1.04 (8.472)** 1.74 (5.152)** 1.19 (9.892)**
LNIRR 0.26 (2.127)* 0.64 (2.157)* 0.22 (1.996)*
LNSFLHR 0.02 (0.313) 0.09 (0.326) -0.03 (0.454)
TASK -0.17 (0.316) -0.41 (0.550) -0.46 (1.480)
AUREPALLE * * 1.03 (3.229)**
KANZARA * * 0.60 (1.650)
a 2 0.73 (13.702)** 0.91 (9.487)** 0.84 (17.420)**
Log-Likelihood -104.3845 -59.66200 -186.0989
No. of Observations 94 45 149
N o te  : d en o te s th a t th e  va r ia b le  co n cern ed  is sign ifican t a t 5% w h ile  ’* * ’ d en o tes th a t it is  sign ifican t a t 1% .
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TABLE 4.3.2’.a. Task Characteristics and the Demand for Regular Labour-Hours : T ru n c a te d  R e g re ss io n  
Estimates, Paddy and Cotton Production
D ep en d en t V aria b le  : L N SPLH R  =  N a tu ra l lo g a rith m  o f  to ta l re g u la r  la b o u r-h o u rs u sed  o n  a  fa rm
Variables Paddy Cotton
ONE
LNCULT
LNIRR
LNSFLHR
TASK
o 2
Log-Likelihood 
No. of Observations
2.04 (2.604)* 
1.21 (7.453)** 
0.63 (3.701)** 
-0.05 (0.988) 
0.16 (0.801) 
0.55 (8.832)** 
-31.71086 
39
3.88 (1.577) 
2.60 (4.653)** 
1.35 (2.443)* 
-0.20 (1.038) 
-0.79 (1.585) 
1.04 (6.631)** 
-32.27792 
22
N o te  : d en o te s  th a t th e  v a r ia b le  co n cern ed  is s ign ifican t a t 5% w h ile  ’**' d en o tes  th a t it is  s ign ifican t a t 1% .
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CHAPTER 6. CASUAL AND REGULAR CONTRACTS : 
DETERMINANTS OF THE WORKERS’ CHOICE OF LABOUR
CONTRACTS
Introduction
Most models of the choice of contract in rural labour markets in India (Bardhan, 
1983, 1984a; Eswaran & Kotwal, 1985a; Guha, 1989; Dasgupta, 1993a) emphasize the role 
of demand. However, in the light of our interviews in Aurepalle, two models, namely the 
Collateral Model and the Time Constraint Model, were developed in chapter 2 formalising 
the possible role of supply considerations in the choice of contracts in rural India. One of the 
hypotheses emanating from the analysis is H6  (see the introductory chapter), which states that 
regular labour contracts are likely to be particularly attractive for landless labourers.
Given the seasonal nature of the agricultural employment, credit plays a central role 
in smoothing out production and consumption. Land is the most acceptable form of collateral; 
hence, the availability of credit, especially for consumption purposes, is limited for landless 
poor. Regular farm contracts with access to advance payment (i.e., credit) thus acts as a 
convenient instrument to meet the needs of both labourers and employers. Labourers obtain 
scarce credit while the employers monitor labourers with greater ease1. Ihis is a case where 
credit market imperfection is interlocked with contractual arrangements in the labour market. 
Secondly, the choice of regular contracts by landless labourers is compatible with their time 
constraint, in contrast with landed labourers who are usually constrained to devote a good 
deal of time to family farming. Hence, a landless labourer’s choice of a regular contract is 
advantageous not only in view of the higher marginal cost of credit he faces in the market, 
but also in view of the lower opportunity cost of time.
In view of hypothesis H6 , this chapter focuses on the workers’ choice of contract and 
the nature of their market participatioa It has been found in chapter three that the households 
with larger and better-quality land also own more non-land resources so that the ownership 
of landholding is some indication of the ownership of other productive resources held by the 
household. In view of this relationship, the analysis of the workers’ choice of contract in this
*Ray and Sengupta (1989) have argued that an interlocker faces better terms of trade as with the case of 
regular labour contracts. Besides earning interest on the amount lent, a regular employer can ensure the requisite 
effort level with minimum supervision while a moneylender is only satisfied with earning interest
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chapter, hinges heavily on the family landholding which reflects both the time and credit 
constraints on the potential workers in the market2.
This chapter is developed as follows. Section 6.1 describes the data-set while section 
6 .2  examines the association between family landholding and the worker’s choice of contract 
in the study villages. Section 6.3 and 6.4 focus on the nature of participation in the casual 
labour market; section 6.3 analyses the factors determining farm and non-farm employment 
while section 6.4 discusses those determining the duration of unemployment among male and 
female casual labourers. The chapter ends with a brief summary of our findings.
6.1. Description of Regression Variables
The empirical analysis, in this chapter, is primarily based on the data collected by 
the International Crop Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT) from three 
study villages, Aurepalle, Shirapur and Kanzara (see chapter three). However, for the purpose 
of investigating hypothesis H6 , ICRISAT data are found to be lopsided. Firstly, the data on 
labour use by the sample farms (VLS-Y) do not include information regarding the 
characteristics of labourers3. Hence, we consider the labour market participation data given 
in the VLS-K schedule where each observation indicates the details of the individual’s actual 
employment situation. However, here too there is a problem; day-to-day market participation 
data refers to casual labourers only. Regular farm labourers are excluded from here because 
they are bound to work every day during the stipulated period of the contract, except when 
they are sick. Information about the regular farm servants are obtained from the VLS-C 
schedule which includes their personal characteristics like age, sex, education as well as the 
employment details like the period of contract, hours worked a day, wages in cash and kind, 
etc.; their family background is, however, left out Hence, in order to study the worker’s 
choice of contract, I shall make use of my resurvey data collected from Aurepalle in January 
1992. However, we shall use the ICRISAT data-set to examine the 
employment/unemployment situation prevailing in the casual labour market In this section,
2In view of the seasonality of production and employment, family landholding determines the amount of time 
available to be sold in the market and thus determines the choice of contract in these household economies. 
Secondly, given the collateral requirement to obtain credit from the market, family landholding determines the 
creditworthiness of the labourers. Finally, family often offers support during a spell of unemployment; labourers 
from the landless households cannot, therefore, fall back upon the family.
3For a description of the VLS-Y schedule, see chapter three. The schedule has information only about the type 
of labour (human or animal, family, regular or casual, male, female or child.
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we describe the regression variables obtained from the ICRISAT data-set as well as those 
obtained from the resurvey data-set.
6.1.1. ICRISAT Data
First, the variables constructed from the original ICRISAT data are considered. 
Information are gathered primarily from three schedules, namely, VLS-C, VLS-K and VLS- 
Yl. Personal characteristics of casual labourers are found in the VLS-C schedule which is 
adjusted to consider each member once each year. If there is a change of status (e.g., if the 
member left the household or re-entered) after the rabi (second) season, s/he is not included.
With this adjustment, the following family characteristics are defined for male and 
female labourers residing in the study villages over each agricultural year during the period 
1980-84.
TYPE = 1 if i-th labourer belongs to medium/large farms in the ICRISAT classification 
(VLS-C/VLS-K schedule)
= 0 if the i-th labourer belongs to labour households/small farms in the ICRISAT 
classification
AGGCULT = family landholding in acres (VLS-Y1 schedule)
LNCULT = natural logarithm of family landholding
NFNG = 1 if the i-th labourer participates in both non-farm and governmental work 
= 0  otherwise
CASTE 1 = 1 if the i-th labourer belongs to caste group 1 
= 0 otherwise (VLS-C schedule)
CASTE2 = 1 if the i-th labourer belongs to caste group 2 
= 0 otherwise (VLS-C schedule)
CASTE3 = 1 if the i-th labourer belongs to caste group 3 
= 0 otherwise (VLS-C schedule)
CASTE4 = 1 if the i-th labourer belongs to caste group 4 
= 0 otherwise (VLS-C schedule).
Besides the family characteristics, a number of variables relating to the personal
characteristics have also been constructed from the VLS-C schedule as follows.
AGE = Age of the i-th labourer in years 
LNAGE = Natural logarithm of AGE 
SQAGE = Square of AGE 
LNSQAGE = Natural logarithm of SQAGE 
ILLI = 1 if the i-th labourer is illiterate 
= 0  otherwise
Finally, the following participation variables are constructed from VLS-K schedule.
FDAY = Number of days worked by the i-th labourer on others’ farms in a year 
LNFDAY = Natural logarithm of FDAY
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FWNFW = 1 if the i-th labourer performs both farm and non-farm employment in a year 
= 0  otherwise
UNEMP = Monthly duration of unemployment of the i-th labourer 
LNUNEMP = Natural logarithm of UNEMP.
6.1.2. Resurvey Data
The resurvey data used here is collected from one of the study villages, namely,
Aurepalle during January 1992. All the regular farm servants in Aurepalle are male. Hence,
a sample of 26 male regular labourers and 85 male casual labourers hired by the sample
households in Aurepalle is chosen; the choice of sample itself eliminates the sex bias
operating in the market.
On the basis of our information, the following variables have been constructed.
AGE = Age of the i-th labourer in years 
LNAGE = Natural logarithm of AGE 
SQAGE = Square of AGE in years 
LNSQAGE = Natural logarithm of SQAGE 
ILLI = 1 if the i-th labourer is illiterate 
= 0  otherwise4
TYPE = 1 if the i-th labourer comes from a medium or large landholding household
= 0  if the i-th labourer comes from a labour household or a small farmers’ family 
FLHOLD = amount of family landholding of the i-th labourer in acres 
LNFLHOLD = natural logarithm of family landholding 
IRRORN = 1 if the family land of the i-th labourer is irrigated 
= 0  otherwise
MALAGA = 1 if the i-th labourer comes from Mala or Madiga household 
= 0  otherwise
GOWDA = 1 if the i-th labourer comes from Gowda household 
= 0  otherwise
KURMA = 1 if the i-th labourer comes from Kurma household 
= 0  otherwise
OTHERS = 1 if the i-th labourer comes from other caste groups in the village 
= 0  otherwise
CASTE4 = 1 if the i-th labourer comes from a household with caste ranking four.
= 0  otherwise5
FATHRFS = 1 if the father of the i-th labourer is/was a regular farm servant (RFS)
= 0  otherwise.
4In our sample, most of the labourers are found to be illiterate. Hence, we did not consider the level of
educational achievement of these labourers. We thus divide them in two categories only, literate and illiterate.
*We classify different castes according to the variable JGRCAST (see chapter three).
6.2. Determinants of Workers’ Choice of Contract
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A majority of regular farm servants in Aurepalle as noted in my resurvey data6 came 
from families with marginal/no landholdings7. All the regular farm servants in the sample 
owned land less than or equal to 5 acres and in every case the land owned was dry. Figure 
1 depicts the cumulative distribution of family landholdings of casual and regular labourers 
in Aurepalle where we plot the workers’ family landholdings (in acres) on the horizontal 
axis. A majority of individuals with less than or equal to 5 acres of family landholding 
choose regular jobs, while all the workers owning more than 5 acres of land choose casual 
contracts.
The market for regular farm servants in Aurepalle is a strongly caste-bound system 
where most regular labourers come from the Madiga caste. In our sample, 73% of the regular 
farm servants belong to the Madiga caste and 11.5% to Mala; the rest are Gowda (the toddy 
tappers) (see table 2). However, traditionally Mala and Madiga are the two castes who 
dominate the market for regular farm servants. The Gowdas in the sample joined the regular 
farm servants’ job because they had incurred losses in their traditional business of selling 
toddy and needed some access to credit8. However, castes like Kurma, Gowda, Mala and 
Madiga are found to dominate the casual labour market (see table 2’)9. This may reflect the 
fact that caste is a major controlling factor in the male’s access to the regular labour market 
in Aurepalle10.
The employment of the father as a regular farm servant may also have an important 
influence in the son taking a farm-servant’s job. In our sample, respondents were asked about 
the occupation of their father and other family members. In about 65% of the cases, the 
father of a regular farm servant is found to be a regular farm servant as well, at least for 
some years, if not throughout their lifetime. In some cases, the son is found to be working 
with the same employer as his father. This long-standing relationship with the employer may
6One of the reasons for conducting this resurvey of Aurepalle was as follows: ICRISAT data does not include 
information about the family landholding of regular labourers. This was collected during my resurvey.
7The distribution of land is highly unequal in all the study villages. The average operational landholding is 
3.53 ha (2.4 acres = 1 ha) in Aurepalle; however, the average size of landholding of the largest farm size category 
is 7 times higher than the average size of landholding, in general. In Kanzara, more than one-third of the 
households operate hardly 8% of the area while 6% of the households operate 33% of the total area. The same 
picture holds for Shirapur where 50% of the cultivating households operate 17% of the total area.
traditionally Gowdas participate in the casual labour market
9A11 these castes, namely, Mala, Madiga, Gowda, Kurma belong to JGR caste ranking four (see discussion 
in chapter three; also see Doherty, 1982).
10However, caste factor is not so important in the other two study villages (Walker and Ryan, 1990).
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sometimes entail certain extra-economic obligations (Rudra, 1982a). For example, other 
members of the regular farm servant’s family (e.g., wife or children) may also work for the 
employer’s family, though they are not bound to do that. However, in the study villages they 
are usually found to receive some payments in cash or kind in exchange for these unofficial 
labour services11,12.
Some chi-square test statistics13 of independence are computed to examine the 
association between the contract variable PL and the family landholding FLHOLD. Values 
of these statistics are shown in table 2". The computed values of the chi-square test statistics 
(Pearson’s as well as likelihood ratio), are all significant which supports that there is a 
significant association between the choice of contract (PL) and family landholding of the 
workers (FLHOLD). Moreover, the Pearson’s correlation coefficient between contract 
variable PL and family landholding is negatively significant suggesting that individuals from 
landless families choose regular contracts.
In the absence of any obligation to cultivate family landholding, these landless 
labourers are usually in a position to offer all their non-leisure time in the market Moreover, 
in their inability to offer land as collateral, they are usually excluded from the formal credit 
market which offers cheaper credit as compared to informal agencies. Hence, regular 
contracts with interest-free credit availability may be an attractive choice for these labourers, 
especially the landless ones.
Using the resurvey data from Aurepalle, this section examines the following 
hypothesis: the higher the family landholding of labourers, the lower is the likelihood of 
choosing a regular farm contract. The analysis is developed as follows. A probit model of 
contractual choice is described in section 6.2.1. The model is specified in section 6.2.2 while 
it is estimated in section 6.2.3. Finally, in view of the probit estimates, section 6.2.4 
examines the relationship between family landholding and the choice of contract. The section
uIt appears that the employer-employee relationship in the regular contract is quite impersonal and is different
from the cases of bonded labour as in a feudal society (Bardhan, 1984a; also see chapter seven of the 
dissertation).
,2Usually only one member of the family works as the regular farm servant, while others participate in casual 
employment in farm or non-farm work. Other male members of regular labourer’s family are found to be engaged 
in different sorts of activities. A majority of them go in for some farm/non-farm casual employment Sometimes, 
the son/brother of the regular farm servant is found to be a tenant or another farm servant (if so, usually with a 
different employer to secure another source of credit). Women members usually go in for casual farm work in 
transplanting or weeding or harvesting while the younger children in some farm servants’ households go to the 
primary school. The regular contract with the employer ensures access to credit, taken for different purposes (like 
family consumption or purchasing land/bullocks or for medical expenses in the family).
13For a description of these test-statistics, see appendix two.
is concluded with a brief summary of findings.
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6.2.1. A  Probit Model
Analysis of the resurvey data suggests that family landholding plays a significant role
in the workers’ choice of contracts. Using a probit regression model, we shall in this section
examine the factors determining the workers’ choice of contracts. The probit equation
identifies the factors that determines whether an individual chooses a regular job as against
a casual one. Corresponding to these different factors, the predicted probability of choosing
a regular contract can also be calculated.
Let there be n potential workers in the market Given other things14, suppose an
individual i, (i = 1, 2,.., n) is free to choose from two alternative contracts available in the
market, namely, casual and regular farm contracts.
Let denote the choice of contract as follows :
yj = 1 if the i-th labourer chooses a regular contract 
= 0  otherwise.
Suppose y{ is explained by a vector of explanatory variables x such that the following 
regression framework holds good :
y, =  P '  * ,  +  (X )
where ut ~ N(0 , 1)
The resulting model is a probit model; the parameters of the model (p) are estimated by 
maximising the following log-likelihood function:
L  = £  [y, ln4>(P'x) + (1 -  y )  ln(l -  1>(P'r))] (2)
i ■ 1
where the subscript i refers to the number of observations. <X>(.) being the cumulative normal 
distribution function. Since the dependent variable is a dummy, the regression coefficients 
in a probit model do not reflect the marginal changes. Hence, as in chapter five, we 
determine the marginal effects of the regression variables in the probit model as follows:
14The principal focus of this chapter is on the individual’s preference pattern for a particular type of contract 
(supply of labour). In doing so, we assume that employers are indifferent about the identity of the labourers.
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Probit : “ 2. = <D(p'x) * p (3)
6.2.2. Model Specification
The analysis is based on the information collected from a group of male casual and 
regular farm servants in Aurepalle during January 1992. There are 111 observations 
altogether; of these, 26 are regular labourers and 85 are casual labourers.
The dependent variable in the probit equation is PL which is defined as follows :
PL = 1 if the i-th labourer is found to be a regular one 
= 0  otherwise.
Both personal and family characteristics are assumed to determine the choice of 
contracts. The variable of primary importance is the family landholding of the workers. As 
portrayed in the ’Collateral Model’ as well as the ’Time Constraint Model’, family wealth 
(total value of land and non-land resources held by the workers’ family) reflects the time and 
credit constraints faced by the workers. However, as already shown in chapter three, there
is a strong correlation between the ownership of land and non-land resources in these
villages; hence, family landholding is a good index of the ownership of the productive non­
land resources held by the family.
As suggested in the introduction to section 6.2, the caste factor may play an 
important role in the choice of contract; hence a caste variable MALAGA is included which 
is equal to one if the individual concerned belongs to the caste Mala or Madiga.
Besides family characteristics, some personal variables like age and literacy are also 
included in the regression. Upto a certain extent, age may enhance experience, though 
afterwards it may be an index of inability of the worker concerned. Literacy, however, may 
have a disincentive effect on the workers’ choice of contract; more educated workers may 
dislike to work as farm servants for the employer without much independence.
Thus the set of explanatory variables used in the regression is as follows :
X = (ONE , LNAGE , LNSQAGE , ILU  , LNFLHOLD , MALAGA) <4)
The definitions of these variables are as given in section one of the chapter. The continuous 
variables, namely, age, square of age and family landholding are taken in logarithmic terms. 
The mean and standard deviation of the explanatory variables are shown in table 2.2.
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6.2.3. Probit Estimates
The parameter estimates of the probit model are presented in table 2.3. T-ratios are 
given in parentheses; marginal effects are shown in the third column of the table15.
The value of the log-likelihood function is -31.1068 while the value of the likelihood 
ratio (chi-square) statistic is 58.63 which is significant; this establishes the joint significance 
of the model. There are 92 (=77+16) correct predictions. All these statistics support the 
goodness of fit of the estimated model.
Secondly, we test the normality of the probit model; to this end, we compute a 
second likelihood ratio test (see Appendix 3). The likelihood ratio (chi-square) statistic is 
0.68. The non-significance of the likelihood ratio statistic leads to the acceptance of the null 
hypothesis that the random term is normally distributed.
The central hypothesis H6  relates to the significance of the landholding variable 
LNFLHOLD in the choice of regular contracts. The coefficient of family landholding is 
significantly negative; this means, the larger the size of the family landholding, the lower is 
the likelihood that the individual concerned chooses a regular contract Given the initial 
distribution of land, family landholding not only determines the level of family wealth, but 
also the time and credit constraints. A landless labourer is expected to be more risk-averse 
than a landed one. Secondly, the opportunity cost of time is lower for a landless labourer. 
Finally, given a lower daily wage for the regular farm jobs, landless labourers in the study 
villages have a comparative advantage in the regular contracts if the credit constraint in the 
market is effective; this is the case in Aurepalle (see chapter four). In other words, 
individuals from the landless/marginal farmers’ family are more likely to choose a regular 
labour contract.
The caste factor is also found to be important to explain the workers’ choice of 
regular contracts. The caste dummy MALAGA is positive and statistically significant in our 
specification. According to JGRCAST (see chapter three), both Mala and Madiga households 
in Aurepalle belong to the lowest caste category, namely, caste ranking four. The significance 
of caste factor, therefore, shows that given landholding of labourers, there is a greater 
likelihood of the members of Mala and Madiga households to participate in regular contracts. 
As already analysed in chapter three, these households hold less land compared to the higher 
caste households in the village and do not have many alternative opportunities of 
supplementing earnings. In other words, in the absence of better alternative employment
15We have also estimated a probit model corrected for the presence of heteroscedasticity in the continuous 
variables; however, a comparison of the log-likelihood functions (likelihood ratio test) suggests that we should 
accept the original (uncorrected) probit estimates. That is why we present the original estimates only.
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opportunities to supplement agricultural earnings, the lowest caste households in the study 
villages may find it attractive to choose regular contracts which offer employment and credit 
insurance.
Next, the estimates of the variables relating to the personal characteristics of an 
individual, namely, LNAGE, LNSQAGE and ILLI are considered. The coefficient of LNAGE 
is significantly positive while that of LNSQAGE is significantly negative. Hence, it is likely 
for the older individuals to work in the regular labour market. However, the likelihood 
increases less than proportionately with age (since the coefficient of LNSQAGE is negative). 
The estimate, therefore, suggests that experience is important in a regular farm job.
The literacy dummy ILLI is significantly positive; hence, it is less likely for an 
educated member to choose a regular job. Education has a disincentive effect on the 
participation rates in the regular labour market Educated labourers are found to be reluctant 
to participate in regular jobs which does not offer much freedom of work. An educated 
labourer has better opportunities to supplement agricultural-labour earnings with alternative 
employment, and these opportunities have to be renounced in the event where one takes up 
regular wage labour.
6.2.4. Family Landholding and Choice of Contract
There is a close association between the distribution of land and non-land resources 
in the study villages; the larger farms not only own more land and non-land resources, they 
also belong to the higher caste category in the village hierarchy. This is reflected in the 
workers’ choice of contract Risk-averse landless labourers tend to choose regular contracts 
while landed labourers participate in casual contracts.
Using the probit likelihood estimates, we calculate the predicted probability of an 
illiterate worker (ELLI=1) who belongs to Mala or Madiga (MALAGA=1) caste according 
to the distribution of family landholding (LNFLHOLD)25, at its mean, median, mode, 
minimum and maximum values.
1<sNote that the corresponding distribution of actual family landholding (FLHOLD) are as follows : 
Mean = 9.384, Median = 5.000, Mode = 2.00, M inim um  = 0.00, M axim um  = 40 acres.
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Prob (PL-1) -  ®(b’x)
Pj = 0.6973 when LNFLHOLD is at its mean = 1.612 acres17 
P2 = 0.6981 when LNFLHOLD is at its median value = 1.609 acres 
P3 = 0.89 when LNFLHOLD is at its modal value = 0.693 acres 
P4 -  0.9889 when LNFLHOLD is at its minimum = -0.693 acres 
P5 = 0.1359 when LNFLHOLD is at its maximum = 3.709 acres
The analysis suggests that family landholding plays a significant role in the 
occupational choice of individual participants in the rural household economies; the higher 
the value of the landholding, the lower is the likelihood of choosing a regular contract In 
particular, for individuals with the value of landholding at its minimum, the probability of 
choosing a regular contract P4 is the highest (almost close to 1) while the probability P5 is 
the minimum (0.14) for those with the highest amount of landholding in the distribution (see 
figure 2). It follows, therefore, that other things remaining unchanged, if the distribution of 
land is improved, there will be a lower incidence of regular contracts.
6.2.5. An Overview
The primary implications of the Time Constraint Model and the Collateral Model 
(See chapter two) can be supported by the statistical significance of the workers’ family 
landholding. The fact that the opportunity cost of pre-committing one’s time is higher for 
landed persons induces them not to choose regular contracts. On the other hand, the 
opportunity cost of time is lower for landless labourers. Moreover, they face a higher 
marginal cost of credit because they cannot use land as a collateral. Both these factors imply 
that it is more likely for landless labourers to choose regular contracts in Aurepalle. Probit 
estimates indicate that the higher the family landholding, the lower is the likelihood of 
choosing a regular contract which is also reflected in the predicted probabilities that P4 »
P5.
In addition to family landholding, the caste factor plays a significant role in the 
choice of contract; individuals from Mala or Madiga households are more likely to choose 
regular contracts in Aurepalle which suggests that, in the absence of better alternative 
opportunities, these low-caste labourers are more likely to precommit themselves in regular 
contracts.
17However, the probability that an individual who does not belong to a Mala or Madiga household chooses 
a regular contract is found to be 0.17 (values of other variables being fixed at their respective means); hence, the 
probability of choosing a regular contract by an individual who does not belong to Mala or Madiga households 
is much lower than that (0.69) of one who belongs to Mala or Madiga households.
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Among the personal characteristics, age has a positive impact on the probability of 
choosing a regular contract which suggests the requirement of experience in regular contracts. 
In contrast, education or formal schooling has a definite disincentive effect on the choice of 
regular contracts, implying the significance of better employment opportunities for educated 
labourers.
In other words, in addition to supporting the prediction of ’Collateral’ and ’Time 
Constraint’ Models, our analysis reveals the significant role of alternative employment 
opportunities in the choice of contract.
6.3. Determinants of Casual Labour Participation
Regular farm servants are supposed to work everyday for the employer during the 
contract period except when they are sick. However, participation in the casual labour market 
gives workers the freedom of combining farm/non-farm/govemment jobs for different 
employers during the course of the year, if such opportunities arise. Hence, an analysis of 
day-to-day participation behaviour loses its significance for regular farm servants. This 
section, therefore, devotes attention to the labour participation behaviour of casual labourers.
6.3.1. Participation Characteristics
An individual who is participating in a casual farm job at some time of the year is 
free to participate in other farm/non-farm jobs or may work in some on-going government 
project at another time of the year or may also work on his/her own farm. However, 
compared to regular jobs, casual jobs have neither the security of employment nor the credit 
facilities to be obtained from the employer.
Unlike the regular farm servants’ market, the casual labour market in the study 
villages is divided between male and female labourers. Using five-years’ (1980-84) ICRISAT 
data, we have compared the casual-labour participation characteristics of male and female 
casual labourers in section 4.4 of chapter four. Two measures, namely, the probability of 
farm labour force participation (POL) and the probability of casual farm labour participation 
rate (POM) are used, the difference between the two being the number of days worked on 
the individual’s own farm (which is included in POL, but not in POM).
Here, we look back at section 4.4 of chapter four. Since landless labourers do not
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have the option of working on own farm, POL and POM are equal for them. The difference 
between POL and POM is, however, significantly positive for landed labourers reflecting the 
fact that landed labourers may frequently be required to work on their own plots. Secondly, 
the probability of casual labour participation is higher for landless labourers, reflecting a 
relatively lower opportunity cost of their time. Both these observations suggest, compared 
to the landless labourers, opportunity cost of precommitting one’s time is higher for landed 
labourers.
6.3.2. A Tobit Model
In this section, a regression analysis is performed to determine the factors explaining 
male and female casual labourers’ participation in farm work in the study villages.
The dependent variable of regression is LNFDAY which is the natural logarithm of 
the number of days worked on others’ farms. The variable is a measure of the involvement 
of casual labourers in casual agricultural wage labour. The variable takes a value zero for a 
number of individuals in the sample. Hence, the best way of estimating the variable is to 
follow a tobit maximum likelihood method which is already described in chapter five.
Recalling from chapter five, suppose that the tobit regression equation is given as 
follows :
Yit = (Vx + e.f if rhs > 0
= 0  otherwise (5)
where eit ~ N(0 , a 2)
As before, following Maddala (1983), the tobit likelihood function can be written as follows.
iogL=$Sog(i - s\) + E  iog-4- " E t?  - $'x)2
o 1 v  2no3'  1 20
where Oj is the cumulative normal distribution function. We maximise the likelihood function 
to obtain the parameters p, a 2.
If, however, heteroscedasticity is present, the maximum likelihood estimates of the 
parameters will be inconsistent Hence, one needs to correct for heteroscedasticity. In this 
respect, following Petersen and Waldman (1981), a multiplicative heteroscedasticity is 
assumed as follows:
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g ] = exp (a!z) W
where is a subset of x causing heteroscedasticity. Replacing a  with g { in the log-likelihood 
function and including a 2 in the summation adjusts for the presence of heteroscedasticity. 
Maximising the modified log-likelihood function yields values of all the parameters, namely, 
p, a 2 as well as oc.
6.3.3. Model Specification
Members of the sample households who are at or above the age of 6  years, residing 
in the village, and participating in farm/non-farm jobs are identified as casual labourers. The 
analysis is performed in two stages. First, we pool the three study villages together. Next, we 
estimate village-specific equations.
The dependent variable of interest is the natural logarithm of the number of days 
worked on others’ farms in a given year (LNFDAY). The mean and standard deviation (given 
in parentheses) of the dependent variable are as follows :
Labourers Aurepalle Shirapur Kanzara All Villages
Male
Female
3.48 (1.29) 
4.32 (0.93)
1.32 (1.29) 
1.35 (1.11)
3.61 (1.35) 
3.90 (1.33)
3.44 (1.19) 
3.95 (1.19)
Farm participation in the market is assumed to be determined by the workers’ 
personal and family characteristics as well as the availability of the job.
In addition to personal-characteristic variables like LNAGE, LNSQAGE, ILLI, a few 
variables reflecting family characteristics have also been included. These include the size of 
family landholding (LNCULT) and caste dummy CASTE4 which refers to the households 
belonging to the lowest caste category in the respective villages. Finally, we include an 
intercept term in each regression equation.
Given the significance of family characteristics in the workers’ choice of contracts 
(section 2 ), we are interested in examining the role of family characteristics, namely, 
LNCULT and caste dummy CASTE4 in the determination of farm participation. Given the 
more binding nature of the time constraint, it is expected that individuals from families with
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larger landholdings and higher caste ranking will participate less in the market.
In the casual labour market (when all villages are pooled together) about 6 6 % of 
female labourers and 56% of male labourers come from small farms or labour households; 
hence, a larger proportion of female labourers belong to poorer households. A majority of 
female labourers (75.2%) come from the lower caste groups three and four while the 
distribution of male casual labourers among these four caste groups is more even. These are 
24.7%, 27.4%, 22.2% and 25.7% respectively.
To the extent that the availability of the job is important, two village dummies 
AUREPALLE and KANZARA are included in the model where all villages are pooled 
together18. In addition, four year dummies, namely, YEAR80, YEAR81, YEAR82, YEAR83 
take account of the yearly variation of farm participation among male and female casual 
labourers.
The mean and standard deviation of the explanatory variables over this five year 
period (1980-84) are shown in tables 3.3 and 3.3.a.
6.3.4. Tobit Estimates
Tobit maximum likelihood estimates are presented for both male and female casual 
labourers as shown in tables 3.4, 3.4.a and 3.4.b respectively. T-ratios are given in 
parentheses.
Table 3.4 gives the tobit estimates corrected for heteroscedasticity when we pool the 
study villages together. LNAGE, LNSQAGE and LNCULT are the three continuous variables 
used in the regression. Assuming a multiplicative heteroscedastic structure, the likelihood 
function is modified for the presence of heteroscedasticity in these continuous variables.
A likelihood ratio (LR) statistic is computed to compare the models presented in 
tables 3.4 and 3.4’. The statistic which tests for the assumption of homoscedasticity is 
constructed as follows:
Female : LR = 2(-824.5727 + 829.9836) = 10.8218 (8)
Male : LR = 2(-7962469 + 798.9846) = 5.4754
The LR statistic follows a chi-square distribution with a degree of freedom equal to 3 which 
is the number of restrictions in the original tobit model. Critical values of chi-square (with
18These village dum m ies are naturally dropped when we consider these study villages individually.
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degree of freedom equal to 3) are 7.815 and 11.345 at 5% and 1% levels of significance 
respectively. The LR statistic is, therefore, significant for female labourers at the 5% level 
of significance, thereby rejecting the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity. However, it is not 
so for male casual labourers. Hence, we obtain the following estimates for male and female 
casual labourers.
Male : 3.96* + -2.49 LNAGE + 1.26 LNSQAGE -  0.08 ILLI -  0.33 LNCULT*
-  0.27 CASTE4 +0.15 AUREPALLE + 0.28 KANZARA * -  0.41 YEAR80 *
-  0.27 YEAR81 -  0.03 YEAR82 -0.06 YEAR83
Female : 4.19 * + (17.89 -  10.75) LNAGE -  (9.02-5.41) LNSQAGE + 0.16 ILLI
-  (0.17 -  0.09) LNCULT * -  0.25 CASTE4 * + 0.59 AUREPALLE * + 0.34 KANZARA
-  0.23 YEAR80 -  0.04 YEAR81 -  0.10 YEAR82 + 0.003 YEAR83 (9)
where indicates that the variable concerned is significant
The coefficient of the family landholding (LNCULT) is significantly negative. This 
means that male and female members from families with larger landholding participate less 
in the casual farm work because the opportunity cost of time is higher for them. In other 
words, there is a greater farm participation by the individual with marginal/no landholding.
Secondly, female members belonging to the lowest caste category CASTE4 participate more 
in casual farm employment. This, too, implies that in the absence of many alternative 
opportunities individuals belonging to the lowest caste category have lower opportunity cost 
of time and they therefore, participate more in farm employment. To some extent, the 
difference can be explained by the social taboo prevailing in these villages. It is not 
customary for a higher caste woman belonging to a family with larger landholding to work 
on others’ fields, even if she may need to work for survival.
Interestingly enough, male participation behaviour is different from female ones with 
respect to caste ranking. Male participation is less (significant at 10% level) if the individual 
concerned belongs to the lowest caste category CASTE4. Male casual labourers primarily 
come from small and medium farmers owning some land. Thus, a greater male farm 
participation comes from the members of households with some landholding (also see table 
2 .1’).
However, personal characteristics are not important. Neither age (LNAGE, 
LNSQAGE), nor the literacy variable ILLI are significant to explain number of days worked 
on others’ farms (for male and female labourers).
To some extent, village and year dummies reflect the demand for casual farm labour.
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Female labourers in Aurepalle participate significantly more in farm employment as 
compared to those in Shirapur or Kanzara. Among the year dummies, YEAR80 is found to 
be negatively significant for both male and female participation.
Given the significance of village dummies in male and female regression functions, 
next we consider casual labour participation at the individual village level (tables 3.4.a and
3.4.b)19. This enables us to examine, as to what extent, the nature of casual labour 
participation in the individual villages differs from the aggregate picture. A comparison 
between Aurepalle, Shirapur and Kanzara shows the degree of contrast between these 
villages. Undoubtedly, caste is the major controlling factor to determine male and female 
participation in Aurepalle. Predominantly, number of days worked on others’ farms is higher 
for women from the lowest caste category while it is not so for male labourers. In Kanzara, 
however, family landholding is the crucial factor determining both male and female 
participation while caste dummy CASTE4 is significant (and negative) for male participation, 
though insignificant for female participation. In Shirapur, on the other hand, caste is not 
significant for both male and female participation. The most important factor determining 
casual labour participation in Shirapur is family landholding; both male and female labourers 
from families with larger landholding participate less in farm jobs.
To conclude, personal characteristics do not play any significant role in determining 
casual labour participation in any of these study villages. Family landholding is the most 
important determinant in all the study villages. In Aurepalle, however, caste factor, too, 
definitely plays a significant role while it is not so pronounced in Shirapur or Kanzara. 
Considering all the villages pooled together, caste factor is found to be significant; it is 
observed that female labourers belonging to the lowest caste and male labourers belonging 
relatively higher caste participate more in others’ farm.
6.3.5. Significance of Non-Farm Jobs
In the casual labour market, there is a pronounced distinction between farm and non­
farm jobs. Some casual labourers participate in both farm and non-farm work (including 
governmental work) while others are involved in farm work only. In this respect, an inter­
village variation is also noted. As already discussed in section 4.5.1 of chapter four that the 
average number of days worked on non-farm work is higher in Shirapur and Kanzara as
19Note that we accept the uncorrected estimates for male and female labourers in individual study villages. 
This means, as before (see chapter live), the problem of heteroscedasticity is eliminated, if we control for village 
chracteristics.
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compared to that in Aurepalle. In this context, we would like to examine, to what extent, the 
availability of non-farm work affects the level of farm participation in these villages.
In doing so, we repeat the same exercise as done in section 6.3.4. The difference is 
that we now add a dummy variable NFNG into the tobit model which takes a value 1 if the 
individual concerned participates in non-farm work (including governmental work). Results 
obtained are shown in tables 3.5, 3.5.a20 and 3.5’. In this respect, too, a distinct division 
between male and female participation is found. Farm participation is significantly higher for 
male labourers with access to non-farm jobs in Aurepalle, Kanzara as well as all the villages 
taken together. This means that, for male casual labourers, farm and non-farm jobs tend to 
be complements rather than substitutes. However, the dummy variable NFNG is not 
significant for female labourers in any villages nor for all the villages taken together. This 
is perhaps explained by the fact that in most cases female labourers are excluded from the 
non-farm job opportunities so that the non-farm job dummy loses significance for them.
6.3.6. An Overview
Personal characteristics as opposed to family characteristics do not play any 
significant role to determine casual labour participation in the study villages. Family 
landholding and caste are the two most significant variables of participation. However, so far 
as the caste factor is concerned, there is an intervillage variation. Compared to the 
Maharashtra villages, relative significance of caste factor is predominant in Aurepalle. For 
the pooled sample, however, caste factor behaves differently for male and female labourers. 
Female labourers from the lowest caste category participate more in others’ farms; however, 
male labourers from relatively higher castes do so. Secondly, we examine the role of non­
farm jobs to determine casual labour participation in the study villages. In this respect, it is 
found that farm and non-farm jobs are complements for male labourers in the study villages. 
Female labourers are largely excluded from the access to non-farm jobs so that their 
participation does not significantly depend on non-farm jobs.
^ o t e  that we do not present the estimates of Shirapur because the dummy variable NFNG is not significant 
in the determination of farm participation for male or female labourers.
6.4. Determinants of the Incidence of Involuntary Unemployment
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Persistence of unemployment throughout the year is an important characteristic of the 
casual labour market in the study villages. The phenomenon of inter-seasonal adjustments in 
agricultural employment can partly be attributed to the seasonal nature of agricultural 
production. The level of farm employment declines in the slack period of production, thus, 
raising the level of involuntary unemployment. In this section, we consider monthly duration 
of unemployment21 to examine the factors determining the incidence of involuntary 
unemployment among male and female casual labourers in the study villages in different 
seasons.
This section is developed as follows. In section 6.4.1, we describe the features of 
monthly duration of unemployment in the study villages before we perform a regression 
analysis to account for the factors determining male and female unemployment in section
6.4.3. The section is concluded with a brief overview of our findings.
6.4.1 Monthly Duration of Unemployment
In the VLS-K schedule, each individual is interviewed at a regular (monthly) interval. 
The details of unemployment days are obtained from the following question: how many days 
since the last interview was s/he unemployed in the sense described in chapter earlier22. Let 
us call this variable UNEMP in a particular month. The variable UNEMP is calculated for 
each month of the year 1980 (the choice of the particular year is arbitrary) for male and 
female casual labourers in the study villages. On the basis of this information, the distribution 
as well as the factors determining UNEMP is analysed.
According to the observed duration of unemployment, male and female casual 
labourers in the sample are divided into four groups : unemployment with duration (i) zero 
(no-unemployment), (ii) between 1 to five days (short duration); (iii) between six and ten 
days (medium duration), (iv) more than ten days (long duration) a month. For each group, 
the sample probability (as the relative frequency) is calculated as follows for the slack and
21We consider monthly duration of involuntary unemployment to be a measure of unemployment in the study 
villages and for the rest of this section we use these terms ’duration’ and ’incidence’ of unemployment 
interchangeably.
“As explained in chapter four, involuntary unemployment occurs when a person seeks employment, but fails 
to get one at the usual rate.
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peak period23, for the landed and landless labourers as well as for all the labourers. Suppose 
fjj is the number of labourers in the j-th category (e.g. slack, peak, landed, landless etc.) with 
duration of unemployment in the ith range (where ’i’=l,2,3,4 according to the labourer, in 
question, has duration (i), (ii), (iii) and (iv) respectively) so that fj=Zj fjj is the total number 
of labourers belonging to the j-th category. Therefore, the probability that a labourer 
belonging to the j-th category has unemployment duration of i-th range is Py = fj/fj. In other 
words, each probability is the proportion of unemployed labourers who are found to have the 
duration of unemployment in the said range. These probabilities have been shown in table
4.1 and 4.1’ for all villages pooled together as well as for individual villages respectively.
First we consider the probability o f *no-unemployment’ (i.e., when UNEMP=0).
(i) The probability is clearly lower in the slack period than that in the peak period.
(ii) Landless females have a lower probability of ’no-unemployment’ than landed 
females; probability of zero-unemployment is, however, equal for landed and landless male 
labourers.
(iii) Next we consider intervillage variation. Considering all farms, the probability 
is higher in Shirapur and Kanzara than that in Aurepalle.
Secondly, we consider the short, medium and long duration unemployment.
(iv) First we examine the seasonality of the incidence of unemployment; duration of 
unemployment varies across slack and peak periods of agricultural production. The seasonal 
pattern of employment is largely determined by the seasonality of the main crops in these 
villages. Probability of unemployment of any duration is almost unchanged for male and 
female labourers in the slack period. In the peak period, however, long duration 
unemployment declines for both male and female labourers.
(v) We compare the probability of unemployment (of different duration) between 
landed and landless labourers to account for the effect of family landholding. Probability of 
long duration unemployment is less among landless male and female labourers.
(vi) Finally, we consider inter-village variation of the incidence of unemployment. 
Probability of a long duration unemployment (>10 days) is the lowest in Aurepalle and the
23The peak period is the period of buoyant agricultural activities in the village. This is particularly related to 
certain tasks like transplanting and weeding, on the one hand, and harvesting and post-harvesting tasks, on the 
other. However, the concepts of peak period and slack period also vary from one village to the other. This 
depends on the nature of the major crops produced in a village. Because of the erratic rainfall pattern in the 
summer, rabi is the main crop in Shirapur and the labour demand goes up in the months of February and March. 
However, kharif is the main crop in Aurepalle and Kanzara. Accordingly, in these villages the proportion of 
labour demand is found to be relatively higher during transplanting and weeding (July, August), on the one hand, 
and harvesting (October, November and December) of the kharif crops, on the other. On this basis, we have 
generated the dummy variable PEAKPD or its complement SLACKPD.
205
highest in Shirapur while probability of short and medium duration unemployment is the 
highest in Aurepalle.
6.4.2. A Tobit Model
Preliminary observations from the study villages discussed in sections 6.4.1 suggest 
that among other things, the duration of unemployment varies among male and female 
labourers with family landholding as well as with the season of the year (peak/slack periods 
of agricultural production). Accordingly, we, in this section, develop a regression analysis 
as follows.
Suppose the dependent variable (Yit) is the natural logarithm of the days unemployed 
in each month t, t = 1, 2,..., 12 for each of the sample individuals. The dependent variable 
LNUNEMP is a variable that assumes zero or positive values. Hence, applying ordinary least 
squares technique entails inconsistent estimators. We, instead, apply tobit maximum 
likelihood estimation technique24.
As in chapter five, assuming a multiplicative heteroscedastic structure, the model is 
also corrected for heteroscedasticity caused by the continuous explanatory variables.
6.4.3. Model Specification
In this section, a tobit model is specified to determine the variation of the monthly 
duration of unemployment (LNUNEMP). Mean values of the dependent variable along with 
the standard deviation (in the parentheses) are as follows for individual villages.
Labourers Aurepalle Shirapur Kanzara All Villages
Male
Female
1.19 (0.82) 
1.35 (0.82)
1.31 (1.29) 
1.61 (1.31)
1.21 (1.09) 
1.41 (0.11)
1.23 (1.08) 
1.42 (1.04)
Given other things, the prevalence of involuntary unemployment in the casual labour 
market depends primarily on two factors : (a) the arrival of the job offer and (b) the 
individual’s decision to accept/reject the offer depending on his/her reservation wage. While
24The econometric technique developed to analyse the duration of unemployment is commonly known as 
duration analysis (see Keifer, 1985). This is a technique to deal with search type unemployment in a dynamic 
framework. We, however, are concerned with involuntary unemployment in subsistence agriculture. Moreover, 
an application of the duration analysis requires a highly specialized data-set that observes a pool of individuals 
over a period of time stating the change of their employment status at every point of time. The data-set, at our 
disposal, however, do not indicate the change of employment status of sample labourers. Hence, we abstain from 
using this technique.
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the former accounts for the demand for labour25, the latter determines the supply of labour.
The agricultural labour market is seasonal in nature. For the production of a 
particular crop, labour demand goes up for certain operations like sowing/transplanting and 
harvesting (monitorable tasks). These are the operations that absorb predominantly casual 
labour and that take place at certain points in the production cycle. A farm may produce 
different crops over the production year (this usually starts in April and ends the following 
March); sometimes a farm produces two to three crops at the same time on different plots 
or even on the same plot (giving rise to intercropping) and, depending on the technique of 
production26, decides the amount of labour to be hired. Hence, the arrival of a job offer is 
time-contingent in an agricultural labour market. To this end, we incorporate the period 
dummy PEAKPD.
Once a job offer arrives27, the individual concerned decides whether to accept/reject 
the offer. Suppose, we consider an (involuntarily) unemployed person. Given a job offer, the 
decision to accept or reject the job is determined by a comparison of offered and reservation 
wages28. If the offered wage is greater than or equal to the reservation wage, the job will 
be accepted. The reservation wage of an individual, among other things, depends on the 
alternative opportunities available which, in turn, depends on the family support (see our 
discussion in chapter two). This is because the welfare of an unemployed person is more 
closely related to the time s/he spends without a job than to the mere fact of being 
unemployed29. Hence, the question of survival during a spell of unemployment assumes 
importance. Usually, the reservation wage is an increasing function of the level of family 
support; however, the reservation wage may decline as the length of the spell of
“Bardhan (1984a) has shown that, contrary to the popular theories of determination of wages (subsistence 
theory or nutrition-based efficiency wage theory), wages and employment in the agricultural labour market are 
responsive to demand and productivity conditions.
“ Some crops are more labour-intensive than others. Even for a given labour-intensity, production of some 
crops require more of regular labour than others.
“ it is a common practice that in the evenings, employers, regular farm servants or their wives search for 
labourers to be hired the following day. In Sholapur district, employers look for more efficient and reliable 
workers first, and are willing to offer a premium for them. Workers who have to approach prospective employers, 
generally accept discounted wages. Usually caste is not a significant factor in this screening procedure.
“Employees are usually willing to work for almost all employers and they regularly change their employer 
during the course of the year as they find jobs. It is not unusual for a single labourer to work with more than 
twenty employers in a year’s time.
“This is noteworthy. In the literature (for an overview, see Dreze & Mukheqee, 1987), an emphasis has been 
laid on the unemployment figures, i.e., how many of the labourers are unemployed in different years. However, 
the latter is not very relevant in the analysis of poverty of the agricultural labourers. More relevant is the duration 
of unemployment and how an agricultural labourer can survive that particular spell.
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unemployment increases. The latter happens because a longer spell has a direct disutility of 
its own, or because the individual anticipates the effects of being stigmatised or because 
some of the personal attributes (like family support) may be negatively related to the length 
of time spent out of work.
In these household economies, the family is the basic social unit and the primary 
means of survival during any spell of unemployment. For example, if the husband does not 
have any job for a few days, he can still survive on his son and/or wife’s earnings (when 
either or both of them also earn in the casual labour market). If the female member of a 
labourer’s family30 does not get work for some days, crop income from the family farm 
might yield adequate support There may be other sources of family income as well. For 
example, a shepherd’s family earns from animal husbandry or a weaver’s family from 
weaving or a toddy-tapper’s family from selling toddy in the market These jobs are often 
caste-related. Even if labour income fails at times (particularly in the slack agricultural 
seasons), the family as a unit continues to survive from other sources of income. Hence, 
family landholding and caste are included to determine the duration of unemployment.
In addition to family characteristics, some personal characteristics like age and 
education variables may also affect each worker’s reservation wage. To this end, we include 
age and literacy variables.
Estimation is done in two stages. First, we consider all the villages pooled together 
and then we use village-specific regressions. For each individual, the following explanatory 
variables have been included: natural logarithm of age in years (LNAGE), natural logarithm 
of square of age (LNSQAGE), education dummy (ILLI), natural logarithm of the size of 
family landholding (LNCULT), peak period dummy (PEAKPD), caste dummy (CASTE4) 
and the intercept term (ONE). When we consider all the villages together, we include two 
village dummies, namely, AUREPALLE and KANZARA31. The mean and standard 
deviation (given in parentheses) of the explanatory variables for male and female labourers 
are given in tables 4.3 and 4.3.a.
6.4.4. Tobit Estimates
Using monthly data on the duration of unemployment for the year 1980, a tobit
U sually, the female members of a farmer’s family participate in casual employment while the husband 
and/or son work on the family farm.
MThese village dummies are naturally dropped when we consider individual villages.
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regression function explaining the natural logarithm of UNEMP (LNUNEMP) is estimated 
for male and female labourers in the study villages. Two sets of estimates, one for all villages 
and the other for individual villages are given in tables 4 .4 ,4.4.a and 4.4.b. The t-ratios are 
given in parentheses.
Assuming that the continuous regressors LNAGE, LNSQAGE and LNCULT cause 
heteroscedasticity, tobit estimates for all villages taken together are corrected for 
heteroscedasticity (table 4.4’). In order to test the assumption of homoscedasticity, a 
likelihood ratio (LR) statistic is computed as follows :
Male : LR = 2(-255.2313 + 256.7490) = 3.0354 (10)
Female : LR = 2(-423.0782 + 425.8909) = 5.6254
which follows a chi-square distribution with a degree of freedom equal to 3. Comparing these 
values with the critical values of chi-square at 5% and 1% levels of significance, it can be 
concluded that the assumption of homoscedasticity cannot be rejected for both male and 
female labourers and, hence, we accept the original tobit estimates as follows :
Male : 1.75 * + 0.31 LNAGE -  0.11 LNSQAGE + 0.10 ILU  + 0.11 LNCULT *
-  0.02 CASTE4 -  0.02 PEAKPD * -  0.62 AUREPALLE * -  0.25 KANZARA * 
Female : 2.65 * + 1.13) LNAGE -  0.58 LNSQAGE -  0.14 ILU  + 0.06 LNCULT * 
(11) -  0.03 CASTE4 -  0.22 PEAKPD* -  0.70 AUREPALLE * -  0.35 KANZARA *
where indicates that the relevant variable is significant.
As in farm participation, personal characteristics like age or literacy are not 
significant in the determination of the duration of unemployment for both male and female 
casual labourers.
The coefficient of the family landholding LNCULT is positive for both male and 
female labourers. This means that the duration of unemployment is higher for individuals 
belonging to households with larger landholdings. As discussed in the beginning of this 
section, the days worked on the individual’s own farm are not included in the number of 
days involuntarily unemployed. The duration of involuntary unemployment refers to that 
period when an individual looks for jobs, but is unable to obtain one at the going wage
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rate32. It may imply one of the following or both :
(a) Individuals from families with larger landholdings look for the kind of jobs not 
easily available (e.g., because they have a high reservation wage) so that the duration of 
unemployment that they experience is higher.
(b) Employers may not like those who come to the labour market occasionally at 
their discretion; instead they may prefer those labourers who are in the market throughout 
the year.
The caste dummy is not significant for both male and female labourers.
Next, we consider the significance of the dummy variables. The period dummy 
PEAKPD is significantly negative for both male and female labourers. This implies that the 
duration of unemployment among male and female casual labourers is significantly less in 
the peak period when there is a buoyant demand for all kinds of labour. The village dummies 
are also significant which, to some extent, justifies the role of village-specific demand in 
generating rural employment/unemployment Male and female labourers in Kanzara 
experience a significantly lower duration of unemployment compared to Aurepalle or 
Shirapur.
However, the statistical significance of village dummies may also reflect the 
difference in the nature of unemployment prevailing in these individual villages33. Hence, 
at the second stage, we consider these villages individually to examine if it throws some light 
on our understanding. A comparison among the study villages (tables 4.4.a and 4.4.b) shows 
that male and female unemployment in Aurepalle declines during the peak period though 
family landholding is not significant for either group in Aurepalle. In Shirapur and Kanzara, 
however, family landholding is significant to explain female unemployment such that the 
female members of a large farmer’s family have a longer duration of unemployment On the 
other hand, the duration of unemployment among male members does not depend on family 
landholding, but on the period dummy PEAKPD such that duration declines in Aurepalle and 
Shirapur during the peak period
Both family landholding (LNCULT) and the seasonal dummy (PEAKPD) are 
significant for male and female labourers in the aggregate sample. However, a disaggregation 
at the village level enables us to specify the nature of male and female unemployment in the
32Given the definition of involuntary unemployment in the data set, the explanation for ’search’ type of 
unemployment in which the offered wage is less than the reservation wage does not hold good here.
33Note that we accept the uncorrected estimates for male and female labourers in individual study villages. 
This means, as in farm participation, the problem of heteroscedasticity is eliminated, if we control for village 
chracteristics.
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individual villages.
6.4.5. An Overview
The analysis of unemployment in this section suggests that like casual labour 
participation, the duration of unemployment is dependent on family landholding where 
individuals from larger farms have a longer duration of unemployment. However, unlike 
participation, the significance of family landholding as a determinant of unemployment 
reflects the demand-side responses in the market. This may be related to the lack of the kind 
of jobs that, a landed labourer looks for or to the employer’s reluctance to employ an 
occasional entrant in the market which is very much the case with landed labourers34. A 
disaggregation among the villages shows that unemployment is significantly higher for 
female labourers in Kanzara, but not so in Aurepalle.
Secondly, given the availability of labour, a lack of seasonal and local demand for 
farm and non-farm jobs also plays a crucial role in the determination of unemployment This 
is suggested by the significance of both seasonal (PEAKPD is significant) and village-specific 
dummy (AUREPALLE and KANZARA are significant) variables. The monthly duration of 
unemployment is shorter during the peak periods of agricultural production when there is a 
higher demand for labour. This holds good irrespective of whether we consider pooled 
sample villages or individual sample villages. Unemployment among both male and female 
labourers declines during the peak period.
In other words, unlike casual labour participation, the incidence of casual 
unemployment in the study villages can, to a large extent, be explained by the pattern of 
labour demand.
Conclusion
This chapter began by focusing on the choice between casual and regular farm 
contracts. The analytical and empirical literature on the choice of contract is relatively scanty; 
existing studies (Binswanger and Rosenzweig, 1982; Bardhan, 1984a; Eswaran and Kotwal, 
1985a) emphasize labour demand factors. In this chapter, however, we focus on the
^Landed labourers can work for others’ farms only when they do not have much work left on their own 
farms.
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significance of the supply factors, especially those related to the size of family landholdings, 
reflecting workers’ time and credit constraints. The results obtained from the ICRISAT 
villages suggest that there is significant self-selection in these rural labour markets. 
Predominantly, risk-averse male labourers from the families with smaller landholdings 
participate in regular'farm labour as opposed to casual labour who have a low opportunity 
cost of time and high marginal cost of credit The strength of this supply force cannot be 
ignored. In fact, there is growing evidence in these villages that labourers are increasingly 
reluctant to choose regular contracts while employers complain about the non-availability of 
reliable regular labourers (also see chapter seven).
Secondly, casual labour participation behaviour among male and female casual 
labourers is considered. Interestingly enough, personal characteristics do not play any 
significant role in this respect. However, the significant role of family landholdings cannot 
be ignored. Male and female labourers from the families with smaller landholdings participate 
more on others’ farms because their opportunity cost of time is low. Caste is another 
important factor where the male-female distinction is pronounced. Female labourers 
belonging to the lowest caste category participate more on others’ farms while it is the male 
labourers belonging to relatively higher castes who do the same. Secondly, farm and non­
farm jobs are found to be complements in casual male labour participation; female members, 
however, are excluded from casual non-farm jobs in these villages.
Finally, we determine the incidence of involuntary unemployment among male and 
female casual labourers. Unlike determinants of choice of contract and those of casual labour 
participation, the strength of demand forces seems to be unambiguous in the determination 
of unemployment. The duration of unemployment is higher among landed labourers in the 
study villages. Secondly, unemployment significantly depends on the seasonality of labour 
demand such that its incidence declines in the peak period of agricultural production. Finally, 
unemployment is longer in the less prosperous villages like Shirapur compared to Kanzara. 
All these results reflect the significant role of demand factors in the determination of 
unemployment
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CHAPTER 6 : TABLES
TABLE 2. Family Characteristics of Regular Farm Servants in Aurepalle, 1992
Caste Family Landholding (Acres) FATHRFS
Malaga Gowda Others <, 2 £ 5 > 5 1 0
85 15 0 65.4 34.6 0 65.4 34.6
N o te  : A ll  fre q u e n c ie s  a re  g iv e n  in p e r  cent. ’F A T H R F S’ is  a  du m m y v a r ia b le  w h ich  ta k es  a  va lu e  one i f  th e  
f a th e r  o f  the re g u la r  fa rm  se rv a n t isA vas a  a lso  a  re g u la r  fa r m  servan t, a t  le a s t f o r  so m e  tim e in  h is  life.
TABLE: 2 ’. Family Characteristics of Casual Labourers in Aurepalle, 1992
Caste Family Landholding (Acres)
Malaga Gowda Kurma £ 2 <, 5 > 5
24.7 28.2 10.6 24.7 7.0 68.3
N o te  : A ll  fre q u e n c ie s  a re  g iv e n  in  p e r  cent. A lso  n o te  th a t th e in form ation  re g a rd in g  th e  f a th e r ’s  o ccu p a tio n  w a s  
n o t c o lle c te d  f o r  th e  ca su a l labou rers.
TABLE 2". Family Landholding and Choice of Contract: Chi-Square Test Statistics
Test Statistics Values
Pearson’s Correlation between PL and FLHOLD -0.39 (4.54)[1]
Pearson’s Chi-Square between PL and FLHOLD 
Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square between PL and FLHOLD
67.79 (33)[2] 
75.45 (33)
N o te  : [ 1 ]  T he va lu e  in  p a re n th e se s  in d ica te s  the a ss o c ia te d  'l’-sta tistic . 
[ 2 ]  The va lu e  in  p a re n th e se s  in d ica te s  th e  d e g re e  o f  freed o m .
TABLE 2 2 .  Determinants of Workers’ Choice of Contracts : 
Mean and Standard Deviation of Explanatory Variables
Variable Mean Standard Deviation
LNAGE 3.40 0.56
LNSQAGE 6.80 1.13
ILLI 0.66 0.48
LNFLHOLD 1.61 1.19
MALAGA 0.39 0.49
N o te  : D efin ition  o f  th ese va r ia b le s  a re  g iv e n  in se c tio n  6 .1  o f  the ch ap ter.
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TABLE 2 3 .  Probit Estimates of Workers’ Choice of Regular Contracts
D e p e n d e n t V ariab le  : P L  = 1 i f  th e i-th  in d iv idu a l ch o o se s a  re g u la r  co n tra c t
Variables Coefficient (T-Ratio) Marginal Effects 
(T-Ratio)
ONE -1.24 (0.928) -0.21 (0.946)
LNAGE 116.62 (2.254)* 19.92 (2.070)*
LNSQAGE -58.30 (2.251)* -9.96 (2.067)*
ILLI 1.46 (2.673)* 0.25 (2.297)*
LNFLHOLD -0.77 (3.170)** -0.13 (3.046)**
MALAGA 1.48 (3.107)** 0.25 (2.642)*
t -31.1068 *
LR <X2s) 58.63 *
Correct Prediction 77+16 *
No. o f Observations 111 111
N o te  : d en o tes  th a t the v a r ia b le  c o n cern ed  is  s ig n ifica n t a t  5 %  w h ile  ’* * ’ im p lie s  th a t i t  is  s ig n ifica n t a t  lVo.
TABLE 3 3 .  Determinants of Casual Labour Participation :
Mean and Standard Deviation of the Explanatory Variables, A l l  V illa g es and S h ira p u r
Variables
All Villages 
Mean (Standard Deviation)
Shirapur 
Mean (Standard Deviation)
Male Female Male Female
LNAGE 3.29 (0.57) 3.28 (0.56) 3.42 (0.55) 3.39 (0.50)
LNSQAGE 6.59 (1.13) 6.57 (1.11) 6.85 (1.09) 6.79 (1.01)
LNCULT 1.57 (1.19) 1.19 (0.96) 0.44 (0.49) 0.82 (0.39)
ILLIT 0.10 (0.29) 0.06 (0.23) 1.89 (1.28) 1.16 (1.09)
CASTE4 0.22 (0.42) 0.33 (0.47) 0.12 (0.33) 0.21 (0.41)
AUREPALLE 0.36 (0.48) 0.25 (0.44) * *
KANZARA 0.21 (0.41) 0.20 (0.40) * *
YEAR80 0.21 (0.41) 0.20 (0.40) 0.23 (0.42) 0.21 (0.41)
YEAR81 0.22 (0.42) 0.22 (0.42) 0.24 (0.43) 0.19 (0.39)
YEAR82 0.22 (0.42) 0.21 (0.41) 0.20 (0.40) 0.23 (0.42)
YEAR83 0.19 (0.39) 0.19 (0.41) 0.20 (0.40) 0.18 (0.38)
No. of Obs. 482 540 174 137
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TABLE 3«3’. Determinants of Casual Labour Participation :
Mean and Standard Deviation of the Explanatory Variables, Aurepalle and Kanzara
Variables Aurepalle 
Mean (Standard Deviation)
Kanzara 
Mean (Standard Deviation)
Male Female Male Female
LNAGE 3.05 (0.54) 3.26 (0.52) 3.29 (0.57) 3.24 (0.61)
LNSQAGE 6.11 (1.08) 6.53 (1.04) 6.59 (1.13) 6.48 (1.22)
ILLIT 0.71 (0.46) 0.92 (0.27) 0.44 (0.49) 0.73 (0.45)
LNCULT 1.16 (0.96) 1.16 (0.99) 1.49 (1.16) 1.23 (0.85)
CASTE4 0.44 (0.49) 0.53 (0.50) 0.21 (0.41) 0.23 (0.42)
YEAR80 0.24 (0.43) 0.18 (0.39) 0.18 (0.39) 0.21 (0.41)
YEAR81 0.23 (0.42) 0.23 (0.42) 0.21 (0.41) 0.23 (0.42)
YEAR82 0.29 (0.46) 0.21 (0.41) 0.21 (0.41) 0.21 (0.41)
YEAR83 0.16 (0.36) 0.19 (0.39) 0.20 (0.40) 0.19 (0.39)
No. o f Obs. 97 184 211 219
TABLE 3.4. Tobit Estimates of Casual Labour Participation, A l l  V illa g es
D ep en d en t V ariab le  : L N F D A Y  = N a tu ra l lo g a rith m  o f  the n u m ber o f  d a y s  w o rk e d  o n  o th e r s ’ f a r m s
Variable
Male Female
Coefficient (T-Ratio) Coefficient (T-Ratio)
ONE 3.96 (9.155)** 4.19 (11.773)**
LNAGE -2.49 (0.147) 18.72 (1.372)
LNSQAGE 1.26 (0.148) -9.44 (1.383)
ILLI -0.08 (0.589) 0.19 (1.385)
LNCULT -0.33 (6.336)** -0.21 (4.128)**
CASTE4 -0.27 (1.771) 0.27 (2.390)*
AUREPALLE 0.15 (0.846) 0.67 (5.069)**
KANZARA 0.28 (2.083)* 0.37 (3.019)**
YEAR80 -0.41 (2.078)* -0.19 (1.205)
YEAR81 -0.27 (1.390) -0.0001 (0.001)
YEAR82 -0.03 (0.016) -0.09 (0.580)
YEAR83 -0.06 (0.324) -0.03 (0.159)
o 2 1.27 (30.451)** 1.12 (32.648)*
L -798.9446 -829.9836
No. of Obs. 482 540
N o te  : d en o tes  th a t th e  v a r ia b le  c o n cern ed  is  sig n ifica n t a t  5 %  w h ile  ’* * ’ im p lie s  th a t i t  is  sig n ifica n t a t  1% .
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TABLE 3.4.a. Tobit Estimates of Casual Labour Participation, Aurepalle and Kanzara
D e p e n d e n t V ariab le  : L N F D A Y  = N a tu ra l lo g a rith m  o f  the n u m ber o f  d a y s  w o rk e d  o n  o th e r s ’ fa r m s
Variable
Aurepalle 
Coefficient (T-Ratio)
Kanzara 
Coefficient (T-Ratio)
Male Female Male Female
ONE 6.35 (6.990)** 4.34 (9.527)** 3.16 (5.204)** 4.44 (7.571)*
LNAGE 23.35 (0.638) 3.91 (0.215) 12.25 (0.519) 13.58 (0.563)
LNSQAGE -12.08 (0.659) -1.99 (0.219) -5.91 (0.501) -6.89 (0.572)
ILLI -0.23 (0.765) 0.01 (0.039) 0.06 (0.309) 0.55 (2.402)*
LNCULT 0.07 (0.554) 0.05 (0.807) -0.54 (7.171)** -0.34 (3.293)*
CASTE4 -0.05 (2.191)* 0.66 (5.054)** -0.72 (3.292)** 0.11 (0.505)
YEAR80 -0.11 (0.218) -0.13 (0.634) 0.07 (0.238) 0.12 (0.400)
YEAR81 -0.57 (1.175) -0.13 (0.642) -0.23 (0.890) 0.14 (0.493)
YEAR82 -0.48 (1.038) -0.22 (1.084) 0.09 (0.375) 0.08 (0.257)
YEAR83 -0.14 (0.264) -0.49 (2.397)* -0.06 (0.229) 0.38 (1.253)
o 2 1.20 (13.694)** 0.85 (19.183)** 1.20 (20.228)** 1.29 (20.683)*
L -155.1069 -231.8148 -337.0851 -366.4236
Obs. 97 184 211 219
N o te  : d en o tes  th a t the v a r ia b le  c o n cern ed  is  sig n ifica n t a t  5 %  w h ile  ’* * ’ im p lie s  th a t i t  is  sign ifican t a t  1% .
A lso  n o te  th a t th e lik e lih o o d  ra tio  te s t  o f  h e te ro sced a s tic ity  is  n o t s ign ifican t; hence, w e  p re se n t th e  u n co rrec ted  
to b i t  e s tim a te s  f o r  A u rep a lle  a n d  K an zara .
TABLE 3.4.b. Tobit Estimates of Casual Labour Participation, S h ira p u r
D e p e n d e n t V ariab le  : L N F D A Y  = N a tu ra l lo g a rith m  o f  the n u m ber o f  d a y s  w o rk e d  on  o th e r s ’ f a r m s
Variable
Shirapur 
Coefficient (T-Ratio)
Male Female
ONE 4.00 (5.883)** 6.01 (9.205)**
LNAGE -32.09 (1.157) 56.14 (2.310)*
LNSQAGE 16.06 (1.156) -28.274 (2.324)*
ILLI -0.42 (2.777)* -0.19 (0.779)
LNCULT -0.26 (3.299)** -0.41 (5.189)**
CASTE4 0.12 (0.397) -0.36 (1.693)
YEAR80 -1.15 (3.765)** -0.97 (3.477)**
YEAR81 -0.21 (0.680) -0.26 (0.992)
YEAR82 0.19 (0.614) -0.46 (1.748)
YEAR83 -0.12 (0.389) -0.09 (0.345)
o2 1.15 (18.222)** 0.95 (16.446)**
t -270.4084 -187.5089
No. of Obs. 174 137
N o te  : ’* ’ d e n o te s  th a t th e va r ia b le  co n cern ed  is  sign ifica n t a t  5 %  w h ile  ’* * ’ im p lie s  th a t i t  is  s ig n ifica n t a t  1% . 
A lso  n o te  th a t the lik e lih o o d  ra tio  te s t  o f  h e te ro sced a s tic ity  is  n o t s ign ifican t; hence, w e  p re se n t the u n co rrec ted  
to b i t  e s tim a tes  f o r  Shirapur.
V a ria b les C ausing H e te ro sc e d a s tic ity  : Z  = (L N A G E , L N S Q A G E , L N C U L T )
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TABLE 3 A \  Tobit Estimates of Casual Labour Participation, 
Corrected for Heteroscedasticity, A l l  V illa g es
Variable
Male Female
Coefficient (T-Ratio) Coefficient (T-Ratio)
ONE 3.99 (8.553)** 4.19 (10.328)**
LNAGE -2.52 (0.134) 17.89 (1.067)
LNSQAGE 1.28 (0.136) -9.02 (1.076)
ILLI -0.06 (0.415) 0.16 (1.203)
LNCULT -0.34 (5.956)** -0.17 (2.484)*
CASTE4 -0.31 (2.055)* 0.25 (2.005)*
AUREPALLE 0.17 (0.880) 0.59 (3.940)**
KANZARA 0.24 (1.717) 0.34 (2.565)*
YEAR80 -0.51 (2.563)* -0.23 (1.484)
YEAR81 -0.29 (1.419) -0.04 (0.248)
YEAR82 -0.04 (0.165) -0.10 (0.625)
YEAR83 -0.12 (0.532) 0.003 (0.018)
L N A G E 10.59 (0.991) -10.75 (1.188)
L N S Q A G E -5.31 (0.994) 5.41 (1.195)
L N C U L T -0.06 (2.254)* 0.09 (2.532)*
o 2 1.56 (4.608)** 0.79 (4.190)**
L -796.2469 -824.5727
No. of Obs. 482 540
hlote : d en o tes th a t th e  va r ia b le  c o n cern ed  is  s ig n ifica n t a t  5 %  w h ile  ’* * ’ im p lie s  th a t it  is  sign ifica n t a t  1% .
A lso  n o te  th a t th e lik e lih o o d  ra tio  te s t  o f  h e te ro sced a s tic ity  is  n o t s ig n ifica n t f o r  m a le  labou rers, though  i t  is  f o r  
f e m a le  labou rers.
TABLE 3.5. Significance of Non-Farm Jobs : Tobit Estimates, All Villages
Variables Male
T-Ratio (Coefficient)
Female 
T-Ratio (Coefficient)
ONE 3.58 (8.066)** 4.04 (10.886)**
LNAGE -2.38 (0.142) 17.72 (1.299)
LNSQAGE 1.22 (0.145) -8.93 (1.309)
ILLI -0.10 (0.806) 0.20 (1.393)
LNCULT -0.31 (5.825)** -0.20 (3.988)**
CASTE4 -0.35 (2.253)* 0.24 (2.166)*
NFNG 0.39 (3.187)** 0.17 (1.401)
AUREPALLE 0.35 (1.864) 0.74 (5.246)**
KANZARA 0.38 (2.804)* 0.42 (3.275)**
YEAR80 -0.46 (2.334)* -0.19 (1.173)
YEAR81 -0.27 (1.397) 0.01 (0.069)
YEAR82 -0.02 (0.083) -0.07 (0.468)
YEAR83 -0.02 (0.119) -0.005 (0.032)
o 2 1.26 (30.452)** 1.12 (32.648)**
L -793.9156 -829.0043
No. of Obs. 482 540
N o te  : ’*' d en o tes  th a t th e  v a r ia b le  c o n cern ed  is  sign ifica n t a t  5 %  w h ile  ’* * ’ im p lie s  th a t i t  is  sign ifica n t a t  1% .
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TABLE 3.5.a. Significance of Non-Farm Jobs : Tobit Estimates, Aurepalle and Kanzara
Variables
Aurepalle 
T-Ratio (Coefficient)
Kanzara 
T-Ratio (Coefficient)
Male Female Male Female
ONE 6.57 (7.641)** 4.29 (9.427)** 2.96 (4.831)** 4.53 (7.506)**
LNAGE 26.92 (0.779) 2.31 (0.127) 13.48 (0.576) 13.24 (0.549)
LNSQAGE -13.911 (0.803) -1.19 (0.130) -6.52 (0.557) -6.73 (0.559)
ILLI -0.20 (0.690) 0.002 (0.009) 0.07 (0.319) 0.55 (2.392)*
LNCULT 0.02 (0.150) 0.05 (0.832) -0.48 (6.144)** -0.36 (3.352)**
CASTE4 -0.67 (2.153)* 0.62 (4.666)** -0.72 (3.348)* 0.15 (0.659)
NFNG 1.06 (3.504)** 0.26 (1.246) 0.33 (1.951)* -0.15 (0.639)
YEAR80 -0.21 (0.465) -0.14 (0.666) -0.13 (0.487) 0.12 (0.397)
YEAR81 -0.43 (0.944) -0.12 (0.604) -0.26 (1.006) 0.13 (0.465)
YEAR82 -0.39 (0.904) -0.21 (1.060) 0.04 (0.146) 0.06 (0.205)
YEAR83 -0.05 (0.103) -0.48 (2.350)* -0.04 (0.167) 0.36 (1.188)
a 2 1.14 (13.708)** 0.85 (19.183)** 1.19 (20.227)** 1.29 (20.683)**
L -149.2866 -231.0416 -335.3861 -366.2197
No. of Obs. 97 184 211 219
W e d o  not, h ow ever, p re se n t the e s tim a tes  f o r  S h ira p u r beca u se  the dum m y v a r ia b le  N F N G  is  n o t sign ifican t. A lso  
n o te  th a t the lik e lih o o d  ra tio  te s t  o f  h e te ro sced a s tic ity  is  n o t sign ifican t; hence, w e  p re se n t th e  u n co rrec ted  to b it  
es tim a tes  f o r  in d iv idu a l v illages.
TABLE 4.1. Distribution of Monthly Duration of Unemployment in 1980, All Villages
Sex Sample
Duration of Unemployment (Days)
0 1 <, duration ^ 5 6 £ duration £  10 duration > 
10
Male S la c k 0.34 0.23 0.23 0.20
Female P e r io d 0.26 0.21 0.27 0.26
Male P e a k 0.40 0.21 0.26 0.13
Female P e r io d 0.28 0.35 0.21 0.16
Male L a n d e d 0.36 0.23 0.23 0.18
Female 0.49 0.04 0.24 0.23
Male L a n d -le s s 0.36 0.22 0.28 0.14
Female 0.25 0.29 0.25 0.21
Male A l l  F a rm s 0.36 0.22 0.24 0.18
Female 0.26 0.27 0.25 0.22
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TABLE 4.1’. Distribution of Monthly Duration of Unemployment in 1980, Individual Villages
Sex Sample
Duration of Unemployment (Days)
Duration = 0 1 ^ Duration < 5 6 £  Duration < 10 Duration > 10
A C E A C E A C E A c E
M S la c k .26 .40 .34 0.31 0.12 0.27 0.39 0.12 0.15 0.04 0.36 0.24
F .17 .34 .30 0.24 0.08 0.23 0.46 0.11 0.30 0.13 0.46 0.17
M P e a k .27 .50 .45 0.37 0.20 0.13 0.36 0.15 0.24 0.00 0.15 0.19
F .21 .38 .32 0.50 0.12 0.24 0.26 0.13 0.18 0.03 0.37 0.26
M L a n d e d .25 .41 .42 0.34 0.09 0.22 0.39 0.14 0.17 0.02 0.36 0.19
F .19 .36 .32 0.33 0.05 0.24 0.39 0.13 0.13 0.09 0.46 0.31
M L a n d ­ .43 .44 .32 0.43 0.26 0.19 0.14 0.07 0.36 0.00 0.23 0.12
F le s s .18 .33 .26 0.45 0.13 0.24 0.32 0.10 0.34 0.05 0.44 0.16
M A U .26 .42 .39 0.35 0.13 0.21 0.37 0.13 0.24 0.02 0.32 0.17
F F a rm .19 .34 .31 0.35 0.10 0.24 0.38 0.11 0.17 0.08 0.45 0.28
N o te  : A , C  a n d  & re fe r  to  the s tu d y  v illa g es , nam ely, A u repa lle , S h ira p u r a n d  K a n za ra  re sp ec tive ly . ’M ’ a n d  ’F ’
d en o te  m a le  a n d  fe m a le  la b o u rers  re sp ec tive ly .
TABLE 4 3 .  Determinants of the Incidence of Unemployment in 1980 :
Mean and Standard Deviation of Explanatory Variables, A U  V illa g es  and S h ira p u r
Variable
AU VUlages 
Mean (Standard Deviation)
Shirapur 
Mean (Standard Deviation)
Male Female Male Female
LNAGE 3.21 (0.61) 3.20 (0.62) 3.31 (0.62) 3.23 (0.54)
LNSQAGE 6.42 (1.22) 6.39 (1.23) 6.62 (1.24) 6.46 (1.07)
ILLI 0.56 (0.50) 0.89 (0.31) 0.30 (0.46) 0.78 (0.42)
LNCULT 1.31 (1.08) 1.13 (0.88) 1.58 (1.21) 0.79 (0.98)
CASTE4 0.27 (0.45) 0.40 (0.49) 0.17 (0.38) 0.16 (0.37)
PEAKPD 0.36 (0.48) 0.40 (0.49) 0.19 (0.39) 0.18 (0.39)
AUREPALLE 0.24 (0.43) 0.41 (0.49) * *
KANZARA 0.50 (0.50) 0.44 (0.50) * *
No. of Obs. 407 597 103 87
TABLE 43.a. Determinants of the Incidence of Unemployment in 1980:
Mean and Standard Deviation of Explanatory Variables, A u r e p a lle  and K a n za ra
Variable AurepaUe 
Mean (Standard Deviation)
Kanzara 
Mean (Standard Deviation)
Male Female Male Female
LNAGE 
LNSQAGE 
ILLI 
LNCULT 
CASTE4 
PEAKPD 
No.of Obs.
2.79 (0.54) 
2.57 (1.08) 
0.79 (0.40) 
1.47 (0.73) 
0.44 (0.50) 
0.45 (0.50) 
99
3.29 (0.55) 
6.58 (1.10) 
0.98 (0.14) 
1.18 (0.86) 
0.56 (0.49) 
0.44 (0.49) 
245
3.36 (0.53) 
6.73 (1.06) 
0.57 (0.49) 
1.09 (1.11) 
0.24 (0.43) 
0.39 (0.49) 
205
3.10 (0.68)
6.20 (1.37) 
0.86 (0.35)
1.21 (0.85) 
0.33 (0.47) 
0.44 (0.49)
265
219
TABLE 4.4. Tobit Estimates of Incidence of Unemployment, A l l  V illa g es
D e p e n d e n t V ariab le  : L N U N E M P
Variable
Male Female
Coefficient (T-Ratio) Coefficient (T-Ratio)
ONE 1.75 (6.135)** 2.65 (13.796)**
LNAGE 0.31 (0.027) 1.13 (0.112)
LNSQAGE -0.11 (0.019) -0.58 (0.115)
ILLI 0.10 (1.048) -0.14 (1.216)
LNCULT 0.11 (2.408)* 0.06 (1.989)*
CASTE4 0.02 (0.224) -0.03 (0.387)
PEAKPD -0.02 (2.225)* -0.22 (3.519)**
AUREPALLE -0.62 (4.303)** -0.70 (6.728)**
KANZARA -0.25 (2.211)* -0.35 (3.528)**
o2 0.65 (23.170)** 0.64 (29.969)**
L -256.7490 -425.8908
No. of Observations 407 597
N o te  : d en o tes  th a t th e  v a r ia b le  co n cern ed  is  sign ifica n t a t  5 %  w h ile  ’* * ’ im p lie s  th a t i t  is  s ig n ifica n t a t  1% .
TABLE 4.4 .a. Tobit Estimates of the Incidence of Unemployment, A u r e p a lle  and K a n za ra
D e p e n d e n t V ariab le  : L N U N E M P
Variable
Aurepalle 
Coefficient (T-Ratio)
Kanzara 
Coefficient (T-Ratio)
Male Female Male Female
ONE
LNAGE
LNSQAGE
ILLI
LNCULT
CASTE4
PEAKPD
o 2
t
No. of Obs.
1.25 (3.275)** 
-41.25 (1.808) 
20.74 (1.813) 
-0.13 (0.700) 
-0.05 (0.524) 
0.14 (1.065) 
-0.18 (1.999)* 
0.43 (12.120)** 
-42.0252 
99
1.45 (4.124)** 
-4.86 (0.371) 
2.43 (0.370) 
0.38 (1.313) 
-0.03 (0.674) 
0.10 (1.336) 
-0.42 (5.703)** 
0.51 (20.101)** 
-147.2251 
245
1.19 (2.379)* 
1.09 (0.066) 
-0.46 (0.055) 
-0.009 (0.054) 
0.09 (1.309) 
0.05 (0.367) 
-0.24 (2.044)* 
0.64 (16.115)** 
-122.1574 
205
2.42 (8.893)** 
-9.35 (0.484) 
4.61 (0.478) 
-0.09 (0.570) 
0.13 (2.027)* 
-0.19 (1.725) 
0.009 (0.088) 
0.70 (19.487)** 
-195.5188 
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A lso  n o te  th a t the lik e lih o o d  ra tio  te s t  o f  h e te ro sced a s tic ity  is  n o t s ig n if ica n t f o r  m a le  la b o u re rs  w h ile  i t  is  
sign ifica n t f o r  fe m a le  labou rers. H ence, w e  p re se n t bo th  c o r re c te d  a n d  u n co rrec ted  to b it  e s tim a te s  f o r  A u re p a lle  
a n d  K an zara .
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TABLE 4 A .b .  Tobit Estimates of the Incidence of Unemployment, S h ira p u r
Variable
Shirapur 
Coefficient (T-Ratio)
Shirapur 
Corrected Coefficient (T-Ratio)
Male Female Male Female
ONE 2.88 (3.946)** 2.18 (3.926)** 1.82 (2.393)* 2.12 (3.211)**
LNAGE 13.87 (0.436) 6.43 (0.259) 11.52 (0.388) 10.04 (0.469)
LNSQAGE -7.03 (0.442) -3.15 (0.254) -5.68 (0.383) -4.97 (0.465)
ILLI -0.05 (0.176) -0.25 (1.089) -0.14 (0.421) -0.04 (0.145)
LNCULT 0.14 (1.422) 0.11 (2.235)* 0.06 (0.421) 0.11 (1.081)
CASTE4 -0.34 (0.862) -0.11 (0.467) -0.09 (0.192) -0.19 (0.775)
PEAKPD -0.69 (2.624)* -0.28 (2.110)* -0.70 (2.322)* -0.07 (0.227)
LNAGE * * 16.14 (0.284) 4.51 (0.112)
LNSQAGE * * -8.13 (0.285) -2.28 (0.113)
LNCULT * * -0.20 (1.361) 0.34 (2.273)*
a 2 0.76 (11.327)** 0.67 (10.732)** 1.49 (0.744) 0.93 (1.199)
L -69.9005 -58.5107 -67.6602 -52.9078
No. of Obs. 103 87 103 87
Note : d en o tes  th a t the v a r ia b le  co n cern ed  is  sign ifica n t a t  5 %  w h ile  ’* * ’ im p lie s th a t i t  is  sig n ifica n t a t  1% .
A lso  n o te  th a t th e lik e lih o o d  ra tio  te s t  o f  h e te ro sc e d a s tic ity  is  n o t sig n ifica n t f o r  m a le  la b o u re rs  w h ile  i t  is  
sig n if ica n t f o r  f e m a le  labou rers. H en ce, w e  p re se n t b o th  c o r re c te d  a n d  u n co rrec ted  to b it  e s tim a tes  f o r  Sh irapur.
V a ria b les C ausing H e te ro sc e d a s tic ity  : Z = (LNAGE, LNSQAGE, LNCULT)
TABLE 4 A ’. Tobit Estimates of the Incidence of Unemployment: Corrected for Heteroscedasticity, All 
Villages
D ep en d en t V ariab le  : L N U N E M P
Variable
Male Female
Coefficient (T-Ratio) Coefficient (T-Ratio)
ONE 1.66 (5.894)** 2.69 (13.986)**
LNAGE 1.99 (0.143) 2.24 (0.021)
LNSQAGE -0.93 (0.133) -0.14 (0.025)
ILLI 0.07 (0.782) -0.15 (1.464)
LNCULT 0.09 (1.951)* 0.05 (1.354)
CASTE4 0.02 (0.180) 0.03 (0.450)
PEAKPD -0.05 (0.583) -0.23 (3.394)**
AUREPALLE -0.59 (4.087)** -0.69 (5.999)**
KANZARA -0.26 (2.627)* -0.33 (3.221)**
L N A G E 2.94 (0.169) 9.74 (0.779)
L N S Q A G E -1.48 (0.170) -4.81 (0.769)
L N C U L T -0.08 (1.395) -0.03 (0.686)
o2 0.77 (2.958)* 0.44 (4.276)**
L -255.2313 -423.0782
No. of Obs. 407 597
Note : d en o tes  th a t the va r ia b le  co n cern ed  is  s ig n ifica n t a t  5 %  w h ile  ’* * ’ im p lie s  th a t i t  is  s ig n ifica n t a t  1% .
A lso  n o te  th a t the lik e lih o o d  ra tio  te s t  o f  h e te ro sced a s tic ity  is  n o t sign ifican t. H en ce, w e  a c c e p t the u n co rrec ted  
to b it  estim ates.
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Figure 2. Distribution of predicted probability of choosing a regular contract according to family landholding (acres).
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CHAPTER 7. CASUAL AND REGULAR CONTRACTS : 
CHANGING PATTERN IN RURAL INDIA
Introduction
In recent years, there has been a declining incidence of regular farm contracts in the 
study villages. Walker and Ryan (1990) have noted that ’....the market for RFSs (regular farm
servants) has tightened in all the villages Farmers increasingly complain that they are no
longer able to hire good quality permanent help’. This is, however, not an isolated 
phenomenon in the study villages only. The same trend has been observed in some other 
regions of India as well. For example, Bardhan (1984a) has observed there has been a 
slackening of feudal obligations in labour-tying in the villages of Bengal. Reddy (1985) has 
found a declining incidence of the ’saldari’ (regular) employment in some villages in Gujrat. 
Ramachandran (1990) also finds a disintegration of regular contracts in Tamilnadu. Large- 
scale studies like the National Sample Survey in India report that there has been an 
increasing casualisation of the rural labour force in most states in India. However, there are 
* a few studies like Bhalla (1976) and Agarwal (1981) who have observed a rising incidence 
of regular farm labourers in certain tasks like irrigation or ploughing in the prosperous and 
technically advanced villages of Punjab and Haryana.
A common feature of all four theoretical models in chapter two is that the wages to 
be paid to regular labour is an increasing function of the casual wages earned from 
alternative employment opportunities. Therefore, an improvement in alternative employment 
opportunities1 suggests a declining incidence of regular contracts, causing a leftward shift 
in the supply of regular labour. In the light of this proposition, this chapter examines the 
consequences of the growth of alternative employment opportunities on the incidence of 
regular contracts.
The chapter is developed as follows. Section 7.1 discusses the general trend in the 
changing pattern of rural employment while section 7.2 analyses this trend in the rural credit 
markets in India as well as in the study villages. Section 7.3 considers the evolution of 
regular farm contracts, related to the changes in employment and credit opportunities, and
'Alternative opportunities may refer to the availability of non-fann/govemmental employment opportunities 
as well as the availability of cheaper credit which would encompass labourers to get into various self-employment 
schemes.
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the alternative contractual arrangements introduced as a response to the declining incidence 
of regular jobs. In this respect, an inter-village variation is observed; the degree of 
casualisation of labour is higher in the more prosperous villages. In view of this variation, 
the analysis in section 7.4 examines the relationship between economic prosperity and the 
incidence of regular contracts in a village economy. The chapter ends with a brief summary 
of our findings.
7.1, Evolution of Rural Labour Markets
This section analyses the composition and evolution of rural employment in India. 
The discussion is divided into two sub-sections; the first sub-section focuses on All-India 
trends while the second one looks at the trends observed in the study villages.
7.1.1. Changing Composition in India
According to the 32nd round (1977-78) National Sample Survey (NSS), the total 
number of main and marginal workers in rural India (including the chronically unemployed) 
is around 239 million. The size of the labour force in terms of usual status was around 201 
million of which around 69% were male. More than 60% of both male and female workers 
were self-employed or employed in family enterprises, with the rest being wage labourers.
Different rounds of National Sample Survey (NSS) data in India report the changing 
composition of rural employment in India which is shown in table 1.1. Between 1972-73 and 
1977-78, there has been a declining trend in regular employment coupled with an increase 
in casual employment. However, self-employment continues to hold out the best prospect of 
employment in rural India over the years, though its contribution has diminished. In 1977-78, 
41.2% of total rural labour was supplied by family labour, 6.1% by regular labour and 15.3% 
by casual labour (Source : Sarvekshana (NSS), 1981). The relative contribution of females 
in casual employment is higher than that in regular employment. Between 1977-78 and 1983, 
the contribution of the casual and regular components of employment has gone up while that 
of self-employment has continued to fall.
Secondly, using NSS data, the sectoral distribution of main and marginal workers in 
rural India is considered. This is shown in table 1.1’. Agriculture contributes most to the 
generation of rural employment; next in importance come mining, manufacturing, wholesale
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and retail trade and community, social and personal services.
Thirdly, the sectoral distribution of rural workers between 1977-78 and 1983 is 
considered. Female employment in agriculture is found to increase while that of males 
declines during this period. However, male employment in non-agricultural sectors like 
mining, manufacturing, construction, trade, transport and other service sectors has increased 
while the proportion relating to female labourers in these sectors has declined. The transition 
from agricultural to non-agricultural employment, especially for male labourers, marks a 
critical point in formulating rural employment policy.
Next, the Census data relating to the sectoral distribution of rural male workers in 
different states of India is studied (table 1.1"). This reveals that the proportion of male 
agricultural labourers in the male labour force has declined. However, male non-farm rural 
employment has gone up. Thus, both NSS and Census data indicate that gradually agriculture 
has become unable to absorb the fresh entrants in the labour force. Census data indicates that 
a part of the growing rural labour force has been absorbed by the manufacturing sector (table 
1.1") while NSS data (table 1.1’) shows that a part has been absorbed in the service sector.
7.1.1.1, Government Intervention
With the increasing population pressure on land, the adequacy of land reform 
measures to solve the problem of poverty has been questioned. Consequently, in the seventies 
the government undertook a series of different programmes to improve the plight of the 
poorer and weaker sections of rural society; these programmes include the following.
(i) Programmes oriented towards individual beneficiaries like Small Farmers 
Development Agencies (SFDA) and Marginal Farmers’ Association (MFAL) which were 
subsequently supplemented by the Integrated Rural Development Programmes (IRDP) for 
overall development of the rural community;
(ii) Programmes for additional wage employment opportunities such as the Crash 
Scheme for Rural Employment (CSRE), Pilot Intensive Rural Employment Programme 
(PIREP) and the Food for Work Programme (FWP);
(iii) Programmes for the development of the ecologically disadvantaged areas such 
as the Drought Prone Area Programme (DPAP) and Desert Development Programme (DDP);
(iv) Minimum Needs Programme aimed at increasing the level of living through a 
greater provision of basic social consumption and rural infrastructure.
In 1983-84, Landless Employment Guarantee Programme was initiated to provide 
employment of upto 100 days a year to at least one member of every landless household in
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the villages. Besides a number of state governments have special programmes for the benefit 
of the poor; in this respect, special mention should be made of Maharashtra Employment 
Guarantee Scheme (MEGS).
Labour-intensive rural public works programmes, aimed at generating additional wage 
employment, have emerged as an important instrument to alleviate the problems of 
unemployment in rural India. Consequently, the need for public works programmes has been 
assuming a growing importance in recent years. However, there has been inter-state variation 
in the availability of employment generated through public works programmes in India as 
shown in table 1.1.1. The percentage of casual labour in public works programmes is high 
in states like Himachal Pradesh and Jammu and Kashmir, moderate in Madhya Pradesh, 
Maharashtra, Punjab and Haryana, and low in Gujrat, Kerala, Orissa and Andhra Pradesh. 
Moreover, there is distinct discrimination between male and female involvement in rural 
public works. With the exception of Assam, female involvement is lower than that of males 
in all other states.
Rapid expansion of public sector activity in rural areas has led to a steep rise in the 
number of people employed in rural areas directly by the state governments. Moreover, 
different development strategies including the anti-poverty programmes generate further 
incomes among their participants. Thus, rapid expansion of public investment in rural areas 
is a new and growing source of income and employment which may further generate 
successive rounds of increases in the demand for several non-agricultural products and 
services.
Depending on its nature and size, rural public works programmes may generate a 
series of direct and indirect employment and income effects which accrue to poorer workers 
through construction, productive utilisation and regular maintenance of the infrastructure. 
Donovan (1973) reports that project construction in Karanataka generated additional 
employment of at least 18% of the total labour force drawn from seven villages, enhancing 
their incomes by an average of 108%. The role of Maharashtra Employment Guarantee 
Scheme (MEGS) is also noteworthy in this respect. Costa (1978) finds that in a sample of 
projects under MEGS, 70.6% of total expenditure on soil conservation works and 54.3% of 
expenditure incurred on road works have accrued to landless labourers as wages. Finally, 
mention may be made of employment and income benefits arising out of the Pilot Intensive 
Rural Employment Project (PIREP). Workers’ wages constituted 78% of the total expenditure 
under PIREP in 1972-73 and 91% in 1973-74.
Thus, employment prospects in the non-agricultural sectors have been assuming a
227
greater importance in rural India, especially among rural male labourers. NSS data reports 
the per cent change in non-agricultural employment for male labourers in rural India between 
1972-73 and 1977-78. During this period, the proportion of male non-agricultural 
employment has increased in Andhra Pradesh, Punjab, Haryana, Jammu and Kashmir, 
Rajasthan, Tamilnadu, Uttar Pradesh (U.P.) and West Bengal while it has decreased only in 
Assam, Bihar and Gujrat
The attraction of non-agricultural employment as against agricultural employment is 
closely related to the prevalence of higher non-agricultural wages in different parts of India. 
This is also supported by NSS data. NSS data reports daily agricultural and non-agricultural 
wages among different states in 1974-75 and in 1977-78 as shown in table 1.1.1’. Both 
agricultural and non-agricultural wages were higher in Punjab, Haryana and Kerala compared 
to those in other states. In 1974-75, agricultural wages were higher than non-agricultural 
wages in Assam, Kerala, Orissa, Punjab, Tamil Nadu and West Bengal. However, within four 
years, non-agricultural wages grew so fast that in 1977-78, non-agricultural wages were 
higher in all the states. In other words, by 1977-78, non-agricultural jobs were more 
rewarding than agricultural ones in most states in India.
7.1.2. Changing Composition in the Study Villages
Having discussed the general trend in different parts of India, in this section we shall 
consider the changing composition of the rural labour market in the study villages. To this 
end, two sets of data are used. The first one relates to the initial village studies data at 
ICRISAT over a ten-year (1975-84) period while the second one is part of the ICRISAT’s 
latest resurvey data collected from the study villages in 1989. We compare the employment 
status (according to the main occupation) of the members of sample households in the age 
group six to sixty. This is shown in table 1.2.
The proportion of employment generated from self-employment has increased 
between 1975-84 and 1989 in Aurepalle and Shirapur. In Kanzara, however, the percentage 
has declined from 51% to 27%2. The importance of casual jobs is still higher than that of 
regular jobs in the study villages. The contribution of regular employment has declined in 
all the villages uniformly. This declining trend has been coupled with an increase in casual 
employment in Kanzara; in Aurepalle, the proportion of casual employment has remained
2It needs to be mentioned here that Kanzara has experienced a significant increase in the number of 
individuals going to school or college; between 1975-84 and 1989 the proportion increased from 14% to 30%.
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unchanged while it has decreased in Shirapur. However, in Aurepalle and Shirapur, a 
significant rise in the incidence of self-employment (which includes tenancy as well) has 
been observed.
7.1.2.1. An Inter-village Comparison
Though all the study villages are situated in the semi-arid tropics of India, they differ 
widely in agronomic characteristics, which, in turn, determine the alternative job prospects 
available in these villages. Apart from agricultural activities in Kanzara, a substantial portion 
of labour income is earned from non-agricultural activities as well. Non-agricultural work can 
be divided into two categories :
(a) Non-agricultural work offered by households residing in the village which 
includes construction of houses, wells etc. where wages are usually paid on a piece-rate basis.
(b) Government projects which also generate substantial demand for unskilled labour. 
Several construction projects financed by the State Government are being conducted within 
walking distance of the village. The construction of percolation tanks during 1980 in Kanzara 
was intended to increase groundwater and was initiated as a publicly-operated relief project. 
At present, a canal is under construction and draws a significant amount of labour from 
Kanzara.
Both (a) and (b) generate alternative employment opportunities for agricultural 
labourers as well as for small farmers. Labour for the Government project is organised by 
a contractor (Mukkadam). Mukkadam organises labour from his own village. He is paid twice 
the daily wage for organising and supervising a gang of 30 to 50 labourers.
In Shirapur agricultural labour demand is seasonal. On the most fertile soil, only one 
crop is grown on residual moisture in the post-monsoon season. Irrigation amounts to only 
10% of the total cropped area. Consequently, prospects of farm employment are not bright 
in the village. To some extent, this is compensated for by the non-agricultural labour demand 
for unskilled or semi-skilled labour generated by the Sholapur textile industry. As in Kanzara, 
here too the initiation of government projects is another source of non-agricultural labour 
demand. This includes construction of percolation tanks to increase groundwater availability 
as well as the construction of a canal within walking distance of the village.
The role of MEGS is noteworthy in successfully creating labour-intensive rural 
employment in rural Maharashtra. In the 1980s, MEGS has gradually transformed itself from 
a slack season work programme to a regular employment programme. Walker and Ryan 
(1990) have reported that the participation in the MEGS is significantly and inversely related
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to the value of family wealth of the participants, more so for women participants in Shirapur 
and Kanzara. Between 1979-80 and 1983-84, work in government-sponsored public work 
projects accounted for about 19% and 14% of men’s wage employment in Shirapur and 
Kanzara respectively; corresponding figures for female labourers were 25% and 6%.
Agriculture is the main economic activity in Aurepalle. Compared to Kanzara or 
Shirapur, the availability of non-agricultural employment is scarce in Aurepalle. The village 
does not have many alternative employment opportunities as generated from factory work 
or government projects. Among non-farm activities well-digging, well-deepening or bore-well 
work offers some prospects of employment, but this is not a significant and steady source 
of employment. In order to supplement farm income, some households practise their caste 
occupations like toddy-tapping (Gowda caste) or sheep-grazing (Kurma), stone-cutting 
(Vaddera), weaving (Padmasale), supplying meat to Hyderabad (Muslims) etc. as subsidiary 
occupations. Occasionally some labourers migrate (usually temporarily) to Hyderabad for 
rickshaw-pulling3. Thus, labourers in Aurepalle are penalized because of the lack of labour 
demand from non-farm activities. This is further aggravated by the strong caste-based 
segregation of the village population4 and the greater social and economic power of the 
higher caste farmers in the village. In other words, compared to Shirapur or Kanzara, 
Aurepalle continues to suffer from the scarcity of labour demand from non-farm activities 
during the study period.
One of the best indicators of the employment opportunities available in a region is 
the prevailing rate of involuntary unemployment. During 1975-84, the mean village 
unemployment estimates by sex has a moderate, but statistically-significant declining trend 
for both men and women in Aurepalle and Kanzara. When the inter-village disparities in 
unemployment rates are considered, the picture does not seem to have changed during this 
period. Kanzara remained the most prosperous and Shirapur, in spite of substantial non-farm 
employment, suffers from the highest rate of unemployment.
3This supports the view that circulation as a form of migration is more a symptom of persistent 
maladjustments in the system rather than an equilibrating mechanism smoothing out labour market disparities in 
spatially separated markets’ (Mukhopadhyay, 1987).
Participation in the regular market in Aurepalle is found to come primarily from the two Harijan 
communities - Madigas and Malas who have not been successful in improving their plight substantially and, thus, 
are not left with many alternatives.
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7.2. Evolution of Rural Credit Markets
Rural credit markets in India are divided between formal sectors (comprising 
government, cooperative society/banks, commercial banks, insurance companies) and informal 
ones (comprising landlords, agricultural moneylenders, professional moneylenders, traders, 
friends/relatives, etc). While formal credit is cheaper than informal credit in terms of the cost 
of borrowing (also see chapter four), the advantage with informal credit is that in many cases 
it does not require any collateral as opposed to formal credit. The discussion, in this section, 
focuses on the changing composition of formal and informal credit in rural India with 
particular reference to the study villages in the eighties; the aim is to examine whether the 
credit constraints operating on the rural poor have slackened in the eighties.
7.2.2. Changing Composition in India
In order to assess the changing composition of rural credit markets in the eighties, 
we have primarily used the report of the All-India Debt and Investment Survey (AIDIS) 
conducted during the calendar year 1982 (RBI bulletin, 1986). The survey distinguished rural 
households between cultivator and non-cultivators. While the average value of assets for a 
cultivator household was Rs. 44,524 that of a non-cultivator household was Rs. 8,974. The 
average value of total assets per rural household increased more than three-fold in absolute 
terms from, Rs. 11,311 in 1971 to Rs 36,090 in 1981. After adjusting for the price rise, the 
estimated value of the real rate of growth of total assets during the decade is estimated to be 
4% per annum.
However, there are inter-state differences in the growth of real assets. The average 
value of total assets per household was the highest in Punjab, followed by Haryana, Kerala, 
Himachal Pradesh and Jammu and Kashmir. In the second group of medium average values 
of total assets, there are Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan, Gujrat and Maharashtra; low average value 
of total assets were observed in Andhra Pradesh, Assam, West Bengal and Tamil Nadu.
Finally, we consider the distribution of credit by the credit agencies. Debt owed by 
rural households indicated that the formal sector contributed to 61% of the cash debt of rural 
households in 1981 as against 29% in 1971 where the share of commercial banks was 28% 
in 1981 as against only 2% in 1971; debt owed to the cooperatives accounted for 29% in 
1981 as against 20% in 1971. However, the share of debt owed to the government declined 
from 7% in 1971 to 4% in 1981. Debt owed to the informal agencies declined to 39% in 
1981 compared to 71% in 1971; the decline was consistent for each type of informal credit
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agency. In particular, the share of debt owed to the moneylenders (agricultural and 
professional) declined sharply from 37% in 1971 to 17% in 1981. However, informal 
agencies continued to play a predominant role; the share of total debt owed to the informal 
agencies by the non-cultivator households declined from 89% in 1971 to 63% in 1981.
Thus, between 1971 and 1981, there was a pronounced extension of the formal credit 
network in rural India, though the extent is smaller for the non-cultivator households. In other 
words, AIDIS data suggests that even in the eighties, the credit constraint on the rural non­
cultivator class, i.e. the landless households, was still operative, with the extent varying from 
one state to another.
7.2.2. Changing Composition in the Study Villages
According to sources as well as purposes, outstanding debt/credit details of the 
sample households is obtained from the VLS-P schedule (see chapter three). According to 
the source, values of these items are classified into two categories : (i) Amounts lent to or 
borrowed from the formal credit market, namely, the government (local or state), co­
operatives, commercial banks etc.5; (ii) amounts lent to or borrowed from the informal credit 
market, namely, village moneylenders, friends, relatives etc. On this basis, the proportion of 
households having access to formal credit agencies are calculated for two periods : (a) the 
first phase of ICRISAT study during 1975-79 and (b) the second phase of ICRISAT study 
during 1980-84 which is shown in table 2.2.
In general, the extent of the spread of formal credit was much higher in the 
Maharashtra villages compared to the Andhra village, Aurepalle. It follows that by the mid 
eighties, a substantial portion of households belonging to the small, medium and large 
landholding classes had access to formal credit in these villages. However, labour households 
in Aurepalle and Kanzara continued to be excluded from formal credit. The situation was 
different in Shirapur where a substantial proportion of rural households continued to receive 
formal credit. To some extent, this can be attributed to the Drought-Prone Area Programme 
of the government of India which was operative in the village.
In other words, landless households in Aurepalle, as compared to those in Kanzara, 
not only suffer from a lack of job opportunities (section 7.1.2), but also from a lack of credit 
availability (also see chapter four). Shirapur, however, appears to be different from the other
’Shirapur, being situated in the drought-prone area, has access to special credit advanced by the government 
of India under the Drought Prone Area Programme (DPAP).
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two villages. Rural households in Shirapur have substantial non-farm job opportunities; they 
also have access to formal credit at a cheaper rate. However, due to the drought-prone nature 
of the area, the risk of agricultural production is much higher so that the market for farm 
labour often suffers from a lack of demand.
7.3. Evolution of Rural Labour Contracts
Historically, hiring attached regular labourers is primarily confined to wealthy and 
large farmers in the villages. Attached labour contracts have traditionally been viewed as 
patron-client relationships, with the patron being the master or landlord or employer (the 
dominant partner of the contract)6. There has been a large literature contributed by scholars 
from different disciplines - historians, social anthropologists, economists in different parts of 
the world (see Breman (1974), Epstein, (1962, 1967), Geertz (1970), Hayami and Kikuchi 
(1981), Hart (1986), Scott (1976), Bourdieu (1980) and Alexander (1982)). A wide variety 
of patron-client relationships has been observed over time and space with varying degrees 
of dependence and dominance in the relationship.
For example, there are cases of obligatory services rendered by the tenant-serf to the 
lord of the manor in eighteenth-century European feudal society or different kinds of debt- 
bondage to the landlord-moneylender in different parts of Asia or Africa. In this respect, the 
case of the Indian caste system, locally known as ’jajmani’ (Lai, 1988)7, may also be cited 
where the economic interdependence and labour division are organized through a network 
of personal hereditary relationships between the patron and clients (performing specialised, 
caste-based functions). The fact that labour relations are based on hereditary ties has further 
reinforced the solidarity between masters (patrons) and servants (clients) and thus prevented 
the latter from revolting against the dominant castes.
However, with the erosion of feudalism, the growth of commodity economy in 
agriculture and the emergence of industrialised society giving rise to non-agricultural 
employment opportunities, there has been an evolution of this patron-client relationship all
®In the literature, two types of relationship between the patrons have been identified - (i) competing patronage 
and (ii) aristocratic patronage. We observe that the anthropological literature (for example, Scott, Bourdieu) 
extensively documented the fact that the control over a clientele is viewed by the patrons as an important means 
of achieving economic wealth, social prestige, and political power in the village. However, the second kind of 
patronage puts emphasis on the fact that the relations among the patrons are largely governed by a code of honour 
and gentlemanly manners forcing them to cooperate in various matters, including the aspect of labour relations.
7Lal (1988) has offered a risk-sharing explanation. He infers that the bigger landlords (who are risk-neutral) 
would be able to bear the income variability of tropical agriculture by offering a uniform wage to the risk-averse 
workers throughout the year.
233
over the world. We shall, in this section, focus on the decline of regular contracts in India 
with special reference to the study villages.
7.3.1, Decline of Regular Contracts in India
With the erosion of economic and political power of landlords through the 
implementation of different land-reform measures in the post-independence period, the 
growth of alternative non-farm employment opportunities and government intervention in the 
rural labour and credit markets, the patron-client relationship is changing in different parts 
of India. Though the exact circumstances may vary from one region to another, long-term 
labour contracts are, at present, observed to be instances of voluntary labour-tying.
Two specific trends have been observed in this regard. The most prominent and 
widespread one is the declining incidence of regular farm contracts in most villages in India. 
This can either be caused by the individual labourer’s reluctance to participate in regular 
jobs. Alternatively, this can be caused by the farmer’s reluctance to take on customary 
obligations to negotiate regular farm contracts8.
Secondly, Bhalla (1976) while studying the Green Revolution period in Haryana, 
finds that with rising real wages rates in these agriculturally advanced villages, there are 
shifts in the contractual mix towards longer-term contracts for men. Agarwal (1981), too, 
finds that there has been an increasing incidence of regular farm contracts in certain tasks 
like irrigation among the large farmers in the prosperous villages of Punjab.
Bardhan (1984a) argues that yield-increasing improvements increase the importance 
of tied labour as a proportion of total labour hired. The observation also fits well into our 
’hoarding cost’ argument. In agriculturally prosperous villages of Punjab, there is year-round 
demand for labour. Thus, the employment of regular labour not only minimises wage costs9 
(and wage fluctuations), especially when there is upward pressure on daily wages, but also 
minimises the hoarding costs of regular labour in the prosperous irrigated agriculture.
7.3.2. Decline of Regular Contracts in the Study Villages
The institution of regular farm contracts, as prevalent in the study villages does not,
8See further discussion in section 1 .3 3 .2 .
9This holds good because usually daily regular wages are lower than daily casual wages (also see chapter 
four).
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in any way, resemble the serfdom of feudal society. The labourer is free to choose his/her 
employer; if s/he is not satisfied working with the current employer, s/he is also free to leave 
him once the contract period is over. The relationship between the employer and the labourer 
is formal and does not usually extend beyond work related to the farm. The contract 
commonly lasts for about a year; afterwards it can be renewed provided both parties agree. 
This is no longer a case of hereditary labour-tying (also see Bardhan (1984a), Reddy (1985), 
Walker and Ryan (1990)).
The analysis in chapter five shows that large farmers are more likely to hire regular 
farm servants because they have a greater demand for labour throughout the year such that 
hoarding costs are minimum. In chapter six of the dissertation, it is shown that the choice 
of regular contracts is particularly advantageous for landless labourers; a regular contract 
ensures the security of employment as well as that of credit Moreover, the choice is 
consistent with their time constraint In some cases, other members of the regular farm 
servant’s family also work for the same employer, usually in exchange for cash or kind 
payment in kind. Elements of extra-economic coercion are not very apparent here.
With the growth of alternative employment opportunities, the extent of 
unemployment is declining among male and female casual labourers in the study villages, 
especially in Aurepalle and Kanzara (Walker & Ryan, pp.132, 1990). In addition, due to 
government intervention, credit is made available to landless labourers; slack period 
employment opportunities have also been created in some villages. Consequently, the 
incentive of employment and credit security associated with regular farm contract is losing 
its significance. However, an inter-village variation is observed. Employment and credit 
constraints are more binding for the labourers in Aurepalle as compared to Kanzara. This 
perhaps explains why the incidence of regular contracts is higher in Aurepalle (further see 
our discussion in section 7.4).
In comparison, the case of Shirapur is different As already discussed, Shirapur has 
substantial non-farm employment opportunities. However, due to the drought-prone nature 
of the village (i.e., higher risk of farming), prospect of farm employment is rather bleak 
(which is reflected in the rate of unemployment). On the other hand, compared to Aurepalle 
and Kanzara, availability of formal credit is easier, even to the landless labourers. This may 
well be the main reason why the incidence of regular farm contracts is the least in Shirapur.
However, farmers are increasingly complaining about the non-availability of reliable 
and efficient regular farm servants. Nowadays, rural labourers are reluctant to participate in 
the regular market. The situation indicates a downward shift in the supply of regular
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labourers, with demand remaining unchanged. The obvious consequence has been a declining 
incidence of regular farm contracts in these villages.
7,3.3. A Trend towards Casualisation
With the decline of regular contracts, there has been a change in the land-labour 
arrangements all over India which has marked a trend towards a gradual casualisation of the 
labour force.
7.3.3.1. Labour Contracts in the Study Villages
Increasingly, rural labourers in the study villages are reluctant to negotiate regular 
contracts. Nowadays, the entrants to the regular labour market are primarily landless 
labourers with pressing credit needs. Confronted with the supply constraint, farmers are 
forced to adopt alternative arrangements to meet their labour requirements.
Piece-rate contracts as opposed to daily casual contracts are increasingly popular in 
all the study villages, especially in operations like transplanting and weeding where quality 
control is not so important. Sometimes a piece-rate contract is given to a group as well; it 
is then called a group contract. Usually, groups of women labourers headed by a leader (who 
is also a woman) are hired to perform different operations on a contract basis. Given the 
nature of the contract, the farmer does not have to supervise them closely and the work is 
done in time.
Another form of group contract has nowadays been found in Aurepalle. This is 
locally known as ’Arakapollu’ (group tenancy) where two to three persons owning bullocks 
lease-in land for a year and they cultivate land together. Sometimes, the landlord also 
participates in the group. The contract may be on a fixed-rent basis or on a share-cropping 
basis. Mueller and Townsend (1993) find that the contract is on a share-cropping basis when 
the landlord participates; otherwise it is a fixed-rent contract. In most instances of share- 
cropping, the share is fixed at 50%. The rest of the net profit is distributed among the group 
members, including the landlord (if participating) according to the contribution of the labour 
(bullock as well as human labour) in the production process. Fixed-rent contracts specify the 
exact amount of the rent to be paid (in kind) to the landlord for the use of land. The landlord 
does not bear any input costs. In this case, too, the tenant members of the group divide the 
net profits according to the share of the cost borne by them.
To some extent, the group contract eliminates the imperfection in the market for
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bullocks. In the absence of the rental market for bullocks, it is imperative for the landlord 
to arrange bullocks for cultivation where this form of group tenancy becomes convenient. 
Secondly, the need for supervising labourers on land is minimum here because the tenant 
members are made the claimants of the residual profit and because of their joint 
responsibility they supervise each other as well. Thirdly, the formation of these groups 
facilitates the access to credit. In some cases, they receive required funding from the 
participating/non-participating landlords. In other cases, they pool their own funds to meet 
the required expenses. In still other cases, expenses are partly financed by the landlord and 
partly from their own resources. Finally, the arrangement has the benefit of pure tenancy; it 
helps the landlord to share the risk of crop production with the tenants which may be 
significant in this semi-arid tropical area.
With the tightening of the regular market, a particular form of share-cropping 
contract called ’Angwata’ has been popular in Shirapur. In the drought-prone area of 
Shirapur, only a few farmers nowadays can afford more than one regular farm servant. 
Instead, they prefer share-cropping where the risk of production is shared with the tenant. 
Usually, the landowner provides the bullocks for cultivation and the labourer works as the 
operator. Output is shared between the landlord and the tenant; the rate varies according to 
whether the land is irrigated or not This contract is usually given for a single production 
period by the end of which the contract can be renewed so that the tenant cannot claim the 
ownership right on land. Some households who served as regular farm servants for years are 
now tenants or share-croppers. But ’it is found that on an average, total earnings of the 
share-cropper households are equal to or less than the income he would have earned as an 
RFS10’. Labourers prefer it since they are in a position to take farming decisions 
independently and they are free to do other work as well. Farmers, too, find it convenient 
because they do not need to supervise labour closely for day to day operations; the latter 
holds good, because the share-cropper has his/her own incentive to work hard as s/he is the 
claimant of the residual profit. In addition, the risk of production is shared with the tenant.
7.33.2. Labour Contracts in Other Parts of India
With the tightening of the regular labour market, farmers in different parts of India 
have adopted various alternatives. This distinctly shows a trend towards casualisation of the 
rural labour force. For example, Krishnamurty (1984) and Vaidyanathan (1986) have used
10Bhende, M.J. and Ladole, V.B. ’Labour Market Survey’, tour Report, ICRISAT.
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NSS data to show that there has been an increase in the share of casual labour in total labour. 
In addition, a number of micro-level village studies conducted in different parts of India 
(Breman, 1974; Reddy, 1985; Walker and Ryan, 1990) also find evidence towards a 
casualisation of the rural labour.
Krishnamurty (1984) uses 27th and 32nd round National Sample Survey data. Table
3.2.2. is borrowed from him. This shows the extent of casualisation, i.e., the per cent share 
of casual labour in the rural work force. There has been an increase in the share of 
employment of casual labour relative to total employment. In this respect, an inter-state 
variation is observed. During the years 1972-73 and 1977-78, the degree of casualisation of 
male labourers in most states in India was observed to go up with Kerala and Maharashtra 
being exceptions. However, on an average, a higher proportion of casual labourers continues 
to prevail in both Kerala and Maharashtra in 1977-78. The scenario is found to be very 
similar for female casual labourers as well, where the degree of casualisation is on the 
increase in most states except Kerala, Maharashtra and West Bengal.
Next, we consider some micro-level village studies conducted in other parts of India 
in order to compare them with the trends prevailing in the study villages. Breman (1974) has 
studied the disintegration of the ’Hali’ system (attached farm contracts) in the villages of 
south Gujrat. According to him, this was a gradual change which perhaps started some time 
in the beginning of the twentieth century11. Breman argued that during this time, due to a 
large increase in wages, the amount to be paid by the master to the hali had increased 
substantially; at the same time with the growth of urban centres around these villages, the 
risk of the hali running away was also greater. Moreover, due to the continuous subdivision 
of land, the financial capacity of the landlords was affected adversely. In addition, with the 
changing in the cropping system, landlords did not need to use much regular labour and 
could, instead, continue their operations with short-term labour.
Reddy (1985) has considered the evolution of labour contracts in a number of 
villages in the Amaravati district of Gujrat Regular farm servants in Amaravati are 
commonly known as ’saldars’. In the old days, a loan taken from the employer was the 
beginning of lifelong employment in the most servile condition when the prestige of the 
landlord depended not only on the amount of landholdings or bullocks, but also on the 
number of regular farm servants (competing patronage). However, by the beginning of the 
century, the form of the regular contract started changing when regular farm servants were
11 According to Joshi (1966), it started after the First World War while according to Desai (1965) it started 
a bit later, some time during 1940-60.
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being employed just for a year; the contract could be renewed at the end of the year. In the 
post-independence period, employers in Amaravati started hiring labourers on a monthly 
basis; the number of farm servants fluctuated with the need for labour, being higher in the 
peak agricultural seasons.
With the decline of saldari employment, the incidence of monthly labour contracts 
has gone up correspondingly. Usually, the monthly labour contracts are renewed each month 
and wages are wholly paid in cash. Even under the monthly contract system, some labourers 
are able to gain employment for the whole year, but a majority of them are without any job 
for three to four months a year.
In some cases, traditional regular relations between the employer and the labourer 
has taken the form of the employment of ’Ghaddis’. A Ghaddi works as a daily labourer, but 
on a regular basis, sometimes continuing for the whole year. Ghaddis work for longer hours 
a day, though for a slightly higher daily wage than a daily labourer and they do the work of 
a saldar. However, unlike saldars, Ghaddis do not usually obtain any additional customary 
gifts or bonus from the employer.
Ramachandran (1990), too, analyses the causes of the disintegration of regular farm 
contracts in some villages in Tamilnadu. He argues that there are two sets of factors that lead 
to the declining incidence of regular contracts. One is the growth of the commodity economy 
in agriculture, intensive farming for profit and large-scale employment of hired labour to 
ensure high productivity. The second is the spread of modernity, penetration of the civil 
society into the village, workers’ unionisation and the opportunity for migratioa
Our analysis in this section suggests that it is not only the landlords, but also the 
farm servants, who are responsible for a gradual change in the system of regular contracts. 
However, the relative strength of each party is not so obvious. In the study villages, however, 
there is strong evidence of a decline in the supply of regular labour. In fact, most studies 
(e.g., Reddy, Ramachandran, Walker and Ryan) find that the decline of regular contracts is 
closely related to the leftward shift in the supply of labour.
7.3.4. Causes of the Decline of the Supply of Regular Labour
In view of our analysis in the preceding sections, let us now summarise the factors 
leading to the declining supply of regular labour in rural India. These are as follows:
(i) Alleviation of Employment Constraint: As already discussed in section 7.1, this 
may take the following forms:
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(a) Brighter prospects o f Farm Employment: As farm investment is becoming more 
profitable, and as tenant protection legislation is being implemented, landowners are resorting 
to own farming with hired labour instead of leasing out land. Increasing operational 
concentration of land and the intensification of farming for profit have increased the 
proportion of hired to total farm labour input. Secondly, under the impetus of technological 
factors, the nature of the traditional village economy has gradually been changing. Until very 
recently most farmers used to produce a single crop in the year. This is no longer the case. 
We cannot identify a single slack period (when the demand for labour is lower) followed by 
a peak period (when labour demand goes up). With the adoption of multiple cropping (due 
to the availability of steady irrigation facilities throughout the year) and the 
commercialisation of agriculture, there is a year-round demand for farm labour. This is 
especially true in the areas of irrigated agriculture where inter-village variation is observed. 
Compared to rainfall-assured Kanzara, the demand for farm labour is lower in both Aurepalle 
and Shirapur.
(b) Availability of non-farm employment opportunities is assuming greater importance 
in rural India; non-farm jobs are considered better because of the higher wages offered 
(relative to farm employment). However, there is regional variation in this respect Non-farm 
employment prospects are not bright in Aurepalle compared to Shirapur which has an 
advantageous location because of its proximity to the Sholapur textile industry.
(c) A variety of rural development (RD) programmes have been launched in India 
in recent years. Under these various programmes (e.g., IRDP, NREP etc; also see discussion 
in 7.1.1), central and state governments are taking an active interest towards generating 
supplementary wage employment, especially in the slack seasons, particularly for poor 
agricultural labourers and marginal farmers. The government is increasingly investing in 
various public works programmes like local irrigation projects and road development. These 
projects continue for a few years with an enormous impact on the local unskilled/semi-skilled 
labour markets. As already mentioned, Maharashtra Employment Guarantee Scheme (MEGS) 
has played a successful role in Shirapur and Kanzara as opposed to Aurepalle.
(ii) Alleviation o f the Credit Constraint: We have already discussed in section 7.2 
that in recent years there has been an expansion of formal credit network towards the poorest 
of the poor in the rural society. As part of different poverty alleviation programmes 
undertaken in different five-year plans in the seventies, a variety of subsidized credit schemes 
have been launched in rural India, especially directed to the needs of landless labourers to 
encourage various self-employment schemes. Under these schemes, many labourers receive
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subsidized loans to buy goats, sheep, buffaloes or bullocks.
Lack of non-farm labour demand in Aurepalle has, to some extent, been compensated 
for by several self-employment schemes. With the availability of cheaper credit, there has 
been an increasing opportunity to participate in self-employed subsidiary occupations like 
poultry, dairy farming, sheep grazing, toddy tapping, stone-cutting, etc. some of which are 
associated with caste-related occupations. For example, with rising goat and sheep prices, the 
shepherd community (Kurma) in Aurepalle prefer to concentrate more on their family 
business and participate even less in wage employment The same story applies to the toddy- 
tappers (Gowdas) in Aurepalle. The traditional occupation of the Gowdas is toddy-tapping; 
with the rising prices (and increasing profitability) of toddy (palm juice), nowadays they 
devote more time and effort to tap toddy (palm). Very often, they invest the profit obtained 
from toddy-tapping to buy land and to start own cultivation; consequently, their market 
participation rates have declined. However, participation in caste-occupations like weaving, 
carpentry, black-smithy, pottery, livestock-rearing etc. is not very significant in the other two 
study villages, Shirapur or Kanzara.
In addition to the cheaper credit from the government, co-operatives and commercial 
banks offered to labourers in the Maharashtra villages, Shirapur has gained significantly from 
the DPAP programme of the government of India. Under the scheme, a substantial amount 
of low-cost credit has been made available to landless labourers. Consequently, unlike 
Aurepalle and Kanzara, the credit incentive attached to the regular farm contracts has lost 
much of its significance in the village. In addition to the higher risk of employing regular 
labourers in this drought-prone village, this may perhaps explain why the incidence of regular 
farm contracts is less than that in Aurepalle and Kanzara.
(tii) Evolving Ideology : With the government laying emphasis on education, the 
younger members of the farming households, especially those belonging to the families of 
medium and large farmers, do go to school regularly. Consequently, these younger members 
cannot offer their labour on the family farm on a full-time basis. The situation is often 
different in the labouring households, where the opportunity cost of time spent in school is 
very high.
Side by side, there has been a growing feeling of class consciousness in these 
villages. Regular labourers are increasingly conscious of their servitude and their lack of 
dignity. Instead of being attached to some farm as regular farm servants, even the poorer 
labourers, prefer to be their own boss (cultivating their own land, however small, or leasing 
in land and/or doing some other casual work). Educated members of the cultivating
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households prefer to participate in rural white-collared jobs. A similar tendency has been 
observed by Rudra (1982a) among the agricultural labourers in the villages in West Bengal.
Presumably, this class consciousness has emerged partly as a result of a campaign 
against illiteracy at the state level as well as the penetration of urban values into the rural life 
(also see discussion in section 7.4.2).
7.4, Incidence of Regular Farm Contracts and Economic Prosperity of the Village 
Economy
This section examines the association between growing economic prosperity of rural 
India, and the easing of employment and credit constraints for agricultural labourers, 
especially the landless ones. It is argued that the declining incidence of regular labour 
contracts is directly related to the economic advancement and prosperity of the village 
economy. The argument is as follows: economic development in rural India usually goes 
hand in hand with the expansion of alternative employment opportunities for agricultural 
labourers, and with a greater access to credit. This, in turn, can be expected to lead to a 
lower incidence of labour-tying arrangements. Indeed, a common feature of each of the four 
theoretical models examined in chapter two is that the wage paid to regular labourers is an 
increasing function of their alternative employment opportunities. When these opportunities 
improve, the supply curve for regular labour shifts to the left, and the new equilibrium 
typically involves less employment of regular labourers and a higher real wage rate.
7,4.1. Economic Prosperity and Classification o f the Study Villages
The availability of alternative employment opportunities depends on the economic 
prosperity of the village which, in turn, depends on the characteristics of the village 
economy. Using these characteristics, we classify the study villages according to the level of 
economic prosperity.
First we consider different socio-economic indicators at the state level as shown in 
table 4.1. Taken together, these indicators suggest that the state of Maharashtra (where 
Kanzara and Shirapur are situated) is more prosperous than Andhra Pradesh (where Aurepalle 
is situated).
Secondly, we consider the inter-village differences in agro-economic characteristics
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(see table 1.2.1 in chapter three). In Aurepalle, the population density is the highest while the 
literacy rate is the lowest. Here the average annual rainfall is lower than in Kanzara, though 
higher than that in Shirapur. Shirapur is situated in the drought-prone area of Maharashtra. 
Compared to Aurepalle, the proportion of total area irrigated is lower in Shirapur, giving rise 
to greater risk involved in farm production in this drought-prone village. The proportion of 
crop income in total income is 48% in Aurepalle while that in Shirapur is 34-46%. However, 
the proportion of labour income is higher in Shirapur (43%) than in Aurepalle (20%).
Finally, we compare the average net per capita household income during 1975-76 and 
1977-78 among these study villages. The average net per capita income was Rs. 627 in 
Kanzara, Rs. 445 in Shirapur and Rs. 422 in Aurepalle at 1968-69 prices. The lack of 
agricultural and non-agricultural employment opportunities in Aurepalle is reflected in that 
it has the lowest household income among the study village closely followed by Shirapur; 
Kanzara, however, has a much higher per capita income. It is noteworthy that irrespective 
of greater variability in crop income, Shirapur has a greater average per capita household 
income than Aurepalle. This can be attributed to the better prospects of non-farm 
employment opportunities (including the government projects) prevalent in Shirapur.
On the basis of the above indicators, study villages are classified as advanced, 
intermediate and backward. Kanzara is certainly in an advantageous position, being situated 
in the more rainfall-assured zone of the semi-arid tropics which is reflected in its higher per 
capita income. Compared to both Aurepalle and Shirapur, Kanzara is economically more 
prosperous. Kanzara is, therefore, called the ’advanced’ village. Shirapur is also situated in 
Maharashtra; but compared to Kanzara, it is located in a more drought-prone area, giving rise 
to a high variability in crop income. The third village, Aurepalle, situated in the semi-arid 
area of Andhra Pradesh also suffers frequently from fluctuating crop production (though 
irrigation facilities are better in Aurepalle relative to Shirapur,; see table 1.2.1 in chapter 
three). However, there is a crucial distinction between Aurepalle and Shirapur. The high 
variability of farm income in Shirapur is, to a large extent, compensated for by the 
availability of non-farm employment opportunities (including government jobs) to all groups 
of labourers. In addition to the positive impact of MEGS, the village has access to the 
unskilled labour market of the Sholapur textile industry. Secondly, the village comes under 
the Drought-Prone Area Programme (DPAP) and, as such, receives steady and substantial 
support from the central and the state governments. Moreover, it follows from our 
discussions in sections two and three of this chapter that compared to Kanzara and Shirapur, 
landless labourers in Aurepalle are worse off not only with respect to the availability of non­
243
farm employment opportunities, but also with respect to that of credit. Accordingly, Shirapur 
is designated to be the ’intermediate’ village and Aurepalle the ’backward’ one.
7.4.2. Incidence of Regular Farm Contracts
In this section, we examine the association between the declining incidence of regular 
contracts and the growing economic well-being of a village. As an illustration, let us take the 
case of Aurepalle. Aurepalle is the most backward of the three study villages and it is the 
village with the highest incidence of regular farm servants. These are also found to be the 
poorest (in terms of wage and non-wage benefits) among all three study villages. The number 
of regular labourers hired by the sample households fluctuates over the period 1975-76 to 
1984-85, but lies in the range of 23 to 26. In comparison, the number of regular labourers 
in Kanzara varies between 10 to 26 over this 10 year period (in most years it was around 17) 
while the number is as low as 2 to 5 in Shirapur. This is also reflected in the probability of 
hiring regular farm servants in the study villages12; while the probability is 0.33 in 
Aurepalle, it is 0.17 in Kanzara during the study period, i.e., 1980-84 (also see section 5.2 
in chapter five). The probability comes to only 0.04 in Shirapur (see our explanation in 
sections 7.3.2 and 7.3.4). The average period of association as well as the degree of 
dependence on the employer is also higher in Aurepalle compared to Shirapur or Kanzara.
Thus, compared to Shirapur or Kanzara, the institution of regular farm contracts 
continues to be stronger in Aurepalle. According to our analysis, this can be attributed to 
greater employment and credit constraints operating on the landless labourers in this village 
compared to other study villages.
Next, we consider the trend in casualisation of the rural labour force in India. To this 
end, we use the reports of some large-scale surveys in India. As already mentioned, 
Vaidyanathan (1986) and Krishnamurty (1984) examine the general trend in an all-India 
perspective. Using their information, we calculate the per cent change in the growth of non- 
agricultural employment and that of the casual labour force as shown in table 4.2. Positive 
(+) and negative (-) signs in the table indicate the direction of change over the period under 
consideration. Using columns (i) and (ii) of table 4.2, the correlation coefficient between the 
growth of non-agricultural employment in different states of India and the corresponding rate 
of casualisation (% share of casual labour in total employment) for the period 1972-73 to
12As before, we calculate the probability of hiring regular farm servants in a particular village as the relative 
frequency; it is the ratio of the number of households hiring regular farm servants out of the total number of 
sample households considered in the village during the study period.
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1977-78 is calculated. The correlation coefficient is found to be positive for both male and 
female labourers, though smaller for female labourers; it is 0.15 for male and 0.08 for female 
labourers. This means that with the growth of non-farm employment opportunities, there has 
been an increasing casualisation of the male and female rural labour force with the extent 
being greater for male labourers. In fact, it has been found that in many instances female 
labourers are denied the access to non-farm jobs.
The primary incentive of regular contracts in many parts of India still today is the 
credit security made available to the landless poor which is otherwise difficult to obtain. The 
analysis in section two of the chapter indicates that credit constraints operating on the rural 
poor have weakened in different parts of India in recent years, but its extent also varies 
among the villages situated in different states. In general, landless labourers are largely 
excluded from the access to formal credit in different parts of the country. We, however, are 
not aware of any study which identifies increasing credit availability as a factor in the 
disintegration of regular farm contracts in India.
7.4.3. Growth of Real Agricultural Wages
The final task is to relate the declining incidence of regular contracts with the growth 
of real wages. This enables us to separate out the effect of the supply factor relative to 
demand. As already discussed, under the pressure of lack of regular labour supply, regular 
wages have grown faster in the study villages. Between 1975-78 and 1981-84, both men and 
women’s real casual wages have risen by about 60% in Aurepalle. During the same period, 
men’s real wages rose by 41% in Shirapur while females’ wages increased by 58%. In 
contrast, real wages in Kanzara grew at a much lower rate during this period; the 
corresponding figures were 11% for men and 19% for women (Walker & Ryan, 1990).
With the growing reluctance among labourers to take on regular farm servants’ jobs, 
there has also been an upgrading of regular wages in all the study villages during the first 
half of the eighties. In Aurepalle, the mean monthly payment in paddy increased by 20% 
from 45 kg. in 1979 to 55 kg. in 1985. A similar trend has also been found in the 
Maharashtra villages; in Shirapur, the cash component of the regular wage doubled from Rs. 
75 in 1979-80 to Rs. 150 in 1985-86 (though the payment in kind, in sorghum, remained 
unchanged). In Kanzara, the mean monthly salary rose from Rs. 110 in 1979-80 to Rs. 190 
in 1985-86. It follows that, in the first half of eighties, the regular wage did increase in real 
terms, even if we allow for the rise in prices during this period (village consumer price index
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(1975-76 = 100) rose to a level between 150 and 160 in the early eighties).
Evidence suggests that the pressure of demand relative to supply has led to an 
increase in the advance component of the remuneration given to regular farm servants. For 
example, ’.... in the Akola villages from 1980-81 to 1982-83, seventy regular contracts were 
negotiated by the respondent household members, and of these 51% included advances 
averaging Rs. 313. The same households from 1983-84 to 1985-86 negotiated only 59 regular 
farm contracts, 73% of them involving advances averaging Rs. 520’ (pp. 135, Walker and 
Ryan, 1990).
Secondly, we consider the growth in real agricultural wages (for male casual 
labourers) in different states of India during 1972-73 and 1977-78 as shown in table 4.2. It 
suggests that during this period real wage rates grew fast in most states in India. Next, we 
examine if there is a direct correlation between the rate of casualisation of the rural labour 
force and the rate of growth of real wages in different states in India. To this end, we 
calculate the correlation coefficient between the rate of casualisation (column ii of table 4.2) 
and the rate of growth of real (male) wages (column iii of table 4.2). The correlation 
coefficient for male labourers is estimated to be 0.59 and it is statistically significant, too.
The above analysis suggests that recent declining trend in the incidence of regular 
contracts is closely related to the growth of rural non-farm employment opportunities in 
different parts of India. Moreover, this declining incidence of regular contracts is generally 
accompanied by the growth of real wages not only in the study villages but also in different 
states of India. Taken together, available evidence reflects that the recent decline of regular 
contracts in India is caused by the leftward shift of the supply of labour so that real wages 
have increased (and not decreased).
7.4.4. Some Additional Considerations
Our analysis so far has emphasized the growth of alternative employment and credit 
prospects to explain the changing pattern of labour contracts in rural India. However, some 
additional factors may also be important in the determination of the nature of rural labour 
contracts.
One possible factor affecting the evolution of labour contracts is the mechanization 
of agriculture, started in the early sixties. Some studies highlight the effect of agricultural 
mechanization in the Indian states of Punjab and Haryana where the impact of mechanization 
(related to the successful green revolution) is most pronounced. Using a sample of 240
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owner-cultivator farms drawn from the wheat-growing areas of Punjab in 1971-72, Agarwal 
(1981) examines the effect of mechanization on employment by agricultural operations. She 
finds that there are variations according to farm-size and the nature of agricultural operations.
Harvesting is the function which is still carried on by manual labour while threshing 
is highly mechanized for most farms in these villages. Both traditional and modem 
techniques are used in ploughing and sowing while irrigation is done largely by modem 
means. In ploughing, as farm size increases, the proportion of family labour time displaced 
decreases while that of permanent and casual labour time displaced increases. Similarly, in 
sowing, tractors tend to reduce requirements of family labour time on the smaller farms and 
of permanent labour time on the larger ones with some little increase in the use of casual 
labour time. Canal irrigation, however, leads to an increase in the use of labour time on 
farms of all sizes; on smaller farms it raises the use of family labour time while on larger 
farms it raises the use of permanent labour time. Mechanization is found to be labour- 
displacing in threshing; in this case, it displaces family and casual labour on smaller farms, 
and family and permanent labour on larger farms.
Agarwal’s observations fit into Bardhan’s (1984a) andEswaran and Kotwal’s (1985a) 
argument that labour-saving technical progress (e.g., as threshing) reduces the incidence of 
regular farm contracts while yield-increasing technical progress (e.g., irrigation) will increase 
the incidence of regular farm contracts. It appears that the study villages are the traditional 
ones which still follow labour-intensive techniques of production; the use of tractors, 
threshers and sprayers is extremely limited. Hence, the effect of mechanization has not yet 
been felt on the present form of labour contracts in these villages.
Secondly, migration may also play a crucial role in determining the nature and 
incidence of regular farm contracts, especially in view of the increasing inter-regional 
disparity in agricultural development in India. Migration offers an additional opportunity for 
labourers to change their working conditions and more to where wages are higher. Also, 
migrant labour enjoys a kind of anonymity; unlike the village his or her labour is not 
associated with his caste or family background. Thus, migration may be a way out of the 
village social hierarchy. However, as already discussed in chapter four, short-distance 
migration among the neighbouring villages is not very common in rural India. More common 
is long-distance migration.
There are some studies where the significance of migration is studied. For example, 
Oberoi and Singh (1980) have examined the case of migrant labourers, moving from U.P. 
to the villages in Punjab; Breman (1985) has studied the case of migrant labourers in the
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prosperous villages of south Gujrat (also see discussion in chapter four). None of them has 
studied the consequence of migration on the form of labour contracts. However, 
Ramachandran (1990) argues that the opportunity of migration from the village 
(Gokilapuram) in Tamilnadu to the cardamom estates in Kerala may contribute to the 
disintegration of labour services in Gokilapuram.
In the study villages, however, migration does not offer a viable employment 
opportunity for labourers13. Occasionally, some members of the household move to cities 
to earn a better livelihood; nevertheless, in view of the high costs of dislocation relative to 
the benefits, villagers do not usually consider migration to be an attractive option.
7.4.5. An Overview
To summarise, we emphasize that the declining incidence of regular labour contracts 
in India is not only related to the changing employment constraints, but also to the slackening 
credit constraints in rural India. Our analysis emphasizes the fact that this decline of regular 
labour contracts is due primarily to a shift to the left of the supply curve itself, due to better 
employment and credit opportunities, rather than to a shift to the left of the demand curve, 
reflecting an increasing reluctance on the part of the farmers to hire regular labourers (i.e., 
it is a ’pull’ and not a ’push’ effect). A possible manifestation of this effect is that the 
decline of regular contracts has gone hand in hand with an increase and not a decrease in 
real wages.
Secondly, we find that the greater the economic prosperity of a village, the lower is 
the extent of these constraints and the lower the incidence of regular farm contracts or, 
conversely, the higher is the casualisation of the labour force.
It appears that there is a contradiction between our findings and the belief that there 
has been a major impoverishment of agricultural labourers in rural India in recent years. 
Using NSS data, Kalpana Bardhan (1989) finds that between 1964-65 and 1974-75 (the 
period following the green revolution in India), the rural wage labour force with little/no land 
nearly doubled. By 1977-78, there were 62 million agricultural labourers while there were 
only about 100 million cultivating peasants. According to Bardhan this upsurge in the rural 
wage labour force has been the result of the following factors: (i) rapid population growth,
(ii) agrarian structural changes (e.g., increasing operational concentration of land and the
13Among the study villages, there is some in-migration in Kanzara; but migration out of the villages is not 
common.
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intensification of agriculture, decline of tenancy due to the fear of tenancy regulations etc.) 
and (iii) the push-pull effect of regional disparity working through intra-rural labour 
migration and displacement of previously self-employed persons who entered the market for 
farm labour. There is no denying the fact that the above factors can explain the growing 
casualisation of the rural labour in India, at least to some extent
It appears that Bardhan was misled by the apparent decline in the real agricultural 
wages during 1964-65 and 1974-75, a lot of which can be attributed to the rise in price level 
in 1974-75. Secondly, there is no reason why a rapid increase in population growth would 
not lead to a growing incidence of regular contracts as opposed to casual contracts. Finally, 
’impoverishment’ theory is not consistent with more recent evidence on trends and wage 
levels during this period. Hence, we retain our argument of a leftward shift of labour supply 
curve which has been caused by the following factors, namely, (a) rapid growth of rural non­
farm jobs and (b) increasing government efforts with a variety of employment and credit 
programmes to improve the plight of the rural poor14 during this period. These factors 
worked as the ’pull’ factor one symptom of which may be the fact that increasing 
casualisation has gone hand in hand with an increase in real wages not only in the study 
villages, but also in most states in India.
Nevertheless, the institution of regular farm contracts continues to prevail in rural 
India. The factors which can be attributed to the persistence of this institution are as follows:
(i) Landlessness, unemployment and poverty of a large number of rural households;
(ii) Various kinds of credit market rigidity and usury;
(iii) Prevalence of the caste system and its close relationship with landlessness;
(iv) Lack of literacy and social awareness of poor households of what is happening
around.
Conclusion
The analysis in this chapter suggests that, with the evolution of rural credit and 
labour markets, the institution of regular farm servants has undergone substantial change in
14Kalpana Bardhan claims that these factors are relevant for those somewhat above the poorest strata. This 
is, however, not true in the study villages. Our analysis in chapter six suggests that farm and non-farm jobs are 
complements for rural male who come predominantly from families with less landholdings. Also, Walker and 
Ryan (1990) find that the benefits of MEGS directly accrue to the poorest labourers in Shirapur and Kanzara 
which explains the significantly negative coefficient of the effect of assets on workers’ participation.
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the eighties.
With the introduction of various employment and credit programmes, employment 
and credit constraints on landless labourers are slackening, giving rise to various kinds of 
wage employment and self-employment opportunities. As various alternative employment 
opportunities are coming up, rural labourers including the landless ones in the villages are 
becoming reluctant to take on regular farm jobs. Under the pressure of circumstances, the 
following trends have set in:
(a) Due to better employment and credit facilities made available to the rural 
labourers, especially to the landless ones, there has been a declining incidence of regular farm 
contracts15. This has been followed by a growing casualisation of the rural labour force 
which primarily reflects the growth of non-farm and governmental jobs as well as the 
availability of cheap credit.
(b) The decline of regular labour has occurred hand in hand with the introduction of 
various types of contractual arrangements to suit the needs of employers and employees, 
which generally marks a trend towards casualisation of the rural labour force. This has been 
accompanied by the rise of real casual and regular wages, possibly manifesting a leftward 
shift of labour supply and not an upward shift of labour demand.
(c) Interestingly enough, the relation between employers and regular farm servants 
has also undergone some changes. Nowadays, even the poorer labourers are in a stronger 
bargaining position vis-a-vis their employers. The employer-employee relation is just 
confined to farm work and does not usually extend to the domestic work for the employer 
as was the case before. The extent of extra-economic coercion or patron-client relationship 
has been reduced to a minimum.
However, inter-regional differences are observed. The higher the economic prosperity 
of a village, the higher the growth of farm and non-farm employment opportunities as well 
as access to better credit facilities; consequently, the lower is the incidence of regular 
contracts (and/or the better is the conditions for regular farm servants). This necessitates that 
the government to undertake further measures to alleviate the constraints operating in the 
labour and credit markets for the poorer labourers in the more deprived villages.
Given an already existing unequal distribution of land and non-land resources, free 
functioning of the rural labour markets may not ensure the best outcomes in terms of wage 
and employment of the rural labour force. Different kinds of intervention including both
15Existence of long-term contracts does not allow flexibility in market adjustment in response to demand- 
supply shifts. Thus a general trend towards casualisation of the labour force may lead to increased efficiency of 
the labour market
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long-term and short-term ones may be suggested at this point:
(a) Redistribution of both land and non-land assets.
(b) Encouraging workers’ mobility through the introduction of education and training 
programmes.
(c) Removing imperfections in the credit market.
(d) Formulating and implementing legislation governing wages and working 
conditions of workers.
(e) Generation of more non-farm employment opportunities for rural labour, 
especially in the slack season.
(f) Strengthening workers’ organisations to exercise some bargaining power over 
wages and employment levels by controlling the supply of labour.
While (a) and (b) refer to long-term policies of intervention, (c), (d) and (e) refer to 
those governing short-term interventions. An effective implementation of short and long-term 
measures may help to reduce the problems of poverty and inequality among the rural labour 
in India.
With the increase in government intervention and the implementation of different 
credit and employment programmes, a process of casualisation of labour has started. This is 
a move in the right direction; it not only alleviates credit and labour market rigidity, but also 
strengthens the bargaining position of the rural landless poor. However, given the regional 
dispersion, the desired impact is still lagging behind expectation.
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CHAPTER 7 : TABLES
TABLE 1.1. Changing Composition of Main and Marginal Workers in Rural India, 1972-73,1977-78 and 
1983
Status of 
Employment
1972-73 1977-78 1983
Male Female Male Female Male Female
Self 65.9% 64.5% 62.8% 62.1% 60.4% 62.2%
Regular 12.1% 4.1% 10.6% 2.8% 10.8% 3.1%
Casual 22.0% 31.4% 26.7% 35.1% 28.8% 34.7 %
S o u r c e  : V a id y a n a th a n  (1 9 8 6 ) .
TABLE 1.1’. Sectoral Distribution (%) of Rural Workers in India, 1977-78 and 1983
Sector
1977-78 1983
Male Female Male Female
Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry, Fishing 80.6 88.1 76.8 86.7
Mining, Quarrying, Manufacturing 7.1 6.2 8.0 7.2
Construction 1.7 0.6 2.6 0.9
Trade, Transport 5.5 2.0 6.5 2.1
Community, Social & Personal Services 5.1 3.0 5.9 3.0
S o u r c e  : V a id y a n a th a n  (1 ^ 8 6 )  ( b a s e d  o n  N s S  d a ta ) .
TABLE 1.1". Per Cent Distribution of Male Working Force by Main Activity, All India (Excluding Assam), 
1971 and 1981
Main Activity 1971 1981
Cultivation 55.73 55.16
Agricultural Labour 25.61 24.00
Plantation & Forestry 2.39 2.50
Mining & Quarrying 0.43 0.49
Household Manufacturing 3.19 2.87
Non-Household Manufacturing 2.49 3.82
Construction 0.83 1.12
Trade &  Commerce 2.75 3.27
Transport & Communication 0.97 1.37
Other Services 5.62 5.39
S o u r c e  : K r is h n a m u r ty  (1 9 8 4 )  ( b a s e d  o n  C e n su s  d a ta ) .
252
TABLE 1.1.1. Inter-State Variation in the Distribution of Casual Labour in Public Works, 1977-78
States
%  o f Total Casual Labour in Public Works
Male Female Total
Andhra Pradesh 2.80 1.16 1.98
Assam 4.79 14.87 6.34
Bihar 3.16 1.88 2.75
Gujrat 0.30 * 0.18
Haryana 8.15 * 6.34
Himachal Pradesh 32.83 17.31 30.46
Jammu & Kashmir 20.82 20.00 20.77
Karnataka 2.23 2.22 2.23
Kerala 0.80 0.67 0.74
Madhya Pradesh 9.33 6.58 8.00
Maharashtra 7.49 6.61 7.00
Orissa 1.64 0.37 1.13
Punjab 8.19 * 7.45
Rajasthan 6.75 * 4.32
Tamil Nadu 2.53 1.21 1.90
Uttar Pradesh 6.90 1.04 5.33
West Bengal 2.10 1.88 2.05
S o u rce  : S. M u kh opadh yay (1 9 8 7 )  (b a se d  on  N S S  da ta).
TABLE 1.1.1’. Average Daily Earnings of Male Labourers (in Rs.) in Different States, 1974-75 and 1977-78
States
1974-75 1977-78
Farm Non-Farm Farm Non-Farm
Andhra Pradesh 2.66 2.80 3.50 4.39
Assam 4.02 3.29 5.12 5.42
Bihar 3.24 3.38 3.39 4.53
Gujrat 3.22 3.22 3.89 5.70
Haryana * * 5.75 6.06
Karnataka 2.87 3.16 3.04 4.15
Kerala 5.97 5.48 6.65 6.72
Madhya Pradesh 2.42 2.47 2.76 6.79
Maharashtra 2.64 2.68 3.15 4.53
Orissa 2.64 2.50 3.07 3.75
Punjab 5.60 5.10 7.08 7.71
Rajasthan 3.85 3.27 4.33 5.37
Tamil Nadu 3.69 3.56 3.89 4.32
Uttar Pradesh 3.21 3.66 3.63 5.20
West Bengal 3.49 3.27 3.98 5.37
S o u rce  : V aidyanathan  (1 9 8 6 ) (b a se d  on  M SS da ta ).
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TABLE 12. Composition of Workers in the Study Villages, 1975-84 and 1989
Employment Status Aurepalle Shirapur Kanzara
1975-84 1989 1975-84 1989 1975-84 1989
Self 0.40 0.45 0.39 0.69 0.51 0.27
Casual 0.23 0.23 0.28 0.10 0.20 0.33
Regular 0.24 0.16 0.10 0.02 0.15 0.10
Others 0.13 0.16 0.23 0.18 0.14 0.31
N o te  : The defin ition  o f  d ifferen t typ es  o f  em p lo ym en t s ta tu s is  g iv e n  the text. E ach  e n try  re fers  to  th e p ro p o r tio n  
o f  w o rk e rs  in  th e re sp ec tive  ty p e  o f  em p lo ym en t sta tus.
TABLE 2.1. Distribution of Rural Households According to the Source of Credit, 1971 and 1981, All India
Source of Credit
Cultivators Non-Cultivators All Rural Hhs
1971 1981 1971 1981 1971 1981
A . F o rm a l 31.7 63.2 10.8 36.7 29.2 61.2
Government 7.1 3.9 3.4 4.5 6.7 4.0
Co-operatives 22.0 29.8 6.0 13.9 20.1 28.6
Commercial Banks 2.4 28.8 0.8 17.3 2.2 28.0
Insurance 0.1 0.4 0.2 - 0.1 0.3
Provident Fund 0.1 0.3 0.4 1.0 0.1 0.3
B . I n fo rm a l 68.3 36.8 89.2 63.3 70.8 38.8
Landlords 8.1 3.7 12.6 8.4 8.6 4.0
Agri. Money-lenders 23.0 8.3 23.8 11.4 23.1 8.6
Prof. Money-lenders 13.1 7.8 18.7 13.4 13.8 8.3
Traders 8.4 3.1 10.9 5.8 8.7 3.4
Relatives/F riends 13.1 8.7 19.0 14.4 13.8 9.0
Others 2.6 5.2 4.2 9.9 2.8 5.5
C. T o ta l 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
S ou rce: R B l bu lletin , 1 986
TABLE 2 2 .  Per Cent of Households Having Access to Formal Credit in the Study Villages, 1975-79 and 
1980-84
Villages Labour Households Small Farms Medium Farms Large Farms
75-79 80-84 75-79 80-84 75-79 80-84 75-79 80-84
Aurepalle 0 0 0 52% 26% 15% 43% 59%
Shirapur 61% 75% 56% 38% 62% 68% 71% 73%
Kanzara 0 0 80% 95% 81% 82% 82% 97%
N o te  : F orm al c r e d it  in c lu d es c r e d it  o ffe red  b y  the co m m erc ia l banks, la n d -d e ve lo p m en t banks, c o o p era tives ,  
g o vern m en t etc.
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TABLE 3.2.2. Per Cent Share of Casual Labour in Rural Work Force in Different States in India, 1972-73 
and 1977-78
States
Male Female
1972-73 1977-78 1972-73 1977-78
Andhra Pradesh 27.42 33.58 48.98 52.76
Bihar 24.05 32.63 36.00 45.72
Gujrat 25.01 29.41 26.31 32.07
Haryana 9.67 14.94 8.38 18.71
Kerala 39.13 37.71 47.65 32.22
Madhya Pradesh 15.50 22.17 24.79 31.11
Maharashtra 31.78 30.79 44.76 46.77
Punjab 16.01 19.04 9.58 8.55
Rajasthan 5.47 10.85 4.86 8.27
Tamil Nadu 31.30 35.20 45.92 57.29
Uttar Pradesh 13.83 16.33 15.32 20.21
West Bengal 32.09 34.07 38.89 33.14
India 22.03 26.65 31.44 35.06
S o u rce  : K rish n a m u rty  (1 9 8 4 (b a se d  on  N S S  d a ta
TABLE 4.1. Some Socio-Economic Indicators at the State-Level
Indicators Andhra
Pradesh
Maharashtra
Population Density in 1981 [1] 195 204
% of literacy in 1981 [2] 25 (20) 39 (35)
Annual Rainfall (mm.) 879 1314
% of gross cropped area irrigated in 1982 31.4 9.1
Rate of Growth of NDP in Agriculture during 70/71-84/85 [3] 2.13 4.21
State domestic product per capita in 1984-85[4] 705 1017
% of total villages electrified in 1988-89 97.4 98.2
%  of villages connected with all-weather roads in 1987-88 43.0 52.9
State-wise rural monthly p.c. consumer expenditure in 1977-78[5] 69.7 76.9
% of population below poverty line in 1983/84 36.4 34.9
% of casual agricultural labour in Public Works in 1977-78 2.15 8.00
%  share in total factory employment in 1984-85[6] 8.7 16.0
Note
[2] Numbers in parentheses refer to the female literacy rate.
[3] Rate of growth of net domestic product (NDP) in Rs. of workers in agriculture (70/71=100).
[4] State domestic product per capita in 84-85 is measured in Rs. at 70-71 prices.
[5] Per capita (p.c.) consumer expenditure in Rs. at 70-71 prices.
[6] It includes factory units employing ten or more workers using power and also those factory units 
employing twenty or more workers not using power. It does not include working proprietors or unpaid family 
workers.
S o u rce  : S. M u kh opadh yay (1 9 9 2 );  A .V . J o se  (1 9 9 2 );  In d ia  d a ta  b a se  b y  H .L  C h an dh ok  a n d  th e P o lic y  G roup, 
1 9 9 0 ; In d ia  E co n o m ic  In form ation  Y e a r  B ook, A g a rw a l, V arm a a n d  G upta , 1 9 8 8 -8 9 ; S ta tis tic a l O u tlin e  o f  India, 
D e p a r tm e n t o f  E c o n o m ics a n d  S ta tis tics , T a ta  S e rv ic e s  L td ., 1989-90 .
255
TABLE 4 2 .  Changes in Non-Agricultural Employment, Real Wages and Casualisation in Percentage of 
Rural Labour Force During 1972-73 and 1977-78
States
% Change in Employment during 
1972-73 to 1977-78
(i)
Non-farm
Employment
[1]
(ii) %  Share of Casual Labour 
in Total Rural Labour Force [2] (iii) Male Real Wages [3]
Male Female
Andhra Pradesh +7.66 +6.16 +3.78 +10.16
Assam -49.19 * * -6.02
Bihar -6.44 +8.58 +9.72 +27.76
Gujrat -14.49 +4.4 +5.76 +28.86
Haryana +26.21 +5.27 +10.33 +0.93
Jammu and Kashmir +37.11 * * +29.17
Karnataka -6.34 * * -1.72
Kerala -1.59 -1.42 -15.43 +13.93
Madhya Pradesh +7.2 +6.67 +6.32 +13.21
Maharashtra -31.03 -0.99 +2.01 14.15
Orissa -8.04 * * -2.01
Punjab +26.63 +3.03 -1.03 +16.47
Rajasthan +25.81 +5.38 +3.41 +2.70
Tamil Nadu +26.51 +3.90 +1137 +4.74
Uttar Pradesh +5.39 +2.50 +4.89 +10.46
West Bengal +3.09 +1.98 -5.75 +11.33
N o te  : [1 J  C a lcu la ted  f r o m  V aidyanathan  (1 9 8 6 );
[ 2 ]  C a lcu la ted  f r o m  K rish n a m u rty  (1 9 8 4 )  (b a se d  o n  N S S  d a ta ).
[ 3 ]  C a lcu la ted  f r o m  A c h a rya  (1 9 8 9 ), A g r ic u ltu ra l W a g es in  In d ia  : A  D isa g g r e g a te d  A n a lys is ', Indian
J o u rn a l o f  A g r icu ltu ra l E conom ics, 44 (2 ).
[ 4 ]  E ach  en try  in  1 9 7 2 -7 3  c o rre sp o n d s to  p o p u la tio n  in th e a g e -g ro u p  1 5 -5 9  y e a r s  w h ile  th a t in  1 9 7 7 -  
7 8  re fe rs  to  th e p o p u la tio n  a g e d  m o re  than  5  yea rs .
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
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As discussed in the introductory chapter, the intention of this dissertation is to 
analyze the coexistence of casual and regular labour contracts in Indian agriculture. In 
particular, we have dealt in some detail with two relevant decision problems: (i) how an 
employer chooses between casual and regular contracts and (ii) how a labourer chooses 
between casual and regular contracts. We have attempted to examine these issues from both 
a theoretical and an empirical perspective. This chapter presents an overview of the findings, 
and some concluding remarks.
1. Theoretical Issues
1.1. Earlier Contributions
Village studies and household surveys bring out a number of stylised facts relating 
to the coexistence of casual and regular labour contracts in Indian agriculture. It has been 
argued (chapter one) that existing labour-market theories fail to account for all these stylised 
facts, and to provide satisfactory explanations of the coexistence of regular and casual 
contracts.
(a) Dual labour market theories, developed in the context of advanced industrial 
economies, cannot be easily applied in the context of Indian agriculture. Their concerns are 
rather different, and so are the empirical facts they attempt to explain. For instance, these 
theories have placed strong emphasis on exogenous workers’ characteristics such as race or 
sex, which cannot explain the segmentation of the labour market between casual and regular 
contracts in Indian agriculture. Similarly, these theories neglect crucial aspects of the labour 
market in Indian agriculture, such as the seasonality, which play a central role in the 
coexistence of casual and regular labour contracts.
(b) Some variants of the efficiency wage models (based on shirking and nutrition) 
attempt to explain the coexistence of casual and regular contracts. As we saw in chapter two, 
however, efficiency wage arguments have primarily been used to explain the substitution of 
casual labour contracts for regular contracts rather than their coexistence.
(c) Screening models are not plausible for a small, closed village economy. This is 
because the asymmetric-information assumption that employers do not know the personal 
characteristics of prospective labourers is not valid in such an economy.
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(d) Finally, a group of models argue that the coexistence of casual and regular 
contracts in rural India reflects the sharing of risk between employers and labourers in the 
context of seasonal agriculture. Some of these models also include considerations such as 
’recruitment costs’, and ’wage fluctuations’ between slack and peak seasons, as the primary 
motives for regular labour contracts. These theories come closer to a persuasive explanation, 
but, as discussed in chapter two, they leave a number of stylised facts unexplained or 
ignored, e.g., seasonal unemployment, farm heterogeneity, the role of workers’ characteristics 
and the prevalence of advance payments in regular contracts. Our purpose has been to refine 
and extend this last group of models, taking into account the relevant stylised facts.
In short, at least three important shortcomings of the existing literatures motivate an 
in-depth investigation of the issues examined in this thesis : (i) few labour-market models 
have explicitly analyzed the coexistence of regular and casual labour contracts in agriculture,
(ii) the existing theories do not account for the observed stylised facts, (iii) the existing 
theories have not been subjected to detailed empirical scrutiny.
1.2. Alternative Models
In chapter two, we have developed four different models to explain or characterise 
the coexistence of casual and regular labour contracts in agriculture. These are as follows:
(a) Implicit Contract Model If farmers are risk-neutral and workers risk-averse, 
farmers may insure a group of labourers against the fluctuations of wage and employment 
by offering them employment over a prolonged period at a predetermined wage. In the 
process, farmers will be able to pay a lower wage per day to die regular labourers as 
compared to the casual labourers, where the wage differential constitutes an insurance 
premium.
However, if resale of labour in the slack period is not possible, farmers may have to 
bear the ’hoarding costs’ of maintaining a fixed pool of regular labour, where ’hoarding costs 
refer to the cost of paying regular labour when their productivity is low in some slack 
periods. Given these hoarding costs, farmers may not hire regular labourers only; they may 
hire some casual labourers as well (even though the daily wage rate for casual labourer is 
higher than the daily earnings of a regular labourer. Hoarding costs are particularly high for 
the smaller farms who have a relatively low demand for labour in the slack period; this 
induces them to rely primarily on casual labourers.
(b) Shirking Model. The second model is a variant of the efficiency wage theory. 
Here we assume that some tasks are difficult to supervise, because effort is unobservable.
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Employment of casual labourers in these non-monitorable tasks may be inefficient since, by 
the very nature of the contract, casual labourers are paid even if they shirk. However, a 
regular labourer may be fired if the work is not done properly. Further, if the wage rate is 
higher for regular than for casual labourers, regular labourers will have an incentive to avoid 
being fired. Thus if a farm offers regular contracts with additional incentives, it may succeed 
in inducing the regular labourers not to shirk in the non-monitorable tasks, while employing 
casual labourers to perform other monitorable tasks.
(c) Collateral Model. Rural credit markets in India are segmented between formal 
and informal sectors. Credit is cheaper in the formal sector, though it requires some collateral 
to be offered. Land is the most acceptable form of collateral in these village economies. Due 
to their inability to offer the required collateral, it is difficult for landless labourers to secure 
credit. Hence, risk-averse landless labourers usually go to the informal credit market where 
the marginal cost of credit is comparatively higher.
Usually casual labourers are paid on a daily basis, while a major portion of regular 
wages are paid at the beginning of the contract, and no interest is charged on this advance. 
Consequently, regular contracts with advance payment (i.e., implicit credit) may represent an 
attractive arrangement for landless labourers. If the marginal cost of credit is higher for 
labourers than for employers, and if there is no uncertainty about casual wages, then there 
exists a wage level for regular contracts such that these contracts are mutually beneficial to 
employers and labourers.
(d) Time Constraint Model. The opportunity cost of time is different for landed and 
landless labourers. Landless labourers do not have any obligation to spend labour-time on 
family land so that they can offer their entire non-leisure time in the labour market. On the 
other hand, landed labourers with obligations to work on family land cannot easily spare the 
time to participate in regular jobs. In other words, given that the opportunity cost of pre­
committing time is lower for landless labourers, they have a comparative advantage in regular 
contracts.
It has also been shown that, in each of these models, alternative employment 
opportunities (in the household or outside) play a significant role. If alternative employment 
opportunities expand, the supply curve for regular labour shifts to the left Under these 
circumstances, several outcomes are possible. In particular: (i) farmers may shift to 
alternative contractual arrangements (e.g., casual labour), leading to a decline in the incidence 
of regular labour contracts, (ii) wage and non-wage benefits in regular contracts may be 
revised upwards so as to enhance labourers’ incentives to participate in regular labour
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contracts. Generally, of course, we would expect both effects to take place.
2. Empirical Issues
2.1. Background
The empirical investigations presented in this thesis (chapters three to seven) focus 
mainly on three villages, namely, Aurepalle, Shirapur and Kanzara (the ’study villages’), 
situated in the semi-arid tropics of India. The primary data-set involves observations of a 
cross-section of 120 households in these villages over a period of five years (1980-84). This 
data-set made available by ICRISAT has been supplemented by the following sources : (i) 
ICRISAT resurvey of the three study villages in 1989; (ii) my own resurveys of Aurepalle 
in 1991 and 1992; (iii) reports of some large-scale sample surveys like the National Sample 
Survey (NSS) and the Census and (iv) reports from other available village studies.
As shown in chapter three, there is a positive correlation between land ownership and 
land quality (or value) in the study villages. There is also a positive correlation between land 
ownership and non-land resources per acre. This does not invalidate the use of land area as 
an index of productive endowment, although it does mean that land area underestimates the 
extent of inequality in the ownership of productive resources. We also found a strong 
correlation between land ownership and income per household as well as between caste and 
land ownership.
2.2. Determinants of Labour Participation
In chapter four, we have examined the determinants of labour force participation in 
the study villages. Two elementary determinants are sex and season. Regular labourers are 
predominantly male while females dominate in the casual labour market. There is pronounced 
seasonality in the labour demand as well as in labour participation.
Another preliminary observation of some relevance is that daily regular wages (i.e., 
daily earnings from regular labour contracts) are lower than daily casual wages; this remains 
true if we adjust casual wages to take unemployment into account (by multiplying casual 
wages by (1 - u), where u is the unemployment rate. Hence, risk-neutral landless labourers 
ought to prefer casual contracts to regular contracts. However, this conclusion need not apply 
if we take account the fact that regular labourers receive a large part of their wages in 
advance and that the comparative attractiveness of casual and regular contracts for labourers 
depends quite crucially on credit and alternative employment opportunities.
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Using a probit maximum likelihood technique, the workers’ choice of contract in 
Aurepalle (based on my resurvey data) has been examined. Family landholding is found to 
be a good index of credit and time constraints of the potential workers in the study villages. 
The significance of workers’ family landholding as an explanatory variable suggests that 
individuals from families with smaller landholdings have high marginal costs of credit and 
low opportunity costs of time and are, therefore, more likely to choose regular labour 
contracts. Besides, workers’ age, education and caste are found to be significant explanatory 
variables, all of which reflect the influence of alternative employment opportunities on the 
choice of regular contract.
Two sets of tobit models are used to analyse casual-labour participation in all the 
study villages. Male and female casual labourers from families with smaller landholdings 
participate more in casual agricultural employment because their opportunity cost of time is 
lower than for those with larger family landholdings. Female participation comes primarily 
from the lowest castes, but the same does not apply to male labourers (probably low-caste 
men have a higher propensity to engage in regular contracts). Farm and non-farm 
employment are complementary as far as male labour is concerned, but not so for female 
members (female labourers are largely excluded from casual non-farm employment). Taken 
together, our results suggest that family characteristics are more important than personal 
characteristics as determinants of casual-labour participation.
2.3. Determinants of Involuntary Unemployment
A tobit model has been used to analyse the incidence of unemployment among male 
and female casual labourers (chapter six). As expected, duration of unemployment (number 
of days unemployed per month) significantly declines in the peak season, when the demand 
for labour expands. Also the monthly duration of unemployment is higher in less prosperous 
villages like Shirapur compared to others like Kanzara. Interestingly, labourers from families 
with larger landholdings are found to experience greater duration of unemployment. This may 
be because they look for jobs which are low in demand (e.g., skilled jobs); because 
employers prefer to employ ’habitual’ employees rather than ’occasional’ entrants in the 
labour market; or because involvement in regular labour reduces the incidence of 
unemployment among households with little land.
2.4. Determinants o f Labour Demand
The implicit contract model and the shirking model point to two determinants of the
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demand for regular labour, namely, size of farm and nature of tasks. We have examined the 
significance of these two variables and of other possible determinants of the demand for 
regular labour, using regression analysis (chapter five).
Univariate probit and tobit models have been estimated to determine the type of 
contract a farm offers and the demand for regular labour-hours respectively. We have also 
estimated a ’double-hurdle model’ in which the farms’ choice of contract and the demand for 
regular labour-hours (if a regular contract is chosen) are simultaneously determined. All the 
estimates confirm that regular contracts are more likely to be offered by larger farms. In 
addition to farm size, irrigation facilities and ownership of farm equipments favourably affect 
the likelihood of hiring a regular farm servant. Availability of family labour, on the other 
hand, acts as a substitute to the demand for regular labour. Despite the fact that regular 
labour has zero marginal cost, farm size has positive effect on regular labour-hours among 
farms with a single regular labourer; as explained in chapter five, this finding lends support 
to the notion that there are substantial ’hoarding costs’ associated with hiring regular labour, 
particularly in smaller farms.
Next, the relationship between the nature of agricultural tasks and the type of the 
labour contract is examined. Tasks which are difficult to supervise (e.g., soil preparation, 
spreading fertilizer, irrigation) are called non-monitorable tasks, while those easy to supervise 
(e.g., harvesting and post-harvesting) are monitorable tasks. The probability of employing 
only casual labour is higher for monitorable tasks, though the probability of employing only 
regular labour in non-monitorable tasks is very low in Shirapur and Kanzara. It is only in 
Aurepalle that the probability of employing only regular labour for non-monitorable tasks is 
higher than that of employing only casual labour. However, when cropping patterns are 
accounted for, it appears that in the production of paddy in Aurepalle, it is more likely that 
a large farm employs regular farm servants for the non-monitorable tasks as opposed to the 
monitorable ones.
We have computed chi-square statistics of association between type of contract and 
type of tasks. We have also run multivariate tobit and truncated regressions to investigate 
whether task type has a significant influence on the demand for regular labour-hours (this 
exercise has been carried out separately for all farms and for farms hiring regular labour). 
Neither the chi-square tests nor the tobit/truncated regressions lend support to the notion that 
task type are important determinants of employers’ choice between casual and regular labour. 
In other words, we have found no empirical support for the hypothesis of task-based 
segmentation of labour contracts (the ’shirking model’ developed in chapter two).
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2.5. Trends in Labour Contracts
The growth of alternative employment opportunities in the study villages in recent 
years has had an adverse effect on the incidence of regular contracts (chapter seven). As 
alternative credit and employment opportunities have expanded, rural labourers are 
increasingly reluctant to participate in regular contracts unless they have pressing credit 
requirements. Farmers are found to complain about the non-availability of reliable regular 
farm servants in spite of the increase in real wages. Similar observations have been made in 
many other parts of India. In the light of these observations, we have argued that the decline 
in regular labour in rural India is primarily caused by a decline of labour supply rather than 
by a decline in demand. This is in contrast with the common view that the recent 
casualisation of labour contracts in rural India goes hand in hand with a process of 
impoverishment of agricultural labourers (the latter is inconsistent with the sustained increase 
of real wages for both regular and casual labourers).
The extent of casualisation of the agricultural labour force has not been uniform 
among the study villages. The higher the degree of growth and wealth accumulation in a 
village, the greater is the extent of casualisation of labour.
3. Concluding Remarks
The empirical findings of this thesis are consistent with the implicit contract model, 
the collateral model and the time constraint model (and these models are consistent with each 
other). However, as mentioned earlier we have found no support for the shirking (efficiency 
wage) model.
In terms of policy implications, these findings underline the role played by economic 
insecurity, credit constraints and limited employment opportunities in perpetuating regular 
labour contracts in agriculture. If the incidence of these contracts is to be reduced (and there 
are good grounds for attempting to do so, not only on efficiency grounds, but also in view 
of extra-ordinarily poor terms of employment of regular labour), intervention should be 
directed at removing these disadvantages experienced by agricultural labourers. Possible 
means of doing so include redistribution of land and other assets, provision of educational 
facilities and training programmes, targeted supply of subsidized credit without collateral 
requirements, generation of non-farm employment opportunities (especially in the slack 
seasons) and strengthening of workers’ organisation. While current trends already seem to 
be going in the right direction, much can be done to accelerate them.
APPENDIX
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Appendix. 1
1. Inequality Measures
’Inequality obviously suggests a departure from equality’ (Cowell, 1977). In this 
section, we shall discuss a few inequality measures which satisfy the properties of an ideal 
measure of inequality. We shall refer to the distribution of different variables like land and 
other non-land resources. However, for expositional purpose, we shall refer to all of them as 
income.
An ideal index of inequality should satisfy the following properties (Sen, 1973) :
(i) it should be independent of the change in mean or scale;
(ii) It should be independent of the change in population size;
(iii) it should satisfy the Pigou-Dalton condition which requires the measure of inequality to 
increase if there is a transfer of income from a poorer person to someone richer.
1.1. Variance and the Coefficient of Variation
There are different measures of inequality and these are defined in terms of a 
distribution of income.
Suppose there are n households who are arranged in ascending order of income such
that yx < y2 <...... < yn and let p be the mean of this income distribution. There are a number
of inequality measures which are based on the dispersion of the distribution. For example, 
range, absolute mean deviation, relative mean deviation, variance and coefficient of variation 
are all suggested as different measures of inequality. Variance and the coefficient of variation 
are relatively widely used in the literature. Common definitions of variance and coefficient 
of variation in the distribution y = (ylf y2, y j  are as follows:
i-1  w 
CV = 1  ; CV2 =n n3
where p is the mean of the distribution.
While variance fails to satisfy the property of mean independence, the coefficient of
variation satisfies all three desirable properties of an inequality index.
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1.2. Theirs T and L Indices
We Consider Theil’s T and L indices (Glewwe, 1986) as two measures of inequality 
both of which satisfy all the desirable properties of a good inequality index. The choice is 
guided by the fact that these indices are decomposable. An inequality measure is 
decomposable according to the population groups if it can be expressed as the weighted 
average of the same measure for different groups (within group component) plus the 
inequality measure for the population as a whole where each member is given the average 
income of its particular group (between-group component). If the weights for the between- 
group component are the population shares, we call it weakly decomposable; if, however, 
these are income shares, it is weakly decomposable.
Let y* be the income of the ith household in the h-th landholding class, h = 1,2,...,H 
where H is the total number of landholding classes in the sample. Let there be % households 
in each landholding class so that % = n is the total number of households in the sample. 
Therefore, y11 = E, y/1 is the total income of the households in the hth landholding class. 
Following measures are defined with respect to the income distribution :
Theil’s entropy index (T) is defined as :
r- EE4*
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where n is the total number of households in the population. In other words, T is the sum 
of within group component and between group components. T satisfies all three desirable 
properties of an ideal index of inequality. Moreover, it is weakly decomposable. T is defined 
even when y=0 .
A second measure is Theil’s entropy index (L) which is defined as follows :
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L is also expressed as the sum of within group components and between group components. 
L satisfies the properties of mean and population independence; it also satisfies the Pigou- 
Dalton sensitivity condition. Moreover, L is additively decomposable in the strict sense. 
However, L is not defined for zero income level since ln(y) tends to infinity as y tends to 
zero.
Appendix. 2
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2.1. Some Tests of Independence
Two variables X and Y are said to be independent if the joint probability is the 
product of the marginal probabilities, i.e., P(XY) = P(X) * P(Y). This can be explained on 
the basis of a bivariate contingency table. Each cell (i j)  in the contingency table denotes the 
number of cases (frequency) taking values X=Xi and Y=Yj. Along with the frequency, we 
can calculate row and column percentages keeping one/other variable, in this bivariate 
framework, constant. These are known as the marginals. To construct a statistical test of 
independence, we calculate the following :
p / y  V \  =  I count e  row <\ j  count € column j \
K 1 ’ V  \ N I [  N I
where N is the sample size. To obtain the expected number of observations El} in each cell 
(i,j), the probability P  ^is multiplied by N.
h - [
_  [" (count 6 row i) * (count e  column j ) 1 
N
A statistic that has often been used to test the hypothesis that the row and the column 
variables are independent is Pearson’s chi-square statistic. It is calculated by summing over 
the squared residuals of all cells divided by the expected frequencies. The statistic thus 
provides a numerical index of the discrepancy between P  ^ and E .^ Expected frequencies are 
the frequencies that would be expected if the variables of interest are not related. Therefore, 
any significant discrepancy between Py and E  ^ establishes the fact that the variables are 
related.
(p, - v
An alternative to Pearson’s chi-square is the likelihood ratio (LR) chi-square which is based
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on the value of maximum likelihood function. For large sample Pearson’s chi-square and LR 
chi-square give very similar results.
However, the magnitude of the observed chi-square depends not only on the 
goodness of fit of the independence model, but also on the sample size. If the sample size 
increases, so does the value of chi-square. Hence, we calculate Cramer’s V that corrects x2 
for the influence of the sample size and provides a more easily interpreted measure of the 
strength of the relationship.
V = N il(n - 1)
where n is the number of rows or columns whichever is smaller and N is the total number 
of cases.
2.2. Ordinal Measures of Association
The degree of association between two ordered variables may be measured by the 
concept of correlation. The Spearman correlation coefficient is a commonly used measure of 
correlation between two ordinal variables. For all cases, variables are ranked from the 
smallest to the largest values. Pearson correlation coefficient, on the other hand, is computed 
on the ranks. Correlation is positive if the higher value of one variable is associated with a 
higher value of the second variable. However, correlation is negative if the higher value of 
one variable is associated with a lower value of the other.
Appendix: 3
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Diagnostic Tests : Probit and Tobit Models
3.1. Goodness of Fit
In an ordinary linear regression, multiple correlation coefficient R2 serves as the 
appropriate test statistic. In a limited dependent model (probit/tobit), however, R2 loses its 
relevance. Hence, we have to use some alternative test statistics.
The simplest way to check the goodness of fit is to report the maximized value of 
the log-likelihood function (L). One can also report the value of the log-likelihood function 
(L0), when the coefficients of all the regressors except that of the constant term are zero. In 
a probit model one can combine L and L0 in a single goodness of fit statistic (Greene, 1991), 
giving rise to the likelihood ratio index (LRI) as follows :
LRI = M 4 )]
where L is the natural logarithm of the maximised value of die likelihood function and Lq 
is the value of the likelihood function when there is only the constant intercept term 
(assuming that all the other parameters are zero).
More importantly, one may construct a statistical test for the joint significance of the
i
regression coefficients. Using a likelihood ratio (LR) test, this can be done as follows.
LR = 2 (L -  Lq) ~ X*
which follows a chi-square distribution with a degree of freedom equal to k where k is the 
number of regressor in the model.
3.2. Normality
It is assumed that the random variables in probit and tobit models follow a normal 
distribution. If, however, they are not normally distributed in reality, maximum likelihood 
probit and tobit estimates are inconsistent. Hence, we need to test for normality.
Let us first consider the standard latent variable model for the univariate probit.
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y;  = X ' p + ui 
where ut ~ N  (0 , 1) , i = 1 , 2 n
Under normality, Y* is distributed with a mean X*’p and a variance unity where n is the 
sample size.
Following Rudd (1984) and Pagan and Vella (1990), we can parameterise the 
alternative hypothesis of non-normality as follows :
0 [*/p h- y2(*/p)2 + y3(jc/P)3] (1)
where <E>(.) is the cumulative distribution function of a standard normal variable.
This specification is based on the fact that any marginal distribution function can be 
approximated by a power series expansion of the normal distribution. Suppose, the true 
probability that Yj, = 1 is G(x’p) as follows :
G(x/P) = m (V P)]
where £(.) is an m-th order power series with a non-negative first derivative as follows :
«*/p) - i» /p )”
n«l
If we assume that m = 3 and if we normalise y0 = 0, yx = 1, (1) holds good. It follows that 
when (xjp) is normally distributed, y2 = y3 = 0 1.
Given the above specification of the null and the alternative hypothesis, we can 
construct a RESET-type (Ramsey, 1969) likelihood ratio statistic to test the following 
hypothesis :
H o: Y2 = "h = 0.
form al distribution has the property that the third central moment (moment about mean of the distribution) 
is zero and the fourth moment is the square of the second moment which is normalised to 1.
270
We maximise the ordinary probit log-likelihood function L to estimate p = P. Given 
these estimates, we can obtain the predicted value x/P. Finally we plug (x/P)2 and (x/3 )3 as 
two additional regressors into the probit equation as follows :
Y* = x'$ + y2(x/p)2 + y3(x/p)3 + u.
Hence, the final parameter vector contains (p, y2, y3). We estimate the log-likelihood 
Lx of the modified probit function to obtain the parameter estimates (p, y2, y3).
The final step is to construct a likelihood ratio statistic as follows:
LR = 2 (4  -  t )
where 4  is the value of the log-likelihood function of the modified probit while L is the 
value of the original probit log-likelihood function (when y’s are restricted to zero).
Under the null hypothesis Hq, LR follows a x2 distribution with 2 degrees of freedom 
where 2  is the number of restrictions (y2 = 0  and y3 = 0 ) on the likelihood function.
Following Pagan and Vella (1990), a similar likelihood ratio test for tobit models can 
be performed.
3.3. Heteroscedasticity
There may be different ways of testing heteroscedasticity in a limited dependent 
model (Davidson and Mackinon, 1984; Pagan and Vella, 1990; Greene, 1991). Following 
Greene (1991), we perform a likelihood ratio test of heteroscedasticity.
First we consider the probit model as before where the log-likelihood function is as
follows:
i 2= t e i = E  + (1 -  y) ln ( l -  4>(P'*,))]
i
Now suppose there is a multiplicative heteroscedasticity (Godfrey, 1978) term as
follows:
271
E(u) = 0 ; Vaiiu) = exp(y Z.) ; 
i = 1,2 ,....,n
Once we incorporate the heteroscedasticity term, the probit log-likelihood function will be 
modified to:
The null hypothesis is
Hq : y = 0  (homoscedasticity).
Under the null hypothesis the likelihood ratio (LR) statistic can be constructed as follows :
LR = 2(L3 -  4 )
which is distributed as a chi-square with k degrees of freedom where k is the number of 
variables in the vector z causing heteroscedasticity. 4  and L3 are the maximised values of 
the log-likelihood functions L2 and L3 respectively.
Similarly, we construct another likelihood ratio statistic to test for heteroscedasticity 
in a tobit model.
GLOSSARY
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1. ICRISAT Data
TYPE = 1 if the i-th labourer belongs to medium/large farms in the ICRISAT classification 
= 0 if the i-th labourer belongs to labour households/small farms in the ICRISAT 
classification;
PL = 1 if the i-th farm hires some regular labour (SPLHR > 0)
= 0  otherwise;
LNSPLHR = Natural logarithm of total regular labour-hours hired by the i-th farm.
TASK = 1 if the i-th farm hires labour to perform non-monitrorable tasks;
= 0  otherwise
LNCULT = Natural logarithm of the total area cultivated by i-th farm (VLS-Y1 schedule); 
LNIRR = Natural logarithm of the area irrigated (VLS-Y1 schedule);
LNFEQVAL = Natural logarithm of the total values of farm-equipments held by the i-th 
farm (VLS-F schedule)1;
LNPLOTVA = Natural logarithm of the mean value of the plots per acre belonging to the 
i-th farm (VLS-Y1 schedule);
LNSFLHR = Natural logarithm of the total number of family labour-hours used in 
cultivation (VLS-Y2 schedule);
OBUL = 1 if the i-th farm uses its own livestock in cultivation (VLS-Y2 schedule)
= 0  otherwise;
LNFDAY = Natural logarithm of the number of days worked by the i-th labourer on others’ 
farms in a year (VLS-K schedule);
FWNFW = 1 if the i-th labourer performs both farm and non-farm employment in a year 
(VLS-K schedule)
= 0  otherwise;
LNUNEMP = Natural logarithm of the monthly duration of unemployment;
LNAGE = Natural logarithm of age in years (VLS-C schedule);
LNSQAGE = Natural logarithm of square of age (VLS-C schedule);
ILLI = 1 if the i-th labourer is illiterate (VLS-C schedule)
= 0  otherwise;
CASTE4 = 1 if the i-th labourer belongs to caste group 4 
= 0 otherwise (VLS-C schedule).
AUREPALLE = 1 if the i-th farm comes from Aurepalle 
= 0  otherwise;
KANZARA = 1 if the i-th farm comes from Kanzara 
= 0  otherwise;
YEAR80 = 1 if the i-th observation is from year 1980 
= 0  otherwise;
YEAR81 = 1 if the i-th observation is from year 1981 
= 0  otherwise;
YEAR82 = 1 if the i-th observation is from year 1982 
= 0  otherwise;
YEAR83 = 1 if the i-th observation is from year 1983 
= 0  otherwise.
1A11 values are calculated at 1960-61 prices.
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2. Resurvey Data from Aurepalle
LNAGE = Natural logarithm of age of the ith labourer in years;
LNSQAGE = Natural logarithm of square of age;
ILLIORN = 1 if the i-th labourer is illiterate 
= 0  otherwise2;
LNFLHOLD = natural logarithm of family landholding of the ith labourer in acres; 
IRRORN = 1 if the family-land of the i-th labourer is irrigated 
= 0  otherwise;
MALAGA = 1 if the i-th labourer comes from Mala or Madiga household 
= 0  otherwise.
3. Unit o f Account
a. Land area in acres
1 hectare = 2.4 acres
b. Wage, income and other values in Indian Rupees (Rs.)
c. Age in Years
d. Employment/unemployment in days (unless otherwise stated).
2In our sample, most of the labourers are found to be illiterate. Hence, we did not consider the level of 
educational achievement of these labourers. We thus divide them in two categories only, literate and illiterate.
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